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KARL H. POTTER

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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION



INTRODUCTION: ACTIVISM IN INDIAN THOUGHT¹

P. T. Raju

The often expressed opinion that Indian thought has had no activism must be false. But is it false? We can easily see that it is. There is a wrong impression in the world, which is due to several reasons, that Indian philosophy means the Vedānta, and Vedānta means Saṃkara's Advaita; that the world is *māyā* for every Indian, who attaches no importance to the values of the world; that Indian philosophy preaches retreat from the world of action to the world of contemplation; that Indian thought is unrealistic and quietistic; and that the Indian therefore is made passive and inactive. For producing this impression, we in India are to a certain extent responsible. For instance, dozens of theses have appeared in the philosophy departments of Indian universities, but so far as my knowledge goes, not a single thesis has been produced on Indian activism. A thesis or two might have appeared on Indian ethics, not from the activist point of view, but as imperfect Vedāntic thought; so that activism as found in its purity has not been brought to the notice of scholars and thinkers. Our chief activist philosophy is the *Mīmāṃsā*; but there has been little research on this important school. Those who have taken interest in this school of thought are Sanskritists, orientalist and jurists: philosophers have taken only a passing notice of it. But the genius of Lokamanya Tilak recognized the importance of activism for the health and strength of our nation.

"But should we say that this school is not important? One reason may be advanced for saying that it is not important. If all philosophy is *mokṣa-śāstra* or the science of salvation, then

¹We reprint here P. T. Raju's Address originally delivered at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, on the 17th September 1958, and subsequently reprinted in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 39, pp. 186-225, and even more recently in *StudM*, pp. 131-165. Prof. Raju was a teacher of the General Editor of these Volumes. Thus, it is a special pleasure to present again this forceful and insightful article.

the Mīmāṃsā is not philosophy, because it was not originally meant to be a *mokṣa-sāstra* but a *dhārma-sāstra* or science of duty or right action. It was a philosophy of *karman* or action. Later Mīmāṃsā writers accepted the concept of *mokṣa* and made the Mīmāṃsā subservient to the Vedānta, thereby making it an incomplete and imperfect Vedānta and so an incomplete and imperfect philosophy. The Mīmāṃsā preaches *karman*; but the fashion of treating *karman* (action) as subservient to *bhakti* (devotion) and *jñāna* (knowledge, gnosis) has grown. Thus by interpreting the Mīmāṃsā as what it was not intended to be, it was represented as incomplete, imperfect and so unimportant; and thus the very spirit behind the philosophy was lost sight of. But most of the protagonists of this school did not accept this interpretation.

"Every philosophy, whether in India or outside, has claimed and is still claiming to have the final say on the matter and to possess the final truth; and it never has said and is saying that it is a handmaiden to another philosophy. The question is not whether the claim is justified or justifiable, but whether it is made or not. In India the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Vedānta have advanced the claim. If any of these schools interpreted the others as stepping-stones to itself, each of the others also interpreted the others as similar stepping-stones. If we accept any of these claims, it is due to our own inclinations and convictions, but not due to the protagonists of the schools. Further, there is another feature of Indian philosophical thought, namely, corresponding to each of the four values of life, *artha* (wealth), *kāma* (enjoyment), *dhārma* (duty), and *mokṣa* (salvation). We have four kinds of philosophies developed, called *arthaśāstra* (science of wealth), *kāmaśāstra* (science of enjoyment), *dhārmaśāstra* (science of duty), and *mokṣaśāstra* (science of salvation). Of these four, the first two are not as well systematized into theories as the last two. Of the last two again, the first is not as well developed as the next. The reason is that the Mīmāṃsā, which devoted itself to a study of right action, was more concerned with the Vedic ritual of sacrifice than the other; and ritual does not easily lend itself to theorizing. And yet there is a vast amount of theory in the Mīmāṃsā literature.

"We should note that each of these sciences or disciplines generally claims to be the ultimate philosophy and rejects the others. No one will question that the idea of salvation has developed the most elaborate systems of metaphysics; and

everyone will concede that the idea of duty, though associated with and even entangled in sacrificial ritual, has developed a philosophy. But whether the other two values, *artha* (wealth) and *kāma* (enjoyment), have philosophies at all may be doubted. It can be said that the former has a philosophy, namely, the Cārvāka. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Prasthānabheda* does not mention it. But Jayarāsi in his *Tattvopaplavasimha* says that his philosophy is the sunrise of *artha* (wealth), meaning thereby that it is the supporting philosophy for the acquisition of wealth by all means and without any limiting principles. I have not seen any such philosophical basis for *kāmaśāstra* (science of enjoyment). And I am not sure whether philosophical literature on *kāma-kalā* (should we translate the word as 'phases of desire' or 'power of desire', explaining 'desire' as the desire of the self to create?) can be made a philosophical basis for *kāmaśāstra*. However, just as there have been philosophies in the West to defend their scientific values and their concepts, mathematical values and their concepts, biological values and their concepts, ethical values and their concepts, psycho-analytic values and their concepts, spiritual values and their concepts etc., there were philosophies in India for defending each of the four values and its concepts, whether the philosophies were equally well developed or not. Each philosophy was concerned with a value of life and claimed to be the philosophy of whole life. It is wrong to think that they were always mere intellectual exercises in system-building and formulating of doctrines in order each to preserve its own individuality and to refute the others. The idea that is more and more appreciated now, namely, that philosophers do nothing but create artificial problems and solve them by showing that they are artificial and fictitious, certainly does not apply to our chief classical philosophers. And I doubt whether it applies even to the contemporary philosophers wholesale. It will be unfair to say that they create only artificial and fictitious problems one after another; they are interested in certain values taken by them to be unquestionable, and discover and face certain problems connected with them. The final difficulties in which each lands are not solved merely by showing that the problems are fictitious nonsense, but by showing that the values which the whole line of thought makes its basis is not the only values of life. Human life is wider and richer than any single value can cover.

"The value which the Mīmāṃsā wants to defend is an indispensable value of life. Treating it as an ultimate value, this school developed its own doctrines. And it is an integral part of Indian philosophy of life.

"How is it an integral part? All the orthodox schools accept the Veda as authoritative and claim to be based on it, whether they succeed in substantiating their claim or not. And whatever the opinion of the followers of Jainism and Buddhism, both the schools originated in the Vedic atmosphere, which constituted their matrix. We can safely say that the Vedas are the origin and basis of our Indian culture. For a non-partisan student, the Vedas have four parts: Samhitās, Brāhmanas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads. The Mīmāṃsā is based on the first two parts, and the Vedānta on the next two. Thus both the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta are equally important philosophies of life, and somehow were originally meant to constitute one philosophy. But if the Veda is one and has to give us one unitary philosophy of life, how can both the philosophies be true? Each philosophy claims that the other is subsidiary to itself, and the contrast between the two is sharp. The uncommitted student is perplexed. Attempts have been made to reconcile the conflict by saying that the Mīmāṃsā is meant for one of immature intelligence, and the Vedānta for one of mature intelligence. But this attempt is not satisfactory. First, the Mīmāṃsakas themselves do not accept it. Secondly, each school has a distinct metaphysics or theory of ultimates. And ultimates, when they conflict with each other, cannot be reconciled. In the third place, no metaphysics, whether monistic or pluralistic, can be for an immature intellect. One who can understand the intricacies of the Mīmāṃsā doctrines can understand the intricacies of the Vedānta doctrines also. If it is said that the two philosophies are meant for people with different values of life, we have said that any philosophy meant for defending any one value of life will remain incomplete as a philosophy of life, not able to explain and defend other values of life. In the fourth place, if both philosophies are true at different levels of man's maturity, then they are accepted with reference to man, whatever the level of maturity; and so the reality of man and his importance have to be accepted and asserted first and any philosophy that treats man as unreal cannot be true, for any philosophy given by a fictitious being can only be fictitious. Thus a new kind of humanism, unrecognized and unaccepted so far, has to be recognized as inherent in the philosophy of the

Veda. In the fifth place, there is a final difficulty. The Vedānta, for instance, is said to be true for the highest level of maturity. But how is this higher level to be recognized? If the level is recognized to be the highest level because it accepts the Vedānta, then we are arguing in a vicious circle: the Vedānta is true because it is accepted by the higher level, and the level is higher because it accepts the Vedānta. If it is said that the highest level is marked by *vairāgya* or disinterest in the values of the world, then this is what is questioned by the Mīmāṃsā; *vairāgya* is not a virtue but escapism, and life-long celibacy is not a virtue but a cover behind which one hides one's impotency. Then the only way open is to propound our philosophy independently of the consideration whether the reader's intellect is mature or immature. This both the schools claim to have done.

"Thus the problem remains where it was. How can the same Veda propound two systems of metaphysics? I have not come across a satisfactory solution of this difficult cultural and philosophical problem. I can offer only a tentative solution. Both systems of metaphysics refer to man, as we have seen. We may then bring man to the center of philosophy. We have to study him, his nature, and his relation to the environment both inwards and outwards. For man's conscious being is not exhausted by his outwardness or by his inwardness; it spreads both ways. This insight is not absent in our classical literature. The *Mahābhārata* says:

*guhyam brahma tadidam yo bravīmi
na mānuṣāt śreṣṭhataram hi kimcit*

(This, I tell you, is the secret Brahman: there is nothing greater than man.) However this stanza may be interpreted (we shall see how the Mīmāṃsakas would interpret it), at least for philosophical purposes, there is no better concept than that of man to be used as basic and central, as is shown by the reference made to him for reconciling the truths of both the Mīmāṃsaka and the Vedānta. Thus the inherent humanism of the Vedas has to be made explicit. This remains our task now, which is however beyond the purpose of the present address, which is to show that, if the truth of the Veda is to be accepted, then the truth of the Mīmāṃsā also has to be accepted, whatever be the difficulties involved. To dismiss the Mīmāṃsā as meant only for the immature intellect is only a cavalier solution of the problem, which is false to the very nature of our culture. The Mīmāṃsā, therefore, has to be accepted as an

integral part of Vedic philosophy and, therefore, of our culture. If not, we shall be unable to explain not only how the Veda is an integral whole, but also why and how our culture still survives. There is no life without action, and the Mīmāṃsā supplies the necessary activist element.

II

Now, two questions will naturally arise. First, how can we accept the Mīmāṃsā with all the ritualistic elements it contains? Secondly, is the Mīmāṃsā activism? We may take up the first question first. The Brāhmanas deal with sacrificial ritual and so the Mīmāṃsā doctrines are entangled in the ritual. But our faith in most of the ritual is slowly disappearing. The sacrifices are addressed to several gods like Indra and Agni; but we now think that these are really inorganic natural forces without mind, and these fictitious gods cannot help us in obtaining result. The Mīmāṃsā treats the Veda as sacrosanct and as not composed by anyone; but we think that not every statement of the Veda is significant, and some are unacceptable, and we cannot understand how any scripture can come into existence without being composed by someone. Similar objections were advanced by ancient rival schools also.

"But the acceptance of these objections should not deter us from making a serious study of the Mīmāṃsā. Similar objections can be brought not only against other Indian schools, but also against philosophies outside India. Every religion has its sacred scriptures, and every school has its basic texts. For the reason that we cannot accept the dogma of virgin birth, we do not reject the teachings of Christ. Even Plato indulged in mythology; but for that reason we do not discard the whole of Plato's philosophy. Judaism is not less ritualistic than the Brahmanical religion of the Mīmāṃsā; and yet we do not say that the ten commandments are valueless; on the contrary, we appreciate the high ethicalism of the Jews. We may discard the ritual; but we should appreciate the philosophy underlying the ritual. We have to treat the rituals as examples of ethical acts. All philosophies developed in circumstances when man had a particular outlook. But when he tried to theorize, he formulated doctrines of universal applicability. In his doctrines also, he may be mistaken. Subsequent generations have the right to sift the true from the false, purify the doctrines, and develop them. But what is true and important also should not be rejected. The Mīmāṃsā represents one important aspect of India's

philosophical thought, and that is activism.

III

Now, we may ask whether the Mīmāṃsā is really activism. *Ethical activism.* The Mīmāṃsā is not an activism of the Bergsonian type. The idea of evolution, as understood after Darwin, was foreign to the minds of the thinkers of the time. The Mīmāṃsakas say that the world had no beginning in time and will have no end; and so the question of the evolution of the world does not arise for them. Even to the other thinkers, evolution as only a speculative idea may be said to be present; but evolution as producing the *ātman* was not present, which, if at all, can be traced only to the Cārvākas. Again, the Mīmāṃsakas do not derive the categories of substance, quality etc. from that activity, as for instance, Bergson and the modern process philosophies would. Such derivation can be found among some Nairuktas. Yet, the Mīmāṃsā would regard the category of activity (*karman*) as primary for any explanation of the universe. Substance, quality etc. are accepted. The reality of a world independent of mind is accepted. It is independent of even activity; for all activity presupposes a pre-existent material on which it is imposed. But what is presupposed by this ethical activism is that the material world allows itself to be molded according to ethical law by action; and further, that without action the conditions of existence cannot be changed. Kant and later Huxley were worried about the indifference of nature to moral law. Nature works according to its own fixed laws; but morality works according to ideals, postulates the freedom of man to do or not to do what is required of him, and also assumes that this law of freedom in man and the laws of determinism in nature can somehow be reconciled. But we cannot understand how, and hence the worry of Kant and Huxley. But the Mīmāṃsakas do not feel the keenness of the conflict between freedom and determinism or morality and nature. They have for them the support of the Veda, the validity of which they do not doubt. If the Vedas say that ethical law governs the universe, they mean that the determinism of nature adjusts itself to the freedom of man. We moderns may not be confident of the conformity of freedom and determinism, and may call it the faith of the Mīmāṃsakas based on their trust in the Vedas. But we have to recognize that they have this faith and believe in the conformity.

"Thus the Mīmāṃsā activism is not evolutionism. It is ethical activism. The world processes conform to the moral and the immoral, prescribed and prohibited activities of man by producing corresponding results. The freedom of man to do the prescribed or prohibited action is accepted; but once the act is done, the causal relation between the act and the result is fixed, and there is no freedom here. The act guides the processes of the world, which has its own laws. The Mīmāṃsā is activism so far as it asserts that the processes of the world are guided by ethical action: the controller of the world is ethical action.

God not necessary. Jaimini and his early followers do not think that for controlling the processes of the world God is necessary. Action itself as prescribed by the Veda is enough. If God is the creator of man and the world, then he should be responsible for all the imperfections of his creatures. So an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God could not have created this world; or if there is a creator of the world, he cannot have these perfections. In fact, no creator is necessary, because the world is not created but is eternal. All that man wants is that the forms of his environment must be conducive to his happiness; and he can bring about the required forms through action. Therefore, instead of accepting a hypothetical entity like God, about whose existence we can never be sure, it is better to accept that *karman* (action) itself as prescribed by the Vedas controls the world processes. *Karman* can control the world process, because it produces results according to its own good and evil nature. Thus *karman* is made to occupy the place of God in the Mīmāṃsā. That is why we read

*yaṃ śaivāḥ samupāsate śiva iti brahmeti vedāntinah
bauddhāḥ buddha iti pramāṇasacivāḥ karteti naiyāyikāḥ
arhannityatha jainasāsanarātāḥ karmeti mīmāṃsakāḥ
so'yaṃ vat vidadhātu vāñchitaphalam trailokanātho hariḥ*

("May Hari, the Lord of the three worlds, confer the desired result; He who is worshiped by the Śaivas as Śiva, by the Vedāntins as the Brahman, by the Buddhists aided by logic as Buddha, by the Naiyāyikas as the agent of world-creation, by those who are versed in Jaina law as the Arhat, and by the Mīmāṃsakas as *karman*.")

"The Mīmāṃsakas do not accept God. But a unitary controller is necessary in order to see that the *karmans* of the different *ātman*s do not come into conflict. Hence there must be unitary *karman*, that is, *karman* must be one controlling the different processes of the world, obtaining stimulus at the same

time from the different *karmans* of the different *ātman*s. Then the different *karmans* must be different forms of the same unitary *karman*. This is practically implied in the philosophy of the Mīmāṃsā:

*atra jagatītalavartiniṅ ekaiva karmavyaktiḥ.
abhivyaktimātram tu bhidyate. athavā māstu vyaktibhedah.
śabdāntarādīpramāṇaiśca āgneyādijātaya eva bhidyante.¹*

(In the whole world there is only one individual *karman*; its manifestations are different. Let there be no different individuals, that is, individual *karmans*; the universal forms of *karman* like *āgneya* etc. are different, because of different Vedic statements'). Thus in the Mīmāṃsā the unitary *karman* is substituted for the unitary Divine Power.

"*Karman* (action) then becomes the Divine Principle. God (*īśvara*) is not accepted for two main reasons. First, the Vedas are not composed by anyone; they are eternal. They are not written symbols, but uttered words. Between the word and its meaning, the relation also is eternal. So, God is not necessary for composing the Vedas. Secondly, he is not necessary for creating the world. For the world is never created and will never be destroyed; it goes on forever. So no creator is necessary. There is a relation between the two arguments. If the world is eternal, then ethical law also must be eternal; if the former is uncreated, then the latter also must be uncreated. And as it is contained in the Vedas, then the Vedas also could not have come into being at any time by being composed by someone. These two doctrines are known to every student of the Mīmāṃsā. They are held by this school because it wants to give absolute primacy to ethical action, but not to a Being who is above ethical action and in whom ethical law has its source.

"*Injunctive sentences primary in the Vedas.* The primacy of ethical activity is supported by another doctrine for interpreting the Veda. According to the Mīmāṃsā, as it is to the other orthodox schools, the whole Veda is authoritative. But to the Vedāntins the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upanisads* are more important than the *Samhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas*, because the former deal with *mokṣa* (salvation), which, according to them, is the highest value (*puruṣārtha*). But to the Mīmāṃsakas *dharma* (duty, right

¹*Mīmāṃsākośa*, p. 1399, by Kevalananda Sarasvati (Prājñā Pāthasālā Maṇḍala, Wai, District N. Satara, 1954). Quoted from *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* of Khāṇḍadeva.

action) is more important than salvation; and so they regard the first two parts of the Veda as more important than the other two. In fact, they classify the Veda into two parts only, *mantra* (which is another name for *Samhitā*) and *Brāhmaṇa*. They would include the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads* in the *Brāhmaṇas*. The *mantras* are statements for recalling the things concerned at the time of performing an act. The *Brāhmaṇas* are statements enjoining action. All else is subsidiary to the *Brāhmaṇas*. Thus the primary sentences of the Veda are those enjoining action.

"But Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who is a Vedāntin, divides the Veda into three classes: *vidhi* (injunction), *arthavāda* (praise and blame), and what is different from both. The third comprises Vedāntic statements which are not injunctions. The reason for this division is that, if the *Upaniṣads* are treated as part of the *Brāhmaṇas*, and the *Brāhmaṇas* as enjoining action, then the importance of the *Upaniṣads*, which do not enjoin action, is lost. Then the importance of the Vedānta as preaching *mokṣa* (salvation) is also lost.

"To obtain salvation is not a duty (*dharma*). Though Madhusūdana Sarasvatī does not regard the *Upaniṣads* as enjoining action and as consisting of *vidhis* (injunctions), there are other Vedāntins who regard them as injunctions. The author of *Prakāṭārtha* held the view that the statement 'the *ātman* has to be realized' is a *vidhi* (injunction) or duty. But Vācaspati [Miśra] maintains that it is no *vidhi* at all.

"The author of the *Arthasaṃgraha* divides the Veda into five kinds: *vidhi* (injunction), *mantra* (hymn), *nāmadheya* (names of sacrifices), *niśedha* (prohibition), and *arthavāda* (commendatory and condemnatory passages). Of the five, again, *vidhi* is primary. Thus this division also does not give a separate place for passages on salvation.

"In fact, it is the *Mīmāṃsā* tradition that only the injunctive passages of the Veda are primary, and the rest are subsidiary to them. Kumārila, who is the most popular exponent of the *Mīmāṃsā*, says:

*tasmād vedapramānārtham ātmā atra pratipādyate
vadyapi prakṛtam vākyaṃ vyākhyāyetārthavādātāḥ*

(Hence for establishing the authority of the Veda *ātman* is here propounded. But the present sentence has to be explained as commendatory'.) The sentence here referred to says that the *ātman* is not the agent but is beyond all activity. The doctrine of the *ātman* as propounded by the Veda is meant only for

action (*kratvartha*); knowledge of the *ātman* is useful for action producing other-worldly fruit; and the other-worldly fruit can be enjoyed only if the *ātman* is eternal and can have other-worldly life. And when man realizes that there is such an *ātman*, he will perform actions producing other-worldly fruit.

*ātmā jñātavya ityeta mokṣārtham na ca coditam
karmapravṛttihetutvam ātmajñānasya lakṣyate*

(The exhortation 'ātman has to be known' is not given for the sake of *mokṣa*; knowledge of the *ātman* is meant for induction into action'.)

"Thus for both Prabhākara and Kumārila, the foremost exponents of the *Mīmāṃsā*, the *ātman* is in truth both the agent of actions and the enjoyer of their fruits.

"Action becomes the property of the *ātman*. Not only is the *ātman* the agent of action, but also action once performed becomes its property and gets imputed to it. For instance, we say that a person's conduct is the outcome of his character, and also that the character is his attribute. But we think also that the performance of a particular kind of action produces a particular attitude, which later on becomes a sort of attribute, and so a factor in the character of the person. This means not only that character determines conduct but also that conduct determines character. As we shall see presently, the term 'attribute' has to be understood with a difference in the context of the *Mīmāṃsā*; for character, the *Mīmāṃsā* would say, is an attribute of the will, and is not an inactive quality like the color of an object, but a force that determines activity.

"The occasion for the problem was the difficulty realized by the *Mīmāṃsakas* that a sacrifice performed for obtaining heaven did not produce the result immediately but after death. In such cases, the continuity between cause (sacrifice) and effect (heaven) is lost. But there can be no causation without the continuity of cause and effect. Kumārila, therefore, says that the act performed by the agent assumes the form of *apūrva* and resides in the *ātman*. It cannot reside in the deity to whom the sacrifice is addressed, because it has to produce the result for the agent, not for the deity. It cannot reside in the sacrifice, because it is finished and is over. Therefore, it must reside in the *ātman* of the agent, which is to enjoy the fruit. If the action is good, the *apūrva* will be favorable; if bad, it will be unfavorable.

"On this point there seems to be a minor difference between Kumārila and Prabhākara. The latter maintains that

the Vedic injunction commands one to produce *apūrva* itself by performing a certain action, and the injunction to perform the action is not the primary one. But Kumārila maintains that the main injunction is about the action, which in its turn produces *apūrva*. The reason for Prabhākara's view seems to be that the Vedas tell us what cannot be known otherwise, and the reality of *apūrva* cannot be known otherwise than through the Vedas; but when once *apūrva* is accepted, the injunction to perform a particular act tells us only what is partly unknown, because we do not know which act produces which *apūrva*. The reason for Kumārila's view seems to be that the Vedas ordain actions because they produce some good results. However, this difference seems to us to be of scholastic interest; for both accept *apūrva* though Prabhākara's view seems to be more conservative and orthodox. In fact, Śābara, whom both interpret, tells us that *apūrva* is the potential form of the power of action, which will after some time produce the result. It may first be in the action itself; but when the action is once finished, it has to pass on to the agent. This seems to be in Kumārila's mind. But when it passes on to the agent it becomes his property. We may, therefore, agree at least for our present purpose, that what both Kumārila and Prabhākara say comes to the same thing.

"The view that finally the act accrues to the agent and becomes his property is similar to, but not the same as, the view that positive law has its source in the individuals constituting society and is really their attribute. It is said that the criminal is punished because the crime has become his attribute and he is called a criminal because of the attribute. It is not an attribute like the color of a rose, but an imputed attribute or an ethical attribute. It is a new tendency or force of his will.

"In the case of the Mīmāṃsā, as there is no one above the *ātman* to punish or reward it, the spiritual world of the Mīmāṃsā is a sort of self-constituted democracy of the *ātman*s, each performing certain actions and readily accepting the rewards and punishments resulting from them—the act by accruing to the *ātman* entitles it to its own rewards and punishments. Hegel and the Hegelians say that the criminal's freedom is violated if he is not punished; and their view is apparently strange. But as a free individual of a particular society, the criminal has freely chosen its laws; and so it is his freedom that necessitates the punishment. Similarly, the Mīmāṃsā *ātman* freely chooses the results of its own actions;

and the action necessarily produces the fruit for the enjoyment of the *ātman*; and this does not violate the freedom of the *ātman*, which voluntarily invites the fruit of its actions.

The Right and the Good. The conflict between the Right and the Good, which we come across in Western ethics, is found in the Mīmāṃsā also. In Western ethics the conflict can be traced to the Jewish and the Greek conceptions of 'what ought to be done' by men. The Jews believed implicitly in the commands given by God through Moses, and never allowed any to raise questions about their validity. They maintained that the commands were good because they were given by God, but not that God gave the commandments because they were good. The Greek mind would not accept such an idea, and always asked for reasons. It would rather say that any commandment, including even that of God, was right, because it was good.

"A similar controversy is found between Kumārila and Prabhākara, the former maintaining the doctrine of the Good and the latter that of the Right. Indeed, both of them believed in the injunctions of the Veda as implicitly as the Jews in the commandments of God: To that extent both were followers of the Right. Both accept that, of the sentences of the Veda, those which are injunctive are primary. But in answering the question: Is the injunction a command to act or is it a command to produce *apūrva*?, they differ. Prabhākara says that the definition of *dharma* given by Jaimini has to be interpreted as enjoining the production of a result (*kārya*), not as enjoining a particular act (*kriyā*). But Kumārila says that the injunction is of the act (*kriyā*). Kumārila is, therefore, called *kriyāvādī* and Prabhākara *kāryāvādī*. So far, Kumārila may be taken to be on the side of the Right and Prabhākara to be on the side of the Good. But Kumārila introduces another idea, namely, the purpose of action. The injunction is indeed for action; but the action is right not merely because it is due to a command of the Veda, but also because it is directed towards the production of the Good (*prayojanavat*). That is why his followers later defined *dharma* as

vedapratipādyah prayojanavadartho dharmah.

(*Dharma* is that object which is beneficial and which is propounded by the Veda.) This definition omits the word 'injunction' (*codanā*) and the reference to action, and retains reference only to the Good and the Veda. For it is emphasized by the followers of Kumārila that no one acts without a purpose:

prayojanamanuddisya mando'pi na pravartate.
 ('Without a purpose even the stupid does not act.') But Prabhākara and his followers remain consistently conservative in demanding implicit obedience to the injunctions of the Veda without asking questions about purpose, and finally come out as the advocates of the Right. The result (*kārya*), which is *apūrva*, has to be procured; but we are not to ask whether the *apūrva*, which the Veda asks us to produce, will bring about favorable or unfavorable fruit.

"Now, in ordinary language, an action is right with reference to the purpose, and the purpose, which is the result attained by the action, is the good. An action is called good also, but with reference to the good aimed at; and it is called evil with reference to the evil aimed at. By itself, it is neither good nor right. But Kumārila's contention is that, if it is performed in obedience to the Vedic commands, it becomes right. By introducing purpose he turns the right into the good. From man's point of view the act is good, not because it produces something beneficial to man, since man does not know how the act produces the fruit and he is completely ignorant how it produces the other-worldly fruit, but because it is a Vedic injunction. In such cases, we call the act right; but not good. Just as Kant said that the rational will is itself the good, Prabhākara would say that the Vedic injunction itself is the good. Obviously Prabhākara is concerned with the Right, and Kumārila with the Good also, not merely with the Right, in the precise sense of these terms. We can appreciate Prabhākara's position. Ultimately, all the Vedic injunctions command man to accumulate *dharma* or *apūrva*. But the injunction cannot be of the form 'Produce *apūrva*', as man does not know how to produce it, but of the form, 'Act in such and such a way'. The direct meaning of the injunction is therefore action (*kriyā*), not the result or purpose of action. But according to Prabhākara, the intention of the Vedic command ultimately is that 'man ought to aim at *dharma*, which he does not understand, which is known only to the Veda, and which is the result (*kārya*) of the act'. Man of course can understand the act. But Kumārila would say that, if man wanted the result, he should perform the act; while Prabhākara would say that man ought to want the result and so should perform the act. In this controversy much scholastics is indulged in, so that many of us may miss the philosophical importance. But we see that Prabhākara's position is more in line with the doctrine of the

Right, fixing even the purpose of action for us, and that it is pressing the activism of the Mīmāṃsā into service of the Right.

However, both Kumārila and Prabhākara are more or less on the side of the Right.

"*Activist interpretation of meaning.* Consistently with the activist interpretation of duty, Prabhākara propounds an activist interpretation of meaning also. According to him, the child first learns the meaning of the word 'cow', not by looking at the object when the word is uttered, but by associating the word with action as in 'Bring the cow' or 'Milk the cow'. If the doctrine that the injunctive sentences and their meanings are primary in the Veda is accepted, then the doctrine that in ordinary speech also the meanings of the words are first learnt when associated with verbs enjoining action is considered to be necessary corollary. Kumārila and the Vedāntins do not accept this view. They say that when an elder points to the object cow and tells the child 'This is a cow', the child learns the meaning of the word.

"One may think that the difference between the two views seems to be too scholastic and academic to be important. But as Russell says often, very important theories are based on what may appear to be simple truisms and unimportant distinctions. Dewey says that the test of any philosophy is its theory of education. Taking these two views with reference to the theory of child education, we may say that Prabhākara would support the theory that teaching should be done through action and practice, and the others that it should be done through imparting knowledge. If life is activity and is meant for activity (*karman*), then the importance of an activist theory of knowledge cannot be over-estimated. In the context of educational theory, then, we see the importance of the difference. Our present aim is not to be partisans in the controversy but only to show that the Mīmāṃsā contains well-pronounced activism.

"The doctrine of Prabhākara is called *anvitābhidhānavāda* or that a sentence consists of words meaningfully connected with a word, and the doctrine of Kumārila is called *abhihitānvayavāda* or that a sentence is a meaningful connection of uttered words with independently obtained meanings. The difference is that, according to Prabhākara, the noun must have already been connected with a verb before it is uttered in order to form a meaningful sentence, and that,

according to Kumārila, the noun and verb are uttered with separate meanings and then connected to form a sentence.

"Nouns derived from verbs. Another important doctrine connected with the above is that all nouns are derived from verbs. Yāska says that according to Śākatāyana and the Nairuktas all nouns without exception are derived from verbs. But one Nairukta by name Gārgya and some grammarians do not accept this view, but say that some nouns are not derived from verbs. Yāska, being the author of *Nirukta*, accepts the former view and answers the objections of the latter.

"The Nairukta view is interesting, being an extreme form of activism and process philosophy. *Nirukta* is the earliest lexicon, which is at the same time the first work on semantics. Durgācārya, the commentator on *Nirukta*, says that grammar deals with the nature of the words, but *Nirukta* deals with the relation between words and meanings and is therefore more important. Unlike the *Mīmāṃsā*, it is not a treatise on *dharma* but on the meanings of the word used in the Veda; and so it treats the *mantra* (*samhita*) as the primary part of the Veda. Yet, the Nairuktas also, as belonging to the Brahmanical religion, regard action as primary, and maintain that activity is the essential truth of the world and every other aspect is a form which activity assumes. This idea is like Bergson's. Then, if language is to give a true picture of the world, it has not only to treat the verb as primary, but also has to treat all nouns as derivations of verbs. In every sentence, the noun and the verb are primary, and the rest secondary; of these two again, the verb is primary and the action secondary. In the meaning of a sentence, nouns, adjectives, prepositions etc. appear as modifications of the verb. In other words, the phenomenal world is adverbial.

"In this connection, Durgācārya expounds an extremely interesting doctrine, which he calls the secret of the Brāhmaṇas. The truth of the world is Becoming, Activity (*bhāva*). It has two aspects, the causal aspect (*kāraṇarūpa*) and the effect aspect (*kāryarūpa*). The causal aspect is pure Becoming; it is the same as the *ātman*. It exists as pure Becoming (*bhavamātra*) during the dissolution of the world when all the manifold of forms disappears. We might note that this is opposed to the Vedāntic view, according to which the *ātman* in its essence is pure Being or Existence (*sat, sattā*), not Becoming (*bhāva, bhavana*). Substance, quality, the various mundane forms of activity (*karman*), etc. which are expressed in language as nouns,

adjectives, verbs etc. are only transformations (*vikāra*) of the original Becoming. It is wrong to say that this original Becoming is the *prakṛti* or *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya. It is not even the atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas, which are only forms of Becoming; it is also not the *śūnya* of the Buddhists. The pure Becoming as the *ātman* is eternal.

"The form of the effect aspect of Becoming, as explained by Vārsagani and accepted by Yāska and Durgācārya, are six: birth, existence (being), modification, growth, decline (decay) and death (destruction). These six states are given for convenience; there are many others, but they are further transformations of these six states of Becoming. What we have to note here is that existence (*sat, sattā*) is only a form, a modification of Becoming. It is not pure existence that becomes something, but that Becoming passes through existence as one of its states or transformations. Names or nouns stand for existence; verbs stand for Becoming. And because Becoming is the original truth of the world and is its essence, verbs are the primary parts of the sentence in which both nouns and verbs occur. Thus even existence is a form of Becoming, act; it is an act that is directed towards the subject itself, and the verb is called intransitive.

"We can see that this philosophy comes into direct conflict with Saṃkara's Advaita. According to it,

asti bhāti priyaṃ rūpaṃ nāma cetyaṃśapañcakam

ādyam trayam brahmarūpaṃ jagadrūpaṃ tato dvayam

(Every known object has five aspects: existence, known-ness, affective aspect or *priyam*, form and name; of these the first three are forms of Brahman, the other two belong to the mundane world.) But according to the Nairyuktas, activity, which is the essential form of Becoming and which is expressed by the verb in sentences, will be in the form of Brahman, and the others will belong to the mundane world.

Thus this is an important activistic philosophy of India. If the world is *samsāra* or an eternal flow of forms, then it can be explained only if its origin also is a pure process. The *Mīmāṃsakas* do not seem to have adopted this philosophy wholesale. But we can see that the *Mīmāṃsā* is closer to this thorough-going activism than any other orthodox school. Prabhākara's doctrine that the child cannot understand the meaning of a noun unless it has already been associated with action seems to be influenced by the Nairuktas. Again, though the Nairuktas treat the *mantra* as the primary part of the Veda,

Durgācārya says that this activism is the essential teaching of the Brāhmaṇas, which are treated as the primary part of the Veda by the Mīmāṃsā. So for both, true philosophy is that of the Brāhmaṇas, which lay primary emphasis on activity and *dharma*. Though *ātman* is pure activity (Becoming), the latter also treat activity in the form of *dharma* as the controller of the universe. It is difficult to find a more thorough-going activism than that of the Nairuktas, who wanted to turn it into a systematic semantics of activism. But unfortunately, this school has not produced much independent literature, entering into controversy with the others schools like the Mīmāṃsā; and so it has not been well known. The difference between the Mīmāṃsā and *Nirukta* comes to this: If we define will as self in action, then the Nairuktas will say that the self possesses will. In any case, the Nairukta philosophy goes on to show that the first two parts of the Veda are essentially activist.

"*Outlook of the early Aryans.* The activism of the Mīmāṃsā, which is based on the earliest parts of the Veda, shows that the outlook of the early Aryans was one of eternal hope, eternal activity and self-reliance. Man considered himself to be the only master of his destiny. He did not rely upon a Supreme Being for his future, but on himself alone. He thought only of building up his *apūrva* or *adr̥ṣṭa*, which is mistakenly translated as 'Fate', because it is the result of his own actions. He felt that without action there was no life, no future, no knowledge even. And he was not tired of action, and did not think of retreating from action. Life and the world were an eternal process. Man was to build up his *apūrva*, and after enjoying and exhausting it, he was to build it up again and again enjoy it. The Mīmāṃsā was opposed to *samnyāsa* (renunciation) and even to a life-long celibacy (*brahmācarya*). Such was the origin of the doctrine of *karman*, which, ironically enough, later became the doctrine of Fate and resignation, and led to the doctrine of freedom from action and *samsāra*.

"*Exalted humanism.* We have referred to the view of the *Mahābhārata* that the secret of the Brahman is that there is nothing greater than man. This statement for the Mīmāṃsā does not mean merely that man is the highest of all creatures, but literally that there is nothing higher than man either in this world or the next. We referred above to the stanza

aḥamdhīyā ātmanah siddheḥ tasyaiva brahmabhāvataḥ etc., that is, the *ātman* is the same as the 'I' and that is the same as the Brahman. That the *ātman* and Brahman are the same is

accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas also, but only for exalting man and not to make him an insignificant creature. Yet the 'I' is not the same as the body or the senses or the mind. The Mīmāṃsakas refer to Manu also, who says that the *ātman* is all the deities (*devatā*), the lord of everything, pervades everything, and like a wheel turns through birth, growth and decay. Yet this circle of *samsāra* is not an object of fear and misery, but something to be enjoyed through ethical action. For

*parāñci khāni vyatṛnat svayambhūh
tasmāt parāñ paśyati nāntarātman
kaścit dhiraḥ pratyagātmānamaikṣāt
āvṛtya cakṣuramṛtatvam icchan.*

('Prajāpati created the senses as outward-looking; so man perceives the outward objects. But some great man, desiring immortality, sees the inward *ātman* by turning back the eye.') This stanza of the *Kātha Upaniṣad* is interpreted by the Mīmāṃsaka as exalting man, not as merely exhorting him to realize the *ātman* within. If man consists of the senses and the *ātman* alone, it is as necessary to realize the *ātman* as it is to use the senses; but one who realizes the *ātman* should never give up using the senses. The difference between man and inorganic matter is that the latter has no senses, and cannot know the *ātman*; but man can. So in order to be a full man, one has not only to use the senses properly, but also realize the *ātman*.

"This exalted conception of man is often more prominent in the Prābhākara branch of Mīmāṃsā than in the Kumārila branch. If man is really the *brahman* working through the senses, then no cognition of his can be mistaken. That is why there is no false awareness or error according to Prābhākara. For him what we call illusory awareness is absence of awareness. It is *agraha* or *akhyāti*, that is, absence of cognition. If there were cognition, it could not have been mistaken; for how can any cognition of Brahman be mistaken? And has not it been declared, therefore, that all cognitions are true (*svataḥprāmānya*)? So when a rope is said to be mistaken for a snake, there is non-cognition of the difference between the rope and the snake.

"Man is the Brahman acting—not in the dramatic sense—in this world. Hence, if man does not use the senses, he will not be different from insentient matter. Thus the stanza quoted from the *Kātha Upaniṣad* is given a new turn in meaning: it is made to condemn a person who does not use the senses, mind and

reason (*buddhi*), but is content only with the realization of the *ātman* or Brahman. Man is really a combination of the *ātman*, reason, minds, sense and the organs of action. He is, therefore, more than the *ātman* alone. He is more than any of the other creatures including the deities, which do not possess one or more of these factors. That is why the *Mahābhārata* says that there is nothing greater than man. But this greatness has conferred on him the power also to misuse his greatness. Hence he has to be told what is *dharma* and what is *adharma*, the distinction between right and wrong. The Veda, the *Mīmāṃsā*, and the *dharmaśāstras* (ethical codes) teach us *dharma*, and *dharma* is right action. They are more important than any other system of philosophy. And man is great because he alone can perform *dharma*.

"Deities inferior to man. The deities cannot perform *dharma*, because they have no body. Śabara says that man alone can perform sacrifices, not even the sages and the deities. The reasons given appear scholastic; the deities cannot perform sacrifices, because the sages cannot have *gotras* (names of founders of families) as they are themselves such founders. However, leaving out the sages, who might have performed sacrifices during their own time, we can appreciate why deities cannot perform sacrifices.

"But there is a subtle reason for giving a lower place to deities than to man, though man is asked to address the sacrifices to deities. As some scholars think, the idea of deities might have originated out of some kind of animism or religion of nature, and within that religion itself the deities as spirits might have been distinguished from their bodies, which were the natural material forms. But still later, when ethical law residing in the soul of man was conceived to be the controller of the universe, and therefore *karman* was considered to be that controller, the deities were made subservient to *karman* and its law. But if the law and the *karman* reside in the *ātman*, then the deities become less important than the *karman* performed.

"We have already referred to a difficulty which the *Mīmāṃsakas* felt, namely, the *apūrva* which results from *karman* cannot reside in the deity to whom the sacrifice is addressed, but only in the *ātman* of the agent. It cannot reside in the objects used in sacrifice, because they are material objects and many of them are destroyed during and after the sacrifices. It cannot exist in the deity, because many people may address many sacrifices to the same deity, and it will be difficult

to apportion the results to different agents. Besides, some of the results are produced in the next cycle, but the life of the deities is limited to one cycle. Again, it is not the deity which enjoys the fruit of action, but the agent of action. So the potential form of an act must reside in the *ātman* of the agent himself, and it is eternal.

"Thus, in any sacrifice the act of sacrifice is primary and the duty, like the objects used in sacrifice, is secondary (*gauna*). Further, in the controversy whether the deities have shape (*vigraha*) as we find in idols, some of the *Mīmāṃsakas* maintain that they do not have even shape. They say

*śabdātmakā eva devatā śabdabodhyā vā
manahkalpitarūpā vā devatāḥ svikāryāḥ*

(The deities are of the nature of words only; they have to be accepted as cognized through words or as created or projected by our mind.). This is an important advance made by the *Mīmāṃsā* from the religion of deities (polytheism) controlling natural forces. It is still accepted that the sacrifices have to be addressed to the deities, and that as such they are important. But they have now become mere names and mental creations of the sacrificer, and their independent reality is practically annulled. Has not Manu declared that the *ātman* itself is in all the deities? Ethical activity has become supreme, and the agent of activity has become more important than gods. The sacrifice and therefore action has to be performed in order to produce *apūrva*, a kind of new transcendent will that accrues to the *ātman* of the agent and produces the results automatically. If the result is obtained from the act itself, why should one beg the gods for it? The deities can at the most prevent obstacles to the successful completion of the act. Thus the religion of animatism and animism, in which man begged gods for favors, is turned into a religion of ethical activism and self-reliance by the *Mīmāṃsā*. Man and his ethical activity are primary; the universe has to be explained in their terms and is controlled by them. The deities are not merely inferior to man; they have become the creations of his mind.

"Heaven only a state of happiness or pleasant existence. If the deities are only mental creations and names, then the so-called heaven is the name of a state of happiness, which is the result of action. The popular notions of heaven as ruled by Indra and inhabited by beautiful damsels etc. does not belong to the philosophical *Mīmāṃsā*. It is a state in which the *ātman* experiences only happiness (*sukha*) without any admixture of

misery (*duḥkha*). It is the result of *karman* (action). As it is produced by *apūrva*, and as everything that is produced has an end, heaven also has an end. After experiencing heaven, man has to come back to the earth, and has again to accumulate *apūrva* through fresh action in order to enjoy heaven again. This is the ideal of life according to the Mīmāṃsā, an ideal of eternal activity.

"*Mokṣa* or salvation. Though Jaimini was not concerned with *mokṣa* or liberation from the world of action, Kumārila and Prabhākara accept its possibility. Both recommend it to those who are wearied of active life and have lost attachment to the values of the world. But its nature is neither pleasure nor pain, but the absence of both. It is not of the nature of pleasure (*sukha*) for

*sukhopabhogarūpaśca yadi mokṣaḥ prakalpyate
svarga eva bhavedeṣa paryāyena kṣayī bhavet.*

('If *mokṣa* is of the form of enjoyment of pleasure, then it is the same as *svarga* or heaven, and so comes to an end.') But *mokṣa* is said to be eternal and so cannot be the same as pleasure. *Mokṣa* is, therefore, negative in form and nature. It is yet one of the values of life (*puruṣārtha*). For though it is a negative state, people strive for it, as this world contains great misery also like birth, disease, death, and fruits of evil actions.

"At this point Prabhākara supports the view of the Vedāntins that I-ness and mine-ness (*ahaṅkāra* and *mamakāra*) do not belong to the *ātman* but are superimposed on it; but he adds that the distinction is not meant for those who are engaged in active life (*karmasaṅgins*). Unlike some of the other Mīmāṃsakas, he does not accept that the *ātman* is the same as the 'I'. If it is asked why did not Śabara elaborate this difference, he says that Dvaipāyana advised him not to distinguish between the *ātman* and the 'I' for the sake of those in active life; Śabara himself was aware of the distinction.

"Then how is man to obtain *mokṣa*? He is to accumulate neither *dharma* nor *adharma* and should end or cut off both. This is possible only when the fruits of both are exhausted. Then man should not perform prohibited actions and actions with self-interest (*niśiddha* and *kāmya karmans*), but only the prescribed daily (compulsory) (*nitya*) and occasional (*naimittika*) duties (*karman*). The fruit of these prescribed duties does not accrue to him, for no reward can go to a person who refuses to receive it.

"Thus the philosophy of the Mīmāṃsaka, which at first laid

all the emphasis on action or *dharma*, gradually gave place to *mokṣa* (salvation) and developed the doctrine of what is called *karmayoga* or *niskāmakarmayoga* in the *Bhagavadgītā*. It may be that the growing popularity of the idea of *mokṣa* obliged the later Mīmāṃsakas to give a place to it in their philosophy; or it may be that the distinction originally drawn between *kratvartha* (for sacrifice) and *puruṣārtha* (for man) actions in the Mīmāṃsā gradually took the form of the distinction between *niskāmakarman* and *kāmyakarman* (action without desire for fruit and action with that desire) for *puruṣārtha* can be interpreted as *kāmyakarman*, even though *mokṣa* is called *puruṣārtha*, for even *mokṣa* can be an object of desire. Even in the *Bhagavadgītā* we read

yajñārthāt karano'nyaiva loko'yaṁ karmabandhanah

('Man is bound by all actions except those meant for sacrifice.') The Mīmāṃsā writers often refer to the *Bhagavadgītā*, which is earlier than Kumārila and Prabhākara. But the *Gītā* ideal itself might have originated in the original Mīmāṃsā distinction. There was a time when the Mīmāṃsā was called atheistic (*nāstika*), by which was meant that it was unspiritual. Kumārila says in the beginning of his work:

*prāyenaiva hi mīmāṃsā loke lokāyatikrtā
tasmāt āstikapade kartum ayam yatnah krto mayā.*

('The Mīmāṃsā has already been rendered unspiritual in the world; and to bring it into the path of the spiritual this attempt is being made by me.') And all that he does is: establishing the reality of the *ātman* or spirit as against the Buddhists, and accepting *mokṣa* as one of the values of life. This is done by Prabhākara also. Though *dharma* is still stressed and action is still commended, we can see a little weakening of the stress on action in the admission of *mokṣa*. Yet God and his grace have not assumed importance as, for instance, in the work of Laugākṣi Bhāskara, who ends his work by referring to God and exhorting man to offer himself and his actions to God alone. Man, for Kumārila and Prabhākara, is still the agent of his actions, whether he desires *mokṣa* or *svarga* (salvation or heaven), and has to rely on himself alone.

"*Dharma* in the Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism. The difference between the Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist conceptions of *dharma* is not only of historical but also of philosophical interest and importance. Their conceptions are at the opposite poles of each other, and so the significance of each can be grasped by contrast with the other. The Mīmāṃsā conception is activistic

and the Buddhist quietistic. Kumārila says that *dharma* is *karman* itself; for Prabhākara, it is *kārya*: in either case *dharma* is directly connected with *karman* (action). But the Buddhists finally answered that it is *nirvāna* (unagitated), *sūnya* (void), *viññāna* (pure consciousness) and *anirvacanīya* (inexplicable). The Mīmāṃsakas wanted to explain Vedic Dharma, which they called Ārya Dharma. The Buddhist also wanted to explain Ārya Dharma, though they did not like Vedic Dharma. Both claimed to be expounders of Ārya Dharma, and both had to explain, therefore, *dharma*.

"In between the Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism comes the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which also claims to explain *dharma*. But what the Vaiśeṣika system meant by *dharma* is different. It is merit. This is obtained by listening and cogitating over the Vaiśeṣika categories, and this listening and cogitating is an injunction of the Veda, which is composed by God (*īśvara*). In this system we have God, who indirectly through the Veda gives the command to listen and think over the categories. Thus listening etc. constitute *dharma*, not by themselves, but by producing *dharma* (merit). Thus what produces *dharma* is also called *dharma*.

"The very first aphorism of Kanāda, like that of Jaimini, proposes to explain *dharma*. But this is not merely *pravṛtti* (action) as in Jaimini, but also *nivṛtti* (withdrawal from action). Further, the Mīmāṃsā would not regard the attainment of *mokṣa* as an injunction at all; but the Vaiśeṣika would. It is also interesting to note that Praśastapāda, the commentator on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, calls his commentary *Padārthadharmasamgraha* and Aniruddha, the Buddhist, calls his work *Abhidharmārthasamgraha*; Vasubandhu calls his work *Abhidharmakośa* and there is the major Buddhist work, *Abhidharmapiṭaka*. All these show that by this time the word '*dharma*' was used not only in the Mīmāṃsaka sense but also in the sense of *nivṛtti* and that of everything that was knowable and thinkable. Already the word has acquired the meaning of category. But the word is not so extensively used in the new meaning by the Vaiśeṣikas as by the Buddhists.

"Most of us know Yamakami Sogen's observation that the word '*dharma*' in Buddhism is a blank check which can be filled by everyone as he likes. It means thing, quality, activity, ethics, religion, law, norm and Ultimate Reality. It also means categories or what the Naiyāyikas called *padārthas* (meanings of words). In no other philosophy is the word more extensively

used in order to mean everything in the world than in Buddhism. It is difficult to say what exactly was the reason for it. We may make a guess.

"Radhakrishnan says: 'In the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā the emphasis is on the ethical side. The ultimate reality of the world is looked upon as the constant principle of *karman*. God is righteousness or *dharma*.' Regarding Buddhism also he says: 'Early Buddhism had an implicit trust in an eternal right that dwells in the constitution of things. The structure of the universe is ethical. It is *dharmabhūta*.' One may conclude from these statements that the Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism offer the same philosophy of life. But as one can easily see, they are poles apart. Then why do they claim to be philosophies of *dharma*? We should imagine that by the time Buddhism became philosophical or even by the time of the Buddha, the word *dharma* as a philosophical and religious term was on the lips of every Indian. The followers of the Brahmanic religion were contending that *dharma* meant *karman*, and without *karman* nothing could be achieved. But we have noticed that the word '*dharma*' means for the Vaiśeṣikas not only *pravṛtti* or action but also *nivṛtti* or withdrawal from action. Nay, they go even further and say that what are called *padārthas* are themselves *dharmas*. Naturally the Buddhists take up the thread, and ask themselves what should be the ultimate nature of *dharma*, if substance, attribute, nature (*svabhāva*), form, action, law are all called *dharma*. Their answer is that it is transcendental and not something to be produced, but only to be realized as eternally existent, whereas the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that it is something to be done or achieved. Thus we get the peculiar significance of the Mīmāṃsaka conception when it is contrasted particularly with the Buddhist. For the former the true nature of *dharmas* is action; but for the latter it is an unagitated and indescribable state. The Vedānta accepted the Buddhist interpretation and apparently remained at the opposite pole of the Mīmāṃsā."

IV

"So far I have presented what is known to many, but for several reasons what has been ignored and neglected, namely that Indian thought does not lack the necessary element of activism, without which our culture could not have survived. But this activism is on the whole ethical activism, not a pure process philosophy, which can be found in the minor philosophy of the Naiyāyikas. Right action is the controller of the

universe; it is not the universe. Ethical activity postulates an objective field that is independent of man and his mind: this realism is present in the Mīmāṃsā. Ethics postulates freedom and autonomy of man, who is not to be a puppet dragged on to the stage and out of it by wires pulled by an invisible hand; it requires the conformity of a deterministic world to free action; and it requires man's responsibility for everything he does. All these requirements are met by the Mīmāṃsā.

"And on the whole, the Mīmāṃsā is a philosophy of the Right rather than of the Good. Ethical law is not an inductive generalization on the basis of the Good, but a command of the Veda implicitly to be obeyed. In a sense, we may say, it is *a priori*, because it is not *a posteriori*. The Mīmāṃsā, unlike Kant, does not attribute the source to the human will, but to the Veda; yet we may call it *a priori*, because the Good is to conform to it, but not *vice versa*. In this respect it is akin to the Jewish conception which treats the law as a command of God. Yet it is not theological, because the Mīmāṃsā refuses to accept God in this connection. By acting according to the Right, man becomes righteous; and righteousness, as a power or force (*śakti*), becomes his property, in the sense in which Kant understood the word 'property', in the legal sense. Property is what enables a man to enjoy, it is not an attribute but power or force, not an adjective but an act that is not yet attained. Though the Mīmāṃsā speaks of *dharma*, it is really concerned with what originally in the Veda is called *rta*, the Right, and the Right is what binds the universe into a unity, and therefore the universe conforms to the forms of the right. The Right, it is thought, is known to the Veda alone, which is eternal and eternally contains the secret of the universe that is important for man and his life; and that secret is right action.

"Before concluding this paper, I should like to point to one implication of the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsā, which is very important for a philosophy of law also. It is often thought that, so far as jurisprudence goes, it is not the philosophy of the Mīmāṃsā that is important, but only its rules of interpretation and application of laws. This, I think, cannot be the complete truth. Even the rules of interpretation and application must have been based on philosophy and must have a theory behind them. The complete truth has not been brought out because the jurists are generally not very much interested in philosophy and philosophers have not recognized the importance of the Mīmāṃsā. The *dharmaśāstras*, with which the jurists are mainly

concerned, are not philosophical works in the sense in which we usually understand them, and are generally studied without reference to Mīmāṃsā philosophy. First, the Mīmāṃsā, the *dharmaśāstras* and the *dharmaśāstras* and all deal with *dharma*. Secondly, all claim to be *karmayogaśāstras*, and Manu explicitly says that his work is on *karmayoga* (way of action). In the third place, the *dharmaśāstras* are extensions of the concept of *dharma* to fields not covered by the Mīmāṃsā. The Mīmāṃsā deals with actions producing mainly other-worldly results; but the *dharmaśāstras* particularly have to deal with actions producing this-worldly results also like punishments for crimes, legalizations of social practices, and enforcement of law in genera. But the concept of *dharma* underlying all is the same. The philosophy of Hindu jurisprudence therefore is the philosophy of *dharma* as expounded by the Mīmāṃsā, which all the writers of the *dharmaśāstras* accept.

"There are many philosophical questions concerning law. The mutual relation between law, action, and man is one such questions. The origin of law is another. We have to ask ourselves whether we can find answers to such questions in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy, apart from whatever semi-philosophical and mythological answers have been given by the *dharmaśāstras*. So far, there has perhaps been no discussion of this topic in a philosophically systematic manner. In the *dharmaśāstras* we find that the authors derive their laws from the Vedas, the *smṛtis*, and customs of groups living at the time. This is the general practice of the law-givers, though they add that one may follow, in cases not covered by the above three, great men and one's own desires. To group all the five is not a philosophical derivation. A metaphysical derivation of law can be found, if at all, only in the Mīmāṃsā. For a satisfactory exposition a deeper study of the concept of *dharma* in all its aspects is wanted. But we may try to get a clue.

"*Dharma*, according to the Mīmāṃsā, is either action (according to Kumārila) or *kārya* (result of action, according to Prabhākara). In either case, it is not the law. The law is the command of the Veda. So the source of law is the Veda. But when it is asked why the Veda gives a particular command, Kumārila at least answers that it is for the Good of man. Yet the good is not *siddha* (ready-made, accomplished) as it is for Buddhism, but *sādhyā* (to be accomplished). The source of law is, therefore something that issues commands, which we may interpret as the Will of the universe; and in the word of the

Mīmāṃsā, which gives the highest importance to *śabda* (word) and verbal knowledge, we may say that the Veda is the embodiment of the Universal Will in words.

"This interpretation is supported by their conception of *apūrva*. *Apūrva* is the latent form, potency, which *karman* (action) becomes before producing the results. And it resides in the *ātman* or the aspect of action, neither in gods nor in objects used in action. Now, what is its nature? The Vaiśeṣikas say that it is nothing but *adr̥ṣṭa* in the form of *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit), and these two are qualities, attributes, *guṇas* of the *ātman*. That is, by performing an act, the *ātman* obtains a new quality in the form of *dharma* or *adharma*. But the Mīmāṃsakas do not accept this view. They say that *apūrva* is not a *guṇa* of the *ātman*, but its power. It is described as

apūrvam yāgānantaravyāparaḥ kiṃvā yāgajanyā kācit śaktiḥ kartṛsamavāyini.

(*Apūrva* is a mediating activity after the sacrifice. Or rather it is a force produced by the sacrifice and residing in the agent.) The Mīmāṃsakas, consistently with their activism, are opposed to reducing force to inactive quality like color. *Apūrva* is a new force accruing to the *ātman* and transforms itself into the result. The force or power or energy of the *ātman* is what we can safely interpret as will. But this will can be produced only through action, not by imagination or contemplation. It is not what we call a mere wish. The Vedic command is a command to generate a will, of whose work the agent may or may not be conscious; it is a will that works and produces effects, whether the agent is or is not conscious of its processes. It works spontaneously according to the law of Right that controls the universe. We know from our own experience that in habitual actions our will works automatically without our deliberation.

"Ethical command or law is, therefore, a unit of the will, just as a proposition or judgment is a unit of thought or cognition. Thus action, *dharma* and *adharma* are not accepted by the Mīmāṃsā as attributes of man, but as forces, potencies or energies. Now, can we apply this conception to cases of positive law? The Vedic command to man may be interpreted, as Prabhākara would do, to produce a will in himself as commanded. If the *dharmaśāstras* as legal codes are to be interpreted in conformity with the Mīmāṃsā conception of *dharma*, then positive law also will be a command to produce a will in conformity with the social will as recorded in the *dharmaśāstras*. A will thus produced will transform itself into

desirable social acceptance of man and the resulting advantages. A criminal produces the opposite kind of will which transforms itself into undesirable social reception and the resulting disadvantages. The phrase 'the will transforming itself' may sound strange. But what the Mīmāṃsā would mean is that the criminal wills his own punishment, and the law-abider wills his own social acceptance. The Mīmāṃsā would not accept that the criminal is punished by society because he obtains a new attribute or quality called 'evil' or 'criminal', but because he produces a will a potency, that produces its own punishment. Such would be an activist philosophy of law. And this philosophy is well worth being worked out, as it has been the implicit basis of our law. I am here giving only a clue to what seems to be a very important basic doctrine of legal philosophy.

"In fact the Mīmāṃsā philosophy of ethics and law does not easily fit into any of the well-known Western schools of law. In a way, it is what Holland calls both ethics and nomology. It is ethics, because external legislation of its law is not possible and it is nomology because conformity of action to laws is demanded. But in a way it is neither; it is not ethics, because there is no explicit demand for conformity of human character to a type, and there is very little discussion of character which is a quality of man's will and all the stress is on action; and it is not nomology because there is no external legislation for all the acts it enjoins. It is actually a combination of both; and the *dharmaśāstras* also are such combinations. Yet there is a system of thought, ethical and legal, implicit in the Mīmāṃsā and the *dharmaśāstras* taken together. And a new line of philosophical activity is needed to bring it out.

"It is not my aim to discuss and present the philosophy of the Mīmāṃsā and its sub-schools and their internal differences. My main aim is to present the activist tendencies in our thought and culture, and contradict the opinion that India has had no activism, that all its philosophies are only *mokṣaśāstras*, that there has been no ethical philosophy, that the conception of the Right as distinct from that of the Good is absent from Indian thought and that Indian thought has to be interpreted as contemplative quietism. Till recently I myself followed this line of thinking. The more we think, read, talk and write about contemplation and the less about action, the more we tend to think that action is unimportant in this world and wishes can produce results. Now that we have attained independence and are ourselves responsible for our future, it is time to read, talk,

think and write about action at least as much as about contemplation. We should see that the golden ages in the history of India followed revolts of activism against quietism; and disasters followed when some quietistic philosophy of life gained attendance. We may draw a lesson from our own history. In this context at least it is necessary to think or re-think what our classical activists thought, which is found right in the Vedic philosophies. This paper is not a plea for the revival of sacrificial ritual but for a revival of activist thought in order to have a balanced view of life.

Distinguishing between ritual Mīmāṃsā and the philosophical school of Uttaramīmāṃsā, Johannes Bronkhorst, in Bronkhorst 2007, has this to say: in the Introduction (pp. 1-3) to his paper titled "Vedānta as Mīmāṃsā" (pp. 1-91):

"The *Śābarabhāṣya* is the oldest surviving commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra*. Śābara's *Bhāṣya* is remarkable for various reasons. Śābara here expresses ideas which differ from those of most of his contemporaries. Most remarkable is the absence of any reference whatsoever to the ideas of rebirth and liberation. Śābara's *Bhāṣya* deals with Vedic ritual, which as a rule leads to heaven.

"The absence of ideas which yet pervade much of Indian thought from the days of the early Upaniṣads onward could be explained by the conservative nature of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. As a matter of fact, most of Vedic literature is not concerned with rebirth and liberation either, and the Upaniṣads themselves reveal that this doctrine was an innovation. It may not necessarily have been accepted by all sacrificing Brahmins, and indeed, later texts such as the *Mahābhārata* show very little awareness of rebirth and liberation in their narrative parts, even though there can be no doubt that these texts are more recent than the early Upaniṣads. One might therefore think that the new ideas of rebirth and liberation took a long time to find general acceptance, and that conservative Brahmins at the time of Śābara—i.e., in the fifth or sixth century C.E.—still did not accept them. Indeed, Śābara's commentator Prabhākara still has no place for liberation in the seventh century C.E., whereas his other commentator Kumārila opens up to this idea at around the same time.

"All this fits in with the general picture according to which the belief in rebirth and liberation did not originate within Vedic Brahmanism. This belief originally belonged to others,

and found its way into the Vedic Upaniṣads from outside, as is indeed confirmed by some Upaniṣadic passages. Vedic Brahmanism, far from being the source of these ideas, resisted them for some thousand years after their first appearance in the Upaniṣads. Seen in this way, the position of Śābara and Prabhākara constitute additional evidence for the originally non-Vedic characters of the belief in rebirth and liberation.

"This simple and elegant way of understanding the spread in time of the belief in rebirth and liberation in India is jeopardized by certain ideas about the early history of the Vedānta philosophy. It is well known that the Vedānta philosophy—which is to be distinguished from the Upaniṣads upon which it claims to be based—played no role in the philosophical debates of the early centuries of the common era. For centuries debates took place, and were recorded, between Sāṃkhyas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and various schools of Buddhism, without any reference to the Vedānta philosophy. The first mention of this school of thought by others may well occur in the *Madhyamakahrdaya*, a text belonging to the sixth century whose author was a Buddhist called Bhavya. This absence of evidence for Vedānta as a school of philosophy might be interpreted as evidence for its relatively late appearance.

"In spite of this, a number of scholars are of the opinion that Vedānta as a system of philosophy was there right from the beginning, that is to say, right from the period immediately following the early Upaniṣads. The Vedānta philosophy, for which the name 'Uttaramīmāṃsā' is sometimes used, was, according to those scholars, part of original Mīmāṃsā, which covered both Pūrvā- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. Together they constituted at the beginning one single school of thought. Some extend this idea, and maintain that this single school of thought originally had one basic text, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. This original text had two parts: the former or first part of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, and the later or second part of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*--in Sanskrit: *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra* and *Uttaramīmāṃsāsūtra*. The later expressions Pūrvamīmāṃsā and *Uttaramīmāṃsā* can then be explained as having (erroneously) evolved from these book-titles.

"It is easy to see that the view according to which the Vedānta philosophy was in the beginning inseparably linked to Pūrvamīmāṃsā contradicts the idea that Pūrvamīmāṃsā for a long time was not interested in liberation and related concepts.

The Vedānta philosophy, we must assume, has always been interested in liberation, through knowledge of Brahman. If the two schools of thought were originally one, we are virtually forced to conclude that the earliest ritualistic Mīmāṃsakas were also convinced Vedāntins. The abandonment by Pūrvamīmāṃsā of the ideal of liberation would then be a later development within the school, a development which soon, with Kumārila, yielded again to the lure of liberation."

Bronkhorst then takes up a number of salient points reflecting the problems raised in his Introduction. On pp. 77-78 he summarizes his "Conclusions":

"It will be clear from the preceding reflections that Uttaramīmāṃsā, far from being part of original Mīmāṃsā, attached itself at some time to it in order to provide speculations about Brahman with the solid underpinning of serious Vedic interpretation. Speculations about Brahman, more or less continuing the ideas found in the Vedic Upaniṣads, had been around probably without interruption since Upaniṣadic times. They had not always profited from the sophisticated instruments of Vedic interpretation that had been developed in Mīmāṃsā for the sake of Vedic ritual. Using these instruments to solidly anchor Vedāntic ideas into the eternal Veda was an aim that gave rise to a new-or perhaps better-supplementary-school of Vedic interpretation: the Uttaramīmāṃsā.

"This way of looking at the historical origins of Uttaramīmāṃsā does away with the need to believe that the early ritual Mīmāṃsakas--Śabara, but also Jaimini, and even the authorities cited in the *sūtra*--were really convinced Vedāntins, who believed in liberation from this world as a possibility beside and above the rewards offered for Vedic ritual practice. It is no longer necessary to think that Śabara, in spite of showing no awareness whatsoever of the notion of liberation in his massive commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, yet was familiar with it and may therefore himself have hoped to attain liberation one day. We can now stick to the far simpler and far more plausible position that Śabara--and Jaimini, and all those they cite--never mention liberation because they did not believe in it. They did not believe in it because there was no place for liberation in their vision of the world which was in this respect still rather close to, and continued, the Vedic ritualistic world view. This in its turn constitutes evidence that Vedic Brahmins had not, from the time of the Upaniṣads onward, employed the

new ideas of karmic retribution and liberation. Far from it, the most conservative among them continued to resist these ideas for at least one thousand years, from the time of the early Upaniṣads until that of Śabara and Prabhākara. We can now also understand how later ritual Mīmāṃsakas--prominent among them Kumārila Bhatta--could no longer resist the lure of the notion of liberation and yielded to it without becoming Vedāntins. From the point of view of ritual Mīmāṃsā the two Mīmāṃsās were not fundamentally one, and had never been one. Vedānta had attached itself to the older school of Vedic interpretation, claiming that it had always been part of it; that ritual Mīmāṃsā had never been complete without it. The ritual Mīmāṃsakas knew better, and historically speaking they were right."

Comments by the Editor (KP):

The pages between the Introduction and Conclusion of Bronkhorst's article, of course, contain those arguments that Bronkhorst gives for his interpretation. These arguments, and the conclusion he draws, are at the time of our writing still fairly recent, and we have yet to see how the scholarly community, and Mīmāṃsaka themselves, may react to them. For this reason, and in order to do justice to the large body of literature that preceded and did not take account of these arguments, the account of Mīmāṃsā literature we have given in what follows tries to straddle the traditional view--that Pūrvas as well as Uttara-Mīmāṃsā (by which is usually understood Vedānta) are schools of Indian philosophy in the sense that they assume the doctrines of rebirth and the possibility of liberation, and the truncation that must follow from acceptance of Bronkhorst's position, that some of the literature that has regularly been included under the rubric "Mīmāṃsā philosophy" does not belong there--viz., the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, Śabara's *Bhāṣya*, and perhaps Prabhākara's works, along with (perhaps) at least some of the commentaries on these texts. Nevertheless, since some of the ("genuinely") philosophical commentaries on the *sūtras* and *bhāṣya* must be included in the literature of Mīmāṃsā philosophy whatever be the truth in Bronkhorst's position, and since those commentaries need to be organized in a natural order in order to fairly represent their content, and most of all because we had in hand and herein present the clear and cogent summaries prepared for us by Francis X. Clooney, the scope of "Mīmāṃsā philosophy" set forth in what follows

overreaches what it should cover if Bronkhorst's position were strictly adhered to.

Selection from Rajendra Nath Sarma, "The sentence-meaning: *bhāvanā* or *niyoga*?", Pramodasindhu pp. 138-142.

"...(T)he theory of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas is called *bhāvanāvākyaṛthavāda* while that of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā is called the *niyogavākyaṛthavāda*...

"*Bhāvanā* is of the most fundamental importance in the Mīmāṃsā system. The *bhāvanā* of the injunctive verb is the heart of the whole Veda. Each and every part of the Veda must be related, in some way, directly or indirectly to it. That is, the Veda consists primarily of a collection of injunctions. All its other parts must be shown to be related to them, and have a right to exist only thereby and the heart of each injunction is the *bhāvanā* (productive energy). It means a tendency to produce something. To be precise, *bhāvanā* means a particular kind of operation in a productive agent which is conducive to the production of the effect.

"The productive force (*bhāvanā*) is expressed by the optative ending which accordingly is the principal part of the word; the root depends psychologically upon it. It is called 'of the word' because in Vedic injunctions there is no authority except the 'word' of the Veda itself behind the injunction. There is no person, human or divine, from whom the injunction emanates.

"According to the Prābhākaras, *bhāvanā* is the activity of a person towards a certain course of action. It is to be said that the Vedic injunctive affix in the word 'yajeta' indicates that the person must put forth his efforts towards a definite end.

"*Bhāvanā* or productive force is of two types - *śābdī* or *śābda bhāvanā* (word productive force) and *ārthī* or *ārtha bhāvanā* (actual productive force). According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the *ārthī bhāvanā* is common to all the verbs and the *śābdī bhāvanā* is expressed by the suffixes *liṅ* [optative] etc. They contend that the Vedic *liṅs* express the *bhāvanā*. This *bhāvanā* is also called *pravṛtti* or *pravartanā*. In their view, *bhāvanā* is in the form of a function of the Vedic optative which makes a person inclined to an action. *Bhāvanā* is also known as *preranā*. *Arthī bhāvanā* is the peculiar energy (of some person) which refers to some action (sacrifice etc.) which energy is engendered by the desire for some objects.

"*Śābdī bhāvanā* is a particular kind of operation in a

productive agent which is productive of men's action. It is expressed by that element (in the ending as *tā*) which denotes injunctive-ness. The *śābdī bhāvanā* is the injunctive force expressed by the optativeness of the ending. It is called *śābdī* because in the Vedic injunctions there is no authority except the word of the Veda itself behind the injunction. Both the *śābdī* and *ārthī bhāvanās* require three elements or parts: (i) the matter or end which is to be accomplished (*sādhya*), (ii) the means by which the result is effected, i.e., the instrument (*sādhana*) and (iii) the mode in which the result is effected, i.e. the procedure (*itīkartavyatā*). These three are according to the three operations (suggested by each *bhāvanā*) - what is to be effected (*kim bhāvayet*); by which it is to be effected (*kim bhāvayet*); and how it is to be effected (*katham bhāvayet*).

The term *niyoga* literally means a duty or *kārya* imposed on man. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas maintain that every Vedic injunction is to be considered as a command, i.e. *niyoga*. This *niyoga* is also called *kārya* or *apūrva* in the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. This *apūrva* is one of the most important concepts in the Mīmāṃsā system. It designates the mysterious, transcendental power generated by a correctly performed ritual act and it, in turn, produces in the fullness of time the 'fruit' which is to be promised reward of the act. Not only has every rite, as a whole, an *apūrva*, but each subordinate action that belongs to it has a subordinate productive *apūrva* (*utpattyapūrva*) of its own. The Prābhākaras call *apūrva* '*niyoga*' because of its acting as an incentive to the prompted person (*niyogin*), making him put forth his efforts towards the action denoted by the verbal root contained in the injunctive word. It is also called *apūrvakārya* as it is to be imposed by the injunctive sentence and not by other agencies. *Niyoga* to the Prābhākaras is the most important factor in an injunctive sentence. It is expressed neither by the verbal root (*dhātu*) nor by the injunctive suffix nor by any other word in the sentence, but it is expressed by the sentence as a whole. It is procured by the general rule that the principal thing made known by the sentence forms the denotation of the sentence.

"While the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept *bhāvanā* as the *vākyaṛtha* (import of the sentence), the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas accept *niyoga* as the *vākyaṛtha*. Thus the two schools of Mīmāṃsā advocate two different theories of *vākyaṛtha*. The theory advocated by the Bhāṭṭas is called the *bhāvanāvākyaṛthavāda* and that of the Prābhākaras is known as

the *niyogavākyaarthavāda* or *apūrvakāryarthavāda*.

"An examination is, therefore, attempted here to ascertain which of the two, viz., *bhāvanā* or *niyoga*, is the *vākyaārtha*. Kumārila and his followers contend that the Vedic suffixes, viz. optative, etc., express the *bhāvanā*. This is, as stated already, also known as *pravṛtti* or *pravartanā*. *Bhāvanā* is a *vyāpāra* (function or activity). So, how can it be the *vākyaārtha*? Rāmānujācārya, a staunch follower of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, refutes the view of the Bhāttas by stating that there is no proof that the suffixes have functions in the form of *preranā* and that the *pravṛtti* of a person towards certain actions subsequent to the hearing of the optative, etc. [endings] is not the cause of this *bhāvanā*. The theory of *bhāvanāvākyaārtha* is not acceptable on the ground that the causal relation between momentary sacrifices and the result (heaven etc.) cannot be proved from the Vedic injunctions. Moreover, if a link in accordance with the Bhātta theory, an *apūrva* produced by a sacrifice, has to be believed as the cause of heaven, sacrifices could not be the direct cause of heaven as indicated by the Vedic injunction. It is also difficult to explain where the *apūrva* can exist till the attainment of the result in the form of heaven etc. Thus, according to the Prābhākāras, *bhāvanā* cannot be the sentence-meaning. The Prābhākāras maintain that the *niyoga* is the sentence-meaning and as such their theory of *niyogavākyaārtha* goes against the *bhāvanāvākyaarthavāda*. According to Śālikanātha Miśra, the polemical writer of the Prābhākara school, *niyoga* or *kārya* is the sentence-meaning because of its being the principal factor in the sentence. Whatever is the principal in a sentence is the sentence-meaning.

"*Niyoga* or *kārya* is what is accomplished by *kṛti* or physical effort. A *kṛti* is nothing but the physical effort (*prayatna*) of a person. The Prābhākāras contend that *kārya* is imposed by the Vedic injunctions called *dharma* and this is nothing but the *niyoga* which is imposed as *kārya* on the *niyojya* through the Vedic moods [e.g., optative, etc.]... A *niyojya* is one who understands a *kārya* as his own...

PART TWO

SUMMARIES OF WORKS (ARRANGED CHRONOLOGICALLY)

1 BĀDARĀYANA

"Bādarāyana is quoted in *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5; 5.2.19; 6.1.8; 10.8.44; 11.1.65." (Verpoorten, p. 4) It is not clear whether this person is the author of (another) set of *Mīmāṃsā sūtras*, or whether he is perhaps the same as the author of the *Vedāntasūtras*.

Ujjvala Jha, in PIPV pp. 27-29, has collected and discussed the several references mentioned by Verpoorten.

2. BĀDARĪ

He seems to be different from Bādarāyana, being "referred to in *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* 3.1.3 and 6.1.7ff.; also quoted in the *Vedānta (=Brahma)sūtra* 1.2.30; 3.1.11; 4.3.7 and 4.10. Thus Bādarī seems to have spoken authoritatively on both "sets of *sūtras*, "but incidentally in an unorthodox way, since he asserted that the *śūdra* was entitled to perform the sacrifice (MS 6.1.27)." (Verpoorten pp. 3-4)

Kiyotaka Yoshimizu ("Bādari and Prabhākara", in StudM pp. 389-413) provides an account of Bādari's position on one topic on pp. 413-414, which we quote here:

"The third *Adhyāya* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* deals with the relation of a subordinate to its principal (*śeṣaśeṣibhāva*) among various ritual factors of which a Vedic sacrifice consists. The first *Sūtra* of the first *Pāda* '*athātaḥ śeṣalakṣaṇam*' declares this subject matter. The second *Sūtra* '*śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt*' shows the general ground for subordination, namely, having the other as its own aim (*parārthatva*). The third *Sūtra* '*dravyagunasamskāreṣu bādari*' informs [us] about Bādari's opinion on what can be subordinate. The fourth *Sūtra* '*karmāny api jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt*' shows Jaimini's opinion that even the act of sacrificing can be subordinated, namely, to the result.

"According to the commentator Śabara, Bādari not only admitted that the substance (*dravya*) used as material for an oblation, its quality appropriate for an oblation and [the] preparatory act (*samskāra*) to make an oblation are subordinated to the act of sacrificing, but also restricted subordination to these three kinds of ritual favors by adding the particle '*eva*' after the enumeration of them. He maintained that the act of sacrificing (*yāga*) cannot be a means to any other ends because there remains nothing to be done (*kartavya*) once

the act of sacrificing has been performed. Even the result (*phala*) is not the purpose of the act of sacrificing because once it has been performed the result will issue automatically; for the act of sacrificing itself is the aim of a human being (*puruṣārtha*)."

3. ĀTREYA

Referred to "in *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* 4.3.18; 5.2.18; 6.1.26", and "also quoted in the *Vedāntasūtra* 3.4.44 and in some other places such as the *Bauddhāyanagr̥hyasūtra*." (Verpoorten, p. 4). These references are discussed by Ujjvala Jha in PIPV pp. 31-32.

4. KRṢṆĀJINI

"MS 4.3.17; 6.7.35; also quoted in *Vedāntasūtra* 3.1.9 and *Kātyāyanaśrautasūtra* 1.6.23." (Verpoorten p. 4). See also Ujjvala Jha in PIPC pp. 29-30.

Verpoorten (p. 4) notes the names of "five more *ācāryas* ("teachers")...mentioned once" in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*: Lāvukāyana (MS 6.7.37 or 38); Kāmukāyana (MS 11.1.58); Āśmarathya (MS 6.5.16); Ālekhana (MS 6.5.17); Atiśāyana (MS 3.2.43). These are all discussed briefly in U. Jha, PIPC pp. 28-32.

5. JAIMINI (25 A.D.?)

(Verpoorten, p. 5) "It is extremely difficult to determine his chronological position. On the one hand, Jaimini is familiar with the ritualistic science and with at least a part of the *dharma* literature, and he discusses the value of the *smṛti* in I.3.11-14. On the other hand, *mīmāṃsā* formulations can be traced back to as early as 450 B.C.

"So we ought to conclude carefully that the MS might be of a rather high antiquity (450-400 B.C. (?the age of Pāṇini?)), but [that] the collection took its present form under the influence and the name of one or several Jaimini(s) in a later period? Is it at the time when Kātyāyana the grammarian commented [on] Pāṇini in his *Vārttika*, about 250 B.C. (?), or when the *Vedāntasūtras* were redacted, that is between 200 and 300 A.D. (?)."

5.1 JAIMINI, *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

(Verpoorten, p. 5) "There are 2745 of them. They are distributed in 12 chapters or *adhyāyas* (literally "recitation,

divided themselves into 4 *pādas* ("quarter"), except the Chapters 3, 6 and 8 which consist of 8 *pādas*."

Summarized by Francis X. Clooney

"E" references are to the edition by the Anandasrama pandits in *Anandasramasamskrtagranthavali* 17 (1976-983), in four parts (indicated as E1-4). "T" references are to the translation by Ganganatha Jha, *Gaekwad Oriental Series* 66 (Baroda 1973).

Introduction to this (and the next) summary (F. X. Clooney)

A. Jaimini's system is not identical with Śābara's, and the summaries will have occasion to point out differences between their views. The summaries attempt to present first ideas of philosophical interest which are common to both. These are presented in Jaimini's terms wherever possible, although occasionally it is clearer to let Śābara explain. Attention will also be given to ideas unique to either of the two. Most often Śābara's commentary includes a great deal of information not demanded by the *sūtras*. Careful comparison of what is said by each should reveal something of the development of the tradition even at the earliest stages.

B. The distinction between *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*: In traditional language, the *pūrvapakṣa* is the first position put forth, the opponent's view. The *siddhānta* is the finally accepted and therefore correct view. The *pūrvapakṣa* is usually given first, either all at once or in stages, but sometimes it follows an initial statement of the *siddhānta*. Jaimini's text is almost entirely a debate between *pūrvapakṣa* (the holder of the *pūrvapakṣa* view) and *siddhāntin* (holds of the *siddhānta*), and Śābara's comment is often structured to include additional back-and-forth arguments.

The summary attempts to retain this argumentative structure for two reasons. First, I hope thereby to preserve both sides of important arguments. Although the *pūrvapakṣa* is rejected, this does not mean that everything in it, or even most of it, is considered erroneous; the *siddhāntin* often accepts most of the *pūrvapakṣa*, or makes sense only as a slight qualification of the *pūrvapakṣa*. Second, I hope to preserve and emphasize a general *mīmāṃsā* attitude, that the right position is gained only through argument, inquiry, generalizations and refinements, by an incremental and cumulative gathering of right conclusions

according to gradually refined right ways of gaining them. The conclusions made are not meant to be separated from the arguments used in gaining those conclusions.

C. The distinction between philosophy and ritual reflection. It is my expectation that some of the material contained in the following summary will appear decidedly unphilosophical to readers, since I have included many rules governing the derivation of rites from one another, and some amount of ritual detail. The primary reason for this is that Mīmāṃsā is quite successful in embedding its philosophical principles in concrete ritual contexts. Much of what Jaimini and Śābara say has to do with their absolute referent of truth and meaning, the sacrifice and the texts expressing it, and one of their main points is that word and meaning always are connected with action, particularly ritual action. They begin with the notion that 'truth' is neither abstract nor unchanging, but is the 'truth of ritual'.

Both Jaimini and Śābara enunciate general principles, clarify them, and test them in specific ritual contexts. Only when the specification is complete is the clarification sufficient. The necessity of summary has required me to omit these final ritual contents, but often there is no sharp distinction between the theory and the application.

Mīmāṃsā reasoning may be tempered by legal reasoning, in the sense that the body of rules formed and decisions made govern but never fully exhaust a realm of actions, events. The sacrifice, and the world organized around it, are structured by principles, but the Mīmāṃsakas never lose their sense that time and space, agent and purpose, are relevant to descriptions of what *happens* and therefore intrinsic to adequate explanation. The analogy with legal reasoning explains as well why a great number of the summary statements I have made take the form of "rules" rather than "truths": they are arrived at by the Mīmāṃsakas as reflectively as any philosophical statements, but are intended primarily to govern action.

It is my hope that including a somewhat ampler body of material as "Mīmāṃsā philosophy" will allow the interested reader to understand why this system developed and what the Mīmāṃsakas had in mind when they reasoned as they did. Attention to the ritual background makes it possible to understand why these thinkers thought the way they did. It may be of philosophical interest, for example, to study the Mīmāṃsā theory of perception, but such study will be better grounded if we realize that Jaimini and Śābara, at least, thought of *texts* as

sources of perceived (and not verbal) data: seeing an object and seeing words in the text are both perception. Likewise, it helps one to understand the rather obscure Mīmāṃsā appeal to 'non-existence' (*abhāva*) as a source of knowledge if one first understands how the looked on the sacrificial "arena" as the place of relevant existence, such that there is a reason for everything that appears there and a similar reason for the non-appearance of everything else. It should be emphasized that the choices necessarily made in this summary, according to the goal of setting forth the philosophical elements of the system, mean that this is not a summary of the whole of the Mīmāṃsā system which includes the ritual details overlooked here.

D. The extended idea of "philosophical topics" operative here. Mīmāṃsā seeks primarily to understand the sacrifice, but that understanding includes by extension ideas about how society in general and ordinary experience relate to the sacrifice. Due in part to this comprehensive nature of the Mīmāṃsā inquiry, and in part to a desire to attend to what might be of use and interesting to various readers, the summary includes material appropriate to quite different branches of philosophy, topics such as the following: the way in which sentences express meanings, the materiality of the gods and heaven, the nature of light and sound, the duties of kings, property and ownership, and the rights and duties of various castes. It is my hope that readers, while concentrating on materials of interest to their own philosophical disciplines, will be aware of the wide reach of Mīmāṃsā.

Finally, the Mīmāṃsakas employ in their investigations several groups of connected terms which structure their arguments, and it is helpful to be aware in advance of the most important of these terms (given here as translated throughout the text):

1. The basic distinction in kinds of knowing is between perception and inference: as mentioned above, this has to do not only with ordinary sense data, but also with what texts *literally* say ("perception") and what is *implied* by texts (known though inference).

The first Chapter *under I.1.5) will set forth other means of knowledge. Throughout the *-sūtras* several other means (beyond perception/literal meaning and inference/indirect meaning) of textual knowledge recur more frequently: knowledge based on the correct interpretation of *statements* (what is known through looking at a whole statement, and not

just part of one); and knowledge gained through attention to *context* (what need to be known to carry out an action, and thus to understand the text prescribing the action).

2. The following terms should be understood, rendered here as translated throughout the summary:

'archetype/ektype': The complexity of the received body of rituals is simplified by conceiving of most rites as derivative (ektypal) of from other (usually simpler) rites (archetypes).

'primary/subsidiary or subordinate or secondary': The main action of a sacrifice is the primary one, and it leads to the desired result. It is supported by smaller (subsidiary) rites within the overall sacrifice (which is therefore comprised of the primary action plus all the subsidiary rites). Subordinate actions are usually actions preparatory of things used in the sacrifice.

'subordinate elements': Everything perceived at the sacrifice, ranging from the performer to the things offered to the results and words spoken, are conceived of as component elements contributing to the progress of the actions. All these terms will be explained detail when they appear in the summary.

'*adhyāya/pāda/sūtra/adhikarāna*': *Adhyāyas* are the twelve major 'books' or 'chapters' of the text. *Pādas* are the sections into which each Chapter is broken. *Sūtras* are the single-line statements made by Jaimini which are commented on individually by Sabara. *Adhikarānas* are the groupings of *sūtras* identified by Sabara, according to topic discussed. References will appear in this form: I.3.21: first Chapter, third Section, twenty-first *sūtra*.

CHAPTER ONE¹

SECTION ONE

1.1.1 (E1.1; T1) *Dharma* is the object of inquiry in this text (i.e., in the entirety of the *sūtras*).

¹ *Dharma* is the object of Mīmāṃsā inquiry, and is known through certain kinds of statements. Other kinds of words, statements and texts express *dharma* less authoritatively. This first Chapter deals with these questions of language and authority.

1.1.2 (E1.13; T4) *Dharma* is the (knowable, meaningful, desirable) purpose the characteristic feature of which is injunction [or Vedic command].

1.1.4 (E1.25; T8) Perception occurs when there is a close connection of the human senses with some existent object. Perception cannot be the source of our knowledge of *dharma*, since it apprehends only what is present, at hand.

1.1.5 (E1.28; T8) The relation between words and what they express (*artha*) is original. It is known only by teaching and invariable connection. Language is authoritative regarding the imperceptible, and is independent.

1.1.6² (E1.8; T3) (Objection:) Words are impermanent because they are made,

1.1.7 (E1.88; T32) because they lack stability (i.e., quickly pass out of existence),

1.1.8 (E1.89; T32) because of expressions like "he makes" (which are conjugated),

1.1.9 (E1.89; T33) because they are used simultaneously to denote several existent things,

1.1.10 (E1.90; T33) because they have original and derivative forms,

1.1.11 (E1.90; T33) and because they multiply due to a plurality of makers.

1.1.12 (E1.91; T33) (Answer:) (No,) words would appear as they do whether made or original, (and so the argument is inconclusive).

1.1.13 (E1.91; T34) (They do not lack stability,) but they are distant from near-at-hand existent objects and so do not become objects of knowledge.

1.1.14 (E1.96; T35) Conjugations, etc. pertain to the use of words, not to their creation.

²The next state of the overall argument pertains to the permanency (*nityatva*; based on priority to any potential speaker) of the relationships between the word and the object it denoted. Unless this permanency exists, words will not be reliable in communicating *dharma* 6-11 set forth reasons against permanency, 12-7 rebut these reasons. To facilitate following the argument, I will give together each opposing reason and its rebuttal as presented by Jaimini (in his most terse fashion. Then 18-23, which offer supporting reasons for permanency, will be summarized.

1.1.15 (E1.97; T35) Words denote many individuals at once just as the sun (though one, shines on many individuals at once).

1.1.16 (E1.99; T36) (*Re* 10 above) Changes in the letters of a word do not constitute modifications of the word,

1.1.17 (E1.100; T36) and they multiply due to a plurality of makers.

1.1.18 (E1.101; T37) The very appearing of words is for the sake of communication.

1.1.19 (E1.104; T38) Words denote every individual simultaneously.

1.1.20 (E1.105; T39) Language is not quantified.

1.1.21 (E1.108; T40) It is independent.

1.1.22 (E1.109; T41) Words appear permanent since they lack connection (with anything impermanent).

1.1.24¹ (E1.110; T42) (Objection:) Even if the relation of words and their meanings is not original, these words taken together as composing sentences do not express *dharma*, since sentences are not the means of knowing *dharma*.

1.1.25 (E1.115; T44) (Answer:) Words are handed down grouped in sentences for the sake of (ritual) action, and so are expressive of action.

1.1.26 (E1.119; T46) In ordinary experience where ritual action is not at issue and sentences are not handed down, this construction (of action-oriented sentences) takes place as the occasion demands.

1.1.27-31 (E1.120-123; T48-49) (Objection:) The Vedas too are authored, for these reasons: each text has an author's name attached to it (27); temporal events are mentioned in the texts (which therefore set limits on the earliest possible dates for composition of these Vedic texts (28).

Answer: We have already explained that words always precede those who use them. The so-called authors are merely the expositors, while the temporal references are only apparent.

1.1.32 (E1.124; T50) The words (in sentences) are

¹The next stage of the argument pertains to the ability of the sentence to communicate *dharma* - even if individual words are not human constructions, sentences may be conventional.

ordered so as to be purposeful; for they are related to sacrificial action.

SECTION TWO¹

1.2.1-6 (E2.1-9; T51-54) (Objection:) Statements which do not contribute to the sacrificial action have no purpose and hence are not original parts of the Veda (1). Such texts often contradict both scripture and ordinary experience (2), lead to no results (3), lack any other evident purpose (4), prohibit what is not possible (or is prohibited) anyway (5), record temporal events (i.e., mention things that occurred in certain time periods and hence could not be prior to any human activity) (6).

1.2.7-18 (E2.10-32; T55-64) (Answer:) These statements form single statements with injunctions, and encourage the performance of what is enjoined (7). They would be contradictory to scripture and ordinary experience only if they pertained to performance -- and they do not demand practical application (9)). They praise knowledge (and need not be fruitful in themselves) (15).

Results are accomplished through action, and as in ordinary experience results are measured by the amount of action accomplished (17).

1.2.23-24 (E2.40-42; T68) An apparently meaningless injunction can sometimes be understood as a statement of encouragement, and so too other apparently meaningless statements (23). When possible, a text should not be removed from its proper context (in order to give it some meaning), since this would suggest it had been pointless for it to have been in that context originally (24).

1.2.31-39 (E2.48-65; T74-79) (Objection:) *Mantras* need not be expressive of meaning: their use is prescribed (on grounds extrinsic to their meaningfulness in the context) (31), the form of the statements is restricted (32), they are enjoined upon persons who already know (what they are supposed to be saying) (33), express what is not present in the context they are

¹This section discusses the authority of non-injunctive statements found in the Veda, first setting forth the view that such texts are not authoritative, since they are not helpful toward the completion of the sacrifice (1-6), and then rebutting it (7-18).

in (or does not exist at all) (34), are addressed to non-intelligent things (for which the meaning is unintelligible and irrelevant) (35), express what is contrary to the purpose at hand (36); their meanings are not the object of study (37), are sometimes unintelligible (38), and record temporal events (39).

1.2.40-45 (E2.65-68; T79-86) (Answer:) The meaning of *mantras* is important. The meaning of statements is no different (in the Veda than in ordinary language) (40). *Mantras* are repeated to emphasize certain qualities (42), are intended to preclude (certain actions or meanings) (42), can be taken as statements of encouragement (43). They can be interpreted in a secondary way to avoid contradiction (47), express what is unknown because it is not nearby and accessible (49), express the temporal only in the way any part of the Veda in general does (cf. 1.1.27-32). If their meaning were not important, their modification would be pointless (52).

SECTION THREE

1.3.1-7 (E2.69-138; T87-98) Even though *dharma* (i.e., correct sacrificial performance) is based on scripture, practices without scriptural basis can still be known to be authoritative inferentially, because performed by the same people who perform the scripturally authorized actions (1-2). However, this inference is valid only when there is no contradiction with what is scriptural, and no ulterior motive involved. (3-7)

1.3.8-10 (E2.139-154; T99-103) When there is no actual contradiction between scripture and traditional practice, still what is explicit in scripture (is inferred), since constitutive of *dharma*.

1.3.11-14 (E2.154-171; T105-106) Texts describing performance are not authoritative, because they are neither exact (12) nor part of the Vedic statements themselves (13).

1.3.15-23 (E2.171-182; T108-111) When practices are judged correct on the basis of inference, this authorization extends to the general practice of those customs (and not just in their narrowest sacrificial connection).

1.3.24-29 (E2.182-228; T112-115) There are no special scriptural rules concerning the derivation or use of words, and so there is no distinction from ordinary usage; it would not be logical for one word to have multiple derivations or usages (24,

26).¹ But since speech requires effort, erroneous usage is always possible (25); the inability to speak correctly may be due to the similarity of correct and incorrect forms (28); even if the ending is wrong, part of the word may be correct and expressive (29).

1.3.30-35 (E2.129-168; T116-124) Likewise, words have a single meaning in the Veda and ordinary experience since there is no special injunction regarding Vedic usage (30).² This is so because words do not express individual things (which would be either Vedic or non-Vedic) but rather a common feature (*ākrtii*) (31-33). The word as used expresses both the common feature and the individual thing (34-35).

SECTION FOUR³

1.4.1-2 (E2.168-177; T125-127) Names are words which indicate something without precedent (*apūrva*) in the original injunctive statement, but which do not enjoin anything. They need not indicate elements contributory to what has been enjoined.

1.4.3-9 (E2.277-297; T130-142) Names including referents to an accessory element still name the main rite (and do not enjoin the accessory), when the accessory is elsewhere enjoined and already familiar. Were the name to enjoin the accessory, the name would enjoin an action identical with that enjoined elsewhere. Only if the accessories have not been elsewhere

¹By my interpretation, Jaimini states in 24 that Vedic and ordinary words are identical, and in the subsequent *sūtras* states that in either case errors are possible, even though grammatical correctness is the single standard for both.

²Jaimini seems to focus the question on how a single word can express both ordinary and Vedic meanings (the answer ultimately being that the 'common feature' is common to every one of the things, whether it is for ordinary or Vedic usage).

³There are individual words in the Veda which are 'new' (i.e., do not clearly refer to something or some action already enjoined) and yet, as individual words, do not constitute injunctions. The status of these words is the first topic in this section (1-22). The second pertains to the interpretation of statements which (poetically) express what is not hitherto known and what at the same time appears useless, irrelevant to Vedic performance (23-30).

enjoined should they be considered enjoined as part of the naming itself.

1.4.10-11 (E2.298-301; T143-145) Words sometimes used without specialized ritual meanings should be understood with those meanings even in ritual contexts.

1.4.17-22 (E2.306-326; T151-154) An element mentioned and hitherto not enjoined should not be counted as enjoined if of no use in the rite in question; it should rather be interpreted as mentioned in order to praise what has been enjoined.

1.4.23-30¹ (E2.327-331; T155-166) (Of the two elements identified), one accomplishes the other's purpose (23). They have the same *jāti* (kind? or birth?) (24). They have similar appearance (25). Praise of one (is by identification with the other) (26). A collection can have a description which applies to most but not all of its members (27). An indication is inherent in the whole group (28). Attention is to be made to context to clarify obscure statements (29). Understanding the intention of what is said. (30). One is part of the other (or, 'in the same place').²

CHAPTER TWO³

¹*Kalpanā* is the attribution of a conjectured meaning to statements which would otherwise be devoid of meaning. These *sūtras* give eight guidelines or rules for interpreting such statements; following the style of this first Chapter, the *sūtras* are laconic, and reliance on Sabara is more than usually necessary for their interpretation.

²This seems to mean that two things can be identified if one is part of the other, or if they are in one location.

³In the first Chapter the relation of word and sacrifice was explored in a somewhat argumentative fashion, defending the authority of language against opponents outside the ritual schools. Here a less apologetic exploration of the relationship of language and sacrifice takes place. The first section examines in detail how words and different kinds of Vedic statements (e.g., prayers and injunctions, poetry and songs) relate to the sacrificial action. Sections 2 and 3 examine potential differentiations of rituals to determine the proper grounds for differentiation. Section 4 examines two possible justifications for differentiation: repetitions of the same rite, and the (same) rite described in several different Vedic schools (*sākhā*).

SECTION ONE

2.1.1-4 (E2.333-356; T167-173) Words expressive of action are creative of something new and from them in particular (and not from all the words of the sentence) we understand the activity to be performed. Nouns refer to already existent and apparent realities, whereas these action words, verbs, refer to what does not exist when the word is used and so require action to have the object of their denotation.

2.1.5 (E2.358; T175) Injunctive words - or the injunctive force in such words¹ - effects the beginning of action.

2.1.6-12 (E2.379-385; T182-186) Sentences denote actions of three varieties: a. secondary actions, preparatory of materials; b. primary actions, which do not prepare any materials; c. so-called dharmic or relational actions involving a material, without their own results, but not strictly preparatory - these are nevertheless primary and not subordinate to the materials used in the actions.

2.1.30-37 (E2.414-428; T200-209) *Mantras* are texts used in the course of the performance of ritual actions. All other texts are *brāhmaṇas* (and contribute to the action without being part of it). *Mantras* are either in metrical form (*ṛg*) or sung verse (*sāman*), or those not included in either category (*yājumśi*).

2.1.46-47 (E2.431-439; T212-216) A statement ('unit of meaning') is a group of words a. expressive of a single purpose/meaning, b. a group of which any part, taken alone, would require additional words to express a purpose. Contiguous sentences of equal status (neither dependent on the other) are separate statements.

2.1.48-49 (E2.443-452; T218-221) Implied extension (*anusāṅga*) is the completion of several parts (clauses) of a statement by words which are mentioned only in connection with one part of it. This procedure of supplementation is not permitted when the parts of the statement to be thus supplemented are separated from one another by other statements (i.e., a single 'context' is required).

¹Jaimini uses *codanā* to mean the injunctions *qua* injunctions, or the injunctive power they verbalize.

SECTION TWO¹

2.2.1 (E3.1; T222) The use of different words to describe certain ritual actions ('to sacrifice', 'to oblate', 'to give') indicates that the rituals are different, since the connection of each word with a different kind of ritual is well-known.

2.2.2 (E3.4' T225) Repetition of the same description indicates a different rite, since if there were no distinction the repetition would be pointless.

2.2.13-16 (E3.29-31; T238-239) The *āghāra* and *agnihotra* rites are enjoined as distinct sacrifices because what the words indicate (respectively, pouring and oblation with fire) occurs in actual performance.

2.2.17 (E3.31; T243) The mention of an offering material indicates a different sacrifice, since in the one context (of a single, undifferentiated rite of which the offering material is already known) the mention of the material would be pointless.

2.2.19 (E3.33; T246) Distinct preparatory acts indicate repetition of the sacrifice, since the materials are thus known to be distinct (each set requiring separate preparation). Otherwise the repetitions of preparatory acts would be pointless, since they subserve the materials.

2.2.21-27 (E3.37-44; T248-260) Enumerations of sacrifices and mentions of distinct names (since names are connected with the rites in their original appearance) and the mention of the property of a material (in connection with a new material) indicate that the rites are different. A repeated mention of a result may or may not indicate a different sacrifice, depending on the comparability of the several sentences. In general, repeated mentions may simply refer back to the first, unless the statements are equally original.

¹The goal of the next two sections is to identify the set of grounds which are sufficient for identifying actions as sacrifices and not simply as actions occurring within sacrifices. This identification is meant to be comprehensive yet economical, avoiding the supposition of any superfluous rites. It is presupposed by Jaimini (but not directly stated) that a sacrifice is a complex of actions involving offering materials, deities, performers, results. The presence of any of these is a 'clue' announcing the existence of an identifiable sacrifice.

SECTION THREE

2.3.1-2 (E3.69; T270-273) The mention of several properties does not indicate the existence of several rites, if they pertain to the motivating purpose of a single rite.

2.3.24-25 (E3.182-210; T306-309) A new context indicates a different overall integrating sacrificial purpose. So too, the mention of a result apart from any sacrifice indicates a separate rite.

PART FOUR¹

2.4.1-7 (E3.268-291; T314-319) The text which says 'Perform this rite as long as you live' prescribes something about the performer, not about the performance.

2.4.8-33² (E3.292-421; T320-335) In this section nine reasons are proposed by the objector in favor of the idea that rites of sacrifice prescribed by different schools are different from each other. All nine are given in *sūtra* 8. In *sūtra* 9 Jaimini gives the basic response, that no significant differences occur in the original texts explaining the rites, in the basic form of sacrifice, in the injunctions which instigate and 'create' the rites, or in the names given rites in the Vedic texts themselves. These elements define the rite prior to any social context, and remain unchanged over time and space.

Reasons against considering the rites as described in different schools to be the same rites, and refutations of those reasons, are as follows:

¹The previous two sections have differentiated actions primarily as different entities - for different purposes, with different details, etc. Here two other kinds of differentiation are considered: regular repetition of the same rite (e.g., fulfilling a daily duty) such that each performance is distinct due to the difference of time (1-7); and repetition due to the traditions of various schools (*śākhā*), each of which treats of rites apparently the same but with local differences, etc. The problem then is to ascertain to what extent time and space are legitimate factors of differentiation (8-33)

²The last possibility for differentiation considered by Jaimini relates to the wider social context of sacrifice. The Vedic texts are received and passed down in different 'branches' or schools, and over time these schools incorporate differences in interpretation and practice. The question posed is whether such differences fundamentally change the rites in question, or are not significant.

2.4.10-12: specific differences in name: but names merely indicate what is already there, are conventional, and are not a basis for real distinction among rites;

2.4.9, 13: differences in the form. In 9 Jaimini seems merely to contradict the opponent by holding that 'form' is a reason for unity, not differentiation; and in 13 says that different forms may appear even if the rites are not distinct;

2.4.14: differences in relations (among elements of the rites): the mention of different relations or 'details' (*dharma*) is for the sake of learning them, not to exclude other such *dharma*s;

2.4.15-20: apparent repetitions in description would have been avoided if the rites were identical: but repetitions can have some special purpose, or be only apparent repetitions because simply the same statements appearing in different locations; since the statements are neither in a single text nor proximate but instead appear in the texts of different schools, the repetitions are not real; the appearance of repetitions may be only a matter of human perspective;

2.4.21: mutual criticisms or vilifications of one another's schools do vilify one another, but to do this is human nature and says nothing about the status of the rites in question;

2.4.22: the impossibility of fulfilling the details of each and every school's performance: it is sometimes impossible even to carry out all the details of one's own school's recension, much less all recensions, and so this inability is irrelevant;

2.4.23: Expiations are demanded for different (even contradictory) mistakes: the differences depend merely on different starting points and rules about what would constitute errors;

2.4.24: there are varying statements as to when the sacrifices are completed; here too, differences of opinion are human and prove nothing;

2.4.25-30: texts which support the idea that the rites really are different: the texts proposed in support of the difference do not prove it.

After these arguments have thus been disposed of, a final argument is added, that the differences in order found in the recensions indicates that the texts enjoining procedure are really different. The response is that these differences do not offer anything incompatible or contradictory, and so are not sufficient grounds for thinking different acts are being talked about.

CHAPTER THREE¹

SECTION ONE

3.1.1-2 (E4.1-8; T336-337) *Śeṣa* is the general names for any subordinate element in the sacrifice. An element is subordinate if it is part of the sacrifice only for the sake of some other element.

3.1.3-6 (E4.16-19; T338-339) Bādari lists three subordinate elements: materials used, properties (of materials, performers, actions, etc.), and preparatory actions.

To these Jaimini adds three more subordinate elements: the actions of the sacrifice, which are done for the sake of the result; the result, which is sought for the sake of the human (performer); the human (performer), who is needed at the sacrifice for the sake of the performance of the action.

3.1.7-10 (E4.22-27; T341-343) All these subordinate elements are related to one another in terms of purpose. Even if a subordinate element is enjoined without specification in the original injunction or context, it is not subordinate to every part

¹Two six-item lists set the agenda for this Chapter: the six subordinate elements (*śeṣa*) constitutive of the sacrifice (3.1.3-6) and the six authoritative means (*pramāṇa*) for interpreting texts and assigning the elements to their right place (3.3.14). The task undertaken in the Chapter is to order correctly the multiple elements found in every sacrificial setting by correctly interpreting the texts governing them, which are sometimes explicit, sometimes very indirect and sometimes assume what is not stated, and are sometimes even in apparent conflict with each other. Structures of things and words must be articulated and interwoven. The structuring occurs through the explication of a number of priorities and precedents which, taken altogether, allow the sacrifice to occur as it in fact does. Every rule is allowed to operate as far as it can, and when this is done everything fits together in harmony. The underlying confidence is that the purposefulness of actions (along with their details, accessories, etc.) is perfectly matched with the meaningfulness of texts.

While it is not explicitly stated, the subordinate elements treated in this Chapter seem to be those recognized by Bādari - materials, their properties, and preparatory actions (3.1.3). Elements which can be assigned more directly in terms of purpose--more important actions, the purposeful sacrificer, and the results themselves (3.1.4-6) -- are considered only in the fourth Chapter.

of the sacrifice. Rather, when it would serve no purpose it should not be done (or be introduced). Purposeful activity has clear results, and only if no results are forthcoming and nothing is perceptible should we rely on the scriptural word alone (and presume some purpose). (In other words, the mere fact of being enjoined is not sufficient to place an accessory in every context; if it has no purpose there, usually it does not belong there.

3.1.11-12 (E4.30-33; T344-346) A material is to be used only for that purpose for which it was introduced originally. When a material and a property have the same purpose (and thus the property belongs to that material) they pertain to single purposeful action, and are restricted (to use in that action and functioning together).

3.1.13-15 (E4.65-95; T357-361) When a material is mentioned in the singular number (i.e., with 'singular' as one of its properties), this does not mean that only one of those materials should be acted upon; only when the number is specifically prescribed should it be attended to.

3.1.16-17 (E4.96-98; T363-364) Properties mentioned with preparatory actions are intended to restrict them, because they are connected with the purpose defined in the original injunction.

3.1.18 (E4.99; T366) When preparatory actions are found to be useless at the primary rite, they pertain to its subsidiary rites instead.

3.1.19-20 (E4.102-103; T368-369) Although a property of the performer does not inhere in the action itself, it is part of the statement of the action, because by definition (cf. 2.1.46) the statement is not complete until it has all it requires to express the purpose; and the statement (requiring this property) is incomplete by itself.

3.1.22-23 (E4.111-114; T373-375) Properties which are each subordinate to something else in the same way are not connected with one another directly.

3.1.24 (E4.116; T377) That two elements are mentioned next to one another in a text does not indicate that they are enjoined as connected with one another.

3.1.26-27 (E4.119-120; T379) A subordinate element connected with a property of another element is restricted to that second element. This is so even though the subordinate element and the property are not purposefully connected to one another (i.e., the subordinate element does not 'help' the

property in any way). For both are connected to one purpose (that of the second element). The mention of the property of the second element is intended to specify (the second element as that to which the subordinate one is connected), and this indirect indication is related to the purpose of that second element.

SECTION TWO

3.2.1-2 (E4.123-130; T382-386) *Mantras* too are subordinate elements due to their ability to denote the goal (of the action occurring). The *mantra* is related to that purpose, which is the unchanging element in the original injunction. Because *mantras* prepare what is enjoined, they are not subordinate to what is not enjoined (i.e., forms of words modified for special situations. (See 9.1.36-44.)

3.2.3-4 (E4.133; T387-388) Certain *mantras* are prescribed for use in contexts where what their words denote is not present, and so they are not used literally (e.g., when the deity invoked is not the deity of the sacrifice); rather, they can be understood to denote some property in the prescribed context (by some qualified meaning), even if this denotation in particular is not enjoined in scripture.

SECTION THREE¹

3.3.1-8 (E4.196-203; T437-440) References to particular kinds of texts (in verse form (*ṛg*), sung (*sāman*), whispered (*yajur*, etc.) pertain to whichever of the three Vedas contains those kinds of texts, not to individual texts or kinds of texts (from whichever Veda).

3.3.9 (E4.204; T441) When primary portions of a text pertain to one Veda while secondary portions pertain to another, the text belongs to the former, because the text relates primarily to that Veda's purpose.

3.3.10 (E4.211; T443) If pertinent to two Vedas, a text belongs to one with which it shares more in common.

3.3.11 (E4.213; T445) When an element has no clear

¹The section discusses whether references to 'Rg', 'Saman', and 'Yajur' refer to the Veda with those names or to the kinds of texts defined in 2.1.35-37. It is interesting both that the discussion recognizes the status of the three Vedas as texts, and, indeed, that the question even arises.

connection (with a text, rite), this should be determined from context - from the fact that the action requires some procedure of enactment (which has to be discerned in some text).

3.3.12 (E4.215; T447) The order of passages or actions also can indicate the connection, on the basis of several elements appearing in the same place.

3.3.13 (E4.218; T448) Names too can indicate connections, since that is their purpose.

3.3.14¹ (E4.219; T449) Thus (as described over the preceding sections, 3.1-3) there are six means of determining where elements belong: 1. explicit declaration; 2. indirect declaration (relying on interpretation of a text to discern what is meant to be enjoined); 3. statement (whatever unit is required to express a complete purpose); 4. context; 5. place in the text; 6. names. Each means is more immediately connected to the enjoined sacrificial purpose than that which follows it in the list and so takes precedence over it in cases of disagreement).

SECTION FOUR

3.4.18-19 (E4.388-389; T508) There is a general prohibition against (sleeping with one's) menstruating wife.

3.4.28,33 (E400, 415; T515,522) What is enjoined scripturally is never blameworthy; likewise, what is done in ordinary experience for an ordinary purpose is never blameworthy.

SECTION SIX

3.6.1-10 (E4.488-497; T574-582) What lacks a context is to be connected only to the archetype, lest it be repetitious (i.e., if it is connected to the archetype, it is automatically transferable to the ektype, and this need not be enjoined).

SECTION SEVEN

3.7.1-5 (E4.547-661; T615-617) A subordinate element

¹We have now the second list - additional to that of subordinate elements - focusing the basic problem set forth for the Chapter: the assignation of the six subordinate elements to their right position according to these six means of correct knowledge in this regard. The complications that are from various combinations and possible conflicts are sorted out in the sections to follow (3.3-3.8).

mentioned without connection to primary or subsidiary rites belongs to both, since context does not restrict connection to the primary.

3.7.6 (E4.551; T618) (When there is some doubt,) because the result is connected with the sacrificer, and because it is the primary action which leads to the results, what pertains specially to the sacrificer belongs at the primary rite (which rite leads to the result).

3.7.18-24 (E4.562-567; T630-633) Even though the result accrues to the performer of the sacrifice, he himself need perform only those subordinate elements related to the primary act, the act of sacrifice. The rest may be done by someone else, as is indicated by the mention of 'payment' - he could not very well pay himself. But the number of other, paid performers is regulated by scripture.

3.7.32-37 (E4.572-579; T642-646) Not all those participating in the action are called priests (*rtvik*), but only those to whom the fee (*dakṣiṇa*) is given and who are called 'sacrificers' (*yajamāna*).

3.7.51 (E4.591; T656) The assignation of subordinate elements because of their names is based on perception, whereas assignation because of the general rule the ektypes are like their archetypes is based on inference. Usually, perception is more authoritative than inference, but because here the latter is based on scriptural evidence while names are secular in origin, the inference is more authoritative than the perception.

SECTION EIGHT

3.8.1-9 (E4.593-597; T659-665) Purificatory rites pertain to the main sacrificer because he is primary (3-4). The ascetical practices must be performed by him, as they lead to the accomplishment of the result (which is connected, by definition, with what is primary), as in ordinary experience (9).

3.8.18 (E4.6-4; T673) Recitation pertains only to the one knowing (what is to be recited). The ignorant person is not so commanded.

3.8.30-36 (E4.618-622; T687-694) Preparations of materials enjoined without specific context apply to both archetypal and ektypal rites. What is enjoined as specific (to the archetype), however, will not apply to the ektype, having no scope there. When the application of a preparation (from the archetype) will conflict (with what is enjoined as specific to the ektype), it must be omitted. Even if an element was

subordinate to both primary and subsidiary rites at the archetype, it will belong only to the primary rite at the ektype, since it has not been enjoined regarding the subsidiary rites found there. When a subordinate element cannot apply to a primary rite of the ektype, it applies to its subsidiaries, which are proximate to it.

3.8.41 (E4.624; T696) Indirect construals of statements are pertinent only when in accordance with reason.

CHAPTER FOUR¹ SECTION ONE

4.1.2 (E5.2; T709) Humans desire to have what gives them pleasure, and this is inseparable from their purpose (or goal).

4.1.3-6 (E5.7-9; T714-716) The surrender of what pleases the performer can also be for his sake, since scripture, which is indubitable, asserts this, and since such actions have no material object; however, they need not lead directly to the desired result.

4.1.7-10 (E5.9-12; T717-719) Materials related to the sacrifice cannot be offered according to one's own wishes (in hope of results). There are specific purposes which govern how they are used.

4.1.11-17 (E5.12-16; T720-725) The appearance of a word in a certain number (i.e., singular, dual or plural) is not insignificant, but tells us about the quantity of offering material; so too the gender of a declined noun can be significant.

4.1.18-20 (E5.17-18; T727-728) Sacrifices within sacrifices (*āśrayī*-rites) are of themselves effective and accomplish a

¹The purpose of this Chapter is announced by Jaimini in the first *sūtra*: an inquiry into the two kinds of motivation organizing the sacrifice, the external perspective of the performer (the *puruṣārtha* rites correctly organized lead to the satisfaction of the performer's desires), and the internal perspective of functional coherence (*kratvartha*): actions and materials are understood to be related to one another harmoniously). As mentioned at the beginning of the previous Chapter, it is possible to see this Chapter as a treatment of the three subordinate elements announced by Jaimini in 3.1.4-6 (performer, action, result) but not analyzed in the Third Chapter. Sections 1-2 treat the internal perspective, and 3-4 the human perspective.

purpose, even if preparatory of some material. They are subordinate, however, because within another sacrifice.

4.1.21 (E5.18; T729) The following *sūtras* (up to 4.2.30) deal with the varying relations of actions and materials to one another in terms of purpose.

SECTION TWO

4.2.23-26 (E5.53-55; T779-782) It is well known that actions require performers and can occur only within time and space, and that materials have qualities and require preparation. When details regarding these are mentioned, it is simply to specify which performer, at which time, etc.

4.2.27-28 (E5.55-56; T784-785) (Generally speaking,) 'sacrifice' is an action involving a material and a deity. 'Oblations' involve pouring.

4.2.29-30 (E5.56-58; T786-787) The specifications of procedure (regarding performer, etc.) are fulfilled in any particular performance; but when another motivating purpose (i.e., prompting another performance) is introduced, the procedure applies to that context just as immediately as to the first. (Each motivating purpose with its specifications constitutes a performance.)

SECTION THREE

4.3.1-3 (E5.59-62; T789-792) Materials, preparations and minor acts do not have their own results, since they are originally introduced as non-primary; and only primary action is fruitful.

4.3.4-7 (E5.63-66; T794-799) A sacrifice which occurs 'occasionally' (only on certain conditions) is a modification of (the original rite on which it is modeled) and so has a different primary aspect. But by alternation the same element can be part both of a permanent rite and an occasional rite (each having different results).

4.3.10-16 (E5.67-72; T801-807) If a sacrifice is enjoined without mention of any result, it should not be interpreted as 'pure (rewardless) duty'. Rather, on the strength of tradition, the injunction must be interpreted as purposeful. Because the injunction instigates a single action, one result should be assumed. Since heaven is the universally attractive result, it should be assumed as the result when none is mentioned. This can be induced (from observing ordinary opinions).

4.3.17-19 (E5.72-73; T808-809) Even if a result has not been directly stated, a text praising a sacrifice for its results legitimately identifies the result. This is preferable to inference, which is required when the text says nothing directly.

4.3.20-24 (E5.74-75; T810-812) Optional rites have as their result that which the person desires in undertaking them.

4.3.25-28 (E5.76-77; T813-815) When it is promised that a rite has 'all results' this is actually so, and means more than simply the results accruing to its parts; for the promise is made in the relation to the primary action. But such results occur successively, not all at once.

SECTION FOUR

4.4.1-7 (E5.87-90; T831-836) Actions not by definition truly sacrificial are subordinate not simply to those they are 'near' (in time or text) but to those which have results and which are by definition primary.

4.4.29-38 (E5.100-103; T853-858) In general, actions which have results are primary, while actions which lack their own results but are proximate to actions with results are subsidiary to those primary actions.

CHAPTER FIVE¹

¹This Chapter presumes that the basic structure and arrangement of the sacrificial system is known, and addresses the problem of sequence in enactment: because it is not possible to do everything simultaneously, sequence is necessary, even though the texts often do not provide for this. Various rules or 'protocols' governing precedence must be established.

The establishment of these rules of order is further complicated when the question of multiple subsidiary rites (pertaining to sometimes multiple primary rites) and the question of ektypal rites with their own peculiar actions in addition to those 'inherited' from the archetype are introduced, since then several levels of precedence must be synthesized.

The 'guiding principle' of this Chapter, beyond those stated below (particularly in regard to respect for what the text actually says and what makes sense), is the sense of proportion or harmony: actions must, where possible, be carried out in some kind of balance whereby if one action is postponed, other comparable actions should be postponed the same amount of time, etc.

SECTION ONE

5.1.1-2 (E5.106-109; T861-864) Two guides for order of performance are obvious: what the text explicitly says ('Do this, then do that'), and one action is known to precede another in terms of purpose (rice must be threshed before it is boiled and not after, firewood must be collected before the fire is built, etc.). The following sections suggest other ways in which order can be determined.

5.1.4-7 (E5.111-112; T866-868) Within a single rite, however, actions should still be performed according to the order given in the text (even when such an order is neither explicitly prescribed nor demanded by purpose). It can be inferred that the order stated in the text is actually intended, and so the acts should be performed in the order stated.

5.1.8-12 (E5.113-116; T870-871) Preparatory actions which are all enjoined for the same time (to be performed on a series of materials to be prepared) should be performed according to the first sequence actually adopted.

5.1.13 (E5.117; T873) Materials should be prepared in the order in which they are listed in the original prescriptive text.

5.1.14-15 (E5.118-119; T875-876) Subsidiary rites are performed in the same order as the primary rites to which they are subordinate, except where there is an explicit directive to the contrary.

5.1.16 (E5.119; T120) As a general principle, when the order suggested by the *mantras* conflicts with that prescribed by the *brāhmaṇas*, the former order is adhered to, since the *mantras* are effective in action and thus have priority over what merely speaks about action.

5.1.17-22 (E5.120-123; T880-882) In the ektype, the subsidiary rites should be performed according to any statements thus indicating order, but there is conflict between such statements and the order followed in the archetype, the archetypal order takes precedence, because of the inherent relationship of archetype and ektype. However, although the ektype should replicate its archetype, if another order can be inferred from the ektypal injunction, it takes precedence.

5.1.23-24 (E5.123-124; T884-885) Because the set of subsidiaries is related as a group to the primary rite, when one subsidiary is postponed or anticipated, the entire set beginning or ending with the one in question is likewise moved.

SECTION TWO

5.2.1-3 (E5.133-134; T897-899) When several primaries occur together (e.g., several animal sacrifices are being prepared at once), each kind of preparation is completed in turn, rather than each primary being individually completed (i.e., rather than the first being subjected to all the preparations before the second receives any).

5.2.9 (E5.137; T904) What is explicitly stated in the text takes precedence over what is logically concluded to. (See 5.2.21, wherein a perceptible connection - expressed in the original text - takes precedence over what is reasoned to; also cf. 5.4.23-24)

5.2.17-19 (E5.141-142; T910-912) When at the ektype additional subsidiary rites similar to those already enjoined for the archetype are found, the additions occur after all those pertaining to the archetype are completed. For only what has been enjoined (i.e., the complete archetypal set of subsidiaries) can have further accessories added to it.

SECTION FOUR¹

5.4.1 (E5.162; T945) The order suggested by a text is violable due to some specific declaration to the contrary, or to some change of purpose.

5.4.2-3 (E5.163-164; T947) The order found in the primary rite takes precedence over the order established by attention to the first sequence actually adopted (see 5.1.8).

CHAPTER SIX²

¹This section elaborates rules by which the rules for sequence can be superseded.

²The main concern of this Chapter is that combination of elements which constitutes the sufficient condition for a sacrifice actually to happen: performer + offering material + action. Previous Chapters dealt with the abstract right relationships which this performance presupposes, while this Chapter deals with the right circumstances for it actually to take place (or, if imperfect, to be fixed or expiated for, etc.). Only when the right people and materials are together at the right time, can the right action occur, continue and be successfully completed.

Actions, materials, and performers are considered together (in pairs or all three), according to various combinations and

SECTION ONE

6.1.1-3 (E5.173-182; T964-969) When materials are connected with actions, they are subordinate (*guna*) to those actions, even though the action cannot be accomplished without the materials. The action is of primary concern in the text, and the materials are interrelated in terms of the action, for the sake of which alone they are mentioned at all.

6.1.4-5 (E5.185; T972-973) (Objection:) Because actions are for the sake of their results, injunctions of action apply to everyone (because everyone desires results).

(Answer:) Rather, the injunctions pertain only to (authorized) potential performers, because (the actions and their results) are connected with these in scripture. Injunctions must be construed in terms of the whole context, not in isolation.

6.1.6-9 (E5.187-189; T976-978) (Objection:) Scripture uses the masculine gender in mentioning the performer, and so only men are eligible. (This is Atiśayana's position.) Moreover, this has already been explained, when it was stated that only those who know the scriptures can perform sacrifices (3.8.18); women are not allowed to study the scriptures, and so cannot sacrifice.

(Answer:) The texts do not specify males only, and it is the human species that is meant. Therefore women too should be included.

6.1.10-16 (E5.190-191; T979-981) (Objection:) Sacrifice requires possessions, so only men, who alone have possessions, can sacrifice. Women own nothing, and indeed are like other possessions, in terms of being bought and sold. They exist for their husbands' sakes, and so too their actions (even their parts in the sacrifice) are for their husbands.

(Answer:) Like men, women desire results and act purposefully; there is nothing to distinguish them in this regard.

possibilities. Traditionally this theme is generalized with the Sanskrit word '*adhikāra*', meaning 'eligibility', 'competence', 'domain', etc. But because '*adhikāra*' is usually understood to pertain to the performer alone, use of the word can in effect narrow the topic too much. Interest in the performer, his caste, sex, etc., is not anthropology for its own sake, but intends to specify who can perform what has been carefully set forth in the texts.

Their being 'purchased' is merely a ritual action (cf. 19). Moreover, texts tell us that they do have possessions (cf. 20).

6.1.17-24 (E5.191-201; T983-993) Women cooperate in one rite with their husbands. Their participation is 'giving a blessing' and 'being chaste'.

6.1.25-29 (E5.208-210; T994-997) Against the view that members of all castes without distinction can sacrifice (because all desire the results), the text cited (above) limits performance to the three castes which install fires. (According to Ātreya, installation of the fires is for the three castes, but actual performance only for the Brahmins.)¹ Bādari claims rather that the text indicates merely the time for installation by these three castes, and is not meant to exclude others. This latter view is incorrect, due to other texts which indicate that this one should be taken literally and restrictively.

6.1.30-38 (E5.210-214; T998-1002) It is not true to say that the exclusion of *śūdras* is due to some defect in them, because if so they could choose to make up for these defects. Rather, it is by explicit statement that the Veda is simply restricted to *non-śūdras*. Lack of knowledge of the Veda is not a defect they can remedy, as they might remedy a lack of other kinds of knowledge, and without this knowledge they have no status with respect to the sacrifice. (Notice that the text thus strives to exclude *śūdras* on only the most restricted grounds, which do not pertain to their 'inner worth' etc.: they lack one of the 'materials' required by sacrificers--knowledge, and lack this not due to some inability to learn, but due to a prohibition against their studying.)

6.1.39-43 (E5.214-216; T1003-1006) Even though the action is accomplished only with materials, lack of property is a deficiency which is not permanent and which can be remedied; it does not permanently exclude otherwise eligible high caste persons. A person lacking a limb is not disqualified,

¹That Ātreya holds this more conservative view conforms to the most straightforward reading of the *sūtra*. But Sabara interprets his view to limit sacrifice to the three castes, and not just Brahmins. Favoring Sabara's interpretation is the fact that the argument proceeds to discuss *śūdras* as distinct from the upper three castes, not Brahmins as distinct from the three lower.

for the same reason, but a person without the right lineage (three *ṛṣis* among his ancestors) is disqualified, since this is a permanent and fundamental defect.

6.1.44-50 (E5.217-219; T1008-1010) The 'chariot-builder' is competent to sacrifice, even though a *śūdra* is not, because the text says so, and no one else could be meant.

SECTION TWO

6.2.1-2 (E5.221-223; T1013-1014) The human goal (=pleasure: 4.1.2) is accomplished only in individuals, and so each individual is authorized to sacrifice and accomplishes that goal. What is said regarding one person in the original text applies 'by division' to many - just as is the case with 'seeing something'.

6.2.3-12 (E5.224-230; T1016-1022) The sacrifice cannot have whatever number of performers as wish to participate, even though each performer participates for his own goal and achieves it through the sacrifice. For the performers are connected with the performance and enjoined for its purpose and needs.

6.2.13-18 (E5.230-233; T1023-1027) Once a sacrifice is begun, the performer is constrained to finish it, precisely because he has begun it. By contrast, ordinary activities may be stopped whenever the performer wishes (even if incomplete), and there is no reason to postulate texts requiring that such acts be completed. Scripture pertains only to what cannot be known by reasoning.

6.2.19-20 (E5.234-235; T1028-1029) (Objection:) A prohibition does not merely enjoin that one thing should not be done, but prescribes that something other than what is prohibited should be done.

(Answer:) Rather, the not-doing is all that is enjoined regarding the performer. Prohibition is not the same as 'enjoining something else', and to conjecture some prescribed action would go beyond the point of the prohibition.

6.2.21-22 (E5.237; T1031) (General) duties, like anything else prescribed in the Veda, become obligatory not at birth but at the time of thread-ceremony (when the adolescent is initiated as a student).

SECTION THREE

6.3.1-10 (E5.242-250; T1039-1045) The purpose of the sacrifice is accomplished through the performance of the main

action, and so the sacrifice may be undertaken by a man who can perform the primary action, but only a part of the subsidiary actions. This does not split up what was prescribed as one (i.e., primary rite with its subsidiaries), since the purpose is accomplished if even one of the subordinate rites is performed. However, this is not the case with optional sacrifices, which do not intend some purpose enjoined in scripture. If these sacrifices are not performed at all (because of inability to perform every subsidiary), no fault would be assigned.

6.3.11-12 (E5.250; T1046) Use of a (substitute) material does not differentiate rites, since neither the form ('deity and material') nor text change - just as various individuals of a species do not differentiate the species, and a single name can apply to many instances.

6.3.18-21 (E5.246-247; T1050-1054) Certain elements are integral to the sacrifice and cannot be altered without changing the sacrifice in an essential fashion: the deity (for whose sake the rite is offered), the fire, the originating text, and the sacrificer (who is in fundamental connection with the result of the sacrifice).

6.3.39 (E5.266; T1070) Since materials pertain to the sacrifice only in terms of their usefulness, when a material does not fit the purpose the purpose has priority (and a substitution for the material is made).

SECTION FIVE

6.5.48 (E5.320; T1144) The 'degraded' is that which is unfit for an Aryan to eat.

6.5.49-56 (E5.320-324; T1145-1152) When two (expiatory) actions are prescribed to happen simultaneously, it is optional which is done first. When earlier and later statements conflict, the later take precedence.

SECTION SIX

6.6.1 (E5.325; T1153) (At sacrifices calling for multiple performers) only those of the same *kalpa* (i.e., a grouping of family lineages (*gotra*)) can sacrifice together.

6.6.16-32¹ (E5.331-336; T1163-1171) Since only Brahmins can be priests, these multiple performers must be Brahmins (16-23). Because only those of the Viśvāmītra family (*gotra*) can be *hotr* priests, the multiple-performer sacrifices are therefore limited to Brahmins of that family. And among these, only those who have already installed their own fires are competent (27-32).

SECTION SEVEN²

6.7.1-13 (E5.339-344; T1176-1185) The 'everything' to be given away includes only what is under one's power. It excludes: that which does not belong to him; the earth, which belongs to everyone; things which it is forbidden to give away; things which are his impermanently; *Sūdras*, because the law forbids this; what is needed for the rest of the sacrifice: the fee, certain materials, etc.

6.7.31-40 (E5.351-355; T1197-1201) Sacrifices are the domain of human beings; but men do not live 1000 years, and sacrifices are to be performed by individuals (i.e., not by families over generations). The only solution is to take 'years' as figurative: 1000 days are meant.

SECTION EIGHT

6.8.30-42 (E5.368-373; T1222-1228) Even though the word 'animal' is generic, we know from common usage and the *mantras* that in practice it is restricted to mean 'goat' (in texts referring to animal sacrifice).

CHAPTER SEVEN

¹The right of the upper three castes to sacrifice, and the possibility of multiple-sacrificer rites, were established, respectively, in 6.1 and 6.2. Here the right to actual performance is shown to be much more restricted, on the grounds that at multiple-sacrificer rites the sacrificers themselves are the priests (which is not the case at simpler rites, where the sacrificer hires priests).

²At the Viśvajit sacrifice the sacrificer is enjoined to give away everything; what is included in 'everything'?

SECTION ONE

7.1.1-12 (E5.374-386; T1229-1239)¹ (Objection): Subordinate elements are attached to a primary element, so assigned due to the authoritative nature of the original archetypal setting (as governing 'future' settings too; 2.5). This is analogous to the way in which certain generic properties pertain to any number of individuals (2), and to the way in which words apply to a variety of individuals of a species (8). Or, a performer remembers the subordinate elements and performs them along with the primary performed in the new setting (10).

(Answer:) Only injunctions can make the subordinate elements occur in new settings, just as it was due only to the original injunction that these elements occurred in the original setting in the first place (3,7). 'Carrying over' based on resemblances or memory or the general power of words is not a proper analogy. Language 'generates' both the action and the purpose of the action, embodying them in the situation of the new ektypal rite (9,12).

SECTION TWO

7.2.1-13 (E5.394-398; T1252-1259) "Sāman" refers to the act of singing and not to the words which are sung. When the specific words do not apply to a new context, they should not be used, although the singing may still be done.

SECTION THREE

7.3.1-4 (E5.402-404; T1266-1268) When the same name is used to indicate two sacrifices, the two named sacrifices are not of equal status, and one of them is derivative of the other (i.e., gains its details from it). This is because the name has an

¹The first *śūtra* recalls the preceding six Chapters and uses them to introduce the subject matter of the next Chapters. It asserts that when the primary (=fruitful; see 4.47, 34) portion of a rite is 'divided off' for the sake of ektypal forms, it does not necessarily bring with it all the subordinate elements (*śeṣa*; see 3.1.1-6) which did accompany it in the archetypal setting. Rather, these subordinate elements are introduced only where there is scope for them (*adhikāra*: the sixth Chapter). The variations are all due to the authority of scripture (the first Chapter).

original relationship with one and not both of the sacrifices. Which is the original rite is known from the perceived presence of some quality connected with it (and not with the other).

7.3.28-29 (E5.418-419; T1291-1292) Reference to the produce of an action (e.g., a basket) is not a reference to the action (e.g., weaving). The form (*rūpa*), what appear (i.e., the accomplished thing) is meant, independent of any action.

SECTION FOUR

7.4.1-12 (E5.424-433; T1300-1311) A rite enjoined without details as to the manner of performance must have some other rite as its precedent; its procedure cannot be merely an ordinary, common-sense way of carrying out the action.¹ Which rite is the precedent is known due to some indication or clue on the basis of which an inference is made. A single such clue is sufficient to warrant the introduction of the entire other procedure. Thus, if someone is cooking rice, it is sufficient to taste a grain or two to know if all the rice is done. Only if no clues are available can some ordinary procedure be devised.

7.4.5-10 intervene, asking whether the appeal to indication (*liṅga*) is sufficient to prevent a borrowing of ordinary procedure. The argument is that even an indirect clue recalls the Vedic purpose and is authorized by the basic injunctive power of the Veda (and so does take precedence over the mere presence of the possibility of ordinary procedure.)

CHAPTER EIGHT

SECTION ONE

8.1.1-2 (E6.1-2; T1320-1321) All that Jaimini says to introduce the subject matter of this brief Chapter is that it is concerned with 'specification' (*viśeṣa*), and that indications - indirect, implicit 'signs' on the basis of which we can assume or infer (something not said explicitly in the text) guide us in making specifications.

8.1.3-19 (E6.4-12; T1323-1326) This Chapter deals with ritual information by nature too specific to summarize. Two points, however, are noteworthy.

¹'Common sense', but not necessarily a way totally ordinary and unrelated to ritual; it may be common sense to perform this rite like some other rite one has performed.

First, the fact of derivation is expressed in terms of 'actualization' (*pravṛtti*). What is introduced from the archetype into the ektype is actualized or set in motion there - it happens in the new context. This way of talking about the derivation process is in keeping with Jaimini's emphasis on act instead of essence.

Second, the examples offered in 8.1.3-19 form a single elaborated structure of multiple derivations: archetypal rites and their ektypes, which in turn are archetypal for other ektypal rites. The examples thus are not random, but establish the overall pattern for sketching out the entire sacrificial system. Moreover, the pattern of 8.1.3-19 in turn establishes the pattern of cases for sections 8.2-4, wherein aspects of the initially outlined structure are examined in greater detail.

8.1.20-22 (E6.12-14; T1337-1338) The archetypal sacrificial act itself cannot be transferred to an ektype, since the act is the essence of the rite, its purpose. Because they are parts of the basic act, the result, defining restrictions, agent and the group of smaller rites (composing the main rite) belonging to the archetype also cannot be transferred.

8.1.23-25 (E6.14-15; T1339-1340) Smaller optional (desiderative) rites-within-rites are transferable, since they contribute to the internal coherence and operation of the rite and do not change from context to context.

8.1.32-34 (E6.18-19; T1346-1347) When a deity and material are found incompatible, the material takes preference (and another compatible deity is introduced), since due to it the rite is liable to description, and it is connected (more intimately) with the action. The deity is mentioned as accessory to the rite.

8.1.35-43 (E6.20-23; T1349-1353) Indications which serve to identify archetypes include similarity in color, consistency, etc. (between materials used at the ektype and various potential archetypes), depending on which similarity is judged more important.

SECTION FOUR

8.4.28 (E6.54; T1407) When conflicting indications appear together, none of them justifies actualization. The ritual order must be regulated in the original setting, and in such conflict the purpose would be moved about (arbitrarily). Therefore, explicit statements (and not indications) would have to be relied on.

CHAPTER NINE¹

SECTION ONE²

9.1.1-3 (E6.56-68; T1417-1424) The act of sacrifice itself, created through the injunction, is primary in relation to all else; preparatory actions and the material prepared are motivated by that primary purpose.

9.1.4-5 (E6.70-71; T1427-1428) Neither the result of the sacrifice nor the deity to whom the sacrifice is offered are primary; they are enjoined as subordinate to the action.

9.1.6-10 (E6.72-81; T1429-1437) (Objection:) The deity is primary, because he is like a guest for whom a meal is prepared, and is the 'lord of wealth' (or 'of purpose' and so is the one to grant the wealth, fulfil the purpose, desired).

(Answer:) No, the act of sacrifice is primary because that

¹The topic taken up in this Chapter is the modification of actions and words, and is a sensitive one for those, like Mimamsakas, who respect the absolute and eternal authority of the Vedic text. There are changes that have to be made in actions (e.g., when the material used at the ektype is not subject to the same preparations - rice can be husked, but not gold pieces, etc.) and texts (e.g., when the *mantra* mentioned one deity and the ektype calls for the mention of two others) to 'fit' ektypal situations, but often there is no explicit authorization for such changes. When, and under what limitations, is such change possible? Under what circumstances is modification necessary (and therefore authorized)?

The term used to indicate such change is *vikāra* - 'to do differently' or 'to modify'. Thus, the question pertains to 'doing' and 'not doing', and this fits the general concern of the text as a whole: *karman*, action. Because action must be purposeful, the decision to change or not change depends on the identification of purpose: what is the purpose of some element (word or act or material), and does that purpose still exist at the ektype? In general the Mimamsakas are cautious and conservative on this matter; whenever possible, change is avoided. Yet they are equally strong in insisting that changes must be made to maintain the purposefulness and meaningfulness of the text.

²The question of the motivation of the sacrifice as a whole is first addressed, because the sacrifice is conceived as a collection of smaller purposes cooperating for the accomplishment of a larger one. When the larger, overall purpose (*prayojana*) is identified, exceptions and complications relating to the integration of the whole according to that motivation can be discussed.

is what scripture brings about; the deities are only secondary in scripture. A guest is primary, because his pleasure is primary; but at the sacrifice (divine) pleasure is absent.

9.1.11-19 (E6.81-87; T1438-1443) When the grouping of a certain number of materials¹ is designated, it is still the overall purpose (of those materials) which integrates the grouping and not the number itself, etc. If the materials themselves motivated the grouping, it could pertain in every situation. The materials in the grouping are not related to one another by any explicit injunction and are interrelated only in terms of the overall sacrificial action which motivates all its details.

9.1.36-44 (E6.107-118; T1464-1477) *Mantras* are subordinate (and integral) to the sacrifice by expressing the meaning (i.e., of actions which are performed). When the meanings they are supposed to express are not present, they obviously cannot be spoken of. The *mantra* must instead be used to express something else (and so requires modification. Nor can they (instead) function by being interpreted to refer to something secondary. When what they refer to primarily is present, they can be modified (in secondary details) to apply to the ektypal context.

SECTION TWO

9.2.1-13 (E6.131-137; T1490-1500) *Sāmaṅs* are ('acts of) music, and the material used in this action is the sung verse. Nevertheless, they cannot be sung with another set of words. Since the word are not to be modified, they should not be used at all.

9.2.29 (E6.154; T1521) When two elements serve the same purpose, it is optional which is used, unless there is a direct statement restricting the use to one of them.

9.2.40-47 (E6.163-170; T1534-1541) The right order (*dharma*) of elements must be purposeful, and so conflicts between the modifications of materials and their properties are forbidden. (To avoid conflicts) they must be ordered according to the injunctions (which introduced them in the first place)

¹The Sanskrit compound I translate as 'the grouping of a certain number of materials' is translated piecemeal by Sabara: 'Regarding "materials", "numbers", and "groupings". But the basic issue of motivation is unchanged.

(40).¹ The materials and properties can appear in the ektypes (where they may not be explicitly enjoined for the ektype) which is purposeful there. When only some of the details pertain without conflicting, they can be introduced at the ektype and the rest omitted.

SECTION THREE

9.3.1 (E6.179; T1552) Elements expressed in the original injunction pertaining to the archetype should appear without modification in the ektypes of that archetype.

9.3.10-14 (E186-188; T1561-1563) What is illogical should be modified and (done or said) purposefully, since what is purposeless is never enjoined.

9.3.15 (E6.189; T1565) When two modified elements performed, since the two are of equal status (regarding textual authority). When one is secondary, the option is not legitimate; for the secondary pertains only to a part and not the whole, (and so is less important than that which has properties).

CHAPTER TEN

SECTION ONE

10.1.1-3 (E6.241-243; T1635-1637) When an archetypal injunction goes into effect in an ektypal context, *mantras*, preparations and materials (from the archetype) appear only when useful in that new context, since their presence there has not been enjoined.

10.1.4-8 (E6.246-250; T1642-1646) The rite initiating the entire sacrifice need not be repeated at each subsidiary rite, since it pertains to the primary rite. When there are several connected primary rites (at a more complicated ritual) the one initial rite still suffices for all.

10.1.9 (E6.250; T1647) Actions preparatory of certain materials should not be performed when those materials are missing from the new rite.

SECTION TWO

10.2.1-2 (E6.272; T1678) Even if a preparatory action appears useless when applied to a new material, it should

¹Sabara offers a more complicated construal of the long compound and therefore introduces more sub-topics; but the basic question remains the same. Cf. n.1 on 9.11 above.

nevertheless be performed when explicitly enjoined.

10.2.22-28 (E6.280-282; T1692-1695) The gift to the priests at the end of the sacrifice is not a purely ritual action (*dharmamātra*: i.e., one performed 'for its own sake' and not for any practical purpose); it is payment for their services. It is clearly connected with the work they have done, as in ordinary experience (where at the end of their task workers get paid), and motivates their action, which was for someone else's benefit (cf. 10.2.35-40; 10.2.60-62).

10.2.63 (E6.302; T1726) Even if a material used in a primary rite lacks a certain property, the action regarding the material is still done.

10.2.74 (E6.311; T1738) Properties which confound the purpose of the action should also be omitted, since the properties exist at all only for the sake of the purpose.

SECTION THREE

10.3.1-12 (E6.313-317; T1739-1744) When the primary rite of the archetype occurs at the ektype, the several secondary rites connected with it at the archetype likewise occur. They are not to be thought of as additions, but as integral parts of the new occurrence; for the original injunction enjoins primary and secondary together as a unit. Even so, the distinction between primary and secondary remains. In general, the arrangement originally enjoined for the archetype pertains without change to the ektype as well, and in both settings everything exists for the primary's sake, since both archetype and ektype originate in the same injunction (wherein the priority of the primary is set forth).

10.3.18-22 (E6.321-323; T1750-1752) A preparatory action at the ektype is presumed to be the same one enjoined at the archetype, since the same injunction applies to both archetype and ektype. An exception would occur if something contradictory were thereby to result.

10.3.26 (E6.325; T1755) It is illogical to repeat what is completed.

10.3.39-44 (E6.330-335; T1765-1769) When a specific number is mentioned in the context of several kinds of enjoined materials, the number is reached by collecting materials all of one kind, even though the number occurs in the context of all the materials. For this is what people ordinary do in such cases.

10.3.53-55 (E6.340-341; T1776) The size of the gift (for

each priest) should vary according to the work performed by each.

SECTION FOUR

10.4.1-2 (E6.357-360; T1798-1800) If there is no basis for inferring that an action preparatory of another action is connected with the archetypal rite, it is known to be additional or new at the ektype. If there is some such indication, it is a modification of the archetypal.

10.4.23-27 (E6.378-383; T1824-1829) *Mantras*, in denoting their object (e.g., when invoking a deity), should use the word mentioned in the injunction (and not some synonym or descriptive word); for the force of the injunction reaches (and specifies) all subordinate elements (including *mantras*). This is so also when the *mantra* is used at the ektype. Since the denoted element (e.g., deity) is enjoined in the first place only with certain qualities, whenever it is mentioned those qualities should also be mentioned.

10.4.49 (E6.396; T1850) Hymns and statements of praise are not modified even when the cups (over which the words are chanted) have different deities at the ektype; for the cups are there for the sake of the action (of chanting), not vice versa.

SECTION FIVE

10.5.1-6 (E6.401-402; T1857-1859) When only several of a sequence of materials are to be introduced at an ektype, the first are chosen. This is so even though all the sequential elements are equally enjoined, because the first were 'activated' first. Chronological sequence itself is not authoritative, since the injunction simultaneously applies to the whole sequence. Sequence in actualization, however, is relevant.

SECTION SIX

10.6.51-58 (E6.470-473; T1956-1960) Even though the *sattra* sacrifice with multiple performers) is an ektype (of a sacrifice where the sacrificer is not the priest), its priests are the sacrificers themselves (and not hired priests) (52).

In doubtful cases, the more reasonable position is preferable (54).

That the sacrificers are their own priests is well-known, and explains why there is no gift at the end of the sacrifice since the gift is pay to priests distinct from sacrificers) (56-58).

SECTION SEVEN

10.7.24-34 (E6.498-506; T1993-2000) If the ektype presumes the procedure of the archetypal, what, if any, is the purpose of the repetition of archetypal injunctions in the specifically ektypal procedure (24)? If it is not meant to praise what is enjoined or to point out a property, and if the statement does not allow for modification (all of which would justify the repetition,) then it must enjoin something new: the repetition of whatever is mentioned the second time (27).

10.7.51-68 (E6.515-521; T2014-2024) When one of several contradictory elements is mentioned, the point of the mention is to select that one (and preclude the others; (51). Since secondary actions must be purposeful, one is introduced when (its purpose) is not already being served (58). So too, when a modified action has the same purpose as the archetypal one, the archetypal is omitted, since otherwise it would be optional as to which is to be performed (and option is to be avoided) (61). Of two contradictory elements, the one explicitly cited must be chosen; otherwise, without scriptural authority, there would be option (68).

SECTION EIGHT

10.8.1 (E6.524; 2028) Objection: When one statement seems to prohibit what is either authorized by a new injunction or archetypal, adherence to either is optional, because both the prohibition and the injunctions are legitimate.

10.8. 13-16 (E6.537-538; T2042-2044) A general injunction is subject to exception by express textual command. This is preferable to interpreting the 'exception' as a prohibition, for this would imply that the two statements, equally authoritative, are optional alternatives (enjoining and prohibiting the same action; this is illogical and undesirable) (15). If one statement is more specific than another, it is better to see the two as unrelated rather than to see them as options (16).

10.8.60 (E6.563; T2073) The presence of properties is indicative of injunctions, since the properties are subordinate to something else (i.e., that of which they are properties or are secondary to, and which must be somewhere enjoined).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

SECTION ONE

11.1.1-4 (T2080-2085) Distinct primary rituals constitute a single sacrifice when all are authorized by a single text and thus integrated by a single overall motivation, which pertains to them as a whole and not disparately. By contrast, merely subordinate actions (elements, *śeṣa*) are distinctly motivated each by its own primary action.

11.1.5-8 (T2086-2087) Distinct subsidiary actions (*aṅga*) contribute to the single overall sacrificial result, even if each is enjoined in a distinct text; for their overall goal is one, and the texts themselves only contribute to accomplishing that. But since distinct sacrifices do not share a single overall goal, they do not constitute a single action.

11.1.11-19 (T2088-2095) The several subsidiary actions pertaining to a sacrifice all contribute to the single sacrificial purpose of that rite, but no one of them alone is sufficient to accomplish that purpose. For a single text governs the sum of them and the injunction of performance is one, enjoining all the subsidiary action together and once, and not sequentially or separately. Hence the performance entails the doing of all and just one. Contrariwise, distinct sacrifices do not depend on one another for completion (and one may be performed without others).

11.1.20-25 (T2097-2100) The results of action occur only upon actual performance, and are proportionate (one performance, one result, etc.), as is the case in common areas of experience, e.g., agriculture (there is a proportion between the work done and the fruit). Each time the action is performed, therefore, the result occurs (20). The repetition of sacrifices duplicates the result, and performances re-occur whenever someone desires the result (21). Since this (arising of desire which prompts performance) is a matter of perception, the performances can be undertaken as one wishes; there is no scriptural prescription in this regard. Subsidiary sacrificial actions are governed by texts, however, and cannot be repeated as one might wish. (Thus, undertaking a sacrifice at all is a matter of personal decision; but within the sacrifice, performance of the actions is strictly governed by scripture).

11.1.26-28 In ordinary experience, action is defined by (perceptible) goals, and the action is complete when the goal is perceived to have been attained (26-27). By contrast, in matters

related to *dharma* and not governed by perception (i.e., pertaining to the purpose and result of the sacrifice), action is begun and completed only as scripture prescribes (28).

11.1.29-57 Even though the repetition of a sacrifice multiplies the results, subsidiary actions within a rite should be done only once (and would not increase the result by repeated performance). For they are prompted solely (by the main action) (30). They are enjoined once as a group, and they do not of themselves lead to the result, since they occur for the sake of the action (and only indirectly for the sake of the result) (35).

11.1.53-70 (Objection:) Since subsidiary actions are performed for the sake of their respective primary actions, when the latter is multiplied, the former are correspondingly multiplied (53).

(Answer:) If the proposed multiple subsidiary actions are identical, governed by a single text and oriented to a single purpose, they are indistinguishable, and a single performance of each subsidiary action suffices for the sake of all their respective primaries (55). They are performed multiply and sequentially only when for some reason simultaneous performance is impossible (58). Even if they are not contiguous with all of the primaries, they reach all, just as does the light of a lamp (60).

The performance of subsidiary actions may be divided, however, when there is a significant difference in the time prescribed for the performances of their respective primary actions (68).

SECTION TWO

11.2.1-4 The multiple primary rites (of a complex but single sacrifice) share the same time, place and performer, since all the rites are prescribed by a single text (1). If time, place and performer are not specified, their interrelation with the rites can be deduced, since time, place and performer are intrinsic to the definition of any sacrifice. When they are explicitly specified, however, this (otherwise superfluous statement) indicates particular connections of time, place and performer with particular primary rites (2). Specification regarding the time, place and performer of the subsidiary rites is unnecessary. If there is some specification regarding the primary rite, this governs the subsidiaries as well, since

subsidiaries are enjoined for the sake of their primary rite and governed by the same injunction (3-4).

11.2.10 Rites which share performer, time and place cohere as a whole and so share their subsidiaries, which can be performed once for all. (This is the idea of *tantra*.) When the three are not shared, the subsidiaries too will require distinct performance for each primary.

11.2.11-17 Within the complex sacrifice, differences of time, and injunctions identify distinct groups within the overall sacrifice and limit the possibility of common performance.

SECTION THREE

11.3.1-2 While subsidiary rites are performed at the time their primaries are performed, and at another time only if this is explicitly stated, the preparation of materials need not occur at the precise time of performance, and yet this preparation will serve the entire subsequent action.

SECTION FOUR

11.4.1-2 A sacrifice like the royal consecration is constituted of multiple complex rites for which the time, place and performers are not specified. A complete sacrifice does not necessarily occur entirely in one time and place, nor do all its component rites necessarily share their subsidiary actions. For each component rite has a distinct performer, and the subsidiaries are performed for each. The overall unity of a sacrifice like the royal consecration is in terms of the accomplishment of its overall goal, which was prescribed by the single original injunction (and this overall unity does not imply unity in all aspects).

11.4.23-24 Even rites which are enjoined by distinct injunctions share their subsidiary rites when all occurring in the same time period. When the time differs, however, the subsidiaries too differ, because they remain connected with their respective primary rites.

11.4.42-44 Actions preparatory of a single material constitute a single act (42). Since the *mantras* related to these acts denote that single material, when the acts are repeated (on the one material) the *mantras* are repeated (43). So too, when there is a different material, the *mantras* refer to the new material distinctly, and are repeated (44).

CHAPTER TWELVE¹
SECTION ONE²

12.1.1-3 (Objection:) When several sacrifices share the performance of their subsidiary rites, only those subsidiaries which are instigated by a single injunction (prescribing for them the same time, place and performer) can in turn share their secondary actions, which otherwise have to be repeated for each subsidiary.

(Answer): Because these subsidiaries and their secondary actions are enjoined in the midst of a shared performance, they too participate in the shared performance articulated in regard to the primary sacrifices. For that shared performance is not significantly differentiated by the subsidiary rites.

12.1.7 Shared performance based on the more distant (i.e., the archetype: *paratantra*) prevents shared performance based on the nearer (i.e., the new rules specific to the ektype: *svatantra*).

¹ This Chapter considers complications arising from *tantra*, that sharing of aspects of the performance which creates in effect 'intersecting spheres' of activity. If subsidiary rituals may be shared, does the sharing extend to actions secondary to the subsidiary rites? Also, when the ektypal rites are performed, the possibility of shared performance is likewise inherited from the archetype, and may lead to a plethora of elements which must be combined or treated as alternatives.

The traditional topic of this Chapter is that of *prasaṅga*, defined by Śabara at the beginning of Chapter 11 as the situation in which an action is enjoined more than once but performed once in fulfilment of both injunctions (in contrast with *tantra*, wherein an action, enjoined once and performed once, helps in two rituals). In general, however, this Chapter does not add any important new concepts to what has been expressed in Chapter 11. (There are several discrepancies in the numbering of the *sūtras* of this Chapter, due mostly to differing combinations or division of *sūtras*. I follow for convenience Jha's division in his translation, since for the purposes of this summary, the discrepancies are not significant.)

² This section refines the notion of shared performance by introducing a further complication: If primary sacrifices share the performance of common subsidiary rites, what about the various subordinate, secondary actions connected with the subsidiary rites?

12.1.10-15 What is already in use takes precedence (regarding future use) over the possible introduction, due to extended application, of elements not already in use (at the archetype).

12.1.42-44 Even when in the originative injunction certain actions are enjoined as separate, they may still share a single common performance, since the only point of the original injunction is that they be done (i.e., that their goal be attained - and not that each be performed separately) (42-43). However, change of place warrants the repeated utterance of *mantras* (44).

SECTION TWO

12.2.17 (What is enjoined for performance during a larger shared performance participates in that sharing as much as possible.

12.2.21 Since time is not a subordinate element of a sacrifice, the 'beginning rites' (which inaugurate the ceremony) cannot be shared by archetype and ektype.

12.2.22-25 When shared performance brings together contradictory relationships (*dharma*), the primary actions have priority (in the determination of which relationships to accept) - and not a solution which would preserve the largest number of the relationships (primary or subsidiary) (22-23). This (reference to the primary) is the standard for the resolution of contradictions within the subsidiary actions too, since these are performed for the sake of the primary actions (25).

12.2.27 In cases of conflict, what is more immediate to the primary action takes precedence.

12.2.33-34 A 'shared' archetypal performance must (in cases of conflict) give precedence to any new element (that would not otherwise appear), lest the injunction of it be purposeless. Additional elements should be shared, since there is nothing contradictory in this.

SECTION THREE

12.3.8-15 All the secondary actions prescribed for a sacrifice should be performed. When several serve the same purpose, one may choose among them as optional alternatives, lest the primary action for which they are performed have to be repeated (in order to allow for the performance of the secondary element). They could all be performed (as what

would be interpreted to be a purposeful repetition) only if so prescribed and prescribed for different times and not simultaneously.

12.3.25 *Mantras* are a means to action and therefore when the *mantra* is completed the action begins.

12.3.29 When *mantras* are recited together and several have the same meaning, they should be treated as optional alternatives.

SECTION FOUR

12.4.5-7 When several materials are intrinsic to a sacrifice, actions pertaining to each individually (such as 'purchasing' and particular preparations) are all performed, (i.e., without fear of repetitiveness).

12.4.8-14 (Because a material as modified for use in the ektype is still the object of purposeful action, when there is a choice among alternatives (i.e., as to which of the several modified materials should be used at a certain rite), what is done must be purposeful (and purposeless repetition must be avoided).

12.4.37 When two elements conflict, the one mentioned second is preferred.

12.4.41-44 Priests are chosen from the Brahmin caste alone, according to tradition.

5.2 JAIMINI, *Samkarṣa(na)kāṇḍa* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

(Verpoorten, pp. 6-7) "The 'Collecting Chapter' is a set of 465 *sūtras* divided into four Chapters and forming a supplement to the twelve Chapters...of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*. (It deals with sundry ritual problems, such as a subsidiary of the *agniṣṭoma* called *anuvāṣatjārayāga*, the sacrificial post (*yupa*), the *avadāna* or cutting of the oblations for each deity, the *varana* or appointment of the priests, and lastly, various kinds of *mantra*.)

"The tradition (the doctor Vedāntadeśika for example) is inclined to ascribe the SK to Jaimini. Indeed, the whole *śāstra* made up by the *Mīmāṃsā*- and the *Vedānta-sūtras* supposedly included 20 books. But if we add the 12 of Jaimini to the 4 of Bādarāyaṇa, this amounts to 16. The 4 books of the SK would thus suit very well to come up to 20.

"The SK is alluded to in the *Śabarabhāṣya* (on MS 10.4.32 and 12.2.11) but neither Śabara nor Kumārila have

apparently written a gloss on it. For a long time, the SK has been forgotten and its manuscripts have been discovered only lately. Its text was to be reconstructed and the last editions are satisfactory, even if complete certainty has not yet been achieved."

The *Samkarṣakāṇḍa* has been edited, with Devasvāmin's *Bhāṣya*, by S. Subrahmanya Sastri in *Annals of Oriental Research* and reprinted from the University of Madras in 1965. At the outset (p. x) Subrahmanya Sastri gives the "Analytical Contents of *Samkarṣakāṇḍa*", which we transcribe here with the usual minor stylistic emendations.

"The *Samkarṣakāṇḍa* consists of four chapters with four *pādas* in each chapter. There are three hundred and fifty-six *adhikaranas* (sections) in the whole work. In both *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* there is the convention that each *adhikaraṇa* should have *saṅgatis* or relationships with (1) the previous sections and (2) with the *śāstra*, (3) chapter and (4) *pāda*, in which each section falls, but [in] *Samkarṣakāṇḍa*, [it] being a collection of discussions that were left out in *Mīmāṃsā* for making it complete, no such relationship is needed. The author of the *Bhāṣya* explicitly says that we need not bother about *saṅgati* (p. 2). He rules out a *saṅgati* even for the first *adhikaraṇa* with the last *adhikaraṇa* of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* of which the present work is a continuation (p. 2). But with the exception of the first three *pādas* each *pāda* has a distinct subject to deal with. The first *pāda* begins with discussions about *anuvāṣatjārayāga*, a subsidiary sacrifice to the Soma sacrifice and proceeds with discussions about sacrificial fees, time, etc. In the second *pāda* there are discussions about the observances of the wife of the sacrificer, the *vegaimṛdha* and *pitryajña* sacrifices. In the third *pāda* discussions are carried on about the *sākamprasthāyīya* sacrifice and about the use of *mantras* in dividing the oblations for the various deities. The fourth *pāda* exclusively deals with *yūpa*, the sacrificial post. The four *pādas* of chapter II deal respectively with discussions about (1) the bricks used in building the sacrificial altar (*chayana*), (2) *avadāna*, the act of cutting or separating the oblations for each deity, (3) *praiśas* or commands of the chief priest, and (4) *homa* or offering the oblations. The four *pādas* of chapter III respectively deal with discussions about (1) times of sacrifices, (2) the sacrificial fire, (3) *grahas*, vessels filled with *soma* juice use in the Soma sacrifice, and (4) *varana*, appointment of priests. The four *pādas* of chapter IV carry on

discussions about (1) *mantras* recited at the time of kindling the sacrificial fire, (2) *nigada*, a kind of *mantra*, (3) *Vaṣatkāra mantras* recited just before the offering of oblations and (4) *yājyā mantras* which preceded [the] *vaṣatkāras*."

Subrahmanya Sastri then (pp. xi-xix) provides, in English, a brief summary of the contents of each section.

6 BODHĀYANA

(Verpoorten, p. 7) He "is mentioned in *Śabarabhāṣya* I.1.5 *sphoṭavāda*..."

7 BHAVADĀSA (?)

(Verpoorten, p. 7) "He is well-known to Kumārila who takes into account his explanation of the first words...of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I.1.1...and his treatment of...I.1.4. The latter *sūtra* was split up by Bhavadāsa into two parts. Thus the first sentence, which is a definition of perception (viz., 'That production of an idea in a person, when contact of the sense-organs is arising, is sense-perception', was severed from the second one that normally supplies it with a Vedic background, viz., 'and it is not a means (of knowing the *dharma*), as it apprehends (only) things existing at the present time' (*anumitam vidyamānopalambhanatvāt*). So considering perception to be a purely epistemological problem, viz. the arising of an idea from the contact of sense and object, Bhavadāsa provoked the hostility not only of the Buddhists for whom that is impossible, but also of the *Mīmāṃsakas* themselves who do not envisage perception as disconnected from its Vedic *dharma* (implicit with the word *animittam*.)"

8 UPAVARṢA (350)

(Verpoorten, p. 7) He "supposedly wrote a commentary named *Kṛtakoti*." On the other hand, V. A. Ramaswami Sastri, (VARS pp. 14-16), speculating on "*Kṛtakoti*", suggests that this may be the person referred in the *Manimekhalai* 'who has formulated eight *pramāṇas*', and reports S. Krishnawami Iyengar as identifying this *Kṛtakoti* with Bodhāyana. Ramaswami Sastri doubts this, since "*Bodhāyana*...cannot have accepted the eight *pramāṇas* but only six, or less than six, according to commentators. It will be well to remember here that the *Manimekhalai* is only a *romance* and need not be taken seriously" (!).

Ramaswami Sastri speculates on the date of Upavarṣa,

suggesting a date between 100 B.C. to 200 A.D. This assumes a very early date for Śabaravānīn, which later scholarship appears to have now abandoned.

9 BHAVADEVĀ, THE VṚTTIKĀRA

(Verpoorten p. 8) "Of this genuine philosopher nothing has come down to us except a part of his doctrine quoted by Śabara in his gloss on MS I.1.5. This 'Commentator' went a step further on the path of the realist and antibuddhist epistemology. Like Bhavadāsa, he divided MS I.1.4 but, moreover, interchanged in it *sat* and *tat*; this resulted in the following translation: 'That cognition is real (*tat*) sense-perception, which appears when there is contact of the sense-organ with the that (*sat* = the outside object).'

"And when asked how a cognition originating in such a contract can be differentiated from another deprived of it, the Vṛttikāra explained: 'When it is found that, at the time of the perception in question, there is no contact (of the sense-organ concerned) with any object other than the one perceived, it follows that the perception has appeared on the contact with the object actually perceived, it follows that the contrary is the case, the perception is taken as following upon contact with something other than the object perceived...How is this known when, for instance, a person taking a shell to be silver thinks: 'My eye is in contact with silver?'...[Answer:] When a correcting cognition is born: 'This is not thus, this is a false cognition'...When the *manas* (mind) is afflicted because of hunger, etc., or a sense-organ by *timira* (jaundice) etc., or the external object is (characterized) by extreme minuteness etc., then the cognition (is) false; if (all these are) not afflicted (by the above-mentioned disadvantages), the cognition is true.

"The Vṛttikāra may have lived within fifty years before Śabara, that is between 300 and 350 A.D."

(VARS p. 30) As Bhavadāsa's *Vṛtti* is not available, nothing can be said in regard to his views on *pramāṇas* and other topics. . But from a study of Kumārila's [*Sloka*] *Vārttika* and its commentaries it can be understood that he considered the two words '*atha*' and '*atah*' in the *sūtra* '*athāto dharmajijñāsā*' as one word in the sense of *ānantarya*; similarly, he divided the fourth *sūtra* into two, taking the former as laying down the definition of *pratyakṣa* and the latter emphasizing its unauthoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya*) on matters of super-normal *dharma*."

10 ŚABARA(SVĀMIN) (400)

Verpoorten, p. 8, indicates that nothing is known of the identity of Śabara, but reports some speculations—that "his real name was Ādityadeva, which was subsequently changed into Śabara 'Forester', for fear of the Jaina persecution. Perusing the text of the *Bhāṣya*, we could also gather that Śabara belonged to the Maitrāyaṇīyāśakhā."

10.1 ŚABARA(SVĀMIN), *Bhāṣya* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

Verpoorten, pp. 9-21, provides an extended analysis concerning the division of the text and its quotations, gives a summary of the 12 chapters, analyzes some liturgical and exegetical, grammatical and philosophical problems." Some of this is provided below, indicated by "V, p. —".

Summarized by Francis X. Clooney

"E" references through Chapter Six are to the incomplete edition published with Hindi comments by Yudhisthira Mimamsaka from Balagadha, 1977-1986. References beginning "E5" or "E6" are to the edition by the Anandasrama pandits in Anandasramasamskrtagrānṭhavalī 17, 1976-1983. "T" references are to the three-volume translation by Ganganatha Jha, *Śabarabhāṣya*. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 66, 73, 74 (Baroda: Oriental Institute 1966-1974).

CHAPTER ONE
SECTION ONE

1.1.1 (E1-9 ; T1-4) Words found in the *sūtras* are used in the same way as they are in ordinary language.

The inquiry into *dharma* is comprised of five parts which may be posed as these questions: What is *dharma*? What is the defining characteristic of *dharma*? What are the means to the attainment of *dharma*? What are only apparent (but actually false) means? What is the goal of *dharma*?

This inquiry presumes study of the Veda, since *dharma* is known from the Veda and not otherwise. *Dharma* requires study, because there is a divergence of opinion as to its meaning but *dharma* requires action, and one should not act without first ascertaining the meaning of what is to be done.

1.1.2 (E10-18; T4-7). The 'characteristic feature' (*lakṣaṇa*) of something is that which is pointed to to indicate the thing. Smoke, for instance, is the characteristic feature of

fire. Vedic injunctions are the characteristic feature of *dharma*, which cannot be known except through these injunctions.

As communicated by the Vedic injunctions, *dharma* is correctly communicated. For false communication is known as such when later information corrects or invalidates what is first said; but regarding *dharma*, no such later knowledge is possible: nothing ever negates the idea that heaven results from the sacrifice. Moreover, there is no possibility of error, since the text has no author and only authors can make errors. If the Veda were composed, its reliability would depend on that of the author, and authors are sometimes trustworthy and sometimes not. Moreover, since *dharma* is not perceptible, authors would not be speaking from experience, and would be like persons born blind speaking about color.

Even if ordinary (human) statements are fallible, the inference that Vedic statements too are fallible does not follow, since the knowledge gained from the Veda is perceptible and hence more authoritative than the inference. The 'good' is investigated in this investigation of *dharma*, because *dharma* has to do with the offering of sacrifices, and this action is what connects performers with the 'good'.

Texts enjoining *dharma* enjoin only the beneficial. Texts which indicate how one can effect what is harmful to others do not actually enjoin such harmful actions.

1.1.4 (E19 ; T8) *Dharma* is something which does not exist at the time of knowledge, but is still future. Perception, however, pertains only to what already exists at the present time, and hence cannot be a source of knowledge regarding *dharma*. Since the other means of knowledge - inference, analogy, and apparent inconsistency (which will be defined under 1.1.5) depend on perception, they too are not sources of knowledge regarding *dharma*.

1.1.5¹ (E20-57; T8-15) (Initial comment on the *sūtra*:

¹ (General Editor:) Verpoorten, pp. 17-19, has provided a helpful analysis of the most philosophically relevant section, viz. I.1.1-5, an account which serves to connect Śabara's analysis with those of subsequent commentators. We provide this analysis at the appropriate place, indicated by V with page references.)

(Clooney:) This section of the *Bhāṣya* is lengthy, and goes far beyond an elucidation of the *sūtra*. The section includes the comments of an earlier commentator called simply the *Vṛttikāra* (the

'Original' (*autpattika*) means 'permanently existent (*nitya*), since 'existence' is what is meant by 'origin' here. The relation between word and meaning is indivisible and thus words can be a source of knowledge regarding *dharma* - the Agnihotra sacrifice, etc.)

(V p. 17) "1. *Autpattikasūtra*: the relationship [of] word [to] meaning (*śabdārthasambandha*) is original (*autpattika*); i.e. everlasting (*nitya*), and infallible (*avyatireka*), being independent from the human will. Thence language (*śabda*) is a valid means of knowing the *dharma*."

A. The nature of awareness (and perception as the primary means of knowledge upon which all others are based).

(V p. 17) "2. *Vṛttikāragrantha*: the value of perception [is] limited to the visible world but fully valid in that sphere. Causes of defective awareness; weakness of the sense-organs; minuteness of the object; falsification of the first perception by the next sublative one.)

The *Vṛttikāra* says: i. The topic of the meaning of knowing *dharma* must be investigated, but not because (as is proposed) perception is a fallible instrument. Whenever there is an actual contact of sense organ and object, correct perception can follow.

Misperceptions - such as thinking shell is silver - are due to incorrect judgments made subsequent to perception. Scrutiny can show if the knowledge assumed gained is based on real sense contact or not. Misperceptions may be due to:

1. confusion of the data of several senses (a defect in the mind);
2. some affliction of the sense organ (a physical defect);
3. too great a subtlety or refinement of the object (a defect in the object).

When there are no apparent defects and no

commentator) and what appears to be an appended proof of the existence of the self. It may be of help to understand the following summary as divided into three sections: 1. Exposition of the means of knowledge: a. The nature of cognition (and perception as the primary means of knowledge); b. Indirect means of knowledge (those based on perception); c. Defense of scripture as a source of knowledge. 2. Analysis of the word-meaning relationship. 3. Proof of the existence of the self (*ātman*).

contradictory evidence we can conclude that the awareness is legitimate. No awareness is erroneous.

(V pp. 18-19) "*Nirālambanavāda* and *Śūnyavāda*: polemics against the Buddhists (*Vijñānavādin*) who deny any perception proceeding from contact with a mind-external object, and claim that perception in waking hours and dream are alike. The *Mīmāṃsaka* vindicates the reality of the outside world and dismisses the perception of the idea (*buddhi/vijñāna* = concept), for it is formless, nameless (*avyapadeśya*), and only inferable (*anumeya*)."

(Objector to the *Vṛttikāra*:) ii. (Objection:) Suppose all awareness is without a supporting object (*nirālambana*), like apparent perceptions occurring during sleep; these lack a real substrate (but suffer none of the three defects just mentioned)?

(*Vṛttikāra*:) But there is no basis for comparison of waking awareness with sleep, since it is not the fact of our being aware of dream that makes it unreliable, but the fact that it is sublated by other awareness - the realization occurring upon waking up, etc., that what appeared in dream was unreal. In other words, the apparent awareness in sleep is not an awareness at all and is not similar to waking awareness.

iii. (Objection:) Suppose awareness is empty (*śūnya*), because there is no difference in form (*ākāra*) between awareness and its content. For in an act of awareness it is the act that we are aware of., not an external object.

(*Vṛttikāra*): There is no basis to this objection: for the act of awareness is not an object of awareness, since it has no form; only external things have this form and can be objects of awareness. Moreover, awarenesses are momentary and do not persist long enough to be thus known.

(Objector): Suppose it is known as object precisely in the moment of awareness, just as a lamp is visible while it makes other things visible?

(*Vṛttikāra*): This too is not possible, since the act of awareness is known only thereafter, through first knowing the object of awareness.

The act of awareness, as formless, is not identical with the object, which always has a form; this form is the substrate of the act of awareness as known. Just as material objects are not known except when their substrates are present (e.g., a mat

is never known unless the reeds composing it are present), so knowledge is not known without the presence of some object of knowledge.

Hence perception is not fallible.

(V p. 18) 4. "Survey of the *pramānas* 'instruments of knowledge' (by the side of *pratyakṣa* 'perception'), namely *anumāna* 'inference' and its various forms. As to the word of the Veda (*śabda*, *śāstra*), it is the means of reaching what is not in touch with the sense-organs."")

B.(E28-30; T15-16) Indirect means of knowledge:

i. Inference occurs when an object not in contact with the senses is known because the knower sees the object with which the unseen object is invariably connected. Inference is of two kinds: a. inference based on a perceived relationship (when we see smoke, we know there is fire); b. inference based on a generalization (we know that the sun has moved when we find it in a different position, because we have perceived on earth that when a man is found in a different position he has moved).

ii. By scripture (*śāstra*) we become aware of objects not in contact with our senses, through knowledge of words.

iii. By comparison (*upamāna*) some similarity generates an act of awareness regarding some object not in contact with the senses. For example, seeing a cow-like animal brings to mind the cow.

iv. By presumption (*arthāpatti*) we conjecture something the non-existence of which would make implausible the existence of something we do see or hear. For example, we know that Devadatta is alive, but discover that he is not in his house; we therefore presume he is elsewhere.

v. When none of these means of knowledge can operate, we can argue from absence (*abhāva*), the non-existence of the alleged object which is not in contact with our senses.

(Verpoorten p. 18) (*Citrāvāda*: a debate between an objector arguing that the word of the Veda is no *pramāna* at all, because it expresses unreliable facts, and a answer which will show that these very facts (i.e. cattle as fruit of the *citrā* oblation and so on) are reliable, because the Veda answering their reliability is valid."

C.(E31-57; T16-18) Defense of scripture as a source of knowledge.

i. (Some sacrifices promise definite material results, such as cattle.) (Objection:) The alleged results of sacrifice - such as

cattle - should be perceptible, but are not. Whatever scripture may promise, there are no evident results to sacrifice. When the sacrificer finally does obtain his cattle (by purchase, etc.), there is no reason to attribute this acquisition to the sacrifice, which by then no longer exists. Therefore scripture is not a reliable means of knowledge. Moreover, scripture promises things contrary to perception, such as that the sacrificer will go to heaven upon death - when he dies, we see that he does not go anywhere.

(Answer:) The connection of the words and their objects precedes any human speaker, and is not due to human composition. Language constitutes an independent source of knowledge. So there is no way in which one can doubt such words by appealing to other means of knowledge.¹

ii. (Objection:) There is no connection between words and their objects: not as (material) cause and effect, nor by occasion and 'occasioned', nor as *āśraya* (locus) and *āśrayin* (what is located).

(Answer:) The relation is that of denoted and denoter, the named and the name, not any of those you suggest. This relation is prior to our usage, even though we learn about it through experience of language as used.

(V p. 18) 6. *Śabdārthasambandha* is the pursuing of the previous analysis.)

2. Language, i.e., word

(E34; T18-26) (Objection:) It is clear that words and what words denote are not permanently related (i.e., are only conventionally related), because a. the word is in the mouth and the object elsewhere, b. people distinguish words from things; c. a word composed of phonemes is clearly different from some material thing such as a cow.

(In response, definitions must be given of a. a word, b. the object of a word, and c. their relation.)

a. What is a word?. Upavarsa says that a word is a combination of phonemes.

(V p. 18) *Sphoṭavāda*: an argument with the grammarians about the *sphoṭa*. According to the realist viewpoint of the Mīmāṃsakas, a word is nothing more than the phonemes making it up.)

¹The latter part of the objection, regarding the sacrificer's going to heaven, is taken up at the end of the *Bhāṣyā* on this *sūtrā*.

Grammarians: By this definition words would communicate nothing, since no single phoneme in the word is able to communicate the object, nor even the sum of the phonemes, (since when one is being uttered the others do not exist). Nor can remembrance of the previously uttered phonemes lead to knowledge of the word meaning, since remembrance too is momentary.

(Answer:) Each phoneme effects a trace or impression (*samskāra*), which traces accumulate and finally communicate the meaning when the last phoneme has contributed its trace. This is so, whatever the popular conception of language is (i.e., people may think that words communicate, not phonemes) or analyses of action (i.e., the view that many actions are only parts of a single act) such as support the idea of a whole beyond parts (i.e., just as 'cooking' is not the aggregate of all the smaller acts involved, so too a word is not the aggregate of the phonemes). In fact there is no such thing as 'word' apart from 'phonemes', and no one experiences a word as separable from the phonemes.

If in a sense then the meaning is said to be known from the phonemes and not the word, this does not make it a figurative expression to say that meaning is known through words.

Nor is there any simpler presumption as to what must be assumed to make language communicative.

(V p. 18: "*Ākṛtīvāda*: the question arises whether the word points out a specific form (*ākṛti*) or an individual object (*vyakti*)." After a thorough discussion, the former view is adopted. The *ākṛti*, though, is conceived as a determination of the *vyakti*, because the latter alone is relevant in the liturgical activities.

b. What is the meaning of a word such as "cow"? The meaning is the common feature (*ākṛti*) of the denoted thing, not an individual instance of it.

(V, p. 18: "Thereupon, an objector would like to identify *ākṛti* and group notion, e.g., a group of trees that is a forest (*vana*), but this view is turned down by the *Vṛttikāra* who urges the fact that the *ākṛti* is grasped in each individual entity, while the group notion depends on apprehending a collection (*samudaya*).")

(Objection:) There is no such thing as a common feature apart from the individual thing denoted by the word, just as there is no such thing as a forest apart from the trees in it.

(Answer:) It is intelligible to speak of a 'forest' even though one sees only 'trees'. It is true that the 'group' (of trees) does not exist apart from the individual trees, but we can still speak of the group, the forest. In any case, the common feature is not something like a group-word; and no further knowledge negates the idea of common feature (even if 'trees' somehow negate 'forest'). Hence the reason offered against the existence of the common feature as the meaning of the word does not hold. (A full discussion of common feature occurs below, at 1.3.30-35.)

(Vp. 19) "*Śabdārthasambandhanityatvavāda* is taking up the discussion of the *autpattikasūtra* in order to prove that the word-object relation is everlasting and not liable to have been created by a *sambandhr*, a 'connector'."

c. What is the relation (*sambandha*) between a word and its meaning? When the word is known, that to which it is related is also known.

(Objection:) This relation is conventional (*kṛtaka*).

(Answer:) We have no evidence - from perception or memory or otherwise - of any supposed creator of the relations between words and what they mean. Nor is it possible that such a creator of language would be entirely forgotten, since conventional terms (artificial relations between words and meanings) rely on the authority of their creators for meaning.

It is true that words do not communicate their meaning on a first hearing, until the hearer learns from experience how someone actually uses the word. No one is known to invent such meanings, and it is simpler therefore to assume that there is no such creator than to presume there was one who has been forgotten.

If words were conventional, it would be inexplicable why it is that it is universally accepted that the letters 'c-o-w' refer to one animal. Moreover, how would someone create the word-object relationship without using already existent words?

Were words merely conventional, they could tell us nothing about imperceptible things - such as deities. For names are made only to specify individuals of which the general idea is already known; since we do not perceive individual instances of things like deities, their names would all be invalid if conventional.

Since language therefore is an infallible means of knowledge, the fact that the result of promised rewards from sacrifices is not known by perception, another means of

knowledge, does not negate the knowledge gained by language. That the desired result does not appear immediately after the sacrifice does not disprove the authority of language, since immediacy is not promised. That the result, when it does appear, has various perceptible causes other than the original sacrifice does not in any way detract from the perduring validity of language.

(V p. 19) "Atmavāda. In order that the reward (*phala*) of the sacrifice accrues to somebody, the permanent background of a personal subject must be laid down. To define the *ātman* or self, use is made of the Vaiśeṣika theory asserting that the determination allows us to understand the determined. In this case, it is cognition that implies the cognizer, that is a subject I (*aham*), gathering all the conscious states but being distinct from them..."

3.(E8-57; T26-31)¹ Certain activities such as breathing occur in the body, but the body remains and remains intact without them. The experience of pain and pleasure, etc. is not apparent to those who see the body from outside, while purely bodily qualities (color, size, etc.) are visible to others. These activities and experiences belong to something other than the body.

(Objection:) Not so; these activities and experiences simply exist, and there is no need to ask what they belong to. If we posit a self, we would have to ask what it belongs to, and this would be a never-ending process. It is easiest to posit simply the existence of knowledge.

(Answer:) But knowledge requires a knower, as the doer of the knowing. This can only be the self, *ātman*. Moreover, it is the self that makes memory possible: we can desire today what we perceived yesterday, only because of something that continues from day to day (and remembers yesterday's perceptions) - the self.

(Objection:) There is simply a series of cognitions, and desires occur after certain cognitions; but there is no basis for positing a self just because of this sequence.

¹Proof of the existence of the self, in order to support the validity of the texts promising the journey to heaven after death (in response to an objection raised above). Reasons why there is a self distinct from the body.

(Answer:) Desire is not possible without memory, and memory is not possible without prior awareness. The prior awareness must be based in the self, and not in a series of awarenesses which simply follow and 'know' one another, without any substrate. Only the 'I', not identical with awarenesses, provides unity for the series of awarenesses. Nor is there ever any further evidence which negates or calls into question the knowledge of the self.

That this 'I' exists is not proved by the mere fact that people use the word 'I', but rather by the fact of continuity from experience to experience. Even though this knowing self cannot be demonstrated for others, it is known to each knower. By a process of negation, we can discern what is not the self - the body, the breath, pleasure - until all that is left unnegated is the person knowing himself as the true self. Then, by analogy (*upamāna*), we can reason to the existence of a self like our own in other people.

Since acts of cognition are the means to knowing the knower, it is not possible to know the knower apart from such acts; for nothing can be known except through acts of cognition.

1.1.6-17 (E60-68; T32) A. (Objection:) Words perish, and words are not understood when first heard; hence a word's connection with its object (which does not appear and disappear with the word) is permanent. . (6)

(Answer:) If we can prove that language is permanent, it will be acceptable to assert that what is variable is the manifestation of language, not its existence. By human effort it is made manifest, having been unmanifest before the effort. Thus the appearance that words perish would not be affected by either viewpoint. (12)

B. (Objection:) As soon as words are uttered, they perish. Nor is there any reason to believe they continue to exist without being perceived, since they are not perceived even when there are no obstacles to perceiving them. Nor can it be said that it is not located so as to be an object of knowledge; for it is located in the (all-pervading space) *ākāśa* and hence should always be available to be known (7).

(Answer:) The variations are in manifestation and not in existence. Words are perceived only when there are contacts

and disjunctions (of sound waves); their 'non-existence' is simply the absences of these. Since the sounds of words are carried through the air, it will depend in part on the movement of the air in which the sound is moving whether or not some particular person's ear is touched by the waves (13).

C. (Objection:) People often refer to words as being made, and as such different from other words (9).

(Answer:) Again, this 'making' can be understood to refer to the use of words, not their creation (14).¹

D. (Objection:) What is eternal cannot be plural, except if some specification (differentiates the several instances), yet words are used to refer to several things at once (e.g., there are more than one referent for 'table', etc.).

(Answer:) Just as people standing in different places each see the sun from a different angle, so too a word appears different and plural to different listeners. It is only as the word strikes the ear of the listener that it seems to be localized, which would not be the case if it were heard where the sound is actually produced (15).

E. (Objection:) Words are modified when spoken together, a final vowel becoming a consonant, etc. (10); and what is permanent cannot be thus modified.

(Answer:) The word apparently modified is really just a different word and not a modification.²

F. (Objection:) When a number of people pronounce a word together, it is louder, and so each speaker is pronouncing a part of it; if the word were permanent and merely manifest by speakers, the sound could not increase (11).

¹The *sūtra* reads *karotiśābdād*, "because of the word 'he makes'", The third person singular form is the ordinary way of citing a verb, whereas in English the infinitive form would be given. It seems therefore that Jaimini is referring to the conjugation of verbs. Śabara's interpretation seems to read the *sūtra* as if it said 'because he makes the word'.

²Notice that Jaimini's *sūtra* can be interpreted to refer to the declined and conjugated forms of words, whereas Śabara's comment, for some reason, ignores this possibility and refers instead to vowels changed at the end of words before initial consonants, etc.

(Answer:) A word is partless and cannot be incrementally increased. It is rather the noise of the word which increases.¹

1.1.18-23 (E71-78; 37-41) Unless the word endures, communication would not be possible. Moreover, human ability to understand a word shows that it perdures from use to use. We cannot say that a word is understood because it is merely similar to a word already pronounced and impressed upon the mind, since such remembering would be unreliable, and since then the word-meaning relation would be created in each case - and we have already shown this to be an untenable proposal (under 1.1.5 above). Utterance cannot effect the use of the word and establish its connection with its meaning at the same time, so the latter must be already established prior to usage (18).

A word uttered once nevertheless refers to the common feature (*ākṛti*; see 1.3.30-35 for the discussion of 'feature' (*ākṛti*) and 'individual' (*vyakti*) as expressed by words.) If the relation of the word and the feature is not there already, it cannot be created, since the speaker would have to use the word in establishing the connection. It is the same class-word which is repeated regarding each individual (19).

Ordinary usage tells us that there is a perduring word: repeating a word such as "cow" we say that we have said "cow" "eight times", not that there are "eight 'cow' words". People understand that the eight uses are not merely similar, but are the same word repeated. The same word "cow" passes out of perception and is perceived when uttered the second and third times, etc.

The recognition of the repeated word as the same word differs from the recognition that an action or awareness repeated is the same action or awareness, since these latter are not actually perceived, as a word is. Since there a word has been perceived to exist, its momentary imperceptibility is no reason to conclude that it no longer exists. Words are never found to perish or end (20).

¹In Sanskrit, *śabda* can mean 'sound' as well as 'word', and retains the former meaning even when the latter is meant. The distinction is made here between word as sound (*śabda*) and mere sound, i.e. a vibration of the air (*nāda*). But some of the preceding arguments do not clearly make the distinction.

Some things are known to be perishable because that of which they are made is perishable; but word has no such perishable material cause (21).

It may be suggested that words are constructed out of wind (*vāyu*), but we do not perceive any wind particles in words and so this suggestion has no basis (22).

1.1.24-26 (E79-86; 42-47) (Objection:) A Vedic injunction such as 'Let him who desires heaven offer the Agnihotra sacrifice' does not say 'Heaven is attained due to the Agnihotra.' Each word has its own meaning, and there is no extra word to communicate the latter statement. Therefore, while the meanings of each word may be original and not conventional, the additional meaning of the sentence - that heaven results from this sacrifice - is either conventional or a mistake.

Moreover, words denote generally, whereas the sentence denotes something specific, and these are quite different. Since the meanings of words and the meanings of sentences are unrelated, there is no way to derive the latter from the former.

If sentences could communicate something new, beyond the meanings of the component words, this something new could be understood even by those who do not understand the component word meanings. If in some way sentences, like words, had original meanings, there would be no relation between the words and the sentence meaning.

Nor can we say that the words of the sentence specify one another. Each word has a general meaning, and this cannot be restricted or specified by another nearby word (24).

(Answer:) Sentences, as distinct from other words in them, have no meaning of their own, for there is no valid means of knowledge by which such an independent meaning would be known. Each word communicates its own meaning, and the cumulative effect of these word meanings, each specifying one another, is the sentence meaning. In this way the specific words of the sentence are themselves useful in the sentence.

Contrary to the objection raised above, the specialization of meaning in a certain sentence is possible, although the specified word still maintains its general reference elsewhere. The grouping of words per se adds nothing to the sum total of word meanings, but communicates only through the process of specification of the words by one another.

If sentence meaning were independent of word

meanings; there could be cases where the sentence is understood although none of the words is understood; but this never happens.

Nor is there any indication that the Vedic sentences are authored, any more than that the words of the Veda are conventional, so conventionality cannot be posed as an objection.¹

Hence the Vedic injunction can be understood to tell us that heaven is the result of the sacrifice (25).

The difference between the Veda and ordinary sentences is that ordinary objects are accessible to the senses, so it is possible for humans to compose sentences regarding them.

1.1.27-31 (87-93; T48-50) (Objection:) The names attached to each text cannot be those of expositors, since there can be many expositors (27).

(Answer:) The priority of words over their speakers has been explained under 1.1.5² (29). Certain expositors are remembered because of the excellence of their exposition (30). The apparent temporal references 'disappear' when explained in a certain etymological manner (31).

1.1.32 (E65-66; T50) There is no apparent sense to some of the Vedic sentences - e.g., 'The trees sit at the sacrifice,' 'The bull sings maddening songs'. But most Vedic sentences do make sense, and we therefore must respect the meaningfulness of the whole. Such apparently meaningless sentences should be interpreted so as to be useful, as praising some aspect of the sacrifice, etc.

SECTION TWO

1.2.1-6 (E128-138; 51-55) Objection: There are many Vedic statements which apparently do not contribute anything

¹This interpretation diverges from what the *sūtra* says. The force of 'for the sake of ritual action' (*kriyārtha*) in Jaimini's statement is that the sentence is communicative of *dharma* precisely because these words appear together in order to instigate or illuminate a certain action. The individual words, however, do not instigate action. It is only the sentence qua sentence and not as the mere sum of words that enjoins action. Śabara makes no reference, at least explicitly, to the action-orientation (*kriyārtha*) in his interpretation.

²Where the unbroken tradition of the Veda is referred to. Where Jaimini is referring to is not clear.

to action, or which appear to lack any plausible meaning. There are five ways that difficult passages can be interpreted as meaningful: A. Supplying what is understood as part of the statement but omitted (i.e., the statement is elliptical). B. Making changes in the words. C. Connecting parts of the statement which are not connected, or D. dividing parts of the statement which are connected. E. Interpreting the statement according to some secondary or figurative meaning.

The purposeless passages are not original parts of the Veda - or, even if original, they lack any enduring purpose (1).

The text 'The mind is a thief' could be interpreted usefully only as indirect injunction to lie, and this would contradict the explicit prohibition against lying. The text which states that fire is visible at night and its smoke during the day contradicts what we know to be true, that both can be seen night and day (2).

Certain statements make extravagant promises, such as 'He who performs this sacrifice gains everything, and so too he who knows this'; if credible, they would make all other knowledge and performance superfluous (4).

1.2.7-18 (E139-164; T55-64) Even though the injunction itself is sufficient to make action occur, and encouragement is not necessary, when words of encouragement are in fact present that is their purpose (7). The tradition treats the non-injunctive texts as parts of the Veda, just like the injunctions (8).

Sentences can express something indirectly, by referring to a property of what is meant. Thus, when reeds are the material at hand, a statement in praise of water indirectly refers to the reeds, since their origin is in water. Or, when one is warned against giving silver because this will cause tears, the indirect connection is that tears and silver have the same color, or that giving away one's wealth (here, silver) is painful and hence causes tears.

The mere knowledge of an event neither causes nor stops action (and so is useless in the Veda), but a statement of praise or blame will cause one to act or cease acting. Therefore texts apparently reporting temporal events are really encouraging certain actions. If necessary, several words in a statement can be taken as having indirect meanings (10).

It is stated in a text (one might think is incorrect) that one cannot be sure if he is a Brahmin or not. The statement is true, since a son belongs to his father, and women are known

to be unfaithful (and hence we cannot be sure who the father is (13)).

It is legitimate to praise knowledge, since when the Veda is recited in the family, the child becomes intelligent, will gain possessions and so have abundant food (15).

Even if one cannot really gain 'everything' from a sacrifice, differences in action do cause differences in quality and quantity of results (17).

1.2.31-39 (182-192; T74-79) If *mantras* were communicative of meaning, they would be used where that meaning was appropriate, and would not require any injunctions prescribing where they are to be used.

When a *mantra* states just what the injunction prescribes, it might be thought that the *mantra's* words are meant to preclude what is not mentioned (in order to salvage some meaning for the *mantra* beyond what the injunction says). Thus, the *mantra* referring to the holding of the horse's reins seems to preclude holding the ass's reins.¹

But preclusion has three defects: 1. It ignores the direct meaning of what is said (i.e., that the horse's reins are to be held); 2. It brings in as the meaning something not said (i.e., that the ass's reins are not to be held); and 3. It negates the point of the injunction (i.e., that reins (of whatever sort) are to be held). Hence the *mantra* merely repeats what the injunction has already said, and therefore has no purpose (31).

If it was the meaning that mattered, the words would not have to be spoken in a set order; since the exact order of words cannot be tampered with, we must conclude that their enunciation in this order is what contributes to the sacrifice, and not the meaning they express (32).

Mantras are memorized by students without reference to their meaning; hence the meaning is not important (37).

¹The injunction says, 'He takes the horse's reins and says the *mantra*, "Taking these reins..." Why does the *mantra* repeat what the injunction has already stated? Either because the meaning of *mantras* is irrelevant, or to make some kind of a restriction, such as 'not an ass's reins'. It is an added difficulty here that the *mantra* as cited here does not mention the horse explicitly; it is the grammatical construction that indicates that the reins belong to the horse. The problems with this aspect of the *mantra* do not occupy Śabara, but only the later Mīmāṃsakas.



1.2.40-53 (E193-211; 79-86) Words found in the Veda have the same meanings as they do in ordinary speech, and hence the *mantras* are expressive of meaning. Even though conversation with the deities, who are not perceptible, and with inanimate objects does not help the sacrifice, conversation with them serves to illuminate the various parts of the sacrifice (mentioned in the *mantras*) (40).

As for the example of the horse's reins: the point of the injunction is to declare that horses' reins are the ones to be held, not that holding is to be done. Therefore the *mantra's* effect of excluding the ass's reins does not negate the point of the injunction (and so avoids the third of the difficulties connected with preclusion; and therefore, by this preclusion of ass's reins, the *mantra* is shown to mean something beyond the injunction's meaning, and so is not meaningless) (42).

The words of the *mantra* can also be interpreted allegorically (e.g., standing for various parts of the sacrifice) or as deliberate exaggerations (e.g., 'Listen, stones!' suggests that if the stones listen, how much more Brahmins?) (46)

The meaning of *mantras* is easy to understand and therefore need not be learned; it is the memorization that is difficult and which requires injunction (48).

SECTION THREE

1.3.1-7 (E122-136; T87-98) (Objection:) Correct remembrance, the basis for the authority of rites without scriptural basis, has to be based on knowledge gained through perception; and none of the traditional (*smṛti*) writers experienced the things they write about. They are like a barren woman thinking of her grandchild's actions, or (in a long tradition) a series of blind men each relying on another blind man to understand colors (1).

(Answer:) *Smṛti* (regarding rituals not found in the Veda) entails knowledge. Actual perception is not its basis, since the origins of rituals are not the object of perception, and no one can remember what he knew in a previous life. It is rather based on the inference that, since the same people perform traditional and Vedic actions, there is some text which authorizes the traditional actions, just as the Veda authorizes the Vedic actions. Such inferred texts, if not extant, may simply be forgotten.

Other texts, such as those which urge respect for

teachers, etc. are authoritative because they serve visible purposes, are beneficial to society, etc. (2)

(This example of conflict between the Veda and tradition is given: The Vedic text prescribes touching the post at one moment in the sacrifice, while the tradition prescribes covering it with a cloth; if it has been covered, it cannot be touched.) 'Option' (a free choice between two alternatives) is possible only when neither of the alternatives is wrong. But one 'alternative' is stated in the Veda, and therefore it is right in every situation; if the other is not right in every situation, it cannot have Vedic authority. Therefore, in cases of conflict, the non-Vedic alternative is wrong, based on knowledge gained through incorrect hearing (*duḥśruti*) or dreaming, etc.

In conflicts, the tradition cannot be true unless the Vedic text is false, since their truth and falsity are interdependent. Since the Vedic text is true, the tradition is false. But when two Vedic texts conflict, they should be interpreted as presenting optional alternatives (3).

An ulterior motive would be some self-serving motive of the priests, such that they 'invent' a tradition for their personal benefit (4).

1.3.8-10 (E237-242; T100-104) 'Learned' people are those who are rooted in scripture, in possession of an unbroken tradition regarding the Vedas and words. Their interpretation of the meaning of words is authoritative, even if other interpretations do not contradict the Veda (9). Regarding words not used by the Aryans, they should not be interpreted through reliance on root meanings, etymology and grammar, but simply as the non-Aryans use them (10).

1.3.11-14 (E245-250; T105-107) *Kalpasūtras* (rubrical texts) are not authoritative, since they are not properly composed and accented (12).

1.3.15-23 (E108-111; T252-260) (Objection:) Customs are by their nature local and so are only locally binding (15).

(Answer:) Injunctions do not express the general or the individual explicitly, and there is no basis for inferring that only some potential performers are meant, and therefore the traditional practices are not restricted to some alone (16). (Some restrictions are visible (such as certain hair-tufts for certain families). (17). Names are relative and imprecise, and the mention of such names in texts cannot be definitively restrictive (19-23). Hence there is no firm reason to restrict customs to certain areas only.

1.3.24-29 (E262-268; T112-115) (Objection:) Incorrect word forms are by unbroken tradition expressive of meanings, and are original (i.e., not of human invention) in their connection with these meanings, just as correct forms are. Since people know what they mean and successfully communicate by them, there is no reason not to use them (24).¹

(Answer: Incorrect forms are not original, but are mistakes made in the course of pronunciation, just as mistakes are made in any human activity (25). It would make no sense to have several forms expressive of exactly the same meaning (26). Even incorrect forms are close enough to the correct to be expressive of meaning (28-29).

1.3.30-35 (E273-283; T116-124) If words had different meanings in the Veda, the Vedic texts would not communicate anything. This is so even regarding sentences communicative of extraordinary meanings. Thus the sentence 'The cows of the gods walk on their backs' may tell us something out of the ordinary, but can do that only because we know what 'cow' and 'back' mean, from ordinary usage. The sentence is not saying 'Cows are animals which walk on their backs' (30).²

The form or 'common feature' (*ākṛti*) of a thing or property or action is what is shared by several of such things, properties or actions; the 'individual' is what constitutes a specific thing or property or act.

(Objection:) Action pertains to individuals and not to forms, and so words in injunctive texts must mean the individuals. The individual (*vyakti*) is meant, but the common feature is a mark identifying the individual, just as indicating a 'lancer' is to point to an individual man, identifying him by the lance he holds (30). If the common feature were meant, it would not be possible to refer to multiple instances, such as 'six

¹Sabara interprets 24 as the position that there is no standard for correct usage, since even incorrect forms communicate meanings.

²Sabara introduces the subsequent discussion by a second interpretation of *sūtrā* 30, wherein it expresses the objection that words express individuals, not universals. In Jaimini it seems easier to focus the question on how a single word can express both ordinary and Vedic meanings (the answer ultimately being that the 'common feature' is common to every one of the things, whether it is for ordinary or Vedic usage).

cows' - since the common feature is only and always singular (31-32).

(Answer:)That the common feature is meant is shown by the Vedic statement 'Make the altar like the *śyena*-bird'. This is possible only if the shape of the bird is meant, not some particular bird. That the common feature is meant makes it possible for a word to refer to more than one individual of a certain kind. Several objections need response:

1. Several individuals can be intended, but each as devoid of common features: but this would mean that at least being signified by the same word would be a common feature of the several individuals.

2. The individuality of something is distinct from its generic and specific features, which it can share with some other thing. The individuality is the substrate of all features in every individual, but is not itself a common feature. The word can be used for several individuals because it refers to one or more generic features: but this would leave no reason for limiting the use of the word, since the individuality could be found in a horse as well as a cow, etc.

3. It is simply a matter of usage that certain words are used for certain things only (even though the substrate individuality is not different for cows and horses, etc.): but if words were thus used as they have been used, a word could not be applied to a new individual, such as a new-born calf. It is only because the common feature is meant that new individuals can be referred to.

4. It is simply the potency of a word that it refers to certain individuals and not to others: but this would be distinction without any reason for distinction.

5. The common feature could serve as the defining characteristic of the individual, and to individuals with that characteristic the word would be applied: but then the individual would be specified with that specification, and the specification (the common feature) would be known (by the word) before the individual is.

6. If both the common feature and the individual are meant, of the two that one is primary which is intended by the speaker; but this would be so only if both were equally denoted by the word. The common feature and the individual are permanently related to one another, but in fact, it is the common feature which is meant, and by this the individual is recognized. The common feature can be known without

knowing the individual, but not vice versa.

7. The meaning of the word is the common feature as qualified by the individual: but this would mean that the word could not mean the common feature as qualified by other individuals.

Hence, the word occasions knowledge of the common feature, which in turn occasions knowledge of the individual. This is so in every case, although whether the common feature or the individual is primarily meant depends on the speaker's intention. Even when the 'lancer' is known by indicating his lance, the individual cannot be known without reference to the lance (and so too the individual cannot be known without reference to the common feature.) Moreover, 'lancer' never means lance, but 'cow' can mean either the common feature itself or some individual. It is therefore, for all these reasons, most reasonable to say that words express forms, not individuals (33).

When action is performed, it is true that it cannot be enjoined with the common feature as its object. Rather, the common feature serves to specify some individual as the object of the action. Numbers simply specify some object already specified by the common feature meant in the word. (35)

SECTION FOUR

1.4.1-2 (E285-290; T125-128) Take the example 'He should sacrifice *udbhid* ('by the *udbhid*¹): This can be (a) a case of 'grammatical coordination' (*sāmānādhikāraṇya*), 'He should sacrifice by means of the *udbhid* sacrifice', in which construction '*udbhid*' names the rite to be performed; or (b) a case of 'possessive indication' (*matvarthalakṣaṇā*), 'He should sacrifice by a sacrifice which has the *udbhid* as its instrument.' In the former case, grammatical coordination, '*udbhid* and 'sacrifice' are interpreted as two words referring to the same reality, the sacrifice, whereas in the latter case, possessive indication, 'sacrifice' refers to the rite and '*udbhid*' to the tool or material. The former is preferable, because it relies only on notice of the instrumental ending - 'by the *udbhid*' - whereas the latter requires the further idea of a second instrumental - 'by the sacrifice by the *udbhid*'. On the preferred interpretation (the

¹The *udbhid* is apparently some kind of plant which could conceivably be used as a tool or offering element at a rite.

former), '*udbhid*' can be etymologically understood to mean not the known material, but 'that which makes manifest'.

1.4.3-9 (E292-314; T130-142) In injunctions such as 'Let him who desires cattle sacrifice with the '*citrā*' (sacrifice?) or bird named '*citrā*'?', understanding '*citrā*' as the name of the rite simplifies the point of the injunction, and is therefore preferable. If such words indicated accessory materials (such as kinds of birds, etc.), the injunctions in question would both enjoin the rites and enjoin the materials, and two things cannot be enjoined at once (this is the danger of 'splitting a statement' - giving a second purpose to words recognized as a unit because they express a single purpose.)

1.4.10-11 (E314-318; T143-146) When the etymological meaning of a word (based on its prefix, root and affix) is applicable - pertinent to the ritual situation at hand - this is preferable to alternative popular (and more specific) meanings.

1.4.17-22 (328-333; T151-154) Praise of the part of something serves to praise the whole of it (20).

1.4.23 (E335-339; T155-157) E.g., 'The sacrificer is the grass bundle'. The grass used at the sacrifice helps in the accomplishment of his purpose, and so is remembered when he is remembered, and comes to mind when 'sacrificer' is said.

In general, words can suggest secondary meaning only if they retain at least part of their own meaning. Even if what is suggested is not exactly the same as what the word primarily denotes, it is suggested and yet the word still retains its primary denotation of the whole. Thus, it is proper to refer to a sick lion cub as a lion, even though the cub lacks many of the qualities attributed to lions (strength, courage, etc.); and yet even here 'lion' still denotes the animal with courage, etc.

1.4.24 (E340-341; T158) 'The Brahmin is *āgneya* ('pertaining to the fire'; '*Āgneya*' is the name of a Vedic sacrifice). In mythology, both Brahmins and Agni (the deity of fire) originate from the mouth of the creator Prajāpati, and so the mention of one calls to mind the other.

1.4.25 (E344-345; T159) 'The sacrificer is the sacrificial post'. The identification is legitimate, because both are tall and bright.

1.4.26 (E345; T160) 'Animals other than cows and horses are not animals.' Such statements are not to be taken literally as excluding other animals from the definition of 'animal'. Their effect is to exalt the worth of the two mentioned.

1.4.27 (E347; T161-162) 'He lays the *srṣṭi* (bricks).' This must refer to the bricks laid (in the construction of the altar) with the *mantras* containing the word '*srṣṭi*' ('creation'). Even though not all the *mantras* used at the brick-laying contain the word, enough do to warrant using the word to describe the collection altogether.

1.4.28 (E348; T163) 'He lays the *prānabhṛta* (bricks).' The presence of a few *mantras* with the word '*prānabhṛta*' marks the whole group, so that reference to that word calls to mind all of them. Just as it is valid to point out 'the men with the umbrella', even though only one man in the group has an umbrella.¹

1.4.29 (E351; T164-165) 'He places the wet pebbles...Clarified butter is brilliance.' With which liquid are the pebbles to be wet?

(Objection:) The first statement gives us the general idea that the pebbles must be wet, and there is no reason to limit this to 'wetting by clarified butter alone'. Rather, due to the initial general statement, we understand 'clarified butter' to suggest any of the possible liquids.

(Answer:) Rather, the initial general statement requires specification by what follows. Whether or not a specific liquid is meant is in doubt, and only when subsequently butter is mentioned does it become clear that a particular liquid is to be used for the wetting. That any liquid is appropriate would have to be construed indirectly from the more general statement, whereas the butter is explicitly mentioned; and the explicit always takes precedence over the indirect.

1.4.30 (E353; T166) 'He slices by hand...with the ladle...with the razor...' Which materials are to be sliced by which instrument is not specified, but the nature of the objects to be sliced, and which instrument can accomplish what is intended, may be referred to in making this decision. Knowing what is possible helps us in interpreting actions to be performed.

CHAPTER TWO SECTION ONE

¹Kumārila explains that this case differs from that explained in 1.4.27 in that fewer bricks are *prānabhṛta* whereas a majority were *srṣṭa*.

2.1.1-4 (T358-365; T167-174)¹ How do we know that sentences express the *apūrva* at all? Verbs indicate that something, such as heaven, is to be brought about, accomplished or made to be, as the result of the sacrifice. Since sacrifice does not effect heaven in any perceptible way, it entails the notion of some intermediate reality, the *apūrva*. Thus, no word in the sentence explicitly expresses the *apūrva*, but the sense of the words demands that we posit the intervening *apūrva*. Hence there is an *apūrva* to be expressed, and one only, so we must ask which word in the sentence primarily expresses it.

The *sūtra* speaks of 'action words' (*karmaśabda*) and 'words intending making something be' (*bhāvārtha*) because there are some action words which do not speak of 'making-be', while some words expressive of 'making-be' do not entail the idea of any particular action (i.e., express 'pure activity').

(1).² Nouns express the form or appearance of something which is existent when expressed, and which endures over time. These things are unlike actions, which come to be and immediately perish (3).

Verbs, contrariwise, express what must be brought into being, and in this creative act are assisted by existing things -

¹Sabara reasons backwards from the plurality or singleness of the *apūrva* (the 'something new', 'what is without precedent'; it is yet to be defined; see 2.1.5 below) expressed by a sentence to what that *apūrva* is. The first question is whether every word in the sentence is expressive of *dharma*; or, if only one word communicates the *dharma*, which word. This is transposed into the question of the *apūrva*, the something 'new' effected by the sacrifice. If there is only one *apūrvā* to a sentence, then it must be determined which word in the sentence primarily communicates the *apūrva*, and which words subordinately.

It is assumed that there is only one *apūrva* expressed by a sentence, since this entails the inference of fewer unseen elements, which is always desirable (see also 2.2.1 for this principle of the desirability of positing fewer unseen elements).

²Kumārila in the *Tantravārttika* has to explain this unclear distinction further. It seems to be unnecessary altogether, based on the meaning of the *sūtra*: '*karmaśabdas*, which intend making-be'. The two terms are not two references to the same thing, but *bhāvārtha* specifies *karmaśabda*.

the things denoted by nouns. Hence, the verb expresses the *apūrva*, and the nouns are supportive, by expressing how this is to be effected.

The action of making something come into existence requires a performer, a person, whereas the materials used (what the noun denotes) are not directly related to the performer (4).

2.1.5 (E366-339; T175-177) By using the word 'injunction' (*codanā*), Jaimini means the 'something new' (*apūrva*) which results from sacrifice. The word '*codanā*' means '*apūrva*', and its use in the *sūtra* occasions the discussion of the proofs for the existence of *apūrva*.

The basic proof is that the Veda promises results like heaven to those who perform sacrifices, while there is no perceptual evidence that anything results from sacrifice: the action ceases, ashes remain, and heaven is not experienced. Since the Veda cannot lie, we must presume that the sacrifice creates something new and unseen, the *apūrva*, which at a later time effects the results. This is the 'argument from presumption' (see 1.1.5 above), whereby something, otherwise unproved, is presumed in order to defend the truth of something else which is known to be indubitably true, such as the Veda.

The response to four objections clarifies this minimal position (even though continuing to say nothing about what *apūrva* is in any essential fashion).

a. It is better to presume an *apūrva* than to presume that the sacrifice continues to exist in some unseen form, since we perceive no other form for the sacrifice beyond the perishable one. If it did continue to exist, it would require some substrate upon which to exist, and this would have to be the self. But this is impossible, since action moves its substrate from one place to another and the self cannot move since it is everywhere. We infer that it is everywhere because it is effected by what happens anywhere, and it is easier to assume that it is everywhere than that (due to action) it happens to go everywhere.

b. Nor can the action subsist in the offering material, which has obviously been reduced to ashes. The material cannot be thought to endure in the form of ashes, since we perceive no such form. Nor can its existence there be inferred from its efficacy in effecting heaven, since its imperceptibility would still have to be explained.

c. The presumption that for some reason (e.g., it is too fine to see, etc. (as explained in Sāṃkhya philosophy)) the sacrifice cannot be perceived though continuing to exist, would be a specific presumption, and such are unwarranted. But the presumption of the *apūrva* is general and general presumptions are warranted.

d. The remaining possibility, that the sacrifice remains but without a substrate, is as unsatisfying as previous hypotheses.

2.1.6-12. (E369-380; T182-189) Treating some verbs as expressive merely of preparations reduces the number of *apūrvas* required, and this is a desirable result (6).

So-called dharmic actions (such as circling the fire with something, or wiping a clean ladle) are secondary, even though no perceptible preparation is effected, because they entail a material which is grammatically expressed in the same accusative case which otherwise denotes the primary element, the 'object' of the action. But in general, as stated at 6.1.1, materials are subordinate to the actions they are used in, not vice versa.¹ That these actions have no perceptible effect on the material prepared by them is not a problem, since even in ordinary life men perform actions without perceptible results - such as circumambulating a village with a torch on the occasion of a visit by men from another village.

2.1.30-37 (E408-423; T20-209) The name '*mantra*' cannot be limited to those texts which are called '*mantra*'s by learned men. Sabara cites fourteen examples of kinds of *mantras* which the earlier commentator, the Vrttikara, mentioned and adds ten more of his own. Even more examples of *brāhmanas* are then adduced. The potential for endless lists of examples warrants making definitions (such as Jaimini attempts), lest every instance require treatment. Definitions are thus inherently useful, like three other kinds of statements:

¹According to my reading of Jaimini (and for some fairly complex reasons relating to the meaning of the Sanskrit), Sabara's interpretation of these purely relational actions is the reverse of what the *sūtras* say. The awkwardness of his interpretation is accentuated by the fact that he favorably cites 6.1.1 which, at that place in the *Bhāṣya*, he considers the objector's viewpoint.

objections, exceptions, and hypotheses (*prāpti*)¹ (32-33).

When the names of teachers and their families, etc. are mentioned, and when the words of *mantras* are modified for special uses, these elements are not authoritative and not part of the *mantras* per se.

2.1.42 (E425-426; T211) Something is a property (*guna*) of something else when it helps that other thing in the accomplishment of its goal.

2.1.46-47 (E428-435; T212-217) Metrical verses (*rg*) are easily discernible due to their meter, and so too sung verses (*sāman*). The definition given in the *sūtra* helps identify the other texts (*yājumśi*), which can vary in length. Insofar as a group of words helps in a certain way, they form one statement.

2.1.48-49 (E436-441; T218-221) When the extension is not possible, the sentences are filled out with ordinary words; but these are not Vedic and therefore not authoritative.

SECTION TWO

2.2.1 (E442-444; T222-224) (Objection:) Since it is preferable to presume as small a number of unseen elements (*apūrva*) as possible, it is necessary to assume that the various acts of the sacrifice all contribute to a single final *apūrva*. It is possible for the diverse acts (of sacrificing, oblation and giving) to cooperate thus because each of the verbs, by its conjugated affix, communicates the same 'productive force' (*bhāvanā*) of 'making be', and simply specifies this by the verbal root (every verb is constructed of a root and a conjugated affix).

(Answer:) Each of the three actions (sacrificing, oblation, giving) is treated in the Veda as distinct, and only from context would all the actions be understood to cooperate - what is explicitly stated is more authoritative than what is learned from context. The basic activity expressed in the affix is individualized by the root and the actions are thereby distinct, each leading to its own *apūrva*. Moreover, 'giving' is not the same as 'sacrificing' and 'oblation', since the former involves alienation of something of one's own and making it belong to another, while the latter involve only the alienation of something of one's own.

¹Jha translates *prāpti* as 'prima facie statements'. *Prāpti* in general seems to indicate conclusions drawn which serve then as the basis for further conclusions.

2.2.2 (E448-451; T225-226) Words indicating groups may be formed in the singular number, as for example 'company', 'group', 'forest', 'assembly'.

2.2.10 (E464-466; T235-236) If two offerings are made without proper interval, the ritual suffers from the flaw of over-closeness (*jami*).

2.2.13-16 (E470-476; T238-242) Names refer to specific individuals, not to general features (14). Direct assertions should be taken literally, but in expressing their object can refer to that object as qualified in some way that is not expressly mentioned (but is known from other texts). An action not enjoined in any text cannot be authoritatively known, and apparent knowledge of it is really only confusion (16).

2.2.21-27 (E489-515; T248-265) Ordinary action, such as agriculture, is not a perfect analogy for sacrificial action, even though both kinds of action lead to results. That agriculture has visible results is no reason to assume results for sacrifice, which has no such visible results. The act of farming is not sufficiently identical with that of sacrifice to warrant drawing conclusions from the one about the other. Other actions are much more similar to agriculture, with visible results, etc. Nor is it a rule that what is seen in one of two similar things must be assumed to be present, though unseen, in the other of the two. If a cause leading to a certain effect is observed in a second instance it may there too be understood to lead to the same effect, but not if it is not seen there (25).

Many elements may be enjoined together, but as long as the overall motivation of their injunction is the same, they are to be considered one statement. An individual statement is to be understood in its context, i.e. with the sentences immediately proximate to it (27).

SECTION THREE

2.3.1-2 (E523-532; T270-274) Conditional sentences (containing an 'if') cannot be injunctive, unless the 'if' is insignificant (1). The condition for action need not always precede what is conditioned by it; something future can prompt present action, as when the expectation of rain prompts preparations (2).

2.3.3 (E534-542; T275-280) (Objection:) What is a king? In North India, a king is one who protects the people and the city, and removes (criminals?); such a king may be of any caste, as long as he fills this function. In the south, however,

everyone in the second (*kṣatriya*) caste is a 'king'. But general usage, unobjectionable to anyone, and the usage of the learned are preferable to unusual usages, so the southern viewpoint may be disregarded.

(Answer:) A king is one who is a member of the second caste, which caste has as its function protection, etc. Figuratively, based on etymology (kingship indicating 'protecting'), someone of another caste can be called 'king'.

2.3.12-15 (E558-565; T290-294) (Referring to the apparent uselessness of *sūtra* 16, which refers to doubtful cases, since problematic cases are difficult to find;) repetitions of known arguments can help the slow-witted, who draw wrong conclusions from examples. For example, a man sees someone survive a scorpion bite and decides that in no case should someone seek treatment after a scorpion bite. However, an ordinary observation of similarity may be acknowledged to lead to a right conclusion when that conclusion is reasonable.

SECTION FOUR

2.4.1-7 (E591-599; T314-319) That the sacrifice is 'life-long' does not define the sacrifice as requiring a lifetime to complete, but defines the obligation of the performer to keep repeating it during his lifetime.

2.4.9 (E606; T324) The form pointed to by the objector is that of external forms and appearances; the answer refers to the basic form of all sacrifices, the alienation of some material for the sake of some deity.

2.4.14 (E611; T325) Teachers often stress different points for the sake of their students' learning.

CHAPTER THREE

SECTION ONE

3.1.1-2 (E633-635; T336-337) It is not sufficient to say that a subordinate element is one which helps another, since even primary elements may help another - as when a teacher, the principal person at an institution, helps his pupils. A true subordinate exists *entirely* for the sake of that which it helps. Although slaves and oxen, bought strictly to help the master, will at time be helped - cared for - by the master, they are true subordinate elements, since even when he helps them it is really for his own sake (keeping them healthy so as to work better, etc.)

3.1.3-6 (E636-641; T338-340) According to Bādari, the

elements suggested by Jaimini are not subordinate elements. The performer simply has to perform the sacrifice, (but does not exist for its sake). The result comes after the sacrifice, but is not created by it, and so the sacrifice is not subordinate to the result. The person desirous of the result performs the sacrifice, but it is not stated that the desired result is for the performer, so the result is not subordinate to the performer. The performer is subordinate to the action, but only as a material and not as a person *per se*.

Jaimini's view is that the sacrifice is performed for the results, the results are for the enjoyment of the sacrificer and are not merely self-accomplishing, and in certain situations, as when the sacrificer's height is the measure for the pole, he too is subordinate. So all three are subordinate elements.

The Vrttikara considers Bādari to be correct, since the elements he refers to are absolutely subordinate, whereas those referred to by Jaimini are subordinate only relative to particular other elements and not all the time.

3.1.8-10 (E644-647; T342-343) (Śabara interprets *sūtra* 7 not as a general statement, but as part of a discussion extending to *sūtra* 10 on the simplicity of the objects of preparatory actions.)

(Objection:) While preparatory actions should be and normally are useful, that they are enjoined in scripture supersedes the question of usefulness and makes them applicable to every available material, to offer some unseen help (even if they have no apparent use).

(Answer:) The actions should be performed only where useful. The presumption of some unseen result is warranted when some explicit injunction is seen (such as enjoins an apparently purposeless action). Since the preparatory actions in question have their individual purposes, there is no warrant to presume for them unseen effects.

3.1.12 (E650-668; T346-356)¹ The basic objection is

¹Śabara uses this *sūtra* to discuss at great length several points of grammatical interpretation, in an argument between objector and another opponent, and then between Śabara and the objector.

It is important first to see the sentence and grammatical construction, to make sense of the arguments to follow. The example is 'He buys the (offering material) with a red, tawny-eyed, one-year-old (calf)'. There are thus five words in the sentence: 1. the verb, 'He

that 'red' (in 'He buys the *soma* with a red, tawny-eyed, one-year-old (calf)') denotes the property of redness and not a material with red color and, as expressed in the instrumental case ('with a red'), should modify the verb, but it cannot do this since the immaterial cannot help an action. The only alternative would be to interpret the sentence to enjoin both the purchase and the three unconnected qualities (color, age, eye-color); but this would demand that the sentence have two purposes, and this is contradictory to the definition of a sentence.

This objection and a number of grammatical points are clarified by the responses to several objections.

a. 'Red' cannot be connected with 'one-year-old', because the latter denotes the material (calf) while the former denotes only a quality.

b. Nor is it a case of grammatical co-extension (*sāmānādhikāraṇya*), as when in the phrase 'blue lotus' both 'blue' and 'lotus' have the same referent, because the instrumental ending directly indicates connection with an action, whereas it would be based on appeal to the sentence structure - which is less powerful - that 'red' and 'one-year-old' would be taken together.

c. It might be said that even if the property of 'redness' is expressed, the word can still refer to the material, which is red, as the primary factor; for words can express one thing primarily (the red object) and another secondarily (redness). If this is so, then 'red' can express the material (the calf) and enter into coordination with 'one-year-old'. But this is not possible accruing to the objector, because it demands that 'one-

buys'; 2. the object, 'the *soma*'; and three terms in the third, instrumental case in Sanskrit: 3. 'red', 4. 'tawny-eyed', and 5. 'one-year-old.' Unlike 'tawny-eyed' and 'one-year-old', 'red' seems merely to express an immaterial quality - and only what is material can help in the accomplishment of an action. Therefore, the question is, 'Does the redness have anything to do with the act of buying?' This is the question posed for argument, the objector arguing that the redness does not help the buying specifically, and so applies to each and every object in the context.

The argument is conducted on grammatical grounds, questioning whether the instrumental 'with-a-red' can be construed with basic actions of purchase either as a. directly modifying the material at hand (the calf) or as b. modifying the 'with a one-year-old'.

year-old' relate to the act and also to the quality; it cannot relate to both, and its instrumental ending connects it clearly with the act. Only if 'one-year-old' were in the genitive (sixth) case and not the instrumental (or any of the other cases (*karaka*)) could we interpret it as not directly related to the action, and so allow it to be related to the quality.

d. An objector to the main objector suggests that while a word as perceived may be quite definite - in a certain case with a certain relation only - an isolated word expresses only a general meaning and requires location in a sentence to indicate anything specific. 'Red' is such a word, indicating nothing until it is construed in the sentence along with 'one-year-old' (and thus with the purchase). We prevent it from being meaningless by requiring of 'one-year-old' a relation with it. The main objector responds that this objection is not relevant, since it would pertain only if in no other way could meaning be found for 'red'. But there are many materials in the wider context which can be red, and so a specific connection with the purchase is unwarranted.

(Answer:) The right interpretation of the text is to understand both 'red' and 'one-year-old' as contributing to the accomplishment of the single purpose of the statement-prescription as to how the *soma* is to be bought. The calf itself, one-year-old, is directly the means of the purchase, while the color contributes indirectly, by specifying that means. But this does not mean that grammatically 'red' is connected only with 'one-year-old'; rather, indicated to be contributory to the action expressed by the sentence, it can be so only through specifying the calf introduced as the material used in the action. Since the several qualifications contribute as an aggregate to the purchase, there is neither option among them; nor are several purchases called for, each with its own material or quality; nor does this one injunction enjoin, in a flawed fashion, several new facts at once.

3.1.13-15 (E670-679; T357-362) When a text says 'He cleans the cup', this does not limit the act of cleaning to a single cup, for the cleaning is enjoined regarding 'cup', which is the genus pertaining to every cup available. That the word 'cup' is singular is not significant here, since it is only the relation of 'cleaning' and 'cup' that has been enjoined, and there is no intention of excluding more than one cup. Since the cleaning has an obvious useful purpose, there is no reason to conjecture some unseen purpose related to cleaning a single cup (14).

If the action pertained to the element used in the primary action of sacrifice (e.g., the animal to be sacrificed), any qualifications such as singleness could not be easily ignored, because it would contribute to the accomplishment of the overall sacrificial result. However, since here the qualification pertains only to the cup which is itself a subordinate element, it need not be thought to contribute to the sacrifice as a whole (15).

3.1.16-17 (E679-683; T363-365) A specification directly mentioned in the text - e.g., one kind of cup and not another - cannot be ignored even if in ordinary experience it could. (Thus, 'singular number' can be ignored, in *sūtras* 13-15, but the kind of cup cannot be ignored.) Reference to something not so qualified would have to be inferred from the wider context, and such an inference is less authoritative than what is perceptibly enjoined in this statement.

3.1.18 (E693-695; T366-367) An element which helps the subsidiary of a primary rite becomes related to that primary rite, even if only through the intervening subsidiary (so it can bear the name of that primary even if it is not used in its performance).

3.1.26-27 (E703-707; T379-381) When the text says 'He quarters the *āgneya* cake,' the quartering is restricted to the cake with that name; for '*āgneya*' ('related to the deity Agni') is not capable of establishing a connection with other deities. (The subordinate action, quartering, is connected with the property, the name '*āgneya*', and thereby to the cake with that name - even though the quartering does not pertain to the name at all.)

SECTION TWO

3.2.1-2 (E707-715; 382-386) The primary meaning of a word is that which is understood directly from the word; a meaning 'behind' this first meaning, construed on the basis of it, is a qualified meaning; this qualified meaning relies on some supportive words. Usage tells us which is the primary meaning, and it is incorrect to claim that the qualified meaning is similarly directly understood from the word: what is 'similar to fire' cannot be indicated until we have an idea of 'fire'.

Mantras, like individual words, have primary and qualified meanings, and must usually be interpreted to express the primary meaning.

3.2.3-4 (E715-719; T387-389) A *mantra* primarily directed to the deity Indra may be prescribed for an action

directed at the 'householder's fire', since the direct prescription is more authoritative. Even though scripture itself cannot establish a relation between a word and a meaning (e.g., to make words directed to Indra instead denote fire), the injunction compels us to seek out some similarity which justifies a secondary meaning, e.g., just as Indra helps the sacrifice, so too fire helps; or, Indra and fire are supreme in their respective realms.

(E743-747; T407-410) Activity is undertaken when it is understood to be fruitful.

3.2.24 (E751-753; 412-414) (Objection:) Names are of secular, non-Vedic origin. Nevertheless they have always named what they name, and so can reliably help explain what is in the Veda, by bringing to mind a connection of name and named.

3.2.25 (E756-757; T414-415) (Answer:) The form (appearance) of *mantras* is their ability to illuminate some object.

SECTION THREE

3.3.9 (E796-797; T441-442) If a primary action is described in one Veda and some action subordinate to it in another, conflicts are resolved in favor of the character of the former.

3.3.11 (E800; T444-445) If an action is prescribed with an incomplete description of how it is to be performed, details which are 'nearby' and capable of supplying those details form one statement with the prescription.

3.3.12 (E801-802; T447) When a series of actions is found to be 'parallel' to a series of accessories, the inference can be made that they are in the same sequence in need of one another (pairs of what is to be done and how to do it), and that they thus form one statement.

3.3.14 (E804-825; T449-464) (This *sūtra* occasions for Śabara the explanation of the six means of interpretation, with ample introduction of texts illustrating the principles and possible conflicts, etc. It is difficult to summarize the main portion of the comment without entering the exegetical details, but the following points can be abstracted from the discussions.)

(To begin at the end:) The guiding principle is that each later means of interpretation requires more steps of thought to reach the intended meaning, and fact relies on all the means prior to it on the list. What requires fewer steps of reasoning

and appeals more directly to what a text says is more authoritative. The rest of the comment deals with detailed exegetical examples, but these points are noteworthy:

Words which taken together express a single meaning form a sentence (statement). Explicit declarations are those of which the meaning is discerned immediately upon hearing them. Indirect declarations are those relying on the capacity of words to express meanings (which may not be the immediate, 'heard' meaning of the sentence.)

(Objection:) Explicit and indirect declarations are of equal authority, since both lead to valid cognitions, and among cognitions there is no difference. If indirect declaration is inferior in some way and yields doubtful awareness, it is not a means at all and cannot even be compared with direct declaration.

3.3.21 (E825-858; T464-486) If a text prescribes the relationship of two elements, one of the elements has already been prescribed elsewhere, and the relation is invariable (i.e., that the known element must be related to something else is already known; what is related to is enjoined in the new statement). If the relation itself is the object of the description, the two related elements are known to be invariably present (as parts of the sacrifice; but are related now by prescription, in these circumstances.

3.3.44 (E858-861; T487-488) When a material is offered to a deity at a sacrifice, this does not mean that the material now belongs to the deity. All we know is that the material is offered to the deity, but we have no proof that the deity receives it; and unless it is received, it does not belong to the deity.

SECTION FOUR

3.4.13-14 (E499-503; T880-887) (At the Darśapūrnāmāsa sacrifice we hear the prohibition "He should not tell a lie". Is the point of the injunction that he should not lie here, or that he, *qua* human being, should not lie (here or anywhere else)?)

(Objection:) The verb 'he should (not) tell' clearly pertains to the effort of the speaker, and so tells us about him in general. It would be only by an inference based on the context that it would pertain to this ritual context.

(Answer:) Verbs express the performance of an action, not some other element related to the action, such as a

performer for it. When people hear the verb they may think of the performer of the action, but this is only a deduction and not something expressed by the verb. When the grammarians say the number of the performer is known from the verb-ending, this does not mean that the fact of having a performer is itself known from the verb-ending. The action and the number of performers are explicitly expressed; that there is a performer is only inferred. Therefore, the injunction does not tell us something general about performers (that they should never tell lies) and there is no reason not to take it as pertaining to the specific ritual context alone.

3.4.17 (891-892; T506-507) A Brahmin should not be threatened nor hit nor wounded (so as to draw blood), but persuaded by other means.

3.4.18-19 (E893-894; T508-509) The prohibition against 'eating her food' is a prohibition against intercourse with a menstruating wife.

SECTION SIX

3.6.1-10 (E997-1007; T574-583) If an element is introduced without specification as to whether it belongs to archetype or ektype, it belongs to the former. This is for the sake of economy of expression: there is no need to say it belongs to both, since what is at the archetype automatically pertains to the ektype (unless prohibited); if it were thought to pertain to the ektype, this would have to mean that it pertained as well to the archetype whence the ektype is derived. Saying it pertains to the archetype is therefore the most accurate and succinct statement (2).

An inference based on what is generally seen can be made: abbreviated prescriptions often occur at the archetype, where the detailed prescriptions too have been made. In question here is an abbreviated prescription, and therefore it belongs to the archetype (6).

Context points to what is common to archetype and ektype, and arguments made from context are general and indirect. A condition is a specification; and arguments from the condition are specific and perceptible. The latter are therefore more authoritative (10).

3.6.43 (E1042-1044; T610-612) Certain texts inform us that the use of special subordinate elements leads to special, optional results in addition to those accruing to the rite as a whole. Such subordinate elements specify the corresponding

form of the element ordinarily connected with the rite (i.e., even when no such additional and optional result is in question.) The special optional result will accrue only if the subordinate element is introduced during the performance of the main action itself (the result is additional, but cannot be achieved separately) - since it cannot pertain as a subordinate element unless it is connected with the overall goal to be accomplished.

SECTION SEVEN

3.7.6 (E1050-1051; T618-619) The primary relationship of sacrifice and sacrificer is that the sacrifice gives the *apūrva* and the sacrificer receives it, not that the sacrifice is the to-be-accomplished and the sacrificer the accomplisher. For the sacrificer does not accomplish the sacrifice; for it would then be connected with being.¹ Rather, the preparatory actions related to the performer, make him capable of receiving the result desired (rather than making him capable of the performance). The preparations pertain to the sacrifice itself by helping it in its purpose, which is to connect the sacrificer with the result.

3.7.18-24 (E1063-1070; T630-634) (Objection:) Only the person who carries out the performance obtains the results of the sacrifice, as is indicated by scripture which obliges the one desirous of results to perform the entire sacrifice (18).

(Answer:) If that were so, it would make the texts prescribing 'hiring' pointless (19).

3.7.32-37 (E1080-1087; T642-647) The text mentioning 'seventeen' priests precludes the possibility that others involved in the action are priests.

(Objection:) There are, however, three standard objections to preclusion: 1. Loss of the proper meaning of what is said (e.g., discounting the clear statement that all who perform the sacrifice are priests.) 2. Conjecture of a different meaning (e.g., stating that only seventeen of the performers are priests). 3. The negation of what has already been concluded.

¹This is interesting but not very clear, and the commentators do not help. The idea is perhaps that if the sacrifice was the goal to be accomplished, it would, when accomplished, be some thing - which as action, it is not. It is rather the result which is accomplished and becomes something during the sacrifice.

There is no basis for ignoring the basic definition, that those who offer the sacrifice are priests.

(Answer:) The objections are not a problem: 1. The meaning we offer is arrived at on the basis of the text referring to 'seventeen', and is also part of the meaning. 2. This is not a different meaning, since it is already known that there are seventeen priests, and so this text must be understood to limit the number to only seventeen. (3. Therefore, nothing that has been concluded is negated.)

The preclusion recognizes the fact that there is some basis for calling all the performers 'priests', and intends to preclude that possibility. Only the seventeen are selected and paid the priestly fee - and therefore only they are priests. (On preclusion, see also 1.2.42)

3.7.51 (E1099-1100; T657-658) The assignation of subordinate elements because of their names is based on perception, whereas assignation because of the general rule that ektypes are like their archetypes is based on inference. Usually, perception is more authoritative than inference, but because here the latter is based on scriptural evidence while names are secular in origin, the inference is more authoritative than the perception.

SECTION EIGHT

3.8.1-9 (E1103-1111; T659-665) The intention of the performer is to obtain the result accruing to the action performed. Just as the primary sacrificial actions leading to results must be performed by the sacrificer himself, preparatory actions making him capable of those actions must be performed by him and not by hired performers, who are hired to help him get what he desires (4). Since the preparatory actions cannot be performed except on some material, and since the sacrificer is the 'nearest' material, they should be performed on him (and not on other performers who are at a 'distance'.) (7)

Ascetic actions help the sacrificer to obtain the result of the sacrifice in this way: Bad actions (*adharmā*) block the reception of the results of sacrifice, and lead to bad effects. But both good and bad actions are 'neutralized' by the experience of their results. Ascetic actions are painful and so constitute the effects of the bad actions, thus negating them and clearing away the obstacle to the enjoyment of the results of the sacrifice.

3.8.18 (E1121-1124; T673-674) The performance of sacrifice presumes the study of the Veda beforehand, not the *ad hoc* learning of *mantras* during performance in order to recite them. But only that part of the Veda pertinent to the performance of a particular sacrifice needs to be known; i.e., mastery of the whole Veda is not required.

3.8.24 (E1134; T681-682) When we hear a certain name, it will be our impression that the action is to be performed by the priest with that name. But this impression is found to be without basis and so is known to be an error, when a text is cited clearly assigning the action to someone else. It is like the erroneous idea that a shell is actually silver (i.e., which idea too is negated by the further perception that what was perceived is just shell).

3.8.31 (E1144-1147; T688-689) The primary actions occur at the ektype, but the subordinate elements only if they are useful; for even though such elements appeared with the primary in the archetype, it must be established positively that they are pertinent at the ektype.

3.8.41 (E1163; T696-697) Arguments cannot be based merely on indirect statements which may support the arguments; they must have some proof. Lacking such authority, they are false cognitions, like mirages.

CHAPTER FOUR SECTION ONE

4.1.1 (E1171-1172; T707-708)¹ Primary actions (leading to the result) pertain to the performer's perspective; subsidiary actions, lacking their own results, pertain to the internal sacrificial perspective. Injunctions which inform us for the first time of the particular results of a rite pertain to the performer, while statements praising rites as leading to results pertain to the internal sacrificial perspective. What pertains to the performer's perspective motivates and integrates (*prayojaka*) the sacrifice, while what does not do that pertains to the internal sacrificial perspective.

4.1.2 (E1174-1181; T709-713) (First interpretation:) The fact that one element helps another is not sufficient reason

¹Sabara understands 4.1.1-20 to be an extension of the Third Chapter, prior to the introduction of the proper material of this Chapter with 4.1.21.

for considering it accessory to that which it helps; rather it is accessory if it has been enjoined for the purpose of the other.

(Second interpretation:) The acquisition of wealth is for the sake of the person in general, not simply for the financing of sacrifices, even though the wealth is required for the sacrificial purposes. Wealth may be used for other purposes as well.

4.1.3-6 (E1181-1185; T714-716) Scripture is a more authoritative source for information than one's own parents, because from scripture one gets knowledge directly, just as by one's own sense organs (3). In ordinary experience, it is assumed that actions without results are connected with actions having results.

4.1.11-17 (E1193-1201; T720-726) Number is part of what is expressed by a verb, and is not extraneous to that expression. When for instance it is said "Sacrifice the animal", the main point of the injunction is to instigate the act of sacrificing; but the sentence also communicates the fact that it is one animal to be killed (and a masculine animal). (3.1.13-15. offers another analysis of the significance of number).

4.1.18-20 (E1203-1206; T727-728) Sacrifices within sacrifices are offerings to deities which occur within larger rites. These rites bring about something new (*apūrva*). When a verb expresses an action leading to a visible result, there is no reason to suppose some invisible *apūrva*.

Mantras are recited at the sacrifice to call to mind the deities of the sacrifice.

4.1.23-48 (E1209-1250; T730-755) When there is doubt as to whether to understand a statement literally or as indirectly suggestive, literal meaning must be preferred (23). When the usefulness of an injunction is established by one reason, there is no need to search for a further reason (24). If an action requires part of a material, the action cannot be the motive for introducing the whole of the material (28; see also 4.2.4). A statement merely pointing out what is already present cannot be an injunction introducing the whole of that thing (32).

SECTION TWO

4.2.1-24 (1252-1288; T756-781) Some words are relational and do not communicate a full meaning without another word. For example, 'an eastern place' is always related to some place to the 'west' of it, etc. (7) Repetition is generally

to be avoided because people fear making their work heavy; but it is not a great fault. What is to be learned should be repeated, especially when there is a fear that people have not understood (13). The purpose that prompts the beginning of an action is the purpose of the action (7).

4.2.27-28 (E1291-1294; T784-785) 'Sacrifice' brings about a relation between a material and a deity; this general definition applies to oblations and gift-offerings and not just burnt offerings. 'Giving' means 'alienating something of one's own and making it belong to someone else'. Definitions such as these require no statement of their purpose, since definitions simply give us knowledge.

SECTION THREE

4.3.1-3 (E1304-1309; T789-793) Inferences establishing cause and effect which are based on mere concomitance (such as the inference that a certain result is due to the presence of a certain implement, because the implement is present when the result is achieved) are invalid. The connection must be invariable, such that when the first is present, the second is, and when the first is not present, the second is not present. Although a sentence (such as 'A man with this ladle will hear no evil') may be interpreted to predict a presently unseen result, this interpretation is not reliable. For even in ordinary language words are often interpreted according to secondary meanings, words not presented are added in (to elaborate what is meant), forms of words are changed, words are construed with words not proximate to them, etc. Thus appearances suggest various false ideas as true; they are like mirages, etc. Hence, that an interpretation is possible is no guarantee it is true. Such sentences cannot authoritatively prompt action, and are in fact irrelevant regarding activity.

4.3.8 (E1320-1321; T800) Vows (*vratas*) are undertaken to maintain and strengthen the body.

4.3.10-16 (E1322-1334; T801-807) (Objection:) It is obvious that sacrifices are difficult and lead to unpleasant results, and it would be contrary to perception to think that sacrifices (named without mention of results) have pleasant results. The inference "because they must be done they must be efficacious of pleasant results" would be contrary to perception, which has greater weight than inference. Rather than conjecture the existence of results to preserve the meaningfulness of the text, it is better to assume that the text is

meaningless. Since it is the *apūrva* which leads to the alleged happy result, and *apūrva* is presumed on the basis of the need for a link between the action and the result, it would be a double assumption to assume a result in order to assume an *apūrva*, a vicious circle. Nor are there any grounds for assuming that a reference to a result is to be added to the sentence, since we have a whole sentence which lacks nothing and invites no additions (10).

(Answer:) It is legitimate to add reference to a result, because otherwise the statement will have no purpose (i.e., will instigate no one to action). The addition will be from the Veda and authoritative, and meets our need to understand the Veda correctly (even though the sentence which does not mention a result is not in itself defective). It is legitimate too to borrow such an addition from another context, since this will naturally occur to the mind of the person thinking about this (11).

'Heaven' is 'pleasure' and everyone desires pleasure. This is known from ordinary experience (15-16).

4.3.24 (E1342-1343; T812) People must finish sacrifices undertaken optionally, even if their initial desire is gone, because educated people look with reproach on people who do not finish what they begin.

4.3.27-28 (E1347-1349; T815-816) (Objection:) Effects are known to be such when they appear immediately after their causes. But sacrifices for the acquisition of cows, etc. do not yield any immediate perceptible results. Even if cows are then acquired, the immediate cause will be 'purchase' or the like. The logical conclusion is this: since in general the body is due to unseen (force), it is reasonable to conclude that the sacrificer is given a special body shaped according to the 'unseen' (force), is made capable of acquiring the cows, etc (second explanation of 27).

(Answer:) Although the acquisition cannot be perceived or inferred in this life, it is indubitably known from scripture. That other causes are present (purchase, etc.) is irrelevant (second explanation of 28).

4.3.37-41 (E1361-1375; T823-830) The deity connected with the sacrifice is part of its 'appearance' or 'form', and this deity is known only through scripture and not by perception, etc. (37).

A father can offer a sacrifice the results of which accrue to his son (i.e., there are actions whose results accrue to a designated person and not the performer). For if a scriptural

text says something (like this transfer of results), it is true, no matter how difficult it is to accept (38). A sacrifice is complete when all its subsidiaries are accomplished (41).

SECTION FOUR

4.4.10-19 (E1387-1399; T839-847) The only appearance or form of the deity perceptible to us is its eternity (i.e., we perceive certain sacrifices to be always or permanently compulsory for us (10). Words which point out what is already known, or which enjoin what cannot otherwise be known, cannot be interpreted in some secondary way (*lakṣanā*). (19)

4.4.29-38 (E1409-1419; T853-858) Subsidiaries constitute the manner of performance for primary actions (actions with results).

CHAPTER FIVE SECTION ONE

5.1.1-2 (E1424-1429; 861-864) It may seem repetitious to state again that what is explicitly stated in the text must be adhered to, but repetition of a good man's statement is always a good idea, although even reporting once a bad man's words is a bad idea.

Since order is not a proper object of the senses, it must be known through scripture. When one thing helps toward the accomplishment of another, it is accessory to it; what does not help is not accessory, the other not being defective without it. Thus adoption of a certain order may or may not be accessory to the accomplishment of some purpose.

5.1.4-7 (E1432-1437; T866-869) The Veda does not merely enjoin actions, but also indicates the order of actions. That some alternative order would offer some greater unseen benefit is an unwarranted conjecture.

5.1.8-12 (E1438-1441; T870-872) When it is impossible (because everything cannot be done at once) to perform preparatory actions immediately as prescribed, still those preparations should be removed from their right time only as far as necessary. This minimal displacement is best achieved by moving all the minor actions proportionate distances from their primaries, and not some less, some more, etc. What is actually done the first time around has priority over any other possible order of action: the element receiving the first preparation first, should receive the second first, etc.

5.1.14-15 (E1445-1448; T875-877) What is explicitly

stated is known more directly than anything implied by the order of actions found in the text.

5.1.17-22 (E:1450-1456; T879-883) (Objection:) The general rule that an ektype is identical with its archetype (except where there are reasons to the contrary) provides only an inferential basis for the order of actions at the ektype.

(Answer:) Not so. The general rule is more authoritative than descriptive statements because due to it the ektype both has details and has them in a certain way. Statements describing the order of the ektype merely describe how details appear in a certain way, but do not make them present in the ektype in the first place. Because the general rule thus has a double purpose, it takes precedence (17-18)

5.1.28 (E1465-1466; T891-892) Order has to do with when things occur at the sacrifice, not with their purpose there. It is possible for things to introduced separately, and yet all share a single motivating purpose.

SECTION TWO

5.2.8 (E1485-1486; T903-904) What is done at the archetype for a reason peculiar to the archetype does not appear at the ektype.

5.2.17-19 (E1497-1500; T911-912) You can give a toy to a baby only after the baby has been born.

SECTION THREE

5.3.2 (E1508; T918) Number inheres in individual things, and only when there are not enough of the things to constitute the stated number should the number be reached by repetition.

5.3.29-30 (E1534-1536; T935-937) A combination of two things is preferable to choosing between them. That a certain word is not used is not proof for the non-existence of what the word denotes; even when something exists, the word referring to it will be used only when there is reason to do so.

5.3.34 (E1539; T939) Desires do not arise in any set order, and therefore the effects of those desires cannot be ordered in any set way.

SECTION FOUR

5.4.1 (E1551-1552; T945-946) All actions must be purposeful, contributory to the primary action, and so the order

given by the text may be superseded to maintain purposefulness.

5.4.2-3 (E1553-1555; T947-948) If the order found in the primary rite is followed, there is a smaller and therefore preferable displacement of minor actions in relation to their primary.

5.4.19 (E1572; T958) The performer's relation to the deity of the sacrifice is established by the offering made to that deity.

CHAPTER SIX SECTION ONE

6.1.1-3 (E1586-1597; T964-971)¹ Scripture says "The person desirous of heaven should sacrifice". Does this mean that desire for heaven' is one of the (many) qualifications of the sacrificer, and merely contributes to the goal of action, the accomplishment of the sacrifice? Or does it mean that by means of the sacrifice the performer will gain what he desires, heaven (which, therefore, is the real goal of the action)?

To answer this question, another question must be answered: what is 'heaven'? If it is a thing, like any other thing - an already existent entity - it is subordinate to action; if it is something to be accomplished, the sacrificial action will be subordinate to it.

(Objection:) Common usage tells us that heaven is a thing. People say 'Fine silken clothes are heaven', 'Sandal-paste is heaven', 'Sixteen-year-old girls are heaven', and this indicates that heaven is something which gives pleasure, by the force of grammatical coordination. This is not a mere comparison ('heaven is like fine clothing, etc.'), since the compared term, heaven, is not available to us outside such alleged comparisons, such that we would know what the comparison is supposed to mean.

(Answer:) There are instances where heaven is spoken of without reference to a thing, yet there are no instances in which it does not refer to pleasure: by negative and positive concomitance, therefore, we conclude that the word merely denotes pleasure.

¹Sabara turns what, in my opinion, is a straightforward discussion of actions and materials into a discussion of whether heaven is primary or subordinate in relation to action.

(Objection:) 'Pleasure' specifies heaven, but this is not the direct denotation of the word 'heaven'; just as 'lancer' denotes primarily the man holding the lance, and not the lance. People are also known to refer to heaven as a place, but since no one has gone there and returned to tell us about it, the proof would be only an inference and not direct perception as is demanded; stories to that effect are mere tales. Nor is there any proof that there are perfect men (*siddha*) who have seen it. Even Vedic passages which speak of such a place do not intend to give us information about such a place; they merely encourage the hearer to perform prescribed actions. Finally, if the existence of such a place has to be presumed in support of the idea that there is perfect pleasure, that would not detract from our basic thesis that heaven is a means to pleasure.

Since, then, heaven is a thing, it must be subordinate to sacrifice, since things are used in the accomplishment of action. Moreover, since what ought to be done leads to pleasure and what ought not to be done leads to frustration, one desiring pleasure must do what ought to be done, i.e., perform the sacrifice. The desire for heaven is thus subordinate to the accomplishment of sacrifice. (1)

(Answer:) To define 'heaven' as a thing qualified by pleasure presumes that the word first denotes pleasure (with which heaven is always connected) and only secondly things (which may or may not produce pleasure). 'Heaven' is not analogous with 'lancer'. The latter combines reference to the lance and the man (by the '-er'), whereas 'heaven' has no such combined denotation. 'Heaven' therefore denotes pleasure.

But since human effort is only for the sake of pleasure, this pleasure - heaven - cannot be a means to the accomplishment of sacrifice, but vice versa. Sacrifice *qua* action does not require orientation to pleasure - its definition includes only the material and the deity - but in fact, there would be no performer unless pleasure were the result of it; for in itself sacrifice is always painful. That it is enjoined might lead to the inference that it is pleasurable, but this inference is less authoritative than the perception that it is painful. The conclusion is that sacrifice is the means to heaven. (2)

Understanding sacrifice to be the means and heaven the end makes it easier to interpret the injunction 'The person desirous of heaven should sacrifice'. If the sentence merely enjoins sacrifice as a duty, the point of qualifying the performer as 'desirous of heaven' in this same sentence is not clear;

whereas if the sentence is meant to enjoin sacrifice as the means to heaven, its unitary meaning is preserved and we learn what we would not learn otherwise, viz., sacrifice leads to heaven. Therefore the injunction designates the person who is authorized to sacrifice, by mentioning desire for heaven (3).

6.1.4-5 (E1598-1605; 972-975) (Objection:) Excepting things without consciousness, such as trees, all living things desire pleasure. Thus we see dogs, etc. undertaking actions for their own pleasure, and not just for immediate pleasures (which are thereby unlike pleasures promised in scripture which happen only after an interval of time). For instance, dogs and other animals fast regularly on certain days of the month, with no immediate reason for doing so. Therefore, there is no reason for barring such animals from performing sacrifices to obtain the promised pleasures. (4)

(Answer:) Only those capable of the whole sacrificial action should perform it. Therefore, deities cannot perform sacrifices, since they have no deities to sacrifice to; the great ṛṣis cannot sacrifice, since the sacrificer must have these ṛṣis as ancestors; animals cannot sacrifice for the promised Vedic results since, not having studied the Veda, they do not know about these results. Their so-called fasting is due merely to natural causes, regularly recurring fevers, etc. (5)

6.1.6-9 (E1605-1611; T976-979) (Objection:) Scripture condemns abortions occurring before the sex of the foetus is known, because thus a potential sacrificer is killed. That the abortion is condemned with this time specification suggests that sex is relevant - i.e., killing a male foetus is killing a sacrificer, but not killing a female child.

(Answer:) The masculine affix indicates the male, but does not preclude the female. Such exclusion would have the three defects mentioned above (in 1.2.31, 3.7.32-37 etc.). Only if the point of the injunction were to identify the male person would it exclude women (whereas the point is to identify those desirous of heaven). As for the reference to killing the foetus, the condition 'before its sex is known' merely emphasizes the prohibition against killing the child in the mother's womb, i.e., when its sex cannot be known.

6.1.10-16 (E1612-1616; T979-982) (Objection:) Women are clearly property, sold by their fathers, bought by their husbands, deemed without any rights over their husbands' property, etc. Even what she might earn by cooking, etc., belongs to her husband (10-12).

(Answer:) Because women too desire results, they are authorized to sacrifice, and this right cannot be denied due to customs. Even the marriage rite declares that the wife must be consulted in regard to matters of religion, material goods, and desire. That the 'sale' is a purely ritual act is shown by the fact that the 'price' is invariable, regardless of the girl involved.

6.1.17-24 (E1619-1640; T983-994) That the compounds indicating husband and wife (as two co-sacrificers) are in the masculine gender does not exclude the wife from cooperating in the rite; it is simply correct grammar according to Pāṇini (a dual case expressing man and woman is rendered in the masculine). However, she cannot do everything her husband does at the sacrifice, because she does not know the Veda and cannot utter the required *mantras*.

6.1.30-38 (E1646-1655; T998-1000) The 'defect' Jaimini speaks of is that *śūdras* lack specified songs, ascetical practices, etc., whereas these are cited for the upper castes. Such lacks could be made up in some way or another if they were the issue. But Vedic knowledge can only be gotten from the teacher, and (while not specifically prohibited from sacrificing), *śūdras* are specifically prohibited from learning the Vedic texts.

6.1.39-43 (E1659-1665; T1003-1007) A person who is blind, lame, etc., is barred from sacrificing, because these are deficiencies that cannot be remedied and which prevent the performance of required actions.

SECTION TWO

6.2.1-2 (E1680-1683; T1013-1015) (According to Śabara, at issue here are sacrifices which have multiple performers: do they have multiple results, the whole result (which would accrue to a single performer) accruing to each performer?) All participate in the action, all receive the whole result. Thus, several men may see a certain animal at the same time, but each sees the animal 'completely'.

6.2.3-12 (E1685-1697; T1016-1022) The injunctive texts explicitly subordinate the performer to the sacrifice, enjoining upon him various actions. That it is for his sake, however, and so subordinate to him, can only be inferred from the fact his desire is mentioned (when it is said "He who desires should sacrifice"); for the mere fact of pleasure is of no use to him unless it is *his* pleasure. (6, 8).

6.2.13-18 (E1698-1709; T1023-1027) (Objection:) If

the sacrifice is not the goal to be achieved (and the pleasure beyond it is the goal), one cannot be constrained to complete the sacrificial action itself, if one no longer wants the pleasure. Obviously, the sacrifice being a kind of affliction, it is not in itself a goal.

(Answer:) The sacrificer must finish a sacrifice underway, to avoid the reproach of learned people. Why do they blame someone who does not finish what he starts? The reason is not important; they simply do (13-15). Ordinary experience is governed by ordinary purposes. Whatever the customs are (obliging the completion of work begun), they do not absolutely oblige unless founded in scripture. Even rituals connected with ordinary work may simply have ordinary purposes - to prevent mistakes, etc.

6.2.19-20 (E1711-1716; T1028-1030) If a text says "Kalañja (a kind of garlic) should not be eaten", does this mean 'not-eating should be done', and this 'not-eating' will have a desirable effect? or simply that the eating is not to be done?

(Objection:) The 'not' should be taken with the 'eating', and the idea is 'one should do not-eating', for this is more directly expressed than the connection of 'not' with the verb. Not-eating is done by a certain mental activity. The implication of this is that if one does not desire the result of this action of not-eating he may eat as he wishes.

(Answer:) On the contrary, the negative should be taken with the verb, due to the explicit meaning of the text; it is meant to prohibit the eating (and not to enjoin any sort of mental not-eating). Even though no ill effects of eating *kalañja* are mentioned, learned people will reproach the person eating it, and this is sufficient evil. Since the eating is prohibited (and not the non-eating enjoined), *kalañja* is never to be eaten under any circumstances (20).

6.2.25 (E1720-1721; T1033) The time enjoined for a performance is more than a property of it, and is rather its condition; it therefore cannot be ignored.

6.2.31 (E1725-1727; T1037-1038) Even though when certain duties such as performing the *soma* sacrifice, gaining knowledge and begetting offspring are enjoined, only Brahmins are mentioned, Ksatriyas and Vaiśyas too are obliged to perform these duties. For the injunctions are simply laid down without reference to results and so apply to all.

SECTION THREE

6.3.1-10 (E1728-1737; T1039-1045) The performance of the primary and subsidiary rites together results in the attainment of heaven; if the primary alone is performed, other (more limited) results are still possible. (Sabara has in mind obligatory rites which in his view do not have results. When sacrifices are performed for pleasures like heaven, every subsidiary must be performed; more is expected in an optional performance.) (2,9).

6.3.11-12 (E1737-1740; T1046-1047) Actions such as moving and falling do not change even if the thing moving or falling changes. Only the substrate of the action changes. The action involving one material has perished, while a new one exists, but both have the same essential sacrificial form, and thus the same names apply (i.e., the use of a substitute material does not change the name of the sacrifice which remains essentially the same.)

6.3.18-21 (E1743-1753; T1050-1054) The deity involved in a sacrifice cannot change, since its function is to receive the offering, and different deities are designated to receive different offerings. The remembering accomplished by reciting the *mantras* cannot be accomplished by other words, not even if the meaning of the original *mantras* is recalled (though the words are forgotten) (18).

The definition of 'deity' is: that for the sake of which something is enjoined. 'Deity' is a relational term (invariably connected with the thing enjoined for it, etc.) and not a generic term (19).

6.3.27 (E1759; 1059) Words (including Vedic words) are expressive of the common feature or form. The common feature cannot participate directly in the action which prescribes a material by designating that common feature, but the material used must be one specified by that common feature.

6.3.38 (E1772-1773; T1069) The material remains available even without the preparatory actions. But without the material, the preparatory actions are impossible; the material is their entrance into the process of creating something new, the *apūrva*.

SECTION FOUR

6.4.12 (E1789-1790; T1080-1081) Even when a material is totally spoiled, the expiatory oblation should still be

offered (even though there is no hope of remedying the spoiling); for what is unchanging and always present (e.g., the requirement that the expiation be done) is not for the sake of what is changing (e.g., the ephemeral material), which may or may not be present.

6.4.21 (E1798; T1085-1086) What is connected with some thing may be indicated by mentioning that thing, even if the two are not totally the same.

6.4.23 (E181800-1808; T1087-1092) (At a sacrifice using two offering materials, an expiatory rite is prescribed for when the offering material deteriorates; it is necessary to ascertain whether this means when both materials deteriorate ('the two-fold material') or simply either one of them. This occasions a discussion of how words specify other words.)

Is deterioration specified by 'both' and 'offering material'? Specific words can be used to exclude certain things - as when the statement "Bring the white cows" excludes bringing black cows - but this happens only when the thing (cow) is qualified and *then* connected with the action. When in the present case, however, 'offering material' is connected with the action ('it deteriorates'), it is not necessary to presume all specifications possible in the context, and the deterioration is not necessarily connected with both materials. Since the words 'both' and 'offering material' need not be taken together to make sense of the statement (i.e., the statement 'When the offering material deteriorates perform the expiatory rite' makes sense without reference to the wider context in which 'both' is mentioned), there is no justification for precluding the action when only one material has deteriorated.

The specifications in question ('two-fold' and 'offering material') can be understood in two ways. First, as inherently connected with the material: the 'material' is the offering material, and the material is two-fold. In this case, it is possible to say 'the offering material has deteriorated' without reference to 'two-fold'.

Second, as defining the material: the material is 'the offering material' which is two-fold (= 'both'). In this case, it would be necessary to say 'the offering material which is two-fold has deteriorated'. This second possibility is unacceptable, since it is really two statements in one, specifying the offering material is two-fold and deteriorated. Hence, the original statement enjoins the expiatory rite even if only one material is spoiled.

6.4.33 (E1822-1823; T1102) Since the second (accusative) case always indicates the primary element and the third (instrumental) case the subordinate element, if a statement expresses the primary element in the instrumental case and subordinate element in the instrumental case, the statement should be read as if the cases were reversed.

SECTION FIVE

6.5.40-41 (E1880-1883; T1137-1138) Time is like a river.

(Objection:) This means that what is past can still be reckoned up, and primary rites (whose time had passed) can be performed.

(Answer:) No, it means that what is past is gone and the rites need not be performed.

6.5.48 (E1890; T1144) The 'degraded' is what is flawed, what is not useable for what is to be done. For example, that which has insects or hair in it is not suitable food for Aryans.

6.5.49-56 (E1892-1902; 1145-1152) The later (of two actions) takes precedence, because it can take place at all only by superseding the former; whereas the former can occur without preventing the latter from following it. Thus, ektypal details supersede archetypal ones with which they conflict (since otherwise the ektypal would never appear at all; whereas the archetypal details have already occurred at the archetypal.)

SECTION SIX

6.6.1 (E1904-1906; T1153-1154) Each *kalpa* has a few ritual variations peculiar to it, all of which could not be pursued if members of several *kalpas* sacrificed together.

SECTION SEVEN

6.7.1-13 (E1944-1957; T1176-1186) Even though parents and other relatives are 'one's own', it is wrong to give them away to become servants of others. The 'everything' (in 'Give away everything') means only that which one can give rightly away (2): People own only pieces of land, not the entire earth. Even an emperor called 'lord of the earth' does not own it all, but rather receives a share of its produce because he is engaged in protecting it all. The earth sustains all without distinction and cannot be given away (3). *Śūdras* are not part of what is given away; for according to tradition (*dharmaśāstra*) they have come to a higher caste person to

learn *dharma*, and should not be given away unwillingly. The receiver would not have power over the unwilling *śūdra* and it should not be done by force. However, a *śūdra* unjustly acquired can be given away (6).

6.7.22-24 (E1964-1967; T1191-1193) (Referring to the fact that the 'unmeasured' gift suggested in one text means a large gift.) That this is a secondary and not the most immediate meaning of 'unmeasured' (which does not mean large) is not a defect, because some words have secondary meanings which are so commonly used that the words actually express that meaning directly (i.e., no one thinks 'unmeasured' necessarily means the literally immeasurable.) Thus the word '*aśvakarna*' might literally mean a horse's ear, but everyone knows it means a kind of tree (22). Moreover, 'large' is a relative word, like 'son'; it depends on some other word to be complete. (Since, in the text in question, thousand has been mentioned, 'large' must mean more than a thousand.) (24)

6.7.31-40 (E1972-1987; T1197-1202) Medicines can alleviate the effects of aging but cannot prolong life. Even if they do prolong life a few years, there is no basis for inferring that they could prolong it to a thousand years (34-35). Nor can it be assumed, to defend the truth of scripture (which talks about the 1000-year sacrifice), that people who undertake this sacrifice do live a thousand years. It is better to presume that reading this text has some other, general unseen result [since presumption of a general unseen result, (such as that the text has another meaning) is better than that of a specific one, such as that there are people who live 1000 years]; cf. 2.1.5]. Or perhaps the text simply has no purpose (37).

SECTION EIGHT

6.8.17-18 (E2002-2004; T1211-1212) (In considering the question of whether a boy could have two wives, one before studying the Veda and one afterwards, the latter for cooperation in the sacrifices, etc.:) It is not right to have different wives for different purposes. The single wife taken after studying the Veda is for both child-bearing and cooperation in the sacrifice and is to be consulted regarding all matters of religion, material goods and desire (see 6.1.13-16). If the man had two wives, one would be neglected in regard to these matters (17). However, if a man's wife does not bear children, or is not virtuous, he may take a second (18).

6.8.27 (E2014-2015; T1218-1219) In ordinary

experience, need governs what is done; in the Vedic realm, purposes are known only by language, and are undertaken according to language.

6.8.30-42 (E2020-2030; T1222-1228) (Objection:) Since the genus ('animal') cannot help directly in the sacrifice, some material embodying the genus must be used; since none is specified, any can be used (30).

(Answer:) Limitation of the genus to 'goat' here (due to the other texts) does not mean that there are no other animals. By grammatical coordination we know that there are many specifications of the generic 'animal'. 'Animal' can directly denote any of these, but by other indications we know that here goat alone is meant (35). Since the word 'goat' is originally related to that particular animal, it cannot be interpreted to mean any other animal (40).

CHAPTER SEVEN

SECTION ONE

7.1.-12 (E5.374-386; T1229-1240) (Jaimini's topical question here, which distinguishes given sacrificial arrangements from the injunctive force creating those arrangements, is rephrased by Sabara in terms of whether the details of a rite relate to the abstract sacrifice-*apūrva* relationship or to the particular *apūrva* effected by the rite.) This and the following Chapters deal with rites for which the details are not directly prescribed and must be inferred. (1)

(Objection:) The details of performance relate to the *apūrva* of each sacrifice, since it is an *apūrva* in which each sacrifice eventuates, and for which the details are enjoined. But all *apūrvas* have the same relation to the act of sacrifice, and so no distinction as to which sacrifice the details belong is possible. Similarly, when one is told 'Do not touch the cow', 'cow' indicates the genus cow. But since the genus cannot be touched, what is meant is that one not touch some particular cow, and all particular cows equally well express the genus (and so too all sacrifices express the sacrifice-*apūrva* relationship. Moreover, the details - a material, a deity, a *mantra* - are perceptibly related to the act of sacrifice, whereas their relation to the *apūrva* is only inferential. The details contribute to sacrificing, which eventuates in the *apūrva*. (5)

(Answer:) Details are performed along with the basic act of sacrifice, but there is no perceptible reason to link them to that act. That the *apūrva* is the result of sacrifice is the only

rational alternative, since no other result of sacrifice is perceived; and so the details do pertain to the *apūrva*.

(Objector:) Furthermore, all the unseen results of sacrifices are called '*apūrva*', and thus even if the details are prompted by the *apūrva*, *apūrvas* are undifferentiated and cannot differentiate details (8).

(Answer:) The only information we have about any *apūrva* is from scripture, wherein we see each differentiated by specific details. Hence we have no grounds for thinking merely of some genus *apūrva*. (9).

Since these details are known through language alone, and no argument from the general nature of sacrifice is possible, the details can apply to contexts other than their original one only when authorized by language. However, when rites seem to lack details and there is no text supplying details, details may be transferred from one rite to others similar to it; this transfer is called 'extended application' (*atideśa*), and is the subject matter of this and the next Chapter. (12).¹

SECTION TWO

7.2.1-13 (E5.394-399; T1252-1255) The relation of name and named is original (established prior to anyone's use of them), and a word should never be used to name anything other than that which it originally denoted. thus, 'cow' can never refer to a horse (5).

Effort is made to see what exists but is not perceived, but no one attempts to see what does not exist, such as a hare's horn (10).

7.2.20 (E5.402; T1264) A word legitimately names a kind of action, even though in detail specific actions named may differ greatly. Thus 'cooking' applies to cooking rice and also to cooking molasses, although the procedures are quite different.

SECTION THREE

7.3.1-4 (E5.402-405; T1266-1269) Use of the same name for two or more acts tells us that they are similar; this

¹Because the presence of a detail requires scriptural authorization, the application of details where there is no such authorization must be defended. For both Jaimini and Sabara, scripture 'creates' each sacrifice anew.

may be merely a reference to the already known, or may demand of us that the actions be performed similarly. The relation of name and named is original, and the name should apply only to that which it originally names; loose application elsewhere would undermine our use of language.

7.3.28-29 (E5.418-419; T1291-1292) It would make no sense to ignore a reference to the object visible to us in order to indicate the imperceptible and prior action. The common feature is manifest by the action, and therefore cannot be referred to before the action.

SECTION FOUR

7.4.1-12 (E5.424-434; T1300-1312) The *apūrva* is what is effected by the rite, but how this is to be done is not known unless a procedure (comprised of certain details) is given (the basic act of sacrifice is in itself an abstraction common to all rites). Defects like performing a sacrifice impurely, with the wrong materials, sitting disrespectfully, etc., prevent the effecting of the result (1).

Although it would be possible to adopt a procedure on some common sense basis, the indications of a specific ritual procedure require us to prefer that indicated specific procedure over any alternative. (7)

When it is said that an ektypal rite is like its archetype, this means that it has the same procedure as the archetype (even though the basic action differs - has a different material or god). (10)

Learned people may make mistakes, but the mistakes will not be continued over thousands of year; so the example of the learned should be trusted. (12).

7.4.15 (E5.436-437; T1315-1316) An indication by name of whence a rite borrows its details is more authoritative than the general rule that the ektype borrows from its archetype.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SECTION ONE

8.1.1-2 (E6.1-4 ; T1320-1321) This Chapter continues the theme of the previous one; after the seventh Chapter has established the general idea that rites are derivative of one another and that transfer of details (*atideśa*) occurs, it is necessary to show how one rite and not another is the specific source of details for a given rite.

That an indication can indicate presumes a past relation between a certain detail and a certain rite, such that when the detail (but not the rite) is perceived, it nevertheless brings the rite to mind. This is the process of inference.

Sabara's predecessor, the Vrttikāra, is cited as giving the pertinent rule most succinctly: 'the ektype is like the archetype' - the derivative rite is known, once the derivation is established, to be exactly like its archetype (except where some injunction precludes total similarity). This principle of derivation based on indication is the point of the Chapter.

8.1.3-19 (E6.4-12; T1323-1336) An 'unmanifest' or 'undefined' (*avyakta*) rite is one mentioned without specifying the deity and material, which together constitute the appearance or form (*rūpa*) of the rite. (16)

8.1.23-25 (E6.15-16; T1339-1340) Different implements are introduced to contribute to the effecting of certain optional results. Generally, such optional implements should not be transferred.

8.1.32-34 (E6.18-20; T1346-1348) The material is actually seen to be given away, whereas the deity is 'helpful from afar' and external to sacrificial milieu (32). Just as notice of smoke indicates the presence of fire, the material is noticed and indicates the sacrifice (33). When two elements are mentioned together, the one foremost in the mind is specified by the other. At the sacrifice the material is foremost, not the deity, and so is specified by the deity (34).

SECTION TWO

8.2.15 (E6.26; T1360) Curds and animals share a common shape (*mūrti*), namely their solidity; milk, to which the sacrificial animal might be likened (as the source of the milk) lacks this common shape.

SECTION THREE

8.3.7 (E6.35; T1374-1375) Although one can infer the existence of fire after perceiving smoke, it is possible to perceive the smoke and not bother with the inference. So too, the fact that there are four six-day rites can lead to an inference of the unperceived sum of twenty-four days, but this inference need not be made (and so need not be relevant when discerning an appropriate archetype).

8.3.12-36 (E6.37-45; T1380-1390) (Objection:) The number ten does not exist within the number twenty, since

numbers are qualities and one quality cannot exist within another (14).

(Another objector:) If one number cannot exist within the other, it is possible to think of the two (e.g., ten and ten) as the two parts of the whole (twenty). (15)

'Cow' can indicate anything which is known to move, but in practice is limited to indicating animals with dewlaps, etc. (17).

If a word such as 'lion' is used to indicate something else, such as the statue of a lion, still the word does not directly mean that something else. For 'lion' does not mean anything that looks like a lion. Moreover, when a word is used with a secondary meaning (*lakṣanā*) it still must retain something of the original meaning; if the original meaning is gone, the indirect meaning cannot occur. (24)

CHAPTER NINE

SECTION ONE

9.1.1-3 (E6.56-70; T1417-1426) The question is whether the sacrificial act is primary or the *apūrva*. If the former is primary and integrates the sacrifice, no modification will ever be possible, since the sacrificial act is the same for every sacrifice. Only if the latter is primary will modification be possible, since each sacrifice (archetypal or ektypal) has a unique *apūrva* (which at the ektype would demand modifications of elements to fit with it. As in 7.1.1-12, for Sabara the *apūrva* is the principle of individuation of any sacrifice.

Two kinds of causality must be distinguished. The occasion (*nimitta*) is that which must exist for something else to exist. The motivation (*prayojana*) is that which provides the reason for which something exists. The sacrificial action cannot be the motivation for the procedure of performance, because it is only that which is to be accomplished that requires a procedure, and therefore the *apūrva*, not the sacrifice itself, requires the procedure. The question is: 'How is the *apūrva* to be achieved?', not 'What is the sacrifice like?'

Nor can the sacrificial act be the occasion, since what motivates something is also its occasion. Thus, that a gardener is paid is occasioned by the existence of the garden: its upkeep motivates his salary, and the garden's existence is the necessary condition for the salary. (1)

(Objection:) Subordinate actions are of two kinds: some

contribute directly to the *apūrva* and are specific to it, while others are subordinate (to some element or action in the rite) without direct reference to the *apūrva*. The former are motivated by the *apūrva* and must be modified in ektypal rites, while the latter are not thus motivated and do not require modification (2).

(Answer:) An indirect interpretation of a text is perceptible, and is preferable to the conjecture of something entirely unseen, so it is better to understand the subordinate actions as all related to the *apūrva*. Even subordinate actions with visible results contribute in some unseen way to the *apūrva*. (Therefore, since an ektypal rite has its specific *apūrva*, modifications in procedure (subordinate elements) are necessary and possible.

Does the *apūrva* require the performance of the subordinate actions? Since the *apūrva* is known only through the text, and the text requires the performance, we cannot doubt this. Each subordinate action effects an *apūrva*, by means of which the transitory subordinate action contributes to the subsequent primary *apūrva*. (3)

9.1.4-5 (6.70-72; T1427-1428) What leads to results is what is enjoined, and only the *apūrva* leads to results. Therefore there would be no perceptible reason why subordinate actions would be enjoined in regard to the results and the deities (neither of which leads to results).

9.1.6-10 (E6.72-81; T1429-1437) (Objection:) A sacrifice is simply a meal for a deity. Giving to the deity is more desirable than the immediate goal of the sacrifice (the *apūrva*, etc.). Moreover, 'sacrifice' primarily means worship (*pūjā*), and the worshiped deity is primary with respect to the sacrifice. We know from scripture that the deity has a body (*vigraha*) and can eat the offerings. As for the fact that the offerings do not appear to be eaten, this is because the deity eats their essence only (6). Likewise scripture declares that the deity is pleased by the offering, and gives the desired result (7-8).

(Answer:) Scripture states that sacrifice, not the deity, leads to the results; like any existent thing, the deity must be subordinate to the action when connected with it. Human activity is motivated by what leads to our pleasure, not by what serves the deity. Even if in ordinary experience sacrifice is worship of the deity, here the deity is subordinate to the sacrifice, not vice versa.

The texts allegedly showing that the deity has a body do

not show this. What is claimed is neither perceptible nor can it be based on someone's actual experience (of touching a deity's body), since the Veda is prior to all human experience (including that of someone who would claim such a perception of a divine body), and so cannot be based on such an experience. Invocations of embodied deities merely name those deities and do not prove they are embodied. Moreover, when the limbs of the deity are praised, the intention is to praise the deity (by whatever words are available) and not to assert the existence of divine limbs.

There is no evidence that the deities eat the essence of the food, which really decays due to natural reasons alone, nor that a deity, even if connected with property, has any power to use it as his own. Even things 'owned' by temple deities are clearly under the control of the attendants and there is no evidence these things are disposed of by the deity.

9.1.11-19 (E6.81-87; T1438-1444) The word 'purpose' in *sūtra* 13 means *apūrva*, since the purpose is what leads to results, namely the *apūrva*. If the material, number, etc., motivated the actions connected with them, some (invisible) result for this connection would have to be presumed, and this has less textual basis than the presumption that the actions are motivated by the *apūrva*.

9.1.26 (E6.94-95; T1450-1451) (On the topic of whether the fire altar, composed of many bricks, is a whole or not:) (Objection:) An integral entity is one which, when a part of it is moved, the whole of it moves; if only the part moves, it is not an integral whole. (Since bricks can be removed piecemeal, therefore the altar is not an integral whole.)

(Answer:) A distinction must be made between immobile and mobile wholes. An immobile whole will not move, even when an integral part of it is moved. Thus, when a leaf is pulled off a tree the tree does not move, even though it is a real whole. (And so, even though individual bricks can be removed, the altar is still an (immobile) whole.)

9.1.36-44 (E6.107-119; T1464-1478) Only if the primary aspect of what the *mantra* expresses is absent is modification required; otherwise even inappropriate terms need not be modified (36-37).¹ When a new deity is introduced, the qualities mentioned which pertain to the former deity need not

¹See note 1 in the summary of Jaimini, p.94.

be modified, since there is no authority other than scripture for knowing that the deity has these qualities - which can therefore apply to any deity whose name is inserted (42).

Apparent connections made using the term *vai* (used in equating two things) are valid only if they express what is well-known already. So the statement "Women are not good friends" is correctly stated. But when it is said 'The two fortnights are Indra's', if this is meant to tell us about Indra's power, this is certainly not well-known; if it is understood to tell us that the fortnights - time - make everything perish, this is well-known and properly expressed.

9.1.49 (E6.123; T1483-1484) The proximity of words in the text to one another takes preference over proximity in form. When the referent of a pronoun is not clear, what is close to it in the text should be understood as the referent: some word with the same gender, number, etc. If no such word is available, something proximate in form can be so understood - some animal of that gender, etc.

SECTION TWO

9.2.1-13 (E6.131-140; T1491-1500) (An alternative interpretation of 1-2, which states that *sāmans* are music; not words, pertains to whether certain texts called 'modified songs' are scriptural.)

(Objection:) Either they are Vedic, eternal, and authoritative, or they are produced by humans according to their thinking and are therefore unreliable. The *mantras* in question must be in the former category, since otherwise it would not be desirable to use them in the sacrifice.

(Answer:) They are of human origin, and that is why they are termed 'modified'; they are authoritative insofar as they are not contrary to reason.

9.2.23 (E6.143-144; T1508-1509) (According to the first of two interpretations:) Relational words express nothing if the words to which they relate are not present, in the text or some proximate text. Names, contrariwise, do not depend on another word to be expressive.

9.2.40-47 (E6.163-171; T1534-1542) There is a text which says 'One should not sing "*gira, gira*", because in doing so he would swallow (= '*giret*') himself. Rather, he should sing "*ira*".' The statement cannot be both a prohibition (of '*gira*') and an injunction (of '*ira*'). It must therefore be an injunction,

since this implies the prohibition, whereas the reverse would not be true.

Moreover, the prohibition would not make sense: one cannot swallow one's body, nor is swallowing a fault with regard to the highest self (*paramātman*).

9.2.60 (E6.177-178; T1550-1551) The word 'deity' does not refer to a species of beings but means rather 'that for the sake of which something else is.' So what is the deity of one sacrifice (or, 'for one form?') may not be that of another.

SECTION THREE

9.3.1 (E6.179-180; 1552-1553) The general rule is that whatever is done at the archetype is done at the ektype. However, *mantras* should not be used to denote what was at the archetype but is absent from the ektype. It is better that they should be modified to denote what is present, and so serve a perceptible purpose, than that they be used purely 'formally' to effect some conjectured unseen result.

9.3.3 (E6.181-182; T1554-1556) Generic terms and specific conditions should vary according to the context. For example, there is no absolute value to mentioning the color green in saying 'the green grass'; so if the kind of grass actually used is red, the word 'green' is replaced by 'red'.

9.3.6 (E6.183; T1557) The general rule (identifying ektypes and their archetypes) demands that archetypal *mantras* be used at the ektype, but they are transferrable according to their purpose, not literally - and so must be modified to make sense in the new context.

9.3.10-14 (E6.186-189; T1561-1564) Ordinary usage is the authority for understanding the meaning of words.

9.3.27 (E6.196; T1575-1576) A text says "May his eye go to the sun." The physical eyeball cannot do this; what is meant is that the light of the eyes (*tejas*) goes there. This light is one, and not two-fold (i.e., coming from each eye.) Since light is an (innumerable) aggregate of rays, even the light from the eyes of different animals is still one, and is expressed in the singular.

SECTION FOUR

9.4.18 (E6.215-216; T1598-1599) To avoid an unnecessary multiplication of unseen factors, a sentence should be understood to express only one idea, and not more than one, whenever possible.

9.4.29 (E6.223-225; T1611-1612) When something is

subordinate to a whole group of actions, it is subordinate to each individual action in the group.

9.4.32 (E6.226-227; T1615-1616) 'Eating' can be used as a synonym for 'sacrifice.' The simple act of giving something up does not constitute sacrifice: it must be given up for the sake of some deity.

CHAPTER TEN SECTION ONE

10.1.1-3 (E6.241-245; T1635-1641) When something is first determined to be true and subsequently, for some other reason, determined to be false, this is a case of sublation (*bādha*). When something is determined to be true and then something else is determined to be true and is added to the first, this is a case of supplement (*abhyuccaya*) (1).

Vedic texts never enjoin what has lost its purpose. The general rule that the ektype replicates the archetype does not apply to every archetypal detail, but indicates rather that the ektype accomplishes its result, just as the archetype accomplished its result (2).

As agreed above (9.1.6-10), in reality the deity is neither invoked, nor does it receive the offering, nor is it pleased, nor does it reward the sacrificer. Nevertheless, invocations and the proper actions accompanying invocations must be correctly performed (1-2, second explanation).

10.1.7 (E6.249; T1645-1646) If each rite, including the beginning rite, had to have a special rite to inaugurate it, this would lead to an infinite regress, which is unacceptable.

10.1.11 (E6.251-252; T1649) When something has a well-known purpose, it is wrong to conjecture some other purpose for it; reasoning cannot negate what is well-known.

10.1.14 (E6.253-254; T1651-1652) The deity connected with an action is indicated either by a secondary formation (*taddhita*: belonging to such and such a deity) or by a dative case (for such and such a deity), and not by the mere mention of a deity's name.

10.1.18 (E6.256-257; T1655) Both the deity and the sacrifice are useful (in accomplishing the goal of the sacrifice). But since the sacrifice contributes without an intermediate (literally, contributes 'from afar') to the result, and since without the deity there can be no sacrifice, the deity should be taken as subordinate to the sacrifice. For what is needed by something else is subordinate to that thing.

10.1.23 (E6.258-259; T1658) In general, inherent subsidiary rites (which prepare some sacrificial element) are preferable to subsidiary rites which contribute directly (and not by means of some element of the sacrifice) to the sacrifice (and its final result). Perceptible goals are always preferable to imperceptible ones.

10.1.35 (E6.264; T1664-1665) It is only reasonable to accept well-known meanings of words, such as are acceptable throughout India.

10.1.36 (E6.268; T1665) Cultured people offer to deities things that can be eaten, not inedible things.

10.1.39 (E6.265; T1666) In cases of conflict, a secondary aspect of an element should be negated, not the primary aspect.

10.1.42 (E6.265-266; T1667-1668) What is unique to an ektype takes effect first, and only thereafter the general rule that the ektype replicates the archetype (insofar as following the general rule will not interfere with what is unique to the sacrifice.)

SECTION TWO

10.2.22-23 (E6.280-281; T1692-1693) (Objection:) The strict rules governing gifts to priests, and the common understanding that they are religious, indicate that they are ritual actions (22).

(Answer:) When a perceptible purpose can be assigned (such as payment for services), it is wrong to conjecture some higher purpose (such as a purely ritual transaction); and so the gift should be interpreted to be a payment. At most, the texts define the kind of payment that can be made (23).

10.2.47 (E6.293-294; T1710) At the end of the year in which a sacrificer dies, the 'bones sacrifice' should be offered. The main reason why it cannot be offered by the bones (moved through the various acts by others, etc.) is that the renunciation involved is a mental act - and of course bones have no mind. It would be wrong to interpret 'sacrifice' in a secondary sense, when its direct meaning is applicable (i.e., an enjoined sacrifice, at the core of which is the mental intention, should be actually performed, not reinterpreted as moving bones about). Therefore, others offer this sacrifice for the dead man.

10.2.58 (E6.300-301; T1720-1721) At the *sarvasvara* sacrifice, the sacrificer, desiring death and safe passage to heaven, immolates himself part way through the rite, after

asking the priests to finish it for him.¹ How can it be finished if the sacrificer is dead? Because his command has prompted the priests to action, it is finished whether or not he is alive. In any case, even when the sacrificer is still alive it is the person (*puruṣa*) who performs, not the body, and the person still exists even when the body has fallen away.

10.2.67 (E6.305-306; T1729-1730) When two actions have the same purpose, the performance of one prevents the performance of the other. When an act newly prescribed for the ektype serves the function of something that would be done in replication of the archetype, the latter is not done.

SECTION THREE

10.3.13-15 (E6.318-320; T1746-1748) The deity Prajāpati ('lord of creatures') is called the 'one' lord of creatures because he existed before the appearing of any creatures. The deity Indra is called 'Indra' because of his lordship, for he is able to make creatures appear; he too is 'one', because he existed before creatures appeared.

10.3.26 (E6.325; T1755) Supplementing one thing with another is preferable to excluding one or considering a matter of option which is performed.

10.3.36 (E6.329-330; T1762) The killing of a living being is contrary to right behavior, except when prescribed by scripture.

10.3.42-44 (E6.334-336; T1767-1769) Words with the same case ending are more quickly taken together than words in different cases. Words in the first (nominative) case are more expressive than others, in that they directly express their own meaning. Words in the sixth (genitive) case are less expressive, since they specify the meaning of another word (42).

When people ask for a certain number of something, they mean that number as made up of things of one kind, not diverse kinds; otherwise, if all kinds of things were meant, the highest of all numbers would have to be used along with smaller numbers. (I.e., one would have to say 'Bring me six apples out of the X-number of things in the universe', rather than 'out of the dozen apples on the table'.) (44)

¹That the sacrifice includes self-immolation is not explained by Śabara, but by Jha in his translation (T, p. 1721).

10.3.45-47 (E6.336-338; T1770-1772) Wages are calculated in three ways: by comparable work performed in return for the service done; by the fruits of the service itself allowed to accrue to the performer; by a statement measuring out part of what is already available (i.e., not a result of the labor) as the payment for the service. The sacrificial gift (*dakṣina*) is thus named because it makes the recipient alert (*dakṣa*), by making him strong through satisfying him. Therefore the gift must be of a size capable of achieving the appropriate satisfaction (945). The sacrificer should give a generous gift to the priests, since they have helped him greatly; and it is part of good behavior to help those who have helped you (47).

10.3.53-55 (E6.340-341; T1776-1777) The variation in the size of the gift depends not on the amount of work done, but on the amount of help rendered.

10.3.57 (E6.344-345; T1780-1781) The number and gender of words expressing qualities are determined by the number and gender of the words which they qualify, their substrates. Therefore, however many things there are as parts of the gift, there is still only one gift.

SECTION FOUR

10.4.1-2 (E6.357-361; T1798-1802) If some ektypal element cannot happen without first blocking some archetypal element, it does so. If it can happen without stopping the other, that is preferable, lest some replication supposed to occur be blocked even though it is not contradictory.

10.4.16 (E6.373-374; T1816) A word qualifying one word cannot be construed as qualifying another word too.

10.4.23-27 (E6.378-384; T1824-1830) There are several definitions of 'deity'. First, those beings which the epics and myths describe as living in heaven. Second, only those being explicitly called deities in the *mantras* and injunctive texts. neither definition allows for the recipients of certain offerings - day, month, year, etc. - which function as deities. The general word 'deity' is rarely used in ordinary speech, and so its meaning would not be understood (based on the few times it is used in scripture).

Therefore a third definition is preferable: those beings to whom hymns are addressed and oblations offered. This definition can apply to beings with or without physical forms, with or without consciousness. In effect, the sacrificer

constitutes the deity by deciding to offer something to it. These deities help the sacrifice not by their forms, but by relative words, i.e., by their names (as invoked by the sacrificer, relating them to the sacrificer), just as the priest helps by his hands.

Only the word, and not the deity itself, becomes an inherent part of the sacrifice. The name of the deity is pronounced and found to be related to the offering, and so the deity is known to be connected with the sacrifice. When it is found that the offering cannot be made to the name itself, it is understood to be direct at the deity named. So the purpose of invoking the deity is fulfilled by uttering the name, not by bringing about the idea of the deity; so other words which would call to mind the deity are useless. Therefore the name itself must be used and not other words thought appropriate to the deity in itself.

A logical extension of this theory would be to say that the word itself is the deity; such an extension would not hurt our theory, and therefore it is not our concern to refute it.

10.4.34 (E6.388-389; T1837) Names are either conventional (mere names, and not necessarily used because the root meaning is pertinent), or etymological (naming the deity because the root meaning of the word is appropriate to the character of the deity).

10.4.38 (E6.390-391; T1841) Subsidiary actions contribute to the main action either 'from afar', directly and without any intervening act or material to which they are subordinate, or inherently, as connected with an act or material intrinsically part of the sacrifice. The latter, inherent connection is preferable and actions should be so conceived where possible. (Thus, when three preparatory rites succeed one another, the first two help only from afar, but the third, proximate to the succeeding more important action, should be considered 'inherent'.)¹

10.4.49 (E6.396; T1850) What Jaimini says is obvious, but can be of help to slow thinkers; indeed, everyone is a slow thinker compared with someone else.

¹This may be somewhat confusing, because what is directly helpful to the sacrificial purpose is 'from afar', while what helps 'inherently' is indirectly helpful. The idea is that the former overpass the entire rite and reach the goal, whereas the latter help toward that goal by helping what is proximate to them.

SECTION FIVE

10.5.1-6 (E6.401-403; T1857-1858) There is no reason to pass over the first in the sequence when filling out the number required; and by the time the later in the sequence are reached the number is already filled.

10.5.54 (E6.421-422; T1886) Interpreting one text in such a way as to preclude another explicit text has the three defects described above (at 1.2.42, 3.7.32-37, etc.)

10.5.66 (E6.429; T1897-1898) A single action can be either simply obligatory, or enjoined upon those desirous of a certain result. (The action is unchanged, but has a different purpose and different results.)

10.5.81 (E6.435; T1908) An act undertaken only upon certain conditions, or for the attainment of a certain result, is always a modification of the same act as simply obligatory.

SECTION SIX

10.6.3 (E6.443-447; T1917-1921) It is preferable to understand an injunction as communicating what is otherwise unknown; but if what it communicates is already known, it merely refers to that knowledge, and so is not an injunction.

Statements (*vākya*) express relationships: between an action and its various factors (agent, object, means, etc.); a thing and its specifications; something defined and its defining characteristic.

10.6.30 (E6.461-462; T1941-1942) Arguments from sequence, etc. do not of themselves prove a specific relationship, and must rely on some other means of proof to do so.

10.6.31 (E6.462-463; T1943-1944) The end of an action is of two kinds: simply stopping, or turning to another action.

10.6.41 (E6.467; T1950-1951) The names of (ritual) acts (such as the '12-day rite', etc.) are not mere technical terms detached from the ordinary meaning of the words used, but do express meaning (i.e., really indicate rites twelve days in length, etc.).

10.6.54 (E6.472; T1957-1958) Simpler conclusions, involving the positing of fewer unseen elements, are preferable.

10.6.66 (E6.466-467; T1964-1965) The sacrificial gift is in return for the accomplishment of the desired result, which is what motivates the man to sacrifice. Since this result comes

only from the sacrifice as a whole, and not from any part of it, the gift follows upon the completion of that whole.

SECTION SEVEN

10.7.24-34 (E6.498-506; T1993-2000) A text without any negative word, or without the mention of what is supposed to preclude something else, cannot be prohibitory. For the meaning of word is the basis for the meaning of the sentence. Moreover, preclusion is defective in three ways (cf. 1.2.42, 3.7.32-37, etc.).

10.7.58-68 (E6.517-521; T2018-2024) Since an ektypal rite is introduced with its own deity and material, there is no need to introduce these by appeal to the general rule that an ektype replicates its archetype (58). Alternative means to a single end are mutually exclusive, and cannot function together. The point of mentioning one of the alternatives is to select that as the means to the end (66). The element explicitly cited is preferable to the one available by the general rule (modeling the ektype on the archetype; 68).

SECTION EIGHT

10.8.1-7 (E6.524-535; T2028-2037) The case at issue is the sentence "One does not use the phrase '*ye yajamahe*' at the post-sacrifices (*anuyāja*)."

Certain prohibitions, such as 'Do not take the poison', are exception-less (and are not meant as exceptions to some general idea that one may take poison.) When a prohibition conflicts with an explicit ektypal injunction or with what applies from the archetype, the prohibition is more authoritative; this is true of any statement which negates what has already been said (2).

The sentence in question, however, is not a contradiction to the injunction to use the phrase '*ye yajamahe*' at all the rites, but rather establishes an exception: use it everywhere, but not at the post-sacrifices. Considering two statements to be optional alternatives (as if it were optional whether the phrase were used at the post-sacrifices or not) is undesirable and should be done only to avoid rendering either statement meaningless (4). They negate one another, each valid only when the other is not; but the sacrifice may be correctly performed by adhering to one or the other, optionally (6).

It is possible to construe all prohibitions as preceded by injunctions of the opposite; 'Never take poison' as preceded by

'Take poison'. The effect of such statements is to praise alternatives to eating poison (i.e., eating various foods, etc.) (7)

10.8.13-16 (E6.537-543; T2043-2047) If the purpose of the generic is to identify the specific, then the former is validated in that specific. If the generic is not meant to define the specific, it will not be valid when the specific occurs; or, the specific instance may contradict the generic idea; or the generic may apply to any number of specific instances. Therefore specific rules take precedence over general rules. Option is to be avoided because when one alternative is chosen, the other, although authoritative, is ignored.

A word expressive of the generic does not thereby indicate each specific instance. For if it did, (its denotation would be complete and) it would not be able to indicate new instances beyond those hitherto expressed by the generic term.

10.8.50 (E6.559; T2068) There can be no sacrifice without a deity, and no deity without a statement (naming one).

10.8.59 (E6.562; T2072-2073) A subsidiary rite can be related to several primary rites, but two primary rites cannot be related to one another, nor two subsidiary rites.

CHAPTER ELEVEN SECTION ONE

11.1.1-4 (; T2080-2085) '*Tantra*' is used to describe a situation in which an action, enjoined and performed once, serves one or more purposes beyond the original. '*Prasaṅga*' defines a situation in which an action, enjoined more than once but performed once, fulfils a purpose enjoined in two or more injunctions at the same time.

The injunction 'The man desirous of heaven should sacrifice' would be pointless if not understood to mean that heaven is the result obtained through the sacrifice. If the result was not promised, the man would have no motivation for undertaking the difficult action of sacrifice.

Collective nouns ('village', 'clan', 'sacrifice') joined with a particular action indicate the action as common to the group of individuals, not as pertaining to each of them individually. Thus when it is said 'The village digs a well' it means that the villagers cooperate to dig one well, not that each villager digs a well. So too, the performance of a complex sacrifice (composed of several distinct rites) leads to the single result of

heaven, not several times over (1). If a specification pertains to the action, it occurs once; if it pertains to the objects of the action, it may be repeated. Thus 'Bring in the min in white' need not demand that each be brought in individually, but does indicate that each man is dressed in white (4).

11.1.11-19 (E ; T2090-2096) The discussion in this and the following sections pertains to sacrifices prompted by desire, undertaken for certain results. These are to be contrasted with obligatory sacrifices, which have no results, and which can be successfully performed even if one cannot perform all the subsidiaries.¹

11.1.20-24 (E ; T2097-2100) The result of an action is brought into existence by the action and does not exist beforehand (20).

(Objection:) In the injunctive verb 'He should sacrifice' (*yajeta*), the root (*yaji*) expresses the action and the affix (-*ta*) the performer. The general rule is that together the root and affix express the meaning of the affix, and that therefore the performer is primary and the action dependent for meaning on the performer (just as the root is on the affix). Since the performer is established as such by the single performance (and so the injunction is obeyed), there is no warrant for additional performances (22).

(Answer:) The rule just cited applies only to nouns which denote performers, such as the ruler or the teacher, wherein the root expressive of the action (rule, teaching) is subordinate to the ending expressive of the performers(-er). In verbs, neither the root expressive of the action or the affix expressive of the performer is primary. Rather, making something come into being is primary; and this raises the questions of instrument, end and method (which are not raised at all in reference to the performer, who already exists.)

What is thus to be brought into existence is the result. If it can be produced once it can be produced over and over, and so there is no restriction to only one result-producing performance (24).

11.1.29-35 (E ; T2103-2107) It would be incorrect to infer from the fact that subsidiary rites are helpful that a

¹Jaimini does not make this distinction between obligatory and optional rites in the same way: he presumes that all rites have results.

repetition of them is more helpful. If the action helps the first time, there is no need to repeat it; if it does not help the first time, there is no point in repeating it (29-30). If the subsidiary rites achieved some perceptible result of their own, one might imagine increases through repetition; but since they offer only imperceptible assistance to the primary rites, no such conjecture is warranted. (A further objection is raised, that there is no perceptible way in which subsidiary rites help the primary tie; but this objection is not met by Śabara.)

11.1.38-43 (E ; 2107-2113) Although the plural number can indicate any number higher than two (which in Sanskrit is expressed by dual forms), only for some special reason should the plural be interpreted to mean some number beyond three. Thus (when animals are to be sacrificed) it is reprehensible to kill more animals than strictly necessary, just to get the meat. But killing animals at the sacrifice is not in itself a transgression.

11.1.48 (E ; T2115-2116) When a prohibition has no perceptible purpose, it is better to interpret it as an indirect command than as a prohibition with an imperceptible effect. Thus 'The boys should receive no milk that night' indirectly enjoins the use of all the milk for the particular ritual purpose at hand.

11.1.55-64 (E ; T2119-2124) Because the result follows upon the sacrifice as a whole, the intention of the performer is the simultaneous performance of all its parts, not the distinct performance of each primary with its subsidiary rites, etc. (55) Some actions with a perceptible purpose must be repeated for each sacrifice, since there is no alternative: the rice must be cooked for each offering, ground up, etc. and cannot be done once for all (58).

The several sacrifices in the complex rite form a single context because they function cooperatively. Mere textual proximity (one element mentioned near another in the text) does not form a more authoritative connection. Therefore the subsidiary rites pertain to all the cooperating primary rites, not just to the one they happen to be mentioned near in the first place (64).

SECTION TWO

11.2.1-4 (E ; T2128-2133) That without which something cannot exist is its subsidiary (*aṅga*, subsidiary, literally means limb) (1).

(Objection:) Details pertinent to performance (the grammatical *kāraṅgas* or cases: the object, the means, the recipient, the place, etc.) are related to the action itself and not to qualities of the action - such as its being part of a larger whole etc. hence, specifications regarding time, place and performer pertain to each sacrifice separately and not to the complex set of them (2).

(Answer:) The argument is not valid, since the injunctions of the subsidiaries are not connected simply with the injunctions of the primary sacrifices, but with the entirety of the context (and thus the complex set, the whole larger sacrifice).

The primary element of any sacrifice is the result; whatever activity leads to the result is subordinate to it (4).

11.2.6 (E ; T2134) When the text says 'He should sacrifice by the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice' it is clear that '*darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice' is a means, expressed as it is in the instrumental case. Since it is in grammatical coordination with 'he should sacrifice' (i.e., both parts of the sentence refer to sacrifice), that too must be a means. Hence sacrifice is a means and not an end.

11.2.9 (E ; T2135-2136) A misleading argument (*apadīṣṭa hetu*) relies on a merely apparent, but false analogy between two cases. (Df. 11.2.32)

11.2.11-17 (E ; T2137-2141) Sacrifices which are part of a single complex sacrifice and yet occur at significantly different times - as at two different parts of the month - require repetition of subsidiary rites.

11.2.21 (E ; T2144) Context never establishes the relationship between two elements, but only the arrangement of already related elements.

11.2.23 (E ; T2165-2166) When a statement needs to be connected with another in order to express meaning, the supplementing of an earlier statement with a later one is simply the discovery of the whole of the statement. 'Implied extension' (*anusāṅga*: see 2.1.48-49) occurs when a later statement requires the addition of an earlier one.

11.2.64 (E ; T2173) A material expressed in the second (accusative) case is secondary in relation to the action of which it is the object. So, too, the seventh (locative) case expresses what is subordinate. The various cases in general express elements (means, object, place, etc.) subordinate to action, since what already exists is secondary in relationship to what

must be created. To reverse this would require the unwarranted presumption of some unseen purpose.

SECTION THREE

11.3.1-2 (E ; T2176-2178) Acquired possessions can be used for any purpose which arises, not merely foreseen ones; so too the ritually established fires can be used for any sacrifice.

11.3.9 (E ; T2185-2186) The prescribed time for the introduction of some element into the sacrifice need not be the prescribed time for the actual use of the element.

11.3.33 (E ; T2200) Even cultured people reuse materials at times.

SECTION FOUR

11.4.14 (E ; T2220-2221) There is no limit to what can be enjoined by a scriptural statement.

11.4.42-44 (E ; T2239-2242) The repetitions involved in a single act (such as beating rice) nevertheless form a single act, because it is only together that they bring about what is to be achieved.

11.4.47 (E ; T2244) When repetition does occur, the act itself is undifferentiated, but has the property of repetition.

11.4.49 (E ; T2245-2246) Even though repeated acts of scratching occur at different parts of the body, the act is not thereby differentiated. for the goal is the alleviation of itching, which pertains to the self (*ātman*) (which is not differentiated by parts) and not the body.

CHAPTER TWELVE

SECTION ONE

12.1.1-3 (E ; T2253-2256) (Objection:) Since shared performance is made possible by the fact of injunctions prescribing the same time, place and performers for sacrifices, when such injunctions are lacking (i.e., in regard to details of the subsidiary rites) no sharing is possible.

(Answer:) What occurs within the context of a general shared performance is likewise shared, since the original injunctions govern even the secondary actions related to subsidiary rites.

When something occurs in one place and at the same time helps in another, this is a case of extended application (*prasaṅga*; cf. 11.1.1). (1) Just as a lamp illuminates objects beyond that intended to be illuminated, secondary actions help

subsidiary rites beyond the ones to which they are originally attached.

The general rule that the ektype replicates the archetype does not mean that the subsidiary actions as the former are performed exactly as they were as the latter. For the archetype has its subsidiary rites because it needs them, not because they are inherently connected with it (i.e., the subsidiary rites are performed because they are helpful, not because they are per se integral to the primary rite; if they are no longer useful (at the ektype), their omission does not hurt the primary rite). It is the need for subsidiaries and not the particular subsidiaries which is replicated at the ektype.

The difference between shared performance (*tantra*) and extended application (*prasaṅga*) is that in the former subsidiary rites are shared, whereas in the latter the help rendered by a subsidiary rite is shared (3).

(E ; T2260-2261) The prescriptions peculiar to an ektypal rite govern only what actually appears at that ektype, while the rule of archetypal replication both introduces actions and governs their performance. Hence ektypal prescriptions cannot prevent archetypal extensions from occurring at an ektypal subordinate rite, so the replication takes precedence over any ektypal prohibitions.

A prohibition specific to one context does not prohibit the occurrence of the prohibited element in another context. Thus too in ordinary experience: if a man puts away something of his own and uses something of someone else's, this does not warrant the assumption that he has put away everything of his own.

12.1.11-15 (E ; T2264-2270) What is available from the archetype takes precedence over what is available from another subsidiary rite, just as in ordinary life a person takes pleasure in using what belongs to him already, instead of something new (11). When the general rule of replication (the ektype is identical with the archetype as far as possible) contradicts what is suggested for use by some name found at the ektype, the name is more authoritative (13; cf. 12.2.22). But it is preferable to leave a subsidiary rite incomplete if the possible extended application would cause a defect in the primary rite, such as the removal of some material to the wrong place (15).

12.1.17 (E ; T2271) All-night vigils are prescribed for several sacrifices: this is not for some unseen religious purpose, but to protect the sacrificial tools.

12.1.23 (E ; T2274-2275) Truth-telling is specifically prescribed in certain ritual contexts, but also is obligatory for people in ordinary life.

SECTION TWO

12.2.19-21 (E ; T2303-2304) When the archetype is begun, there is no ektypal rite, since the latter will come to exist only when there is some specific donation or desire in the performer. Hence the ektype cannot be inaugurated along with the archetype.

12.2.22-25 (E ; T2305-2307) When, for example, a fifteen-day sacrifice is called for, it is comprised of several shorter rites which do not all have the same characteristics. The conflict should be resolved so as to preserve the largest number of relationships, since this will ensure the successful completion of more of the sacrifices and hence more results (22). When the number preserved would be equal (whichever of the conflicting rites is chosen) relations pertaining to the primary rite take precedence (23). If the secondary actions of the subsidiary conflict with those of the primary, the former are superseded, since the subsidiary rites are performed at all only to make the primary complete (25).

12.2.27 (E ; T2308) That which is interior (*antarāṅga*) takes precedence over what is exterior (*bahirāṅga*). (What helps directly in the action at hand takes precedence over what helps indirectly.) For when looking to locate what contributes to the *apūrva* (i.e., the goal of the sacrifice), one's mind approaches directly to the interior subordinate elements and only thereafter to the exterior ones.

12.2.33-34 (E ; T2314-2316) The archetypal rite is permanently present (whenever an ektype is considered). Ektypes are adventitious, requiring some occasion or desire to cause their performance. Hence, when in the ektype some detail of the one or the other must be respected, the ektypal is preferred, since otherwise it would never be respected (since by definition it always comes after the archetype and would always be thwarted by it; whereas there are occasions where the archetype occurs without any mention of an ektype.)

SECTION THREE

12.3.10 (E ; T2325) The primary action is performed for the sake of the result, or for what bears the result, but never for the sake of a subsidiary action.

12.3.16-17 (E ; T2327-2329) Expiatory (or contingent) actions are of two sorts. First, those which remedy defects in the performance which are due to human carelessness, i.e., the failure to do what should have been done, or the doing of what was prohibited. These expiatory actions restore the primary action to fruitfulness, but do not positively contribute to it.

Second, those which are subsidiary to the primary action in certain circumstances (e.g., when the sun has risen or not at a certain point in the rite) and which, in those times, do contribute to its fruitfulness.

The first kind of expiatory act is not a true subsidiary rite; if one among several possible expiations remedies the defect, there is no need to perform the others (16). The second kind is a true subsidiary rite and hence when there are several they should all be performed, in combination, and not treated as optional alternatives (17).

12.3.25 (E ; T2337) This refers to *mantras* which are closely connected with certain acts or parts of acts: the action is brought to mind by the *mantra* and then performed.

12.3.26-27 (E ; T2338-2339) All action is momentary (*kṣanika*), even continuous acts like pouring several oblations without interval; therefore the utterance of the *mantra* and performance of the action cannot concur, and the *mantra* should be performed first.

12.3.37 (E ; T2346) Some *mantras*, mentioned above, remind the performer of what must be done, and so precede the action and, when multiple, are optional alternatives - when one *mantra* has reminded him, that is sufficient. Others refer to the action as it is performed, and, when multiple, should all be recited during the performance.

SECTION FOUR

12.4.1 (E ; T2348-2349) *Mantras* mentioning deities can have three purposes: First, if addressed to the deity, the purpose is praise; second, if the *mantra* tells a third party about the deity's deeds, the purpose is naming the deity; third, if the reciter expresses it to himself, the purpose is the recitation itself.

12.4.5-7 (E ; T2352-2356) Thus, the ritual purchasing, when prescribed, should be repeated for each of several materials to be used.

In general, when the meaning of a statement can be respected, it should not be negated (5). When something which

already exists is connected with something which does not yet exist, the former is there for the sake of bringing about the latter. Thus the action will have a visible purpose (6). Giving (even to the priest who performs the sacrifice) has a visible purpose: it entails the alienation of something which is one's own, so that it belongs to someone else (?).

12.4.18 (E ; T2363-2364) What is specific supersedes what is general, when they conflict. For the general has scope elsewhere, but if the specific does not apply to its specific setting, it would apply nowhere and would be useless.

12.4.36 (E ; T2374) The master of the house is just one among the sacrificers (at the *sattra*, which requires several sacrificers; cf. 6.2.1). He is so named because others do things for him, not because he gets a superior part of the results of the sacrifice.

12.4.37 (E ; T2374-2375) When there is no conflict between what serves the sacrificial purpose and the purpose of the performers themselves, the performers will act for their own good. But in cases of conflict, they will do what serves the sacrificial purpose, since otherwise the sacrifice will not happen successfully. If they fail to do what serves their own purpose, this will be merely a defect pertaining to them, secondary in relation to, and weak by comparison with, the sacrificial purpose.

12.4.41-44 (E ; T2376-2377) (Objection:) Anyone in the upper three castes who has studied and is knowledgeable can be the priest at sacrifices. Moreover all three castes have the same three debts - to ancestors, deities and *ṛsis*.

(Answer:) Traditional texts limit the priestly role to Brahmins alone.

11 KUMĀRILA BHATṬA (660)

Nothing much seems to be known for sure about him. "Many scholars believe that Kumārila was a Southerner in view of the fact that he has used in his *Tantravārttika* many Dravidian words whose semantic relationship to Sanskrit words has been emphasized. But Śālikanātha's references to him in his works as "Vārttikakāra Miśra" probably indicate his Northern origin." (VARS, p. 29)

11.1 KUMĀRILA, *Ślokavārttika*

In attempting to summarize this complex text we have taken materials from several sources. To help with the problem of locating passages in the text we have divided it following the divisions found in the edition ("E") by Dwarikadas Sastri (Varanasi: Tara Publications 1978) and the translation ("T") by Ganganatha Jha, Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal 1906). The section numbering is ours and does not correspond with those found in E and T. "1.1" indicates *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1, verse number 1", etc.

Ganganatha Jha, in his Introduction to T, pp. i-xlv, provides some idea of the topics covered in the first few sections; we provide selections here from what appears at the outset of one or two of Jha's opening sections, followed by translations or summaries of some of the passages contained in that section. The translation of the entire text is far too long to allow for complete transcription here.

1.1 *Pratijnā* (E3-34; T1-20; KKD pp.)

(GJiii-iv) "The first *sūtra* of Section 1, Chapter 1, deals with the usefulness of an investigation into *dharma*. In the remaining parts of the chapter we have a treatment of the questions—What is *dharma*? What is its definition? By what means of knowledge is *dharma* cognizable? and so forth.

"The meaning of the *sūtra* is that inasmuch as *dharma* is the purpose that is conceivable by means of the Veda alone, and the Veda is the only authority for it, after the student has finished the study of the Veda he should continue with his teacher a little longer with a view to learn the details of *dharma*.

"The *sūtra* contains two sections, i.e., it treats of two subjects (1) Is a study of the Veda necessary for all the three higher castes? (2) Is *dharma* a subject for consideration?

1.1.1 (N. Aiyaswami (Sastri), writing in *Indian Historical Quarterly* 1, 1925, pp. 759-760, thinks that the first verse of the *Ślokavārttika* cannot be by Kumārila since *Mīmāṃsā* denies the existence of God.) T renders the verse thus: "Reverence to Him who wears the crescent moon, Him who is embodied in pure consciousness, Him whose three eyes are the three Vedas, and who is the source from which all prosperity flows".

1.1.10 *Mīmāṃsā* has in this world been made (a branch of the) Lokāyata (school, atheistic); here an effort has been made by me to make it theistic (*āstikapatha*).

2 *Codanā* (E35-96; T21-66; KKD 5-6, 44-46)

(GJI, pp. 5-6) "The questions dealt with in this *sūtra* are: What is *dharma*? What is the authority—means of knowing-*dharma*?

"The meaning of the *sūtra* is that '*dharma*' is the name that is given to those actions resulting in good, that have been laid down by Vedic injunctions...The doubt is as to whether or not there is a means of knowing *dharma*. Is this means contained in sense-perception and the other ordinary means of knowledge? Or, is *dharma* knowable only by means of Vedic injunctions? Is the action of these injunctions in any way helped by sense-perception and the rest?

"The opposing view [*pūrvapakṣa*] is this: Vedic injunctions are not the means of knowing *dharma*. All sentences serve only to describe things that have been known by means of sense-perception, etc., and as such they cannot be accepted as independent means of knowledge. The conclusion led to by this view is either that (1) there is no means of knowing *dharma*, or (2) that *dharma* is cognizable by means of sense-perception or inference; or (3) that *dharma* is perceptible by the senses for the *yogins* while for us it is to be known either by means of inference or by that of Vedic injunctions; or (4) that it is known by means of Vedic injunctions as aided by apparent inconsistency. The sense of this last theory is that unless we admit of a super-physical cause, we are unable to explain the gradations and differences that we meet with in the universe; and it is the apparent inconsistency of these differences that points to the existence of such a cause in the shape of *dharma*; and then it is the *dharma* whose particular character is known by means of Vedic injunctions. In any case *dharma* is not cognizable by means of Vedic injunctions alone.

"The reply [*siddhānta*] to this opposing view is as follows: When we find that the idea given rise to by the injunction is not contradicted by any produced by other means of knowledge, we cannot but admit the undisputed authority of that sentence. And hence, so long as we have distinct words affording us the due knowledge of *dharma*, we cannot very reasonably declare that there is no means of knowing it. In the case of the words of ordinary persons, there are various causes of mistake—as for instance carelessness, deliberate desire to cheat, and so forth; and as such the authority of such words might very well be doubted. The case of Vedic sentences, however, is quite different, as it has not been composed by

human agency; and as such there being no chance of any of the aforesaid causes of mistake, the words of the Veda cannot but be admitted to have a self-sufficient authority in all matters wherewith they may deal. As for sense-perception and the rest, they are found always to point to things that exist in the present, and have nothing to say with regard to things in the future. As for the perception of *yogins* also, this is based upon memory; and as this always pertains to pre-conceived things, even yogic perception cannot apply to *dharma*, which has never been perceived or thought of and is yet to come....The conclusion arrived at is that Vedic injunctions are the only means of knowing *dharma*."

2.1-8 (G. Jha's summary, in T, p. 22, footnote 8:) "Injunction [*codanā*] is the authority for *dharma*, because authoritative character belongs to the 'Word' [*śabda*, i.e. the Vedas], as it has the capacity of producing conceptions even with regard to such objects as the past, future, etc., and injunction too is only a particular form of the Word; therefore it is only reasonable that this should be the sole authority for *dharma*, which is super-sensuous."

2.6 (Tr. KKD p. 6): "A word verily produces understanding concerning even an altogether absent object. Thus exhibiting the basic feature of all cognition—viz., self-validity—it is confirmed as a case of valid cognition when no defects are present in it."

2.13-14 (Tr. Kataoka 2003, p. 100) "It will be established later that material action, property and so on are *dharmas*. Though they are visible, they are not *dharmas* as such (i.e. as ordinary objects of perception). For it is understood always (only) from the Veda that these are means to accomplish beatitude. And as such (they are) *dharmas*. Therefore (their being *dharmas* is) not an object of the sense faculties."

2.33-61¹ Discussion of the problem of the intrinsic versus the extrinsic validity of cognitions. Kumārila argues against the following views:

(1) both the validity and the invalidity of a cognition are intrinsic;

(2) both the validity and the invalidity of a cognition are extrinsic.

(3) the invalidity of a piece of cognition is intrinsic, its

¹This section is exhaustively studied in Arnold 2001, pp. 597-603.

validity extrinsic.

Kumārila rejects all three of these views in favor of the fourth possible alternative, viz.

(4) the validity of a piece of cognition is intrinsic, its invalidity extrinsic, i.e., when it is discovered that its causes are defective. Thus an awareness is veridical unless proved to be otherwise."

2.34ab (Tr. Rani, pp. 96-97) "Some people hold that both validity and invalidity of cognition are intrinsic, because the thing, which by itself is non-existent (*asat*), cannot be produced by any means."

2.34cd (Sum. Rani, p. 97) "Some others hold that validity and invalidity both are extrinsic (*paratah*), because both depend upon the ascertainment of merits and demerits produced in the cognition by its cause."

2.35ab (Sum. Rani, p. 97) "The view has been repudiated by Kumārila on the ground that the two aspects cannot be accepted as intrinsic in one cognition, because they are mutually contradictory."

2.37 "If it is argued that contradiction would not take place, because the two aspects i.e. validity and invalidity belong to two different cognitions, even then the view would not hold ground, because in that case, it would be difficult to ascertain without the help of any extraneous means as to which cognition is valid and which is invalid."

2.38 (Sum. Rani, p. 101-102) (Buddhist:) "Invalidity should be accepted as [a] natural feature of cognition, [and the] validity of cognition should be accepted as extrinsic."

2.39 (Tr. Rani, p. 101-102) "because 'invalidity, being a non-entity, cannot be originated from the discrepancies of the cause; validity, being a positive entity, is originated in the cognition by the merits (of the cause)."

2.40 (Tr. Rani pp. 99-100) "If validity is accepted as natural and invalidity as extrinsic, who would, then, be able to refute validity even in a dream-cognition?"

2.42 (Sum. Rani, p. 101) "Elucidating the intrinsicity (*svatastva*) of invalidity, the Buddhist asserts that sense-organs and their merits are the cause of validity and the absence of that (i.e. invalidity) can happen in two ways—either when there is some defect in the sense-organs or when there is absence of any one of them."

2.43 (Tr. Rani, pp. 101-102) "[Buddhist:] "It is an error on the part of the Mīmāṃsakas to assume that invalid cognition

is caused by the demerits. In fact there is pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the demerits and the absence of merits. Whenever the demerits are present in the cause, absence of merit comes in its wake and invalidity becomes inevitable."

2.45 (Sum. Rani, p. 102) "Invalidity does not belong to ignorance due to the demerits in the cause, but it belongs to it due to the absence of the causes of cognition."

2.47-53 (KKD p. 5: "In a nutshell his position is that all cognition is valid unless proved to be otherwise."

2.47 (Tr. Rani, p. 99) "You must understand that validity is inherent in all types of cognitions, for, a faculty by itself non-existing, cannot possibly be brought into existence by any other agency."

2.48 (Tr. Taber 1992, p. 207) "And (in general) things depend on (other) causes in arising, but once they exist they exercise their functions by themselves."

2.52-53 (Tr. Taber 1992, p. 212) "When there is intrinsic validity, nothing else is sought. For the falsehood (of the cognition) disappears without effort, as a result of not knowing a defect. Thus, the validity of a cognition, due to its having the nature of knowledge, is (in the case of a false cognition) removed by ascertaining a defect in its cause or realizing that the object really is otherwise."

2.62-63 (KKD p. 5) "He argues that since in a verbal testimony the only possible source of invalidity is the untrustworthy character of the speaker concerned; a verbal testimony devoid of any speaker is automatically proved to be valid."

2.63-109 and the verbal testimony of the Vedas could only seem to be false if its speaker were untrustworthy, since the Vedas themselves have no author(s).

2.110-118 (T, p. 38, n.115) "Neither sense-perception nor inference can prove the existence of an omniscient person. In inference we require a middle term, which we cannot have in the case of omniscience."

2.121-140 [Objection:] Agreed, there are no omniscient persons, but the Buddha and others may know *dharma*.

[Answer:] Only if we believe what the Buddha says is true. "No man can by himself acquire knowledge of things supersensuous in general and religious matters in particular" (KKD p. 3)

112-142 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, p. 161) "That there can be an omniscient person is an unverifiable and absurd hypothesis.

Those who say that the Buddha knows everything through his supernatural eye (*divya cakṣus*) must themselves be knowing taste, sound etc. through their eyes! How, otherwise, could they maintain such an absurd position in spite of their knowledge of the law of nature that the eye can apprehend color only the tongue can apprehend taste only, and so on? We observe that the capacity of the senses is restricted to their own respective spheres and that they cannot transgress their natural limits. We certainly find differences of degree among the sensory and intellectual powers of different individuals. We find that one can acquire unusual powers of observation in the sense that he can see comparatively more distant and more minute things through vision. But we never find that any person has ever improved his vision to such an extent that he can perceive sound through vision. Perception is restricted only to objects existing at present. Hence, through perception alone everything cannot be known. Similarly, inference is possible only when true reason (*liṅga*) can be found out. Therefore, none can be omniscient. At present we do not find any omniscient person and there is no proof that such a person ever existed. There are certain books which claim that their authors were omniscient, but there is no reason why this claim should be accepted. It is argued that this claim should be accepted because it is made by an omniscient person and that the person is omniscient because he makes a true claim. But this argument involves mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) and hence it is false. Moreover, the fact that one person is omniscient, if it be a fact, can truly be known only by another omniscient person, which is impossible. The Jaina view that selves are naturally omniscient and their knowledge is independent of sense-organs can only be supported by the Jaina scriptures and the validity of the Jaina scriptures depends on the truth of this view, and thus there being a sort of mutual dependence nothing can be ascertained."

2.205 (Sum. Yoshimizu, EMH p. 330, fn. 59) "(Kumārila) even regards sacrifices involved in curses as neutral, comparing them to a sword which is different from the injury caused by means of it."

2.236cd-237ab (Sum. Yoshmizu, EMH p. 330, fn. 58) "If one sticks to the criteria of giving pleasure or pain in determining whether an act is good or bad, one cannot condemn illicit drinking (*surāpāna*) or sexual intercourse with the wife of one's teacher as bad deeds."

2.258cd (Sum. Yoshimizu, EMH p. 330, fn. 59)

"Kumārila distinguished 'internal' (*aṅga*) killing which forms an inevitable part of sacrifices from 'external' (*anaṅga*) non-sacrificial killing which is sinful.

3 *Nimitta* (E96; T57)

4 *Pratyakṣa* (E97-148; T68-112)

[This entire section is translated, with the Sanskrit text, by John Taber in Taber 2005. The summary of this section that follows here is based on his translation; in particular, his suggestions as to who is being responded to in certain stanzas is indicated in block parentheses.]

4.1-9 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, p. 148) "An earlier commentator (Bhavādāsa, according to Pārthasārathi) takes the first part of the *sūtra* (i.e. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I.1.4) to be the definition of perception, viz. 'perception is that cognition which arises on the contact of a person's sense-organs with objects', and the second part as stating the ground of its incompetence for knowing *dharma*. Kumārila says that this cannot be a definition of perception, because no definition fits the context. The author of the *sūtra* undertakes an investigation of the means of knowing *dharma* and hence a definition of perception would have been beside the point. Moreover, inference etc. which too are means of knowledge and are not included in perception should have been defined by Jaimini if he intended to define perception. It should not be said that the definitions of other *pramānas* are not given because they are implied in the definition or because they are well-known. The definitions of inference etc. cannot be ascertained from that of perception and the assertion that they are well-known is equally applicable to perception. From this Kumārila concludes that the *sūtra* is meant to state the reason why perception, which is well-known to be a means of knowledge, cannot give knowledge of *dharma*."

4.10-14 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, p. 149) "Bhavādāsa's definition is too wide since it applies to illusion and doubt also. In the illusion of mirage there is a contact of the eyes with heated sand and in the doubtful cognition, 'is it a man or a post?' the eyes are in contact with something of a determinate character. Bhavādāsa's definition excludes only dream cognitions and hallucinations in which there is nothing objective in contact with [the] eyes. A definition of perception as a means of knowledge can be correct only if it covers all

cases of true perception and at the same time excludes all cases of false perception. The definition might have been correct if it were stated in the form 'perception is that cognition which arises on the contact of a person's sense-organs with the object that is cognized (*grāhya*)'. But as the term '*grāhya*' has not been inserted in the definition the defect of over-extensiveness persists since, according to the definition, even the cognition of an object from the contact of the eyes with a different object would come to possess the character of being perception."

4.17-18 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, pp. 148-149) "The import of the *sūtra* is not that that cognition which arises from a present sense-contact is perception, but it is that that which is well-known to be perception possesses the character of being brought about by a present sense-contact."

4.19 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, p. 149) "When Śabara in his *Bhāṣya* says '*pratyakṣam abhinimittam evaṃ lakṣaṇakam hi tat*' what he means by the term '*evaṃ lakṣaṇakam*' is not that such is the definition of perception but that such is the reason why perception is not the means of knowing *dharma*."

4.21 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 16) "The ultimate purpose of such a statement [in the *sūtra*] is to exclude yogic perception as a means of knowing *Dharma*, that is, to reject the position of those who believe that certain revered religious teachers of the past have apprehended *Dharma* by means of some kind of supernormal 'perception'. The *sūtra* rejects this on the ground that anything that is perception will apprehend only that which is present."

4.23-24ab (Sum. Taber 2005, pp. 16-17) "Yogic perception—perception that apprehends that which will take place in the future as the result of a certain action performed now—is, thus, a contradiction in terms. If the *sūtra* is taken in this way, then none of the problems raised earlier in connection with construing it as presenting a definition of perception comes up. In particular, since it does not present a definition of perception at all, it cannot be faulted for presenting a *bad* definition."

4.26 (Tr. Rani, p. 72) "Regarding the objects even of the past and the future and the objects very subtle and interrupted, perception of the *yogins* has been accepted by some (the Buddhists) and perception of the liberated selves by some others (the *ārahantas*)."

4.26-33 (Sum. UPJ 11998, p. 70) "It is clear from this [passage] that Kumārila does not favor the view that *yogins*

perceive past, future, minute and also things beyond the reach of ordinary external sense-organs...By (Jaimini's) definition perception is that cognition the object of which is present in the reach of the sense-organs. Hence perceptual cognition is capable of illumining only those objects which are within the reach of the sense-organs. And hence he says: if the *yogins* perceive something which is past or yet to occur then that knowledge cannot be called perception.

"Whatever is called ["perception"] *pratyakṣa*,...cognition illuminates only those objects which are actually present. So even if it the case of a perception of a *yogin* still if it is a perceptual cognition then the object of it cannot be in the past or future but it has to be present. This implies that even *yogins* cannot perceive the things belonging to past or future times...

"*Dharma* is something which is yet to occur or if it has already occurred it is the 'means of something that is desired' (*iṣṭasādhana*) by the person who performs it—and hence it is never present nor accessible to anyone else than the Veda.

"As it is never present it cannot be perceived because the scope of perception is already determined and that delimits it to the things that are present before the perceiver within the reach of his sense-organs. Thus, *dharma* cannot be the object of perception and it can also never be the object of any other means of knowing because of this reason only as all the other means of knowing are ultimately dependent on perception. And so [the] Veda is the only means to know *dharma*—and it cannot be the object of perception.

"Thus, it leads us to the point that if one accepts that *yogins* perceive past as well as future things then one is forced to accept that *yogins* can perceive *dharma* as *dharma* is something which is future (or past). This again would mean that Vedic injunction is not the only source to know *dharma*, but it can also be an object of yogic perception. That in turn would hamper two basic assumptions of the system, namely, (1) *pratyakṣa* or perception always is the cognition of something present and (2) *dharma* can be known only through Vedic injunction.

"Not only this but Kumārila has refuted even *prātibhāñāna*,...intuition which is sometimes produced even in ordinary people. [The] Vaiśeṣikas have accepted it particularly in case of the sages to know *dharma* and *adharma*. They have divided *prātibhā* into two categories, namely *ārṣa* and *laukikī*. Kumārila refutes this on the ground that as the *laukikī*

pratyakṣa is not alone sufficient to determine the object within the help of the means of knowing such as perception etc., the same is the case of the *prātibhā* of *yogins*."

4.38-39 (Sum. Samanta 1998, p. 80): "Kumārila...interprets the prefix 'sam' in the word 'samprayoge' occurring in the *sūtra* in the sense of 'right'. By 'prayoge' he means the functioning of the sense with reference to their objects (*sat*). Actually speaking, the definition of perception as interpreted by Kumārila is the same as that of [the] *Vṛttikāra*. Still Kumārila is of the opinion that the *sūtra* may be taken as the mere definition of sense-perception."

4.40-41 (Sum. Rani, p. 68) "Kumārila presents the two objections of the Buddhists against the *prāpyakāritva* view of the senses: (i) *Sāntara-agrahanam*—An object which is at some distance from the eye or the ear would not be grasped by the sense, if it be accepted that the sense cognizes the object only after getting to it directly (*prāpyagrahanapakṣa*), because the eye and the ear, being only physiological organs, are incapable of moving from the places of their respective objects to get to them directly. (ii) *Adhiṣṭhānādhikasya agrahanam*—The other objection is that one would not be able to apprehend an object which is larger in size than the sense-organ itself as happened in case of skin and the rest. The skin can apprehend only as much as comes into direct contact. So the eye also would not be able to cognize a hill or an elephant, and the ear would not be able to hear the loud sound of a drum in that case, because they are larger in size than that of the eye and the ear."

4.42-48 (Sum. Taber 2005, pp. 17-18) "Dignāga raises various objections in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* against considering perception as a cognition that arises from the connection of a sense faculty and object in the sense of *direct contact*. First, such a definition would seem to exclude perception at a distance, in particular, hearing and vision. Second, it would entail that a sense faculty could not apprehend something larger than itself."

[Answer:] "There are different ways in which one may hold that there is a connection. One can take it to mean simply that there is an *orienting* of the sense faculty toward the object or else that there is a *capacity* of the sense faculty to perceive the object. Either of these interpretations would allow for the perception of objects at a distance or objects larger than the organ that is the seat of the sense faculty. However, even on the theory that 'connection' means 'contact' Dignāga's objections

can be met. For Sāṃkhya philosophers believed that in perception the sense faculty comes directly in contact with the object insofar as a function (*vṛtti*) extends outward from the external, visible sense organ located in the body - the eyeball, the nose, etc. - to the object...the function could spread out and contact the object over a broad area."

4.52-58 (Sum.Taber 2005, p. 20) "Why stress that a perception is a certain cognition *in a state of origination?* and 'of a person' - How is this expression to be related to the other words of the *sūtra*, and what is this person that is being referred to, anyway?"

4.59 (Sum.Taber 2005, p. 20) [Dignāga's third objection is that] "if...perception" [arises from sense-object contact] "then all properties of an object would be known; for if a sense faculty is connected with an object, it is connected with all of its properties."

4.62-63 (Sum. Taber p. 20) [Answer:] "Even if one considers there to be a connection in the sense of direct contact, the connection in question would not be 'connection in general' but some *specific* connection suitable only for the arising of a cognition of a *certain type* of sensible property of an object."

4.65 (Sum. Rani, p. 56) "*Pratyakṣa* is named after the sense[-organ], because it is its specific cause (*asādhāraṇahetu*).

4.66-69 (Sum.Taber p. 20) "Thus, indeed, a particular sense faculty will perceive only one particular sensible quality. And the various proposals according to which perception is either the connection of sense faculty and mind or the connection of mind and self, or else just the sense faculty itself, can be shown to be impervious to the criticism raised by Dignāga as well."

4.70-73 (Sum.Taber p. 20) "Even theories that hold the cognition of the object to be the means of knowledge, with which Kumārila's own is to be grouped, can be shown to be coherent. Here, of course, the main problem is to explain how *pramāṇa* and *phala* are distinct, that is, how a cognition, which itself is a knowing of an object, can be construed as a means for the arising of another cognition that will be construed as the result (as it is on most theories of this sort). This can be done in various ways: the *pramāṇa* could be a cognition of a qualifying feature of an object, such as the color blue, and the *phala* an awareness of that same object as qualified by that feature, for example, 'the pot is blue'. Or the *pramāṇa* could be a *nonconceptualized* perception of the qualifying feature and the

phala a conceptualized awareness of it. Or the *pramāṇa* could be an awareness of the qualified object, the *phala* an awareness of it as desirable, undesirable, or neither."

4.72 (Sum. Rani, p. 53) "It is a well-known fact according to them (the realist schools), that an instrument is always different from its result."

4.75 (Tr. Rani, p. 54) "As, when the ax is applied to the *khadira* wood, the cutting does not belong to a log of the *palāśa*-so (we see that) in ordinary experience there is no similarity between the ax (the means) and the cut (the result)."

4.78 (Sum.Taber 2005, p. 21) "It seems preferable to take the result of the action of the means of knowledge to be the awareness of a certain object and the means thereto to be whatever process outside of consciousness led up to it; or indeed, if one assumes a certain cognition to be the means of knowledge, then a distinct, subsequent cognition - say, of the value of the object as desirable or undesirable, or of the object as qualified by a certain property - should be considered the result."

4.79 (Tr. Rani, p. 63) "It is not proper to hold that the self-cognition (*svasamvitthi*) is the result, because that is refuted (in the *Sūnyavāda* section). And it is also not proper to assert that the conformity of the object (*viśayākāra*) is the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), because (in such an assertion) the object (*viśaya*) is different (in case of *pramāṇa* and its result)."

4.80-82 (Tr. Rani, p. 64) "Except self-comprehension or -cognition (*svasamvitti*) no other entity has been found in the form of itself (*svākāra*), which may be regarded as the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) with regard to the result, self-cognition. Besides, the form of itself cannot be cognized without another form, and this latter will require another form. Thus there would be no end of series of forms. So long as the 'form of itself' remains uncognized, its existence cannot be ascertained; and if the cognition appearing in the form of an object (*viśayākāra*) is accepted as the object to be cognized (*grāhya*), no other entity as the apprehender (*grāhaka*) is found."

4.83 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, p. 166) "Kumārila does not try to establish the existence of *manas* by arguments as is done by the Naiyāyikas. He simply says that the cognition of pleasure etc. is perceptual in nature, because it arises when *manas* is in contact with them, and *manas* is a sense-organ."

4.85 (Sum.Taber 2005, p. 21) "Regardless of how one defines the *pramāna* perception it is clear that it can apprehend only that which is present, hence that it is not a means of knowing *dharma*. And that is especially the case if one considers perception to be always non-conceptualized, as the Buddhist does; for the character of a particular action as a means to a certain end, which is what *dharma* is concerned with, could only be grasped conceptually."

4.87 (Tr. Rani, p. 67) "When, being incapable of recollection, [sensory awareness] *indriyajñāna* is only non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*), how can it be possible that inference etc. may be preceded by *pratyakṣa*?"

4.88 (Sum.Taber 2005, p. 22) "Both are conceptual in nature insofar as they apprehend objects as possessing certain properties. Comparison (*upamāna*), meanwhile, involves memory. The knowledge that a domestic cow is similar to a wild cow, which Kumārila argues in his chapter on comparison, the *Upamānapariccheda*, is neither perceptual nor inferential, depends on remembering what a domestic cow looks like as one observes a wild cow."

4.89 (Sum.Taber 2005, p. 22) "Supposition (*arthāpatti*) - the postulating of entities or states of affairs capable of accounting for otherwise inexplicable facts (e.g. the postulating of an inherent expressive capacity of words to account for their ability to refer to their meanings) - obviously extends one's awareness beyond what is perceived."

4.91 (Tr. Rani, p. 47) "If an object has already been cognized by *pratyakṣa*, how can there be any validity attached to inference, comparison, etc. with regard to the same object? (Similarly) when an object has been comprehended by them (i.e. by inference etc.) then the same will not be apprehensible by the senses."

4.96 (Sum.Taber 2005, p. 22) "In inference, for example, one can only infer the existence of a property in the subject if one has perceived that the middle term ('inferential mark', *liṅga*) is present therein. In comparison, one can know that something is similar to something else only if one has perceived it."

4.98-99 (Sum.Taber 2005, p. 22) "In inference one must establish by perception the relation of the middle to the major term (that which is to be proved, *sādhyā*). Thus, if one tried to show by inference that something has *dharma* as its property on the basis some other property X serving as the middle term, one

would have to have previous established - by perception - a relation of invariable concomitance between the latter and *dharma* (i.e., 'Everything that has X had *dharma*')."

4.101-108 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 22) Nor can supposition tell us anything useful about *dharma*. Even if it could establish the *presence* of *dharma* as the cause of varying experiences of pleasure and pain in life - that is, a particular person experiences a greater measure of pleasure than others because he lived according to *dharma* in previous lives - which Kumārila disputes (for there could be other reasons for the discrepancies of misery and enjoyment among people - it still would not tell us which specific actions constitute *dharma*, which is what we really need to know."

4.111cd-113 (Sum.Taber 2005, p. 23) "Kumārila asserts at the outset that perception is not necessarily without conceptual construction: 'for a conceptual awareness that assists in the apprehension of the form of the object is also considered a perception'. However, that does not mean that all perception is necessarily conceptual, either, as the Grammarians imply...Rather, theirs is an initial, non-conceptualized cognition of mere looking or seeing, like the cognition of infants and others who lack language, which arises from the undifferentiated object (*śuddhavastu*). It is not distinctly aware of any specific or general features of the object; rather, it is predominantly aware of it as just an indeterminate particular, as 'this' or 'something'."

4.112-113 (Tr. Rani, pp. 59-60) "First of all there arises a cognition in the shape of mere reflection (*ālōcanamātra*), which is construction-free (*nirvikalpaka*) and is similar to the cognition of the infant and the dumb arising purely from the pure object. At that state neither particularity (*viśeṣa*) nor the universal nature (*sāmānya*) is experienced, but only the individuality (*vyakti*) as their substratum is apprehended."

4.117-118 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 23) "This non-conceptualized perception of the object is in most cases immediately followed by a conceptualized one. However, although it does not distinctly present specific properties of the object as such, we know by implication or supposition (*lakṣanā*) that it must nevertheless apprehend both universal and particular aspects of the object in some way, since otherwise it could not give rise in turn to a conceptual awareness, which explicitly identifies such features."

4.119 (Sum. Samanta 1998, p. 80-81) "Kumārila thinks that the object of abstract cognition [construction-free awareness] has a two-fold aspect. What is comprehended by the cognizer is the object pure and simple, without having any qualification. In the sensory awareness the object is not cognized as anything particular, inasmuch as this simple awareness does not serve to exclude other objects. In the first stage of perception [an] object is not cognized as general, simply because there is no exclusion of other objects in such a cognition. An object is capable of being cognized as having common character through the process of assimilation. It is distinguished from other objects through the process of discrimination. These two processes involve a memory of other objects and a comparison of the cognized object with them./ When memory and comparison do not come into existence the object is cognized as an individual whole, in which the specific and the generic characters remain uncognized.

4.120 (Tr. Rani, p. 60) "After that an object* is determined by its attributes like the universal etc. (*jātyādi*) and that too is a perception."

4.121-122 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 24) "The act of memory involved in conceptualized perception is carried out by the self, not the sense faculty. The self, using the sense faculty, as well as the mind, as its instruments, associates what is perceived with an expression."

4.123 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 24) "Any awareness of an object - even a conceptual awareness preceded by a memory - is a perception so long as the connection between sense faculty and object is not broken."

4.125 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 24) "Even when other conceptual awarenesses intervene - as happens when one makes a series of judgments about the object, or when the mind is distracted by other thoughts - one's awareness is perceptual so long as the connection between sense faculty and object is intact."

4.126-127 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 24) "[Question:] Shouldn't a cognition, if it is perceptual, arise as soon as there is a connection between sense faculty and object?"

[Answer:] "No, says Kumārila, one should not expect this. When I enter a dark room from bright sunlight I do not immediately apprehend the objects around me, even though they are within range of my visual sense; similarly, I am not immediately upon the first visual apprehension of an object

from a distance, able to discern all of its features. Thus, a distinct, conceptualized cognition of an object can arise after an initial indistinct, non-conceptualized one and still be a perception."

4.128 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 24) "However, this should not be taken to imply that any cognition following upon the connection of sense faculty and object, whether immediately or not, is a perception. Certainly, I am not having a perception of an object if, after having looked at it, I close my eyes and think about it. Rather, a cognition counts as a perception only if the connection is preserved."

4.129 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 24) "Kumārila then proceeds to argue that, even though the mind may be involved in conceptualized perception (*qua* faculty of memory), it is still etymologically correct to refer to it as a 'perception' (*pratyakṣa*, literally, 'that which pertains to each sense faculty'), because, once again, the functioning of a sense faculty is the factor in the arising of such an awareness not involved in the arising of other types of cognitions. Indeed, the mind, as the function that effectively turns on the sense faculty by establishing a connection with the self, and the self, as the subject of knowledge, are involved in the arising of *all* cognitions."

4.132-133 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 24) "Moreover, conceptualized perceptions are generally recognized as perceptions in common discourse. Philosophers should not be allowed arbitrarily to define perception in such a way as to exclude something that most people agree is perception."

4.134 (Tr. Rani, p. 69) "How can there be any sense-dependence in case of self-apprehension of *kalpanā* (conceptual construction). If it is asserted that (here) [the] mind (*manas*) is the (grasping) sense, then similar is the case with [cowness] *gotva* etc. (i.e. the cognition of *gotva* etc. should also be included in perception."

4.136 (Tr. Rani, p. 69) As in your (Buddhist) theory, perceptibility (*pratyakṣatā*) is assumed with regard to the cognition of the *manas* being a sense, similarly in our case, perceptibility (of *savikalpakajñāna*) will be due to the dependence upon *manas*."

4.137 (Tr. Rani, pp. 57-58) "Although the dependence upon that (i.e. upon *manas*) is similar (in case of perception as well as in other cognitions like inference etc.) yet the Buddhist, having defined perception as 'free from conceptual construction' has accepted only a few cases as *pratyakṣa*."

4.138-139 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 25) "In summary, it is clear that the kinds of conceptual awareness in question does not fit into any other category of cognitions. It is not an inferential cognition, because it is not preceded by an awareness of some middle term, etc. It is not a memory because it does not present an object as having been previous experienced. Nor is it an error, for it is not invalidated by a later cognition. (Nor is it a state of doubt, for it is definite in content). Hence, by process of elimination, one must consider it a perception."

4.140 (Tr. Rani, p. 61) "There arises a determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka dhī*) when the universal etc. (*jātyādi*) being different from the real, are superimposed upon it (the real object); hence this cognition is just like that of mirage."

4.141-144 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 25) "Kumārila argues [that conceptualized] cognitions represent things exactly as they are, for property and property-bearer are in fact identical. This is confirmed by the sorts of perceptions we have of objects with properties: we cognize the property-bearer as *having the form of the property*; that is to say, we cognize property and property-bearer as somehow fused and inseparable. The identifying judgment that the pot is blue is certainly different from the identifying judgment that a crystal is the piece of lac that has been placed next to it and is reflected on it. The latter judgment is erroneous; it is overturned by the occurrence of cognitions of the crystal without the lac and the cognitions of the lac without the crystal. However, we do not have similar kinds of separate cognitions of a particular animal and its genus or a pot and its color."

4.151 (Tr. Rani, p. 61) [Buddhist:] "As there is no substratum (*dharmin*) except the attributes (*dharma*), the idea of cow etc. is only an aggregate (*saṅghamātra*) of these (attributes such as *rūpa*, *rasa*, etc.) as in the case of a forest."

4.152-153 (Sum. Taber p. 26) [Answer:] "Kumārila continues to maintain that the sort of conceptual awareness in question apprehends things exactly as they are, for property and property-bearer are different as well as identical! Although their identity is established by the absence of distinct cognitions of property and property-bearer when the latter remains in one state, their difference is established by the alternation of properties on the one hand the continuity of the property-bearer, on the other, when the latter changes states."

4.157cd-158 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 26) "Every sense

apprehends that something exists; if different senses can apprehend the same universal, existence, they ought also to be able to apprehend a common property-bearer."

4.160 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, p. 171) "Kumārila has emphatically stated that in the perception of color etc. *manas* functions in cooperation with the visual and other sense-organs.

4.163 (KKD p. 57) "The position that the five sense-organs are not different but one he dismisses by pointing out that in that case it should be impossible for one to lack a particular sense-organ while not lacking the rest."

4.169 (KKD p. 57) "All the sensory features can be classified into five groups that correspond to the five sense-organs."

4.170 (KKD p. 57) "The features 'existent-ness' and 'qualified-ness' are perceived through all the five sense-organs, the features 'substance-ness' and 'corporeality' through two (viz. eye and skin), the five features color etc. through the five sense-organs eye etc. respectively."

4.171 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 26) "Kumārila moves on to consider another way in which [conceptual awareness] might be considered a form of error, namely, it superimposes a word onto the perceived object. In judging 'this is a cow' I am, so the objection goes, identifying the word 'cow' with the thing I perceive; for a conceptual awareness is not an awareness of words insofar as it is an articulation of what I perceive in terms of language. In that case, however, a distinct, nonlinguistic awareness of the object drops away and the word by means of which I think about it in effect refer only to themselves. Thus, a conceptual awareness confuses or falsely identifies the perceived object with the word and is therefore a form of error."

4.172 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 27) "When I use a word to refer to an object I have separate awarenesses of the word and of the object. In whatever way I apprehend the object prior to remembering the word for it, in non-conceptualized perception I apprehend it in the same way once the word is applied in conceptualized perception."

4.173-175 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 27) "One might object that we do not cognize something *as* a cow or *as* white prior to acquiring the words 'cow' and 'white'; otherwise, children and others without language would be able to recognize such things. Thus our awareness of such things is inextricably bound up with language. Kumārila responds: just as one is surely

aware of different colors prior to knowing the words for them, so is one aware of cow-ness, whiteness, etc."

4.177 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 27) "Even when one articulates what one is perceiving by means of a linguistic expression there is no confusion of the linguistic expression with the perceived object, for they are objects of different senses, the linguistic expressions being (potentially) an object of hearing and the perceived object (in most cases) an object of vision."

4.179 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 27) "Nor can one argue that the word, insofar as it is the 'revealer' of the object, is confused with it in the same way a mirror revealing a face is mistaken for the face; for the analogy breaks down in the case of other agents of manifestation: no one, for example, confuses an object illumined by a lamp with the lamp."

4.180-181 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 27) "Even if it were the case that properties such as cow-ness are always cognized in conceptualized perceptions as having the nature of words, one could not take such perceptions to be errors; if objects are always cognized in a certain way, that is how they must be! If, on the other hand, one is confident that there is indeed a confusion of distinct entities here - words and objects - then one must in fact somehow cognize them *as distinct*, and not really confuse them."

4.186-191 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 27) "If we did not have a distinct awareness of the meanings of words, we would not be able to recognize polysemic words. We could not be aware of the different meanings so such words as 'pen' or 'ball' (Kumārila, of course, uses Sanskrit examples), apart from phonetic sequences themselves."

4.193-194 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 27) "Second, we would be unable to distinguish words as different parts of speech, or otherwise relate them semantically to each other, for example, see that one word specifies the meaning of another."

4.195-198 (Sum. Taber p. 27) "Moreover, we could not recognize that two words are being used in grammatical coordination, hence that they refer to the same thing, such as the words 'blue' and 'lotus' in the phrase 'blue lotus'. Rather, on the view that the expression is superimposed on its meaning, each would be taken as referring, in effect, to itself, hence to *different* things."

4.199 (Sum. Taber p. 27) "On the other hand, the use of a synonym to paraphrase another word would be

indistinguishable from the use of two words in grammatical coordination.

4.200-202 (Sum. Taber 2005, pp. 27-28) "Certainly, Kumārila continues, when one learns what a word means, that is the convention that assigns the word to its meaning, one is aware of the meaning as distinct from the word. Moreover, that meaning must be, not a particular, but a universal extending over many particulars distributed across space and time, to which the same word may apply."

4.205-206 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 28) "When we use a word later, or when we hear a word, it evokes the same awareness of the meaning we had when we learned it. Thus, words do not obscure their meanings and are not confused with them. Rather, they are reminders of them; that is, they evoke a distinct awareness of them."

4.209-212 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 28) "The superimposition of the idea of one thing onto another is also possible only when there is some similarity between the two, as in the case of mother-of-pearl and silver (both as shiny) or a snake and a rope (both are long and curved). However, there is no similarity between the word 'cat', which is, on most views, a sequence of phonemes, and its meaning, which is a physical object with four legs, ears, fur etc. Nor does the meaning stand in proximity to the word, so that it might receive some influence from it and thus appear like it, like a crystal placed next to a piece of lac."

4.213 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 28) "Finally, if all conceptual awareness involved the false superimposition of words and were thus a form of error, then even inference and scripture - means of knowledge the Buddhist, too, wants to accept - would be rendered invalid, for they are conceptual in nature."

4.214 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 28) "The superimposition theorist's statement of his own position would clearly be self-refuting, because it is couched in words and concepts."

4.215-216 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 28) "The Superimposition Theory, more generally, is called into question by the refutation of idealism and defense of realism, which Kumārila will undertake in the *Sūnyāda* section and which tells us in effect that there is a world of objects that exist independently of how we perceive and think about them."

4.217-228 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 28) "From verses 217-228 Kumārila takes up at greater length the point made at 180

that if one always conceived of things as having the form of words, then one's cognitions in fact would not be false; rather, they would reflect how things actually are. Here the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the eternity of language, in particular, of the connection between word and meaning, then it will always be the same word that is applied to a certain meaning; the meaning will always be perceived as having the form of that word; that, in effect, will be its nature (221ab). Kumārila digresses for several verses to consider objections to the eternity doctrine.

4.229-237ab (Sum. Taber 2005, pp. 28-29) "Kumārila considers the possibility that conceptualized cognitions are memories rather than perceptions, because they arise by associating a particular expression with the object, which must be retrieved by memory, or by identifying the object as a certain type of thing one experienced before (or both). Kumārila rejects this suggestion on the grounds (among other reasons) that regardless whether one's awareness of the word or of a previously experienced object of the same type, is a memory, one's awareness of the *object* is definitely a perception. That is to say, in conceptualized perception one is thinking about an object that one is currently *perceiving* by means of remembered types and terms, and that would seem to place it in the category of a perception, especially if there is an unbroken connection between sense faculty and object."

4.237cd-241ab (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 29) "One might, finally, object that a conceptual awareness of an object does not always arise when a sense faculty is connected with it and the other factors of perception are in place. One's mind may be distracted by some other train of thought or confused in some way, so that one is unable to apprehend the object conceptually. Thus, it does not seem that such a cognition is produced by the object itself, and so is not really a perception. Again, the most obvious alternative is that it is a kind of error, an awareness concocted by the mind independently of the causal powers of the object. In response, Kumārila notes that we commonly acknowledge that a certain kind of preparation is required in order to have certain cognitions. Only a person trained in music, for example, is able to recognize distinct notes, though all people are able to *hear* them. The fact that mental training is necessary, that the mind plays a role, hardly means that such identifications are false."

4.246cd-247ab (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 29) "When all is

said and done, a conceptualized cognition is false only when it attributes a property to something that doesn't really belong to it."

4.247cd-248ab (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 29) "Having concluded his defense of the validity of conceptualized perception, Kumārila reaffirms that inference and so forth are indeed based on (conceptualized) perception insofar as the depend on the perception of the subject of inference as possessing the inferential mark, the connection of inferential mark and property to be proved, and so forth."

4.248cd-254 (Sum. Taber 2005, p. 29) "Indeed, if there were no conceptualized perception, then inference would be impossible; for as Kumārila will show in his *Anumānapariccheda*, if the presence of the inferential mark in the subject cannot be *perceived* then it must be *inferred*, which leads to a regress. Nor does the acceptance of conceptualized perception require one to consider the awareness of a fire that one sees in the distance as hot and other such notions as perceptions, since such cognitions are mediated by other, more proximate cognitions, whereas the cognition 'this is a cow' is not. In general, a conceptual awareness should be considered a perception only if it arises (in part) from the connection of the sense faculty with the object and is immediate and direct."

4.254 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, p. 154) "A cognition which follows from sense-contact is commonly known by people to be perception even without knowing its elaborate definition."

5 *Autpattikā* (E149-151; T113-116)

5.1-8 (Sum. Yoshimizu EMH p. 330, fn. 58) "Kumārila also rejects 'habitual familiarity' (*lokaprasiddhi*) as a criterion for good and bad because in this way one would fall into an ethical relativism."

6 *Vṛtti* (E151-155; T116-119)

6.1-26 (E151-155; T116-119) For an account of the opinions of the *Vṛttikāra* see above, pp. 108-109.

7 *Nirāmbanavāda* (E155-201; T119-148; KKD 88-96)

7.1-4 If perceptions etc. are [all] precluded (*niṣiddha*), then all worldly doings, as well as *dharma* and *adharmā*, all truth (*pramā*), as well as the distinctions between Brahmins and others—the connections between propriety and impropriety

normally accepted in the world and conveyed through scripture, will be without basis. So the existence or nonexistence of external objects needs to be studied.

7.5 (Objection:) Even if only awareness is accepted (as real), all this (that is ordinarily known as the 'external world') is merely conventional (*samvrti*) reality, and as such it is useless for you to persist in holding that external objects are real.

7.6 (Answer:) But what is conventional is not real; and as such how can you speak of 'conventional reality'? If it is a reality, how can it be conventional? If it is false, how can it be real?

7.7 Reality cannot be a universal property of objects that are false as well as real, because the two are contradictory; for certainly tree-ness cannot belong to a lion as well as trees.

7.8-9 Thus the words 'conventional' and 'false' being synonymous, the assumption of conventional reality is only meant to hoodwink ordinary men—just as the word '*vaktrāsava*' ('mouth-wine') is used with reference to saliva— with a view to removing the stain of nihilism from the Buddhist doctrine. The same goes for their theory of the constructed-ness of external objects, because there can be no construction of indivisible (consciousness) in the absence of anything actual.

7.10 Therefore it must be admitted that that which does not exist does not exist, and that which really exists is real, while all else is false; and therefore there can be no construction of two kinds of reality.

7.11 There is a theory current among the Buddhists that all experiences are similar to the experiences in a dream, and it is to refute this theory that we seek to prove the reality of external objects.

7.12-13 It cannot be for the mere pleasure of a dream that people engage in dreaming. A dream coming to a man spontaneously during sleep, a wise man would only lie down quietly instead of sacrificing, etc. when desirous of obtaining real results. For these reasons, we must try our best by arguments to establish the reality of external objects.

7.14-16 (Tr. Rani, 159) "Among the Buddhists, the *Yogācāras* maintain that the cognition exists without any corresponding object in the external world, while the *Mādhyamikas* wish to establish the non-existence not only of the external world, but also of cognition. The non-existence of [the] external world is, thus, common to both the schools, because the *Mādhyamikas*' denial of the existence of cognition

is based upon his denial of external objects. Hence an attempt has been made by the *Bhāṣyakāra Śabarasvāmin* to examine the reality or unreality of the external world."

7.17 The denial of an external object is of two kinds: one is based upon an examination of the object itself, and the other is based upon the instruments of knowledge. Of these, that which is based upon an examination of the object may be laid aside for the present; that which is based upon instruments of knowledge, being the root of the Buddhist theory, is here examined.

7.18-19 Here too the denial has been introduced in two ways: at first through inference, and then, after an examination of the applicability of sense-perception, through its inapplicability to external objects. And it is the inferential argument that is urged in the *Bhāṣya*: "No awareness has a supporting object", etc.

7.20-22 (Buddhist:) (1) It has been declared by the Buddhist objector in the *Bhāṣya* that 'the birth of human awareness arising from contact with a sense-organ is perception'. But there is no relation between the objects and the sense-organ in reality, while, as for an assumed contact, this is present in a dream also. Therefore it is not possible to have any such differentiation in reality as that into awarenesses produced by such contact and those not so produced.

(Answer:) It is said (by the *Vṛttikāra*) that falsity is of just two kinds, not more; but here it is now said that all awareness is of one kind, false

7.23 [Buddhist:] (A) The [waking] cognition [*pratyaya*] of a post, etc. is false [*mithyā*], because it is a cognition, like a dream[-cognition].

7.24-34 [Answer:] In (A) there is no question that dreams are false, nor that "false" here means being without an actual, external object. Śabara refutes (A), contending that (A) cannot be false since it is a properly ascertained (*supariniścita*) cognition.

7.35-37 (Tr. Taber in StudM pp. 31-32) "Since [on the idealist's view] neither subject nor predicate can be apprehended as [really] distinct, either one or the other is not established, or both are not established. The speaker's or hearer's cognition of subject and predicate would itself [according to the Dreaming Argument] be without an object. Thus there would be a denial of [the reality of] both [subject and predicate] by your own statement (*svavāgbādha*)..."

Therefore, there is no felicitous way of stating your thesis."

7.38-40 [Buddhist:] But we don't admit the actuality of a property such as being-without-a-supporting object (*nirālambanatva*), so it is irrelevant to question the knowledge of them.

[Answer:] If such an awareness doesn't exist how do you know so much about it?

[Buddhist:] We hypothesize its existence and then show that it isn't an actual entity (*vastu*).

[Answer:] It must exist for you to hypothesize it.

[Buddhist:] So how do you [Mīmāṃsakas] explain absence?

[Answer:] We hold that [an] absence is an actual entity.

7.41-48 (T p. 125, fn. 41) "The word '*pratyaya*' with an accusative affix signifies that which is cognized, i.e. the object; with a nominal affix, it would mean cognition; with a nominative affix it would mean that which cognizes; and with an instrumental affix it would mean that by which anything is cognized, that is, the sense-organ. 'Contradiction'—if the word '*pratyaya*' be held to end in the nominal affix, then the very name '*pratyaya*' (cognition) would indicate an object which would be comprehended by the cognition; and hence to assert that such cognition has no corresponding reality in the external world would be a self-contradiction. If, on the other hand the word be held to end in the accusative affix, then your conclusion would simply mean that the object of cognition, the jar and the like, is without a substratum in the external world; and this we do not deny; hence your reasoning becomes superfluous. And as for the cognizer (signified by the nominative affix) or the means of cognition (signified by the instrumental affix), none of these is possible in the absence of a cognizable object."

7.49 What does 'false' [in (A), i.e. 'being-without-a-supporting-object' (*nirālambanatva*)] mean? If it means being without a content altogether, then the reason [in (A)] as well as the example involve the fallacy of unestablished qualifier (*viśeṣanāprasiddha*).

7.50 But if it only means being without some object or other, then we agree that all awarenesses lack some supporting object or other; e.g., taste does not grasp color.

7.51 [Buddhist:] We mean that any awareness lacks an object having the form (*ākāra*) that it is alleged to have.

[Answer:] But since you at least accept that you are

aware of your own awarenesses that would involve a self-contradiction.

7.52-53 If you mean that we don't have such an idea as 'that [awareness] is external [to the idea of it]', we certainly do have such an idea in the case of a post, etc., as we all plainly see.

7.54 [Objection:] Then since we see two moons [in the double-moon illusion] there must be two moons—which of course there aren't.

(Answer:) No, the unreality of the second moon is not just because it is cognized but because the second moon is not presented in a veridical experience of that object (*arthasamvit*).

7.55-56 We base the actuality or illusoriness of an object on the presence or absence of sense-object-contact; since you, however, deny the actuality of sense-organs, that basis is not available, so since for you the only reason available for proving the reality of anything is awareness, to deny that awarenesses have real objects as their contents is not justified.

7.57-59 Since you deny that there are any external objects how can you use as the *pakṣa* [in (A)] an awareness that is false (i.e., without an external object)?

7.60 Anyway, your argument proves what we already accept, since our view is that the whole world is real, being provable, etc.

7.61 "An awareness (that is false)"—of what? If the content of an awareness is even only partly different from that awareness this contradicts your position.

7.62 We agree that cognition does not have the same form (*ākāra*)—e.g., the form of being a real entity, since cognition is formless—as its content. But if you infer that the object is non-different from the awareness of it, that would violate the obvious difference between their powers.

7.63 Of course, we agree that at the moment of its production an awareness lacks an external object. (But at the second and third moments it has one.)

7.64 But you wrongly deny such a relation at any of the three moments, making all cognition like dreams or mirages.

7.65-66 If are cognitions are without actual objects then the inference must be that this very cognition must be without an actual object.

7.67 If the word "cognition" ("*pratyaya*") in (A) means that word (viz., "cognition") then you are right, since no word cognizes an object.

7.68 Or if you mean that the word "cognition" cannot bring about an awareness at all, then the *sādhya*-term (in your (A)), viz., "false (cognition)" cannot produce any meaning.

7.69-71 (Tr. Taber in StudM p. 13) "No statement results from a word without a connection [with its meaning]; and there is no connection without a difference [between the word and its meaning]. But there is no difference unless there is a cognition that apprehends a difference which [the word] really has. If those who conduct an inquiry do not understand the various elements of an argument—*pakṣa*, *hetu*, *drṣtānta*, the one who holds the theory, and the one who opposes it—then there is no demonstration. However, if one admits the reality of these things, then one's claim is refuted by one's presuppositions."

7.72-75 Your teacher, the Buddha, accepts the difference between *dharma* and *adharmā*, so your position contradicts your own teacher as well as what everyone knows.

7.76-78 (Objection:) All awarenesses other than this one (viz., that all awarenesses are false) are false.

(Answer:) Then the judgment that some awareness *p* is not this awareness (viz., that all awarenesses are false) is false.

7.79-81 (Tr. KKD p. 92): "An ordinary waking cognition is true, because it is not followed by a contradicting cognition, just like the cognition that contradicts a dream-cognition."

7.83 And without there being knowledge of the difference between bondage and liberation, to strive for liberation would be pointless.

7.84-87 And as a result of all this one would have no way of knowing when awareness occurs or fails to occur. So, since this applies to the beliefs taught by all systems, you might as well accept Sāṃkhya rather than Buddhism.

7.88-90 And everyone knows the difference between dream-objects, which are unreal, and waking objects, which are real.

7.91-93 (Objection:) Ordinary perceptual awarenesses are false, because they are contradicted by a *yogin's* perception.

7.94-96 (Answer:) Who knows what *yogin's* experience, or even that there actually are any *yogin's*?

7.97-100 (Objection:) Awarenesses, e.g. of a post, etc., are false because they are sublated, like the awareness of a mirage, etc.

(Answer:) We agree that some awarenesses are sublated, but that is because the sublating cognitions are true, and anyway if what you say were correct the perceptions of *yogins*

would be as false as any others in waking life.

7.101-106 Both you (Buddhists) and I must agree that the reason of (A) is unproved (*asiddha*), being identical with the thing yet to be proved (*sādhya*).

(Buddhist:) No. The *sādhya* refers to the class of cognitions in general, whereas the reason refers to a particular subclass of cognitions, viz., waking ones.

(Answer:) But you do not allow that two things can be both different and non-different (as for example would relate a class with a subclass of it, since a class and its subclass would have to partially share a property, which is something the Buddhist will not allow).

7.107-114 And "dream(-cognition)"(in (A)) is not an acceptable example, since even dreams have contents, like other false awarenesses. E.g., in a mirage there is something actually perceived, e.g., light reflected in water.

7.115-117ab (Objection:) How can a nonexistent object be the content of an awareness?

(Answer:) It happens all the time! A negative awareness has a positive content, viz., the absence of certain attributes in a given thing.

7.117cd-118ab (Tr. Taber 2001, p. 77, fn. 20) "Therefore, a cognition that knows something to be other than what it is, is 'without an object', but that [cognition, in reality] has non-being as its object [i.e., the non-being of silver: so it is not really object-less]. And non-being is just another being [i.e., the non-being of the silver is the being of the mother-of-pearl], nothing else] hence, it is something *real*, because it is not discerned [as such, i.e., it is never ascertained independently from what exists]."

For you, however, both the awareness of an absence and the absence, an object and the awareness of the absence, together with their causes, can never be ascertained.

119-120 And like the discrepancies of your conclusion, the contradictory character of our reason too would be chargeable to your argument, inasmuch as it leads to the subversion of the forms of the *sādhya*, *pakṣa*, etc., taken severally as well as collectively in the premises.

120-121 The discrepancies of the example too become chargeable to you, inasmuch as in any single object it is not possible have the conception of parts of the *sādhya* and the *hetu*, as well as of pervasion of one by the other.

121-122 Some people urge against you the objection

that in your argument you do not mention any negative example. If you argue that 'it is not mentioned because there is no such example' then they would reply: 'you can't fail to provide a negative example since failure to provide one is appropriate only when the conclusion is an affirmative one'.

123-124 Actually, the citation of a negative example is possible even when the contradictory of the *sādhyā* is negative, e.g., when "sound is transient, because it is an effect" is the argument, "[unlike] a sky-flower, etc." constitutes a negative example, an assertion which is quite reasonable.

124-125 In the case of your argument, however, we have a negative conclusion ('without supporting object'), and hence its contradictory (having a supporting object) is positive, and so it is necessary that the contradictory of your *sādhyā* should be supported by an example.

126-127 Under the circumstances, in the case of the denial of the Buddha's omniscience the following form of reasoning holds: 'The Buddha's perception fails to apply to all things, e.g., to future things, because it is perception, like our own'.

7.128-129 Only one who accepts the terms of debate should be allowed to enter it, but the (Buddhist) *sūnyavādin* denies that any of those terms are real.

7.129-130 (Buddhist:) It is all right if you accept the terms of our debate whether we do so or not.

7.131-149 (Answer:) Then how can you succeed? If you win the argument you contradict your own position, while if you lose you will not establish your conclusion. The truth or falsity of a conclusion depends not on which party accepts the premisses but on which party can demonstrate the truth or falsity of the conclusion.

7.150-152 (Tr. Taber in StudM p. 34) "Asserting such a conclusion [viz., that all cognitions are without objects] you [the Buddhist] are prevented from instructing [anyone about your doctrine] (*pratipādanāt vihatāḥ*); for you do not know a [real] proof commensurate with the conclusion you wish to establish. Likewise, the person to be instructed does not know your conclusion [to be true]; for he realizes that the proof, insofar as it seeks to establish a conclusion of this kind, is invalid. If, on the other hand, the proof is considered to be real, then your statement is not comprehended; for given the reality of the proof, the conclusion is impossible."

7.155 (Objection:) Well, we previously accepted the

premisses but no longer do so.

7.156-58 (Answer:) Then the premisses are unacceptable now and were unacceptable before.

7.159-163 (Objection:) An example showing that our position is right is this: the marks made to represent a certain syllable are not actually that syllable.

(Answer:) No one says they are, but both the marks and the syllable are actual entities.

7.164-168 (Objection:) What we accept in a debate is that the terms are conventionally real (*samvrtisatya*), i.e., such notions are occasioned by traces (*vāsanā*) and language (*śabda*).

7.169-172 (Answer:) If nothing actual is conveyed in traces or connoted by words then there can be no reason to accept one claim or deny another.

7.173 The mystic incantation that you have urged—viz., 'that only when the terms (of the propositions forming an argument) have become the object so of awareness do the functioning of inference and the rest become accomplished, and not merely when these terms exist in the external world'—would also apply to the unproved-ness (*asiddhi*), etc. of your argument that we have urged.

7.174-175 For you, who base all usage upon representations in thought without external objects, the objections urged by us also have to be accepted as established; but the argument brought forward by you does not need to be accepted, because we base all usage upon external objects; and as such, for us, even when a thought has appeared, we cannot in any way have any thoughts devoid of external objects.

7.176 (Objection:) Since nothing exists your objections are as much about nothing as you claim ours are.

7.177 (Answer:) Then there is no point in raising any objection to you.

7.178-180 As for impressions [*samskara, vāsanā*], how do you explain how one impression differs from another? Not because of the differences in the awarenesses that produced them, since according to you there are no such differences in reality.

7.181cd-182ab (Tr. Rani, pp. 130-131) "There can be no existence of impression (*vāsanā*) because of (i) the ideas (*citta*) being momentary, (ii) the destruction being 'without leaving any residue' and (iii) thus there being no association between the impressed and the impresser (*vāsaya* and *vāsaka*)."

7.180-184 (Sum. Bibhuti/Allen p. 161): "The vision that consciousness projects its impressions in space only to encounter them in a cognitive episode is fundamentally flawed. Consciousness does bear [produce] impressions, but they are signs of sensory contact with real objects in the past."

7.185-192 "Impressions also presuppose a self that had the experiences, stored them in its consciousness, and then recalls [them] in the present. Without belief in the self that precedes and succeeds its experience, the presence of impressions and the causative relation between them cannot be explained. One momentary entity cannot leave an impression in another momentary entity."

7.185cd-186 (Tr. Rani, p. 131) (Buddhist:) "If the subsequent conscious moment, being persistent (enduring for some time) does not differ from the previous one, then definitely *vāsanā* (impression) cannot be present there, just as it was not present in the previous moment, inasmuch as there is no difference (in the previous and the succeeding moments); while in (the Buddhists') theory of flux, *vāsanā* can exist, inasmuch as there is similarity as well as difference between the preceding and the succeeding moments."

7.193-195 And even supposing one did so it would—according to the Buddhist theory of momentariness—disappear before the next one arose.

7.196-200 (Objection:) The series of cognitions and the series of traces run parallel to each other.

(Answer:) Then it is senseless to claim that a cognition produces a trace. So this "trace"-theory is only conventionally true, and no real result is ever produced by something only conventionally true.

7.201 (Sum. Bibhuti/Allen p. 162) "It should be noted that Kumārila's quarrel is not with [the] Tathāgata, who rightly warned against the dangers of possessive materialism, the habit of defining the self in terms of the things it desires to have. His [Kumārila's] quarrel is with those Mahāyāna philosophers who, he thinks, are obsessed with nothingness and who elevate the imagination to a theory."

7.202 As a matter of fact, this denial of the reality of external objects—following upon the assumption of such a theory of traces, which is incorrect and devoid of reason—was declared by the Buddha with the sole object of alienating the affections of men from such worldly objects; and somehow or other, some people (the so-called followers of Buddha) fell into

a mistake and accepted it to its utmost extent, as the denial of all external loci of awarenesses.

8 *Śūnyavāda* (E191-245; T148-182)

Buddhist Objection:

8.1 The discrepancies of the inferential argument having been pointed out on the strength of the nature of awarenesses, another Buddhist comes forward with an argument based upon the incapability of the effect of an awareness to give rise to any notions of external objects.

8.2 (Buddhist:) "You stick to sense-perception, and the contradictions involved in it you urge as an objection against our argument; now just consider the following points:"

8.1-3 (Sum. Rani pp. 161-162) "The Yogācāra Buddhist...has emphatically denied the existence of [an] external world. He argues that our cognition is not able to apprehend the external world. He undertakes an examination whether cognition at the time of perception apprehends the form of the external object or is exhausted in apprehending its own form."

8.4 "If it is only the external object that is perceived by the awareness then the objections urged by you are right enough; but if it the awareness itself which is cognized, then each and every one of them falls to the ground."

8.5-9 "It is a well-known fact, realized by everybody, that at the time of cognition there appears only one form like blue, yellow, etc. or of extensiveness etc., which is the object (*viśaya*) of cognition, and hence it cannot be established, on the basis of diversity of forms, that there exist two separate entities—the cognition and the cognized, nor can it be apprehended clearly whether the form belongs to the cognition or to the object (i.e. *bāhyārtha*). If it is accepted that the form belongs to the cognition, then the power of cognition would be exhausted in cognizing its own form and there would be no question of the existence of [an] external world. If, on the other hand, it is posited that the form belongs to the external object, the existence of the external object would have to be accepted due to its cognizability while the existence of its cognition has already been proved."

8.10-14 (Tr. KKD p. 99) "Even if the form in question belongs to an external object (*bāhya artha*) since this object cannot act as an object-of-cognition (*grāhya*) unless a subject-of-cognition (*grāhaka*) is posited cognition (*jñāna*) in the form

of subject (*grāhaka*) will have to be posited. But since in the cognition-situation there appears just one form not two, this cognition appearing as subject should be devoid of a form and that is something untenable (*niṣpramānaka*). If with a view to avoiding this contingency the external object itself is declared to be the subject-of-cognition as well, then it will just be a case of assigning the name 'external object' to an entity acting as both subject-of-cognition as well as object-of-cognition while the supposition that the former is an internal something and the latter an external something is false."

8.15-17 "In my theory, though the real character of awareness is naturally pure, yet in this beginningless world there is an agglomeration of diverse traces born of foregoing awareness, and through these, the awareness comes to appear in the various shades of blue, etc., tinged with the character of the cognized and the cognizer, which latter, however, appear as if they were something quite apart from the awareness itself; and as such, the awareness does not stand in need of any extraneous object. The reciprocal causality of the awareness and its faculty in the shape of traces is without a beginning."

8.18 "The assumption of one cognition alone is certainly better than the assumption of many cognized objects, etc. And then again, the assumption of a diversity in the awarenesses of an object is more acceptable than that of a diversity in the objects themselves."

8.19-20a (Sum. Rani p. 163) "The assumption that the cognition possesses form is more desirable than the assumption that the external object possesses form, because the former is to be accepted by both the parties, i.e. by the idealist as well as by the realist. The realist, even after the assumption of the external object, has to accept the existence of cognition possessing form, because if cognition has not been endowed with form it would not be able to apprehend external objects."

8.20bcd (Sum. Rani pp. 163-164) "Besides, if it assumed that form belongs to the external object and the cognition remains without any form, there would be a sense of remoteness between the object and its cognition, while in the Yogācāra theory the form like blue, etc., being in close proximity and relationship with the cognition, would be easily apprehensible (*grāhya*)."

8.21 (Sum. Rani p. 166) "The realist also holds that the external object, being of non-luminous nature, depends upon the cognition for its own illumination."

8.22 (Tr. Rani, pp. 43-44) "And so long as the illumination in the form of cognition (*jñānākhyā prakāśa*) is not comprehended, even the object will not be apprehended, because its apprehension depends upon the cognition, just as the illumination of a jar depends upon the illumination of the lamp."

8.23-24 (Tr. Rani, p. 44) "Even if the objects have been produced, their apprehension, sometimes, does not occur either due to the absence of luminosity (as in the case of peak darkness) or due to the presence of some impediment (like the obstruction of a wall), while in the case of cognition, there is no impediment (to its illumination) at the time of its origination, nor is it of a non-luminous nature, on account of which it may not be apprehended (i.e. it is self-luminous and hence it is always apprehensible)."

8.25-26 (Tr. Rani, p. 44) "Cognition is always produced before the apprehension of the object and its consciousness (*samvedana*) must also occur at the same time (i.e. at the time of its origination), because if it is not cognized at the same time it cannot be cognized even afterwards."

8.27 (Tr. Rani, p. 44) "Cognition does not require the origination of another cognition, because if it is held that the cognition of previous cognition depends upon the latter one, there would occur *regressus ad infinitum*."

8.28-29 "Nevertheless, cognition does not require that there be external objects, but merely the awareness having a form."

8.30 (Tr. KKD p. 100) "Such an external object is not apprehended unless the cognition concerned is first grasped, nor is apprehension possible on the part of a cognition that is devoid of a form."

8.31 (Sum. Rani p. 168) "This assertion also proves that cognitions can apprehend their objects only if they themselves have already been apprehended, and cognitions can never be apprehended if they are regarded as devoid of any form."

8.32 (Sum. Rani pp. 168-169) "The Yogācāra further points out: Because of the absence of any discriminative notion regarding two forms and also because of the apprehension of something having form, it follows that it is only cognition which is apprehended with form."

8.33-34 (Objection) Awareness is initially formless; it comes to have a form when an external object is cognized.

(Answer:) No, the object is cognized first; only

afterwards do we realize that a cognition occurred.

8.35-36 (Objection:) Only if something else has a form can an awareness have it.

(Answer:) Then this other's form cannot be the form had by something else—the awareness.

8.37-39 (Objection:) It must be there to be reflected in awareness.

(Answer:) To show that it would have to be experienced prior to its experience. Anyway, it makes no sense to speak of reflection in the case of sounds, smells, tastes, etc. We only experience these forms through our awareness of them, and not prior to that.

8.40-41 (Objection:) We confusedly think that it is the object that has a form when it is really only the awareness that has it.

(Answer:) But one is never free from this supposed confusion. By your reasoning anything whatsoever can be termed 'confusion'.

8.42-50 (Objection:) The relation of the two-object and awareness—creates a form in each of the two, which we then confusedly identify.

(Answer:) But the object is in one place, the awareness in another, so they can't be identified.

(Objection:) The two forms occur at the same time.

(Answer:) Then everything that occurs with the awareness should be its content! Only if we experienced the forms independently could we say that there are two of them.

8.51-54 No separate form is created in the cases of memory and dreams.

(Objection:) In those cases the form comes from the trace that causes the memory or dream.

(Answer:) Then that can as well be the case for waking experiences.

8.55-56 An external object and an experience of it can't have the same form: they occur at different places, they never come into contact, and they are never observed separately.

(Objection:) They are not the same, but they are similar.

(Answer:) Only if things are two can they be similar, so that assumes what has to be proved by you.

8.57 (Sum. Rani p. 170) "The misconceptions (*bhramajñāna*) (like that of two moons etc.) also prove the fact that the forms of cognition are not dependent upon the external object, but they are the creation of our own mind."

8.58 (Sum. Rani p. 170) "Different genders and number are found in words indicating the same thing. "If one form would have belonged to the external object, how could it be possible to accommodate different numbers and genders in one and the same object? So, it is proper to assume that there is no extra-mental reality and form is the creation of our own mind."

8.59 (Sum. Rani p. 171) "One woman's body is found attractive by one man, repulsive by another. Different persons regard an object in different manners and this fact proves that form does not really belong to the external object, it is caused by different impressions of mind alone."

8.60-61 (Sum. Rani p.p. 171-172) "Diverse ideas", such as long and short, "should not be possible simultaneously in different cognizers due to the oneness of the object, because contradictory forms cannot exist at one and the same time in one object. According to the *Yogācāras*, diversity of forms is possible due to the diversity of cognitions, which are caused by different types of impressions or forces (*vāsanā* or *śakti*)."

8.62-63: (Tr. KKD p. 102) "So the fact is that whatever be the form of [a] cognition is the form of [its] object, not that whatever be the form of [an] object is the form of [its] cognition. Certainly, when its existence is thus dependent on cognition who will posit an object (in the form of something independent)?"

Realist Answer

8.64-67 You say that an awareness illuminates itself just as fire illuminates itself. But fire is not itself illuminated; it is itself illumination, just as awareness is not cognized by something else—it is itself cognition.

8.68 (Sum. Bibhuti/Allen p. 160): "An entity cannot be both the subject and the object of the same act."

8.69-83 We do not always cognize a subject when we cognize an object, nor do we always cognize an object when we cognize a subject.

8.86-94 (Objection:) That is because we cognize the subject, or the object, of one cognition by another cognition.

(Answer:) But the only thing there is to be cognized—according to you yourself—is another cognition, not two things (subject and object).

8.95-109 If a thing is single then it must be either cognized or uncognized; only if it is multiple can one cognize its different aspects such as e.g., subject and object.

8.110 The conception of the form of the cognizing cognition that is assumed through the peculiarities of cognitions one after the other is only inferred from memory (that a thing which was cognized is the thing now cognized).

8.111-112 If the first awareness be assumed to have only one form, then all other conceptions in connection therewith cannot but have the same form. And it is for this reason that the difference between the cognition of the jar and the cognition of that cognition is not fully established. It is only in the conception of the form of the cognizing cognition that there can be any accumulation of forms.

8.113-114 Where the first awareness appears in a duplicate form and this is followed by a third awareness (such as 'I have that awareness')—in that case, this third awareness as well as the former two are both manifested; and thus, there being an augmentation of forms, the following ones would differ from the preceding ones. And again, since there is subsequent memory of the awareness in the form of the comprehended object, the comprehending awareness must have been cognized before as such.

8.115. But as a matter of fact we do not come across any such accumulation of forms; nor can an awareness be defined without mentioning the object (of cognition).

8.116 Therefore, cognition by itself being single, it is established that the difference in the conceptions is due to a diversity among the contents of cognitions, and as such what business have we to postulate another form for the cognition itself?

8.117 Just as between corporeal objects there is a natural difference, so too, in the present case, though two awarenesses may have the similarity of being incorporeal, it could not these two have a natural difference between themselves?

8.118 It is a false assertion that after being remembered the awareness is inferred to be duplicate, because the awareness of it at that time comes about from presumption alone.

8.119 You say that since both the conception and the comprehended object are identical in form, therefore when one is comprehended the other is also comprehended. But it is not so, and certainly you have not been questioned by me simply to afford you occasion for making any wild assertions you like.

8.120 No one recognizes the character of both the

comprehender and the comprehended in a single object. Nor can such duplicate character be got at by means of inference, especially when all awareness is held to be only a form of sense-perception.

8.121 It is only one form that is comprehended, and yet you assume a second; why then cannot you assume a thousand such forms to be included in that single awareness?

8.122 (Objection:) But there is a natural difference between the comprehender and the comprehended.

(Answer:) That will only strengthen our theory.

(Objector:) Not so, because they are still identical in their common character of being awarenesses."

8.123 (Answer:) But then, how is it that of one and the same object you assume both difference and non-difference? In so doing you accept the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya, having renounced the teachings of the Buddha.

8.124 For if the comprehender and the comprehended be one (as said by the Buddha) whence this assertion of difference (between the two)? And if they are different how could you assert them to be one?

8.125 The comprehended and the comprehender being identical and consisting in one and the same conception, there could be a conception of only one form, be it either that of the comprehender (alone) or that of the comprehended (alone).

8.126 And then again, if one of the two (comprehender and comprehended) were suppressed, the other would also be suppressed (since they are identical); and thus then there would be an absence of both the constituent parts of a conception, which would thereby lose its character altogether; thence there would be an absolute negation of it.

8.127 Or again, on account of its non-difference from two mutually different entities (the comprehender and the comprehended), the character of conception too would cease to be different, like its own self. And thus would be established a double entity (the comprehended object apart from the conception comprehending it, which you sought to disprove and which is all that we seek to establish.

8.128 If, however, it be only as a matter of convention that you name these entities "awarenesses" (*jñāna*), then that may be so. Or the word '*jñāna*', when applied to an object, may be explained as 'that which is known' (the suffix having an objective force), and when applied to cognizing, the suffix may be explained as either the nominal or the instrumental (in the

former case, the meaning being 'knowledge', in the latter, 'that by which something is cognized').

8.129 In any case, the duality of existence (in the shape of comprehension and the comprehended) has been established; and such being the case, you make use of whatever words you like; and we have got nothing to say against words.

8.130 (Objection:) Though there be a difference (between the comprehender and the comprehended) yet the comprehended may only be in the form of another conception (and not any external object as you believe in)

(Answer:) Then we ask, what is the ground for holding the comprehended "cognition" to be a cognition at all? If you urge only those grounds that you have explained above (in 8.128) then we also accept them.

8.131 There is however no such property of awareness that extends over both the comprehender and the comprehended; and as for any distinct nature of awareness-ness, you do not accept any universal apart from individuals.

8.132 And even if there were such a universal property of awareness-ness distinct from both the comprehender and the comprehended,

8.133 then again (in the case of awareness being something distinct from the comprehender and the comprehended) it could be related to each of these, either one by one or as pervading over each in its entirety. In any case, it would be open to the fault of being made up of continuant parts, a fault that is urged against the Vaiśeṣikas.

8.134 The objections that have been urged by the Buddhists against the Vaiśeṣika theory of universals would also apply to the theory that a single universal awareness-ness bears a definite relation to two mutually different awarenesses (one following after the other).

8.135 If again the universal awareness-ness be said to be identical with these two then the aforesaid (8.127) difference would apply to your case. And as for the theories of similarity (between; the individual and the universal) and exclusion (*apoha*), these will be met and refuted later on.

8.136 But as there is no other substance than awareness for you, even an exclusion is not possible, because for the idealist there is no such thing as non-awareness that could be said to be refuted by the exclusion.

8.137 Exclusion, the absence of the opposite, is in no way possible. Even if it were, this absence would be a substance

other than awareness; as the character of a substance would doubtless belong to it on account of its being what is absent.

8.138 Thus then, if an awareness were held to be the denial of a non-awareness, you would have a new substance other than the awareness. If you urge that the absence would be only an assumed one (and so no new substance would have to be accepted), we deny this, because there can be no conceptual construction of what is absolutely absent.

8.139 Your assumed non-awareness too would only be an awareness partaking of the character of non-awareness, and hence it would be awareness alone that could be held to be the object denied.

8.140 And certainly, in any theory of universals, there can be no exclusion of oneself. For never can there be a negation of a tree by the tree itself.

8.141 If the awareness itself were to be denied then you could not establish it as being an awareness. For the character of a tree cannot belong to other subjects such as a jar and the like, which are precluded by tree-ness.

8.142 Thus then it would be a non-awareness alone that would be a real entity (the exclusion), and so there would result the identity of the comprehender and the comprehended. And what locus could this notion of non-awareness have.

8.143 For you cannot admit of any such object of comprehension as non-awareness, free from all thought of awareness itself.

(Objection:) But, since it is only a substance other than awareness that we deny, why could not we comprehend the absence of the substance denied?

8.144 (Answer:) One who does not comprehend positive entities (like a mountain)—what can be said of him with regard to the comprehension of negative ones? And as for the supposition that an awareness of a positive entity grasp part of itself, the same can as well be said about the awareness of a negative entity.

8.145 Therefore in any awareness the thing grasped could be either another awareness or part of the same awareness; and how could we ever recognize a contradictory entity (such as non-awareness) to be the content of the comprehension of awareness?

8.146 Just as in heat there can't be non-heat, so too there can be no awareness of non-awareness with regard to an awareness. For these reasons, if there were no other substance

than awareness, there could be no object denied by an awareness.

8.147 For these reasons, then, we conclude that the character of awareness cannot belong equally to the comprehended and the comprehender; and hence it must be held to belong to one of them only.

8.148-149 Then too, we hold this character of awareness to belong to the comprehender only; since this character is admitted by both of us. And when the duality of objects has been proved, names may be given to them in accordance with one's choice. Both may be called "awareness", or both may be called "content", or even the content may be called the "comprehender".

8.149-150 Since awarenesses do not appear simultaneously, therefore two ideas cannot have between themselves the relation of the conceived (content) and the means of conception, because both ideas are equally devoid of action and instrumentality.

8.151-152 The relation of the content to the awareness of it is known as the relation of cause to effect, and we do not come across such a relation between simultaneous things.

8.152-153 And again, in the case of the right and the left horns of an animal, two objects appearing simultaneously, there can be no such fixed rule as that "this is the effect, and that the cause"; nor can both be both, because that would lead to the fault of mutual dependence.

8.153-154 And people knowing the real character of the causal relation do not define it as mere concomitance independently of all notion of sequence.

8.154-155 Conversely also we find that though at times the cow may follow the horse this mere sequence does not constitute a causal relation. Just as in the case of two moments of awareness, when appearing in different series of awarenesses though occurring simultaneously, and also in the case of the different properties of a jar (though occurring simultaneously), there can be no causal relation.

8.155-156 For these reasons an entity can be said to be the effect of another only when the former is such that it can come about only after the latter has occurred.

8.156-157 You have brought forward the case of the lamp and the light emitted by it as an instance of the simultaneity of the cause and the effect. But in this case also there is a minute point of time intervening between the

appearance of the lamp and that of the light, though this is imperceptible, just as is the case with the piercing with a needle of the hundred petals of the lotus.

8.158 The same refutation would also apply even if you assert the simultaneity of the two parts of an awareness, i.e., the comprehended and the comprehender.

8.158-159 Nor can it be urged that because of the transference of potency the change from one awareness to the second would be gradual, because in that case the object comprehended would have passed away, and it would be unreasonable to assert the identity of that awareness with the present awareness.

8.159-161 What is comprehended by memory, too, is only the comprehended content as intermixed with its past character, and the same could be said in the present case also (if things were to be as you assert them to be). In a dream, however, it can never be so, because dream-awareness is always false: in a dream that which is not present is cognized as present, and this must be a mistaken notion because it is always set aside by a contrary cognition (in the waking state). But there is no such mistake in the present case of ordinary conception.

8.161-162 Therefore a sensory awareness cannot comprehend past objects, because they are past, just like the operation of awarenesses in past lives, which cannot comprehend objects previous in time to them. Or the fact of these not being cognized as past may be taken as the reason, the example (in this case) being "future entities".

8.163 Even if it be past, what proof have you got for the assertion that there is no object, only an awareness?

8.163-164 The past awareness that you have assumed to be the content of the comprehension of the present awareness—is it of the form of the comprehender or of that of the comprehended or of both? If it be of the form of the comprehended alone, then it comes to be a pure content for you, only with a different name.

8.165-166 And inasmuch as it is not cognized at any time except its own (in the past), there could not be any transference (of traces). Just as there can be no such transference from an awareness that has not yet occurred, or from one occurring in another series, so in the same manner there can be no transference of traces from an awareness which

is not strongly realized and which disappears as soon as it is produced.

8.166-167 If (secondly) the past awareness were in the form of the comprehender alone, then it could never have the character of the comprehended, and then in comparison with (and with reference to) what would it be the comprehender?

8.167-168 As for the third possibility, that awareness has a duplicate form, it has already been refuted (8.64 *et seq.*). And if an awareness were to have such a duplicate character it would also be ordinarily recognized as such, which is not the case here, and even if such were the case, the latter awareness would not stand in need of another (foregoing) awareness as the comprehended object, for its full cognizance.

8.168-169 If you hold that an awareness has the duplicate form of comprehender and comprehended, then all right notions would lie in the awareness itself (as you declare that the awareness cognizes itself); and hence, the past could never be a content of awareness. If the latter awareness were of the same form as the former awareness which you assert to be the content of comprehension, then the very character in the latter awareness of being the comprehender would disappear.

8.170 And the absence of any such transference of traces, in accordance with your theory of the momentariness of cognitions, has been proved by us the (previous) section (*viz.*, the *Nirālambanavāda*).

8.171-172 In the case of ideas occurring in the same series, we must deny the relation between them of cause and effect, as also the relation of the impresser and the impressed, because they are ideas, just like ideas occurring in different series of awarenesses.

8.172-174 Therefore, that which is the comprehender (of color, e.g.) must be different from its object (color), because the awareness of one is not always accompanied by that of the other. Similarly the comprehended object is different from the comprehending idea, because one who conceives of the one does not necessarily conceive of the other.

8.175-176 Thus, then, the two factors (the comprehended and the comprehender) must be concluded to be different, like taste, etc., because they are never conceived as identical, as e.g. the awarenesses occurring in another series.

8.176-177 Caitra's awareness cannot be the means of the cognition of the comprehensible part of the awareness occurring in the same series, because it is an awareness, just as

an awareness occurring in the body of another man (Maitra) cannot be the comprehender thereof (*i.e.*, of Caitra's conception).

8.177-179 The same explanation refutes the duplicate capability of awarenesses. We admit of a multiplicity of faculties elsewhere (e.g., in a self), because such is proved by other instruments of knowledge, whereas in the present case there is no ground for asserting any such multiplicity of capabilities. And for these reasons we do not accept as valid the contention that your theory, being simpler, should be acceptable to both of us (a contention you have urged in support of the theory of the form belonging to the awareness and not to any external object.).

8.179-180 There is another reason too—that since awareness is the means of comprehending an object, therefore it must be itself comprehended before the comprehension of the object; this reasoning is unsound, because the case of the sense-organs—the eye, etc.—affords an instance to the contrary.

8.180-181 Then again it has been urged that since the awareness is not suppressed it must be comprehended as soon as it is produced. But to this we respond that the awareness could not be comprehended by itself (for reasons urged above); and nothing else that could comprehend it has till then been produced; hence, in the absence of any means of comprehension, it could not be comprehended as urged.

8.182 If there were no awareness then we could not, in any other way, explain the existence of objects. Hence it is that after the object has been perceived we form an awareness of that awareness as the means of a correct notion of the perceived object.

8.183 The mere fact of non-suppression by something else cannot lead to comprehension of anything. As a matter of fact, in the absence of a fully efficient cause even a solid object is not perceived or comprehended.

8.184 While functioning towards the comprehension of an object an awareness does not approach itself (*i.e.*, does not render itself comprehensible). Hence, though the idea is the illuminator (the means of the comprehension of other things), yet for its own comprehension it stands in need of something else.

8.185 Or, the illuminative character of an awareness may be said to consist only of the comprehension of its content, and there is no comprehension by itself of the awareness itself;

hence it cannot be its own illuminator.

8.186-187 In the case of the eye, etc., we find that though endowed with an illuminative character they have their illuminativeness restricted to their specific objects color, form, etc. Likewise we have the same restriction in the present case also: viz., the illuminativeness of an awareness would affect the external object and not the awareness itself, for the simple reason that it is incapable of doing so (i.e., of leading to awareness of itself).

8.187cd-188 (Tr. Rani, p. 45) "If it (i.e. cognition) is cognized by another cognition, there would be *regressus ad infinitum*. But having found that recollection (*smṛti*) occurs about two things—i.e. about the object as well as its cognition, it is assumed that all is apprehended (at one and the same time). Thus in case of apprehending all by one cognition only (it can be concluded that) every thing is possible by that alone (and no other cognition is required)."

8.189 Your assertion that "there is a memory of each of the awarenesses in a series" is opposed to ordinary experience. For no ordinary person ever remembers any such series of awarenesses.

8.190-191 The ordinary experience is that when such objects as a jar and the like have been comprehended, soon after there follows, through presumption, the recurring awareness of certain conceptions, and this recognition goes on until one becomes tired of it; and hence, subsequently, it is only so many awarenesses that are remembered (and not an endless series of them). And as for any memory prior to such recognition of awareness, it would be like the memory of her child by a childless woman.

8.192 The notion of memory that enters into the subsequent awarenesses is a mistaken one, because it is really only a memory of the content, and not of the awareness of that content. And it is this memory of the content that leads to the awareness of a previous awareness.

8.193 A series of awarenesses continue only so long as one is not tired of it, even if the preparations for its continuance be on a grand scale. And there is sure to be a break, either through fatigue or predilection or contact with something else, just as there is in the case of objects.

8.194 As for "the memory of such and such" that has been mentioned (in 8.188)—if this refers to the first awareness then there would be a comprehension of that one alone, and as

such there would be no "endlessness".

8.195 If however the memory belonged to every one of the cognitions (in a series), then we would have to accept an equal number of awarenesses as well, and as such who could avoid the series even though endless, since the whole endless set of cognitions would be validated?

8.196 If it be assumed that they (i.e., the endless memories) have all got the first awareness for their content, then the differences among the awarenesses (in the series) coming one after the other would not be possible.

8.197 For one who holds that all awarenesses have awarenesses for their content, the distinction between the awareness of the jar and the awareness of that awareness is hardly possible.

8.198 And just as such a theorist, when remembering an awareness, remembers it as devoid of any form, so when remembering a previously-cognized object he would remember it too as devoid of any form.

8.199 When memory follows in the wake of an awareness it is because the awareness is the means of ascertaining the existence of the object and not because the awareness is comprehended.

8.200 The proximity and relation (of content to awareness that has been urged by the Buddhist as reason for the comprehensibility of the awareness based upon its identity with the form of the object) are precluded from belonging to the awareness because of the impossibility of awarenesses being comprehended as objects. Or the two factors (of proximity and relation) could be said to be based on the object's being the content, and as such what good would result from their identity?

8.201 It has been urged (by the Buddhist) that no form of an object is possible in the case of an erroneous awareness, but we have already proved (in the *Nirālambanavāda*) that in some cases of falsity the error applies only to the assessment of time and place.

8.202 Awarenesses (such as memories and dreams) other than those of sense-perception are brought about by means of past and future objects whether or not traces operate.

8.203 In the case of an object that has never been, or never will be, comprehended, there being no traces, how could the Buddhist too have any awareness of it?

8.204 If even in the absence of traces awarenesses were

to appear, then that would contradict the causal efficiency of traces, which you too accept.

8.205 And if there be any traces in that case, then these must have been preceded by an awareness if not in this life, at least in some former life; and such being the case, the object which helped create the traces must have been cognized before at some place or other (so that this cognition, at some distant date, must have given birth to the traces in question).

8.206 Thus then it is not proper ever to assert the absolute non-existence of an object. And on account of the inexplicability of strange dreams and traces without external objects, it becomes established that the object dreamt of had existed and had been cognized at least in some previous birth.

8.207 Sometimes it happens that awarenesses appear in an incorrect form, but this is due to certain discrepancies in the awarenesses themselves. In the case of the earth, etc., however, their forms would be cognized only through themselves and not as based on awarenesses.

8.208 Barring these objects (like the earth, etc.) we cannot ascribe any form to the contents of awareness, for awareness too cannot do its thing unless it is involved with an external object.

8.209 And again if this form dreamt of, and other forms, were to be ascribed to awarenesses alone, then what would be the distinguishing feature in dreams which marks them as absolutely unreal?

8.210 For these reasons it must be concluded that dream is a pure misconception which, while comprehending an object for us, comprehends it in a way other than that in which it exists, and it can never be said to exercise any independent function by itself.

8.211 It is for this reason that the cognition correcting any erroneous awareness gives rise to such a reasoning as that "though the object really exists in another form, yet this (false) form is imposed upon it by awareness under the influence of a certain delusion."

8.212-213 The same is the case with such errors as that of the double moon, and in the same manner with synonyms such as "*tāraḥ*" (feminine) and *nakṣatra* (neuter), having different genders and yet referring to the same thing, viz., the female character; here (1) it might be such as has been perceived elsewhere and attributed here by mistake, or they might be somehow explained as merely verbal differences, or

they might be explained as being due to such perceived agencies as the excess or otherwise of *sattva*, *rajas* and/or *tamas*, as has been suggested by some (e.g., Patañjali in his *Vyākaranabhāṣya*).

8.214 Thus then we find that the application of the three genders to the same object is not unreasonable. And since the diversity is based upon comparative difference (from other objects in the excess or deficiency of one or the other of the attributes), therefore there is no contradiction if different genders be attributed to the same object.

8.215 The same is the case with the ideas of a dead body, handsomeness, and an edible object, etc. with reference to a dead handsome woman, where the same object (the woman) being found to be possessed of all the three properties, the disposition of the cognizing person leads to the recognition of one or the other property.

8.216 In the case of objects with many forms, the trace left after the awareness of it at a particular moment would be the cause of determining any one specific form, setting aside for the time being all other forms.

8.217 Similarly in the case of the notions of length (say, shortness with regard to a single object) and of pot-ness (as opposed to jar-ness with regard to a single object), these will cease to be contradictory the diversity of forms being due to differences based upon comparison of the object with various other objects.

8.218 And on the mere ground of awareness being of multifarious forms it is not right to assert that there can be no form at all, because the diversity of forms may only be due to the diversity of comprehension in different individuals.

8.219 And on the ground of the comprehension (by different persons being diverse), it is quite possible for contradictory forms to belong to one and the same object. There is no such hard and fast rule laid down by God that "one object must have one and only one form".

8.220 We must accept everything just as it is perceived, and even the singleness of an object cannot be held to be absolute.

8.221 Therefore the forms of objects, consisting of appearance and disappearance, would be separately comprehended by means of cognitions brought about by the peculiarities of place, time, etc.

8.222 Among people who simultaneously comprehend

an object as a jar, earthy etc.—he who happens to remember a word denoting a certain form comprehends the object in that form only.

8.2.223 Though the properties of color, smell, etc. reside separately in a jar, yet awareness of them is restricted in accordance with the respective functioning of the eye, the nose, etc.

8.224 In the same manner, though the characters of potness, earth-ness, etc. have their existence equally for all persons, yet their recognition is controlled by the memory by different individuals of words expressing the various forms (of a jar).

8.225 Therefore the character of the object, though existing outside, is assumed to be the content of awareness according as it is reached or not reached by the various organs of sense, the eye and the rest.

8.226 Though ordinary people assert that the external existence of the object is in accordance with the conception we have of it, yet even these people do not attribute a form to the object by means of (and subsequent to) the recognition of the forms of the awareness.

8.227 It is only as an apprehender that an awareness presents to us an object—saying (in effect) "such is the object"—because it (awareness) is only the means (of recognizing the form of the object).

8.228 Thus then those who hold the existence of external objects do not admit their nonexistence, which you seek to prove by means of inferences; passing over their experiences they become aware of the form of the external object itself.

8.229 It is necessary for students of philosophy to explain things exactly according to what is met with in ordinary experience.

8.230 Is it not a fact, according to you yourself, that it is while itself coming into existence that an awareness becomes cognized, as is found to be the case with a lamp which is itself seen renders other things visible?"

8.231 (The meaning of the objection as urged in Śābara's *Bhasya* is that) the objector asks the upholder of external objects "Do you not hold that there is no suppression of awareness while it comprehends an object?"

8.232 The reply to this question is that we do not admit of such comprehension (of an object), because there is no direct (sensuous) means of comprehending (another object); and also

because there is no reason from which such comprehension could be inferred.

8.232-233 Or, the objection may be taken as applying to other theories (such as Vaiśeṣika's). In these other theories an awareness is said to be cognized at the time of the cognition of the object, and in that case the existence of the object would be cut off at its root, and it is for this reason that we bring the objection home to them.

8.234 The passage (of the *Bhāṣya*) beginning with "Even so (according to you)..." is irrelevant (as coming from the Buddhist) because it urges what is desirable for his opponent; and secondly, the mention of sequence contradicts what has been asserted before.

8.235 And if it be urged that "both (awareness and object) being momentary, the point urged in the objection is quite proper, and that the fact of the object being cognized subsequently is mentioned only as a past event", there would be useless repetition of what has already been said before."

8.236 Here too the Buddhist does not speak from his own standpoint, the fact being that through the assertion of his opponent he is mistaken as to the theory of his antagonist and (while under this misapprehension) he has put the question (urged in the object quoted in 8.234 above).

8.237-240 The simultaneity of the manifestation and comprehension of the awareness being absolutely established, we ask if these come before the comprehension of the object or after it or simultaneously with it? We (the Mīmāṃsakas) assert that the comprehension of the awareness follows after that of the object, and in accordance with this theory the awareness would be produced also after the object. But this is not possible; hence we declare the production of the awareness to precede the cognition of the object, and thus at the same time we would also have the comprehension of the awareness (and hence the comprehension of the idea would precede that of the object). And the prior comprehension of the awareness being thus established, there can be no proper discrimination between the external object and the internal awareness and as such, by priority, we infer the form to belong to the awareness and not to any external object. And it is in view of these reasonings that the objector has brought forward the aforesaid objections.

8.241 Even if the comprehension of the object and of the awareness were simultaneous (as mentioned in 8.230), we could not recognize any form as belonging to the object

(because the form will have been cognized as being confined to the awareness). And it is for this reason that the Mīmāṃsaka first seeks to prove that the comprehension of the object precedes that of the awareness (even though the awareness may have been produced before).

8.242 The portion of the *Bhāṣya* that follows after t his has already been explained above.

8.242-243 "Because the character of the object comprehended is not remembered (at some future time), just like an unknown object, that is no direct reason for asserting the previous non-comprehension of the awareness. Therefore with what, and in what way, is the previous non-comprehension of the awareness connected or relevant to the present discussion?"

8.244 For these reasons the present passage must be explained as being a refutation of the theory that the form belongs to the awareness because of its prior cognition—because the notion of the form belonging to the awareness is the result of the argument based on its prior comprehension.

8.245 The passage "Further, even if the awareness and the object were identical in form..." indicates the fact of the awareness being dependent on the object.

8.246-247 As a matter of fact, apart from the form of the object there is no recognition of awareness. And the awareness being recognizable by another's form, it cannot be the object of awareness because it is like a mirage. Thus the, for you, the cognizability of awarenesses would be in accordance with a comprehensible object, which you hold not to exist. And since the form of the awarenesses themselves is a *tabula rasa*, their cognizability could only be assumed to have been caused by the disturbance of traces (*vāsanā*). And as such the awareness itself could not be cognizable in reality.

8.248 "The invariability of the cause" is equally applicable to both the theories, because the upholders of awareness (only) as well as the upholders of external objects both take their stand upon the peculiar faculties of their substances.

8.249 How is it that for you too objects in the shape of threads bring about only such effects as the cloth? Why cannot these threads bring about a jar? Or how is it that the cloth is not brought about by lumps of clay?

8.250 If you object to the ideas of thread and lump of clay (as having the power to bring about the awareness of a

cloth and a jar respectively, then in the same manner you would have an objection to the objects (threads and lumps of clay) having the properties by which to bring about the objects cloth and jar.

8.251 If the fixity in the arising of objects were said to depend on the restriction of capabilities—as the faculty of causing a cloth is restricted to the threads alone and so forth—then who could deny the same capabilities in the restriction of the causation of awarenesses (i.e., we would also have the idea of the thread having restricted to itself the power of bringing about the idea of cloth?)

8.252 Therefore when the objection is common to both theories and when the means of meeting the objection too is similar to both, such an objection should not be brought forward by one against the other during a discussion over the subject.

8.253 But for the upholder of the object (i.e., realist) theory we have such means (of meeting the objections) as the appropriateness of time, place and the like, which serve to control the capabilities of the causes in the manifestation of their particular effects, which resource is not open to the idealist who denies space, time, etc., in fact everything besides awareness(es).

8.254 The capabilities of objects too are such as are postulated through the apparent inconsistency of the effects, and as such those are known to be real, having their application restricted to their respective effects.

8.255 For you, on the other hand, any such capability, either different or non-different from the awareness, is not recognized as real apart from its assumed (unreal) existence.

8.256-257 It is traces alone that you describe by the word "capability" (*śakti*). And the restriction of causality that you base upon the traces becomes impossible, firstly because such traces cannot exist, and secondly because they cannot be said to serve the purpose of any other object. Nor do you accept any such controlling agencies as those of time, place, etc. It is with all this in view that the author of the *Bhāṣya* has urged against his opponent the argument beginning with "Further, whenever the cognition..." etc.

8.258-259 Therefore it does not meet our objection to your theory merely to assert that "just as for you cloth proceeds from threads, so for us too the awareness of a cloth would proceed from the awareness of the threads."

8.259-261 Thus then (we conclude that) the negation of the external object is not proved by the first two means of knowledge (sense-perception and inference). Of verbal authority there is no application in this case (the denial of external objects)—in fact it is applicable to the contrary. Comparison is not applicable, because you admit nothing else that could be similar to awareness. Neither does presumption serve your purpose, because it proves quite the contrary. Hence we conclude that such denial of the external object can only be amenable to the instrument of knowledge called impossibility (*asambhava*), i.e. the denial is only capable of being denied.

8.261 Some people, finding that external objects being aggregates of atoms is incomprehensible, have asserted their emptiness (*śūnyatā*)—their being proved to be unamenable to any instrument of knowledge—to reside in the predicable object itself.

8.262 But on account of the impossibility of any comprehensibility belonging to an internal awareness as shown above, even these people will have to admit the comprehensibility of something else. As for atoms, neither do we accept them to be comprehensible, and as such, we must describe the aggregates of these (atoms) to be real (and as such, objects of comprehension).

8.263 Thus then the reality of the external object having been established, there can be no unreality of awarenesses either; and for those who know the true character of both (objects and awarenesses) they are really a fit object for being made the axle of the wheel of "investigation into *dharma*".

9 Anumāna (E246-287; T182-207)

9.4-6 (Summarized by Tomoyasu Takenaka in StudM, pp. 105-106) "When there is pervasion) of the *liṅga* by the *liṅgin*, the *liṅga* is regarded as *vyāpya* (the pervaded) and therefore works as *gamaka* (one who makes known). On the other hand, because the *liṅgin* is *vyāpaka* (the pervader), it becomes *gamyā* (one which is made known).

[Of the two, P and Q] when P, in time and space, is either the equal or less in comparison with Q, P is the *vyāpya* of Q. On the other hand, when Q is the equal or more in comparison with P, Q is the *vyāpaka* of P. Therefore, it is only after the *vyāpya* (P) has been recognized that the *vyāpaka* (Q) can be cognized. Otherwise there would be no such relation between the two as that of the pervaded and the pervader

(*vyāpyavyāpakatā*, viz. *vyāpya*)."

9.7-9 (KKD p. 61) "Even when two features are equal in extent that one is to be called *vyāpya* which is actually used as a *hetu*."

9.10 (Sum. Takenaka, StudM 108) "*Vyāpti* [of the two] is recognized through *bhūyodarśana* (repeated cognition)."

9.13b-15a (Tr. KKD p. 62) "In the case of all *vyāpti* that we ever come across some one particular feature acts as its begrounder. As for the presence of what feature necessitates the presence of what feature it has to be determined in the basis of a consideration of the capacity involved. So far as the remaining features are concerned they are merely subservient to the *vyāpti* already begroundered by one particular feature—which is why when one of these features is present even then there is no knowing that the *vyāpaka* concerned will also be present."

9.140ab (Tr. Rani, p. 76) "A *hetu* (mark, probans or the middle term) is that which is invariably concomitant [*vyāpta*] with [a part of the] *probandum* (i.e. *sādhyāṅsa*=major term=fire)."

9.149 (Tr. Rani 1984, p. 52) "He, who assumes that universal (*sāmānya*) cannot be cognized without inference, (will have to face *regressus ad infinitum* in his theory)."

9.174ab (Tr. Rani 1984 p. 51) "How an the unique particular (*viśeṣa*) be the object of *pratyakṣa*?"

10 Śabda (E287-307; T207-222; KKD6-7)

10.15-37 (KKD p. 6) "In this section Kumārila considers the question whether verbal testimony is to be treated as a case of inference. As he tells us, the Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas answer it in the affirmative, the Sāṃkhya etc. in the negative. On his own part, Kumārila would side with the latter but he feels dissatisfied with the procedure adopted by them in this connection, and mostly his difficulty with them is that the features which according to them distinguish verbal testimony from inference are actually found even in certain cases of inference."

10.19-20 (Sum. KKD, p. 6) "For example, they say that a word is associated with its meaning according to an arbitrary convention but not as a *hetu* with its *sādhyā*; he points out that when a particular bodily gesture is made to stand for a particular situation it is associated with the latter according to

an arbitrary convention and yet it acts as a reason for the latter."

10.26-27 (Sum. KKD p. 6) "Again, they say that a word and its meaning bear the same form but not a reason and its conclusion; he points out that when reflection in a mirror is made the ground for inferring the thing reflected the reason and the conclusion too bear the same form."

10.32 (Sum. KKD, p. 6) "Likewise, they say that a sentence not properly understood suggests various shades of meaning but nothing of the sort happens with the reason; he points out that a *hetu* not properly discriminated suggests the presence of various *sādhyas*."

10.33 (KKD p. 6) "Lastly, they say that verbal testimony requires no mention of an illustration while an inference does; he points out that an inference with a well-known relation of invariable concomitance too can dispense with the services of an illustration."

10.36-37 (Tr. Rani, p. 87) [Objection:] "There is an identity between verbal testimony and inference, because

(i) the cognition arising from words is just like the inferential cognition of fire from smoke. (a) Both have positive and negative concomitance, (b) direct perception of one (i.e. of *liṅga*), and (c) pre-knowledge of the (invariable) relations;

(ii) both (*śabda* and *anumāna*) are different from sense-perception;

(iii) both cognize the object uncognized by perception;

(iv) [the] object (*viśaya*) of both is [a] generic form (*sāmānya*), and

(v) both refer to objects belonging to all the three times (present, past and future)."

10.38-43 (KKD p. 6) "Then Kumārila considers the position of certain Mīmāṃsakas who distinguish verbal testimony from the remaining means of valid cognition on the ground that it possesses an altogether unique subject-matter."

10.38-53 Some of us Mīmāṃsakas distinguish verbal testimony from the other instruments of knowledge by saying that testimony has a different subject-matter from those others. However, that will result in human (i.e., non-Vedic) utterances not counting as authoritative. But they are not necessarily inferences either. So what is known by verbal testimony is what is learned from language that is valid in its own right and remains so unless defects are detected.

10.54-98 (KKD p. 7) "Then Kumārila undertakes a long

refutation of the view that the acquisition of the meaning of a word on one's part is a case of inference. In this connection his chief argument is that all inference presupposes the cognition of a relation of invariable concomitance between the concerned *hetu* and *sādhya* but that the only relation obtaining between a word and its meaning is the relation sought to be based on this cognition.

10.99-107 (KKD p. 9) "Kumārila...argues that the acquisition of the meaning of a word is not a case of acquiring valid cognition strictly so-called which is always of the form of the cognition of a situation—a novel situation at that (the cognition of word-meaning being no cognition of a situation).

10.108 (KKD p. 9) ".What he is chiefly interested in maintaining is that verbal testimony is not a case of inference while verbal testimony is always of the form of a rightly constructed sentence and never of the form of loose words."

10.109-111 (KKD p. 9) As for the acquisition of sentential meaning itself, Kumārila is convinced that it is so unique a performance that it is impossible to reduce it to a case of inference; hence his taunt that the acquisition of word-meaning is sought to be reduced to a case of inference by people who find it frighteningly impossible to reduce to a case of inference the acquisition of sentential meaning."

11 *Upamāna* (E307-319; T222-230)

11.1 (KKD p. 77) "In popular parlance a case of comparison (*upamāna*) arises when, for example, a townsman enquires from a forest-dweller as to what a *gavaya* is like and the latter replies that it is like a cow."

11.2 (KKD, p. 77) Kumārila however thinks that comparison as thus understood is but a case of verbal testimony.

11.6 (KKD pp. 77-78) "Keeping in mind the Nyāya view of comparison Kumārila says that according to some a case of comparison arises when a townsman who was earlier told by a forest-dweller that a *gavaya* is like a cow goes to the forest, comes across a *gavaya* and finds it to be similar to a cow."

11.7-10 (KKD p. 78) "But on his showing comparison as thus understood is but a case of perception and a case of memory put together, *gavaya* being an object of perception and its similarity with a cow learnt earlier being an object of memory."

11.10-11 (KKD p. 78) "Kumārila particularly objects that

with the present understanding of comparison it becomes difficult to see why the townsman should be told by the forest-dweller that a *gavaya* is like a cow, for even without being told so the former should be in a position to notice that a *gavaya* is like a cow."

11.12 (KKD p. 78) "The Nyāya logician submits that unless the townsman was earlier told by the forest-dweller that a *gavaya* is like a cow it was at that very time and not at the time of the actual perception of a *gavaya* that he learnt what the word '*gavaya*' stands for."

11.12-14 (KKd p. 78) "Kumārila retorts that it is immaterial whether the townsman makes out or does not that the entity being perceived by him is what the word '*gavaya*' stands for, for even in case he was earlier told by the forest-dweller that a *gavaya* is like a cow it was at that very time and not at the time of the actual perception of a *gavaya* that he learned what the word '*gavaya*' stands for (the reason being that the denotative capacity of a word is something super-sensuous and so not something that can be learnt earlier and recognized later on."

11.15 (KKD p. 78) "Kumārila admits that the object of comparison has to be a thing characterized by similarity, but he is dissatisfied with the way the Nyāya logician conceives this object."

11.17 (Tr. Rani, p. 88) "And according to those who accept only *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (sensation), this (cognition-of-similarity-) is only a pseudo-perception. And it cannot be accepted as a valid cognition, inasmuch as there exists no object to be comprehended (in the form of similarity or *sādrśya*)."

11.18-35 (KKD p. 78) "Before formulating an alternative concept of [similarity] Kumārila thinks it necessary to offer a definition of 'similarity' and defend it against possible objections."

"Two objects are similar when they are a seat of two different universals and yet have some number of component parts in common. The implication is that two objects are not just similar but identical when they have not just some but all of their component parts in common—this being the simple meaning of these objects being a seat of the same universal...So when Kumārila defines similarity as two objects having some number of their component parts in common what he means is that one of those component parts as existing in one of those

objects and the same as existing in the other are a seat of one and the same universal..."

11.19 (KKD p. 78) "Sometimes two objects are said to be similar not because they have some number of component parts in common but because a component part of one and a component part of the other have some number of component parts in common, e.g. this is the sense in which an eye is said to be similar to a lotus-petal."

11.22 (KKD p. 78) (Objection:) "Two twins too are said to be similar even if they are not a seat of two different universals—both being a man.

(Answer:) Well this is what we observe. So what do you say?

11.35 (KKD p. 79) "Comparison resides in its entirety in each of the two things compared just as a universal property resides in its entirety in each and every one of the concerned particular objects."

11.37ab (Tr. Rani, p. 88) "The thing remembered with the similarity or the similarity remembered with the thing is regarded as the object (*prameya*) of *upamāna pramāna*."

37cd (Tr. Kataoka 2003, p. 100) "Even though the similarity is known through perception and though a cow is recollected, *upamāna* is a means of valid cognition, because (a cow) qualified (by similarity) is not established through other (means of valid cognition)."

11.38 (Tr. Rani, p. 88) "Though similarity (*sādrśya*) is cognized by perception, and the cow is being remembered, yet 'cow as qualified by similarity' cannot be cognized by any other means, hence *upamāna* is accepted as a distinct means of valid cognition."

11.39 (Tr. Kataoka 2003, p. 100) "(This is) similar (to the case of inference): even though the locus (e.g. a mountain) is visible and a fire is recollected (through invariable concomitance with smoke), inference is not the means of a valid cognition, because it informs (us) about the (locus as) qualified (e.g. by fire)."

11.43-51 (Sum. KKDp. 79) "Kumārila thinks it necessary to argue that the case under consideration is not a case of inferential cognition.

11.43-44 (KKD p. 79-80) "In a nutshell his argument is that no inference can have for its thesis 'that cow is characterized by this similarity', for no *hetu* will be ever available for that; this similarity as belonging to that cow

cannot act as such a *hetu* because that yet remains to be cognized; this similarity as belonging to this *gavaya* cannot do so because that does not characterize that cow.

11.45-50 (KKd p. 80) "Kumārila also considers the fantastic possibility that such a *hetu* might be this *gavaya*, or the possession of horns etc. on the part of this *gavaya*."

12 *Arthāpatti* (E320-334; T230-243)

12.1-9 (Sum. Yoshimizu EMH p. 315, fn. 2) "These verses present some examples of *arthāpatti* together with the kind of *pramāna* by which the premises of *arthāpatti* are confirmed. In the examples based on perception, on inference (*anumāna*) and on analogy, the object of derivation is a *śakti*."

12.10 (Sum. Rani, p. 89) "When an object, known through any of the six means of valid cognition is found otherwise inconsistent, the assumption of an unseen object to make it consistent is called *arthāpatti* or presumption."

12.12a-c (Sum. Yoshimizu EMH p. 316, fn. 4) "According to Kumārila, one can ascertain the positive concomitance of a *hetu* with its *sādhyā* through frequent observation (*bhūyodarśana*)."

12.24 (Tr. Yoshimizu EMH p. 318, fn. 8) "Under the condition that the knowledge of the existence (of a person) is established, (we can conclude that (their) existence shut out from their house necessarily remains outside, when we know that this (person) is absent from their house."

12.26 (Tr. Yoshimizu, EMH p. 322, fn. 26) "Therefore, when the house is cognized by means of perception (and) Caitra's absence, of course, by means of knowing absence, (Caitra's) existence, which has been taken for granted, is established outside (his house)."

12.27b (Sum. Yoshimizu EMH p. 323) "What is important in an *arthāpatti* is that the conclusion is logically implied (*anupraveśin*) in its premiss."

12.29 (Tr. Yoshimizu, EMH pp. 322-323) "In the case of (an *arthāpatti* which is ascertained by means of reduction to absurdity formulated as) 'not being possible otherwise', however, it does not seem to be a fault in our (system) that what is to be known (i.e., Caitra's existence outside) is implied (*anupraveśin*) (in its premise), because (what is to be known is) comprehended (by means of *arthāpatti*) only in this manner."

12.30 (Tr. Yoshimizu, EMH p. 324) "And the inseparable connection (of 'not being in their house' with 'being outside')

in this (domain of discourse which consists of all existent persons) is presumed (*parikalpyate*) only at this time (of deriving Caitra's being outside); it was not comprehended beforehand. In this way, this (inseparable connection) is not the cause (of comprehending the conclusion of an *arthāpatti*), although it is already given."

12.39 (Sum. K. Yoshimizu in EMH, p. 317, fn. 5) (Objection:) "Even the inference for inferring the existence of fire on the ground of [the] perception of smoke is not established for Kumārila inasmuch as he maintains that it is impracticable to ascertain negative concomitance in those cases where the number of dissimilar instances is infinite."

12.40 (Tr. K. Yoshimizu in EMH, p. 317, fn. 5) "For those who maintain that one should comprehend that (the reason is) absent from other entities (i.e., everything that lacks the *sādhyā*), this may be fallacious. In my position, however, (there is no fault, since a reason) has its concomitant known by mere non-perception."

12.42ab (Tr. Yoshimizu, EMH p. 317, fn. 5) "Because the concomitance of fire and smoke is well established owing to their limited domain."

12.63 (Tr. Yoshimizu, EMH p. 322, f. 25) "And neither existence nor a particular is inferred (by means of an inference), whereas here (i.e., by means of an *arthāpatti*) indeed the existence of a particular sentence is recognized."

12.64 (Tr. Yoshimizu, EMH p. 322) "(Through *anumāna* it should be proved that) an object (e.g., a mountain) of which independent existence is established beforehand is qualified by another object (e.g., a fire) (which has also been) independently established). Here (in the case of an *arthāpatti*) one recognizes nothing to be inferred that would be a substrate qualified by a property."

12.76 (Tr. Yoshimizu EMH p. 322, fn. 25) "Therefore, this (i.e., the derivation of a sentence as the conclusion) is acknowledged for the reason that it would be impossible for a given (*śruta*) sentence to bear its meaning unless (the conclusion is true)."

12.86cd (Sum. Yoshimizu EMH p. 317, fn. 4) "Even if it is ascertained that a reason is absent from all dissimilar instances, the reason is specifically indeterminate (*asādhāraṇa*) as long as its presence in similar instances is not observed."

12.116b-d (Sum. Yoshimizu, EMH p. 317, fn. 4) "If there is no substrate (*dharmin*) which can be regarded as a

similar instance, positive concomitance is not realized."¹

13 Absence (*abhāva*) (E334-349; T243-252)

(This section has been edited and translated into German by Birgit Kellner, *Nichts bleib nichts: die buddhistische Zurückweisung von Kumārīlas Abhāvapramāṇa* (Wien, 1997). Here we make use of the summary of the first part of this section found in Taber 2001, pages of which are indicated below by "JT".)

Summarized by John Taber

13.1 (JT p. 74) "Absence is a *pramāṇa* in regard to a real entity (lit., 'the form or nature of a real entity') for which the other five recognized *pramāṇas* do not arise."

13.2-4 (JT pp. 74-75) "Absence serves to establish the 'unmixed coexistence' [as Kellner renders '*asaṅkara*'] of entities, that is, their distinction from each others. There are different ways in which *asaṅkara* is realized, thus the object (*prameya*) if the *pramāṇa* of non-being is divided into different types: prior absence (*prāgabhāva*), e.g., the non-existence of curds in milk prior to the arising of the curds; subsequent absence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), e.g., the non-existence of milk once the curds have arisen; mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*), e.g., the non-existence of a cow in a horse and vice-versa; and complete

¹Yoshimizu's article ends with the following Conclusion: "The typical example of an *arthāpatti* used in Mīmāṃsā treatises, i.e., the *arthāpatti* of Caitra's being outside, can be explained in accordance with the rules of propositional logic. In the *Arthāpattipariccheda* Kumārīla demonstrates the impracticability of confirming the three characteristics of a valid reason with regard to this example. He thereby posed an essential problem in logic to his contemporary logicians, although he himself did not elaborate his method of derivation in order to establish a particular style of formal logic. He maintained that in an *arthāpatti* the conclusion is derived from a premiss that implies the conclusion. He further noticed that in an *arthāpatti* it is not necessary to have recourse to a universal conditional which should be given in the form of a pervasion between two classes in a specific domain of discourse. It may be supposed that this is why Kumārīla refused to reduce such an *arthāpatti* to an *anumāna*, which is necessarily based on pervasion.

or absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*), e.g., the non-existence of a horn of a rabbit."

13.5-6 (JT, p. 75) "Indeed, were there not a valid means of knowing these four types of non-being, all things would fall together, be indistinguishable from each other. We would think that a horse is a cow and curds milk, that rabbits have horns and matter is conscious, etc."

13.7 (JT, p. 74) "Different types of non-being account for our treating things according to the categories of cause and effect, etc.: a cause is that thing in which there is prior absence of the effect; an effect that in which there is the subsequent absence of the cause, and so forth."

13.8-9 (JT, p. 74) "Given, then, that there are these different types of non-being, there must be reality to non-being itself; for we do not distinguish types of something that isn't real. Thus, insofar as they are identical, the non-being of an effect just is the being of the cause, and so, insofar as the pot and the cause are real, the non-being of the cloth and non-being of the effect are also real. In sum, the non-being of objects, which is cognized by the *pramāṇa* called non-being, is something real."

13.11 (JT, p. 74) "It (*abhava*) is the non-arising of the other *pramāṇas*, perception etc., in the absence of any transformation of the self, or as [the occurrence of] a cognition in regard to another real thing."

13.12 (JT, p. 75) "A thing has two aspects: from one point of view, 'according to its own form', i.e. *qua* itself it can be considered something that is; from another point of view, 'according to the form of something else' (*qua* something else) it can be considered something that is not."

13.13 (JT, p. 76) "Which aspect of an object one experiences at a given moment, whether what it is or what it is not, is determined by which one is either 'emergent' (*udbhūti*) or an object the knower desires to apprehend (*jighrṃṣā*).

13.14 (JT, p. 76) "However, the aspect that is not being apprehended continues to exist in unmanifest form (*līna*) as an 'assisting factor' (*upakāraka*); or indeed, Kumārīla suggests, perhaps there is never awareness of the one without the other.

13.15 (JT, p. 76) "For in knowing that something is definitely this or that, one also at the same time knows that it is not some other thing, or that some other thing is not present."

13.17 (JT, p. 76) "Perception, as well as the other *pramāṇas*, apprehend the being-aspect (*bhāvāṃśa*) of a thing;

perception, etc., tell us positively what is there.

(p. 79) "The 'function' (*vyāpāra*) of the *pramāna* of an absence is just the 'non-arising' (*anutpatti*) of perception, etc."

13.21-27 (JT, p. 76) "This idea' [i.e., the idea broached in 17] is presented at greater length. The absence aspect (*abhāvāmsā*), on the other hand, requires another *pramāna* whose functioning consists just in the non-arising of the *pramānas* perception, etc. The origin of the cognition 'It is not' occurs after the present object (the ground) has been perceived and the missing counterpart (the pot) has been recollected; it is not immediately produced by the operation of the senses.

13.29-37 (JT, p. 83) "The first part of the section that treats the question of whether absence is known by inference (AP 29-37) discusses whether some being (*bhāva*)-either the being of the object that is absent or the being of the object that is present-can function as the *liṅga* in such an inference...Kumārila here is considering a possible line of argument that could be developed in support of the inferability of non-being."

13.38-44 (JT, p. 83) "In the second half of the refutation of the view that absence is known by inference (AP 38-44)...Kumārila considers the proposal that the 'non-arising of perception, etc.' (*pratyakṣāder anutpatti*) is the *liṅga* in such an inference...Moreover, in *śloka* 44 he refers to the view that inference is 'a cognition produced by the three-fold mark (*trilakṣanena*)."

13.38ab (Tr. Rani, p. 77) "The non-origination of *pratyakṣa* etc. will not serve the purpose of a *liṅga* (with regard to the cognition of non-existence of anything like pot etc."

13.39 (Tr. D. Sharma 1966) "Furthermore, in the case of [the] universal-absence no valid means (inference) is possible. Then, since the relation of the *hetu* and *sādhyā* is not established (*vyabhicāra*), how can the particular instance of (absence) be known by that (inference)?"

13.40-42 (Sum. KKD p. 86) "No pervasion can obtain between absence of perception and an absence of (something) X because now not only the *sādhyā* but also the *hetu* is an absence.

13.44 (Tr. D. Sharma 1966) "The inferential cognition is contended to be that cognition which is derived from the three-fold reason (*trilakṣaṇa*). But in the case of (the cognition of the absence of) the form of the antecedent (*anutpattirūpasya*), no cause is found any where (which can become the logical mark

of the negative inference - as is the case in [the] smoke-fire relation)."

13.46 (Tr. D. Sharma 1966) "Just as negation cannot be the means (*pramāṇa*) where the object of knowledge is a positive one, so also in the case of a negative object nothing positive can be the means of knowledge."

13.50 (Sum. KKD p. 86) "Kumārila's point is that 'absence of perception etc.' is something existing in the cognizer while the possessor X of the something A (of 13.40-42) as well as A itself are both things existing there in space and so the former cannot be a feature of either of the latter two."

13.52 (Sum. KKD p. 86) Kumārila concedes that an absence of perception can have with absence of A the relation called cognizer-to-the cognized, but he adds that this relation can be noticed only after absence of perception etc. have already cognized absence of A so that it will then be futile to use absence of perception etc. as the *hetu* for absence of A.

14. *Citrākṣepa* (E349-352; T252-24; KKD 7-9)

14.10 (Objection:) The only relation possible between a word and a thing meant is the relation of contact, but there is no such relation, any more than a relation between the Himalaya and the Vindhya mountains.

14.11 (Answer:) There is the relation of denoter to denoted, which is not a type of (e.g.) inference but may lead to the inference about what the speaker meant.

14.20-25 (Question:) Then how is this relation learnt?

(Answer:) Sometimes by learning from an authoritative person, sometimes by watching how a word is used.

14.21 (Yoshimizu EMH p. 330, fn. 60) "In answer to the vehement rejection of Vedic sacrifice as something bringing about no result at all, Kumārila points out that concerning the *citrā* ceremony for attainment of cattle nothing is stated in the Veda about when the result occurs after the performance of the ceremony."

14.26cd (Yoshimizu EMH, p. 330, fn. 60) "In the case of the *kāriri* ceremony, when rain fails to fall immediately there must be some obstacle which results from a previous act related to a Vedic injunction."

14.33 (Objection:) Then the word can't itself have a meaning (independently of how it is used).

14.34 (Answer:) It can itself have a meaning but depend

on other things, or persons, to convey it, though without a meaning it could not do so.

15 *Sambandhāksepa* (E353-361; T254-261)

15.94-95 (Tr. Ram-Prasad 2000, p. 5) "Then again, right cognition is...not contrary to that intrinsic potential (for action in a subject); for right cognition does not enter into opposition with the potential for action. Though it is accepted that lack of right cognition brings about (wrong) actions, as it does attachment and the like (i.e., obstruction to a proper life), they are not removed by (right) cognition."

15.96 (Tr. Ram-Prasad 2000, p. 6) "That right cognition destroys action is not established..."

15.102 (Tr. Ram-Prasad 2000, p. 4) "The senses, etc. do not convey (the idea) that right cognition is the determinant of liberation. Nor does the Veda teach that liberation results from the knowledge taught by the Samkhya (school) and others."

15.103 (Tr. Ram-Prasad 2000, p. 8) "Know the self has not been enjoined with liberation as its objective. It (merely) indicates that self-knowledge is the cause of the undertaking of (certain types of) action."

15.104 (Tr. Ram-Prasad 2000, p. 9) "When this (knowledge) is understood as being for another objective, what is found (i.e. assertions that the self must be known) must merely be exhortatory, and the result is (in any case) nothing other than heaven and the like."

15.106-107 (Tr. Ram-Prasad 2000, pp. 26-27) "Nothing that is an effect (literally, has a cause) is known to be indestructible. Therefore, one is released only through the absence of the cause (of bondage) due to the destruction of consequential action. There is no cause for the eternality of liberation, apart from the absential (i.e. negative) nature of freedom, and no absence is the result of actions."

15.108-109 (Tr. Ram-Prasad 2000, p. 28) "The fact is that for those who know the truth about the self, past actions are annihilated through fruition (the consequences having been met), and with there being no further residue (of consequences to be faced), the body is not produced again. One body is produced for the experiencing of the consequences of past actions; if they (past actions) do not exist [any longer because they are exhausted] no body is then produced."

15.110 (Tr. Ram-Prasad 2000, p. 29) "One whose objective is liberation does not undertake actions which have

the purpose of fulfilling desires or actions which are prohibited, but, performing only those actions which are necessary or occasion-specific, seeks to give up sin.'

15.111a (Tr. Ram-Prasad 2000, p. 30) "It is known that the effects (of the latter two sorts) accrue only to those who solicit them, and not to those who do not desire them."

16 *Sphota* (E361-384; T261-281; KKD 9-11)

The word "*śabda*" is ambiguous: it can mean a *varṇa*, i.e. a syllable which has no meaning by itself, or a *pada*, i.e. a word which has meaning.

(KKD p. 9) "In this section Kumāṛila seeks to explain what he understands by a word (rather by the generic entity in Sanskrit called *śabda* of which two subspecies are phoneme (*varṇa*) and word (*pada*)).

16.5 (KKD p. 9) "A *śabda* is what is an object of auditory perception irrespective of whether it yields a meaning or not."

16.6 (KKD p. 9) "A word (composed of letters) is the case of a *śabda* yielding meaning."

16.7 (KKD p. 9) "An individual phoneme is the case of a *śabda* yielding no meaning."

16.9-64 (KKD 9) "He first undertakes a long description of what a phoneme is."

16.9-15 Since a phoneme has no parts it is the same phoneme that is being pronounced when it is uttered or heard.

16.16 (Objection:) The two different utterances of the same phoneme are different but they have the same universal property characterizing them.

16.17-22 (Answer:) Particulars are different instances of the same universal only if they are similar but at the same time different. Since a phoneme has no parts it cannot be an instance of difference, so it can't be a particular. Of course, the same phoneme may be pronounced at different times and through different *nādas*.

16.23-26 (KKD p. 9) "Kumāṛila goes on to concede that whatever differences might be exhibited by two cases of pronouncing the same letter must be due to the two *nādas* (air vibrations) that are active in making manifest this letter in these two cases; nay, he even points out that he is speaking of one and the same letter being made manifest by two *nādas* precisely as the opponent speaks of one and the same universal being made manifest by two particulars falling under this universal."

16.31-62 (KKD pp. 9-10) "Kumārila admits that he would not even mind if two cases of pronouncing the same letter are treated as a case of two particulars falling under the same universal; for all that he is interested in maintaining is that an entity existing every where and always is made manifest whenever one and the same letter is pronounced here now there, a position defensible on the hypothesis of an unitary letter as also on that of a letter-universal."

16.65-90 How do the various phonemes, pronounced successively, manage to convey the meaning expressed in a whole word? It is the very nature of those phonemes to do so; just as the various portions of a ritual act successively conspire to constitute the total sacrifice, or the parts of a cart operate successfully through time though no single part can do so.

16.91-137 Kumārila now turns to the Grammarians' hypothesis of *sphota*, which "maintains that word is not only an eternal and ubiquitous but also an impartite entity, so that the phonemes alleged to be the constituent units of a word are not really its constituent units but just the agents that make the word manifest at the time when they are pronounced." (KKD p. 10) Kumārila objects that if so, since no one hears a *sphota*—what is heard is the syllables—, a word is not a *sphota*; what is heard or spoken is rather a series of syllables spoken consecutively.

17 *Ākṛti* (E385-399; T281-295; KKD 11-13)

17.1-4 (KKD p. 11) "In this section Kumārila discusses the problem of the ontological status of a universal, and the occasion for it arises as follows:"

17.5 (Translated by Kunio Harikai in BOr p. 401:) "With regard to all objects there arises a double idea, in the shape of one consisting in its differentiation (as an individual apart from others), and another (a collective idea) consisting of its homogeneity (with others resembling it in certain respects). And this double idea is not possible without the double character of the object (as an individual and as belonging to a universal)."

17.5-11 (KKD p. 11) "Then he offers a positive account of the nature of a universal and defends it against possible objections. He begins by making a general declaration to the effect that things are found to possess features that are common to several of them as also those that are peculiar to reach and that neither set is a case of illusory appearance."

17.10-11 (Tr. Harikai, BOr p. 400) "A universal (*sāmānya*) devoid of individuals (*viśeṣa*) does not exist, (-because of the absence of individuals) - like the horns of a hare. And in the same manner, because of the absence of universal(s) there could be no individuals...Or these two premises may be mentioned in the forms 'because one does not possess the character of the other'. By this change, there ceases to exist the slightest difference between the individual and the universal."

17.12 (Objection :) Several different objects might be able to cause us to identify them without their sharing any common property.

17.13-18 (Answer:) The several objects would have to be capable of having the same capacity to produce awareness of them, a capacity different from the objects themselves, and they must cognize that something—and what I call that something is a "universal property".

17.19 (Objection:) Awareness of several universal properties does not involve any property of universal-property-ness.

17.20-23 (Answer:) Something is called (a) "universal property" not because it shares a feature with other things but because it functions to produce a cognition of identity among many things.

17.24 (KKD pp. 11-12) "Universals are called by the same name not on account of this being the seat of new universal but on account of their sharing the feature 'while being one residing in many' or on account of their proclaiming the common function 'producing the cognitions of identity in respect of many'.

17.25 (KKD p. 12) "Kumārila next submits that a universal is not an ubiquitous entity inasmuch as it resides only in those places where there exist a particular body acting as its locus."

17.26 (KKD p. 12) "He soon goes on to concede that a universal is a ubiquitous entity which is only made manifest at a place where there exists a body acting as its locus."

17.27-34 (KKD p. 12) (Objection:) "There seems to be no reason why a particular object should make manifest just one universal when all the universals are equally present there."

(Answer:) "This is so because it is of the very nature of things."

17.35-40 (KKD p. 12) (Objection:) "If the presence of a common feature in several particular objects necessitates the

presence there of a universal then the presence of the common feature 'relatedness to the universal in question' should necessitate the presence of another universal in these very objects, for it virtually amounts to saying that the presence of the universal in question is, and the presence of 'relatedness to the universal in question' is not, a matter of plain observation."

17.41-44 (KKD p. 12) "Kumārila concedes that the particular objects which share a universal also share a corresponding capacity, but his point is that since this capacity is itself posited on the basis of the observation of this universal it cannot be made the basis for denying the existence of this universal."

17.46-47 (Translated by Harikaj, BOr p. 402) "And when there is no absolute difference between the dewlap, etc. and the individual cow, and again between the universal "cow" and the individuals (composing it), then the reply to the question "how is it that (the universal) cow-ness applies only to the objects endowed with the dewlap, etc.?" would be that it does so simply because the universal consists of the (individual endowed with the dewlap, etc.). Then, as for the question "What is the reason for this fact?", you must understand that it lies in the very nature (of the universal and the individuals composing it.)"

17.48-50 (KKD p. 12) "Kumārila also considers the view according to which there exists only one grand universal which is made manifest in the form of this universal or that when this particular object or that acts as the manifesting agent. Against this view his objection is that..."

17.51-64 (KKD p. 12) "A thing exhibits a common feature as well as a peculiar feature while this common feature and this peculiar feature are identical with one another as well as different from one another and both are identical with the thing itself as well as different from it...the identity and difference he is speaking of are not absolute identity and absolute difference but partial identity and partial difference"

17.65-77 (Objection:) The common feature of a thing consists in its similarity (*sārūpya*).

(Answer:) If "similarity" means having the same form then "similarity" is just another way of talking of universal properties. And it is difficult to explain "similarity" any other way. "Similarity" to what? to animals like Bossie? But then only Bossie will be meant by 'cow'. Similarity to some original cow? but nobody knows what that cow looked like!

18 *Apoha* (E400-435; T295-328; KKD 13-15)

18.1 (Sum. Yoshimizu EMH. p. 320, fn. 16) "Kumārila declares that the negation of 'non-cow' is nothing but the real cow-ness (*gotva*)"

18.1 The Buddhist theory of *apoha*, "exclusion", is that a word means a certain group of objects not because these objects share any feature but simply because of what they are not. E.g., the word "cow" is applied to whatever is excluded from the group of non-cows, and "horse" to what is not a non-horse, etc.

18.4-8 (KKD p. 13) "On Kumārila's showing 'exclusion from non-cows' must characterize neither anything more than all cows nor anything less than all the cows. Certainly, 'exclusion from non-cows' cannot characterize horse, but nor can it characterize only certain types of cows, for in the latter case the cows not belonging to the types in question will cease to be cows.

18.10 (KKD p. 13) "But cow-universal is just the thing that resides neither in anything more than all the cows nor in anything less than all the cows; hence Kumārila's equation of 'cow-universal' with 'exclusion from non-cows'.

18.11-34 (KKD p. 13) "Kumārila examines a number of negative words on whose analogy the Buddhist might plead that even positive words are essentially negative in import; most important is his examination of the word 'non-Brahmin' (Skt. *abrāhmana*). In the case of the word 'non-Brahmin' his verdict is that it means not just absence of Brahminhood but manhood-unaccompanied-by-Brahminhood; and his general verdict is that a negative word always means a universal unaccompanied by a subspecies of itself.

18.35-37 However, the Buddhist does not accept the existence of universal properties. The only real things for a Buddhist are "pure particulars" (*svalaksana*), which we are incapable of dealing with in a practical fashion since they are without any properties at all.

18.42 Since exclusion is just absence, and there is only one absence, all exclusions are identical, and thus not being a non-cow and not being a non-horse apply to all entities whatsoever.

18.48-49 (KKD p. 14) "Kumārila refuses to concede that one exclusion can be distinguished from another."

18.53-57 (Objection:) No, not being a non-cow differs from not being a non-horse in that the loci of the two properties are distinct.

(Answer:) No, for the locus of a property is not a part of that nature of that thing.

18.65-66, 83-84 Saying that a cow is what is not a non-cow involves a fallacy, that of mutual dependence, since a non-cow is what is not a cow.

18.86-114 (KKD p. 14-15) "He next offers one set of arguments to demonstrate that accepting this doctrine [of *apoha*] becomes an impossibility...Kumārila's central contention is that the knowledge of word-meaning should enable us to deal with the real things of the world but that the relation of an 'exclusion'—which is what a word means according to the Buddhist—to the real things of the world is ambiguous in the extreme. In one word, being itself unreal an 'exclusion' cannot have any real relation with the real thing but it cannot play any meaningful role in the knowledge-situation unless it has some real relation with these real things."

18.115-134 (KKD pp 14-15) "[Here] Kumārila's central contention is that the entities meant by the words of a sentence must stand in some meaningful relation with each other but that 'exclusions', which are what these words mean according to the Buddhist, cannot stand in any meaningful relation with each other."

18.135-137 (KKD p. 15) "The entity meant by a word must be capable of being assigned a gender, number and the like but an 'exclusion' is incapable of all this."

18.138 (KKD p. 15) "If an universal is of the form of an 'exclusion' it must be cognized by means of non-cognition which is the accredited means of cognizing absences, but it is ever actually thus cognized."

18.140 (Sum. Yoshimizu EMH p. 320, fn. 15) "As for the double negation added to a verb, he [Kumārila] maintains that there remains the action indicated by the verb as its *svārūpa* while the particle *na* which negates the verb is negated (*niṣedhasya niṣedanam*) by another particle *na*."

18.164 (KKD p. 15) "His grand conclusion is that a word is to be said to make an exclusion only in case it is explicitly a negative word while in every other case it is to be assigned a positive meaning."

19 *Vana* (E435-453; T329-347; KKD 15-19)

[This section's title alludes to a prominent argument against the existence of universal properties. "*Vana*" means a forest, and a notable argument against universals is that just as

a forest is nothing but the trees of which it is made up, a "universal" is nothing but the particulars which (allegedly) are its instances.]

19.1-2 (KKD p. 15) "First of all [Kumārila] investigates the relation that obtains between a universal and the features through which it is usually recognized. On his showing, the bodily parts like dewlap etc. are found in each and every cow just as the cow-universal is found in each and every cow and yet the two are two distinct entities, between which there obtains the relation called 'co-residence in the same body'."

19.4-7 (KKD p. 15) "Kumārila would not even concede that the observation of a dewlap etc. is a necessary condition for observing the cow-universal, for his fear is that if the cow-universal cannot be observed without observing a dewlap etc. these latter too should not be observed without observing some third thing, and that would lead to an infinite regress; moreover, in that case the cow-universal should not be observed unless a dewlap etc. are observed in their totality which latter observation would take time while as a matter of fact the cow-universal is observed all at once."

19.8 (KKD pp. 15-16) "As to why the observation of the cow-universal does not take place without at the same time observing a dewlap etc. Kumārila's explanation is that it is so because the two are located at the same place."

19.10 (KKD p. 16) "In the end, however, Kumārila concedes that there is no harm even in maintaining that dewlap etc. and the cow-universal are not absolutely different from each other."

19.11 (KKD p. 16) (Objection:) "A universal is not different from the particulars concerned, because it is not cognized when the latter are not cognized, just like a row, a herd, a forest (which are of the form of a group that is not cognized when its members are not cognized)."

19.12-15 (KKD p. 16): "Kumārila's first reaction is that such argumentation is of no avail when a universal is a matter of general acceptance."

19.16-29 A universal property is not the same thing as a form (or configuration, *ākṛti*). Air and fire have universal properties but no shapes, and a picture of a cow has a cow-shape but is not an instance of cow-ness. (Other examples are offered). Of course we sometimes recognize the presence of a universal property by noticing certain characteristic forms or shapes.

19.30-31 A universal property occurs in each of its particular instances, and remains one throughout. A universal is ubiquitous and without parts, being the same wherever and whenever it occurs, just as a word is ubiquitous and without parts since it has the same form whenever it is uttered.

19.32 (KKD p. 16) "A universal is eternal because it can possibly belong to the particulars that are separated by a time-gap."

19.33 (KKD p. 16) "As for whether a universal resides in a particular partly or wholly Kumārila remarks that the question makes no sense in the case of an impartite entity like a universall."

19.37-39 (KKD p. 16) "His point is that an impartite entity might well reside in its different seats in a manner *sui generis*, as fire is hot in a manner *sui generis*."

19.48-49 (KKD pp. 16-17) "Kumārila then argues that the cognition of two cows as cow is not a case of just cognizing two similar things; for the things in question have got an identity of form, and just as the valid recognition of a thing as the same thing is not false, so also is the cognition of identity of form in the case of two cows not false."

19.50 (Now, returning to the forest:) (Objection:). Just as a forest is nothing more than its trees, so a universal is nothing more than its particulars.

19.51-56 (Answer:) But though the perception of a forest in the trees may (for your reason) be deemed an error, that does not make the perception of a universal in its particulars false. Moving close to a tree we no longer see a forest, but such is not the case when we cognize a particular instance of a property—we still see that property.

19.57-58 (KKD p. 17) "The cognition of oneness in respect of a forest which takes place without the employment of words is thus discarded but the same as taking place in connection with the employment of words persists even for a neutral person; however even this latter cognition is false because it finds no corroboration from perception etc. whereas a universal is cognized in an identical manner by all the means of valid cognition."

19.59 (KKD p. 17) "Certainly, a word is properly applied only in the case of things that are already cognized by other means of valid cognition but as in the case of a forest, etc. it turns out to be false because not applied to things perceived (reading *dr̥ṣṭe'prayuktasya* for *dr̥ṣṭe prayuktasya*)."

19.60 (KKD p. 17) "But Kumārila next quotes at length the view of certain other thinkers who treat a forest as a real entity; it runs as follows: 'The cognition of oneness in respect of a forest is true even when generated through words—this in spite of its not being corroborated by other means of valid cognition, just as the cognition of taste etc. is true (even in spite of its not being corroborated by other means of valid cognition).'"

19.62 (KKD p. 17) "Certainly, it is not necessarily required that the cognition generated through words be corroborated by other means of valid cognition."

19.63 (KKD p. 17) "However, in the present case even such a corroboration is available; for after all a forest is but trees many in number, and they are already cognized by other means of valid cognition while the number one is cognized in the case of other objects."

19.66-67 (KKD p. 17) "On their part, certain others maintain that a forest is the universal 'manyness' residing in the trees concerned, and that this universal is already one (so that the cognition of oneness in respect of a forest is not false). Nay, we might even concede that there exists a forest-universal which however lacks a single locus, just like a composite-whole (which has got numerous loci in the form of its component parts); true, the loci of the forest-universal are not conjoined to each other (as those of a composite whole are), but there is nothing incongruous about it because it is a matter of plain observation."

19.68 (KKD pp. 17-18) "Certainly, the cognition of forest-ness takes place in relation to all forests (just as the cognition of cow-ness takes place in relation to all cows)."

19.69 (KKD p. 18) "And then there are even other cases where a universal has got a locus whose elements do not appear all together but one after another (e.g., the universal motion-ness residing in an act of motion)."

19.70-73-74 (Objection:) A forest is not really a single entity but only figuratively termed so.

(Answer:) Even so, since the trees have a common place, time and function, to treat them as exemplifying one universal is not wrong, just as we talk of a row of things or a herd of elephants as exemplifying universals.

19.75-80 (KKD p. 18) "Soon, however, he submits that a composite whole does exist over and above its component parts; his only suggestion is that it should not be treated as

something absolutely distinct from these component parts. Kumāriila's point is that a composite-whole is both somehow identical with its component parts and somehow different from them, it being his conviction that things of the world invariably thus exhibit mutually contradictory features."

19.82 (KKD p. 18) "As for the question whether a universal exists in a particular partly or wholly, Kumāriila remarks that it should be dismissed as senseless."

19.94-96 (KKD pp. 18-19) "As for the forest conceived as something over and above the trees concerned it is certainly an object of pseudo-perception, but it deserves no comparison with a universal which is a content of genuine perception."

20 *Sambandhāksepaparihāra*

(E453-482; T347-374; KKD 19-21)

20.1-12 (KKD p. 19) "In this section Kumāriila considers the question whether the establishment of the relation between a word and its meaning be not the result of some sort of convention on someone's part."

20.13 Is the relation of a word to its meaning the result of some convention on the part of e.g. one's teacher, or God?

20.13-21 Not by a teacher: if it were, there would be as many meanings to a word as teacher's conventions, and no one could understand anybody.

20.21-23 (KKD pp. 19) "Moreover, if a word uttered on different occasions is a different word then the word whose meaning the teacher had himself learned will not be the same word whose meaning he is teaching to the learner—an obvious anomaly."

20.27 (KKD p. 19) "The difficulty is somewhat obviated if it be granted that a word uttered now and uttered on another occasion both possess the same universal, for then this universal will be the common vehicle of meaning in the two cases, but the trouble is that a word does not exhibit a universal feature and a particular feature, it being one and the same whenever it is uttered."

20.28-29 (KKD p. 19) "As for the relation of a word to its meaning, that is nothing but the denotative capacity of this word, and this capacity exhibits one and the same form whenever it makes its appearance—which too should mean that a word is one and the same whenever it is uttered."

20.30-36 (KKD 19) "Of course, even if a word is a single entity possessed of a single denotative capacity this word

becomes practically useful only to one who has taken cognizance of this capacity, but the point is that one cannot take cognizance of this capacity unless it already exists there in its own right."

20.37-39 (KKD p. 19) "To cite an analogy, a thing cannot be seen without an eye but it must already exist there if it is to be seen with the help of an eye."

20.45-46 (KKD p. 20)¹ "Where nothing whatsoever existed before world-creation who can tell us how God (Prajāpati) looked at that time."

20.47-49 (KKD p. 20) "And in the absence of all motive and all means why should God undertake world-creation at all? Moreover, why should He create a world so full of misery?"

20.52 (KKD p. 20) "Pity could not be His motive, because at that time there was nobody to be pitied."

20.56 (KKD p. 20) "And if world-creation be an act of play on His part, that means He does not have all His desires fulfilled."

20.58-59 (KKD p. 20) "Granted that the beings first created found themselves in the presence of God, but how could they be sure that it was He who had created them?"

20.60-61 (KKD p. 20) "God's own words to that effect could well be false, but [the] Vedas too could yield no necessary information, for on the present hypothesis even [the] Vedas are a creation of God."

20.68 (68-71 are translated by Johannes Bronkhorst in LPEIM pp. 174-175. The word translated as "activity" is "karman".) "[For] We have no proof for a dissolution in the form of universal destruction. And that activity (*karman*) on the part of Prajapati would serve no purpose."

20.69 "Moreover, it is not possible that beings that have engaged in activity would stop without experiencing [the results of] those [activities]; for the fruit deriving from one action cannot be stopped by another activity."

20.70 "The coming to a stop of all (beings) without (experiencing) the fruits [of their activities] is not possible...Nor is that absence of experience itself the fruit of any activity."

¹20.45-116 are summarized more extensively by Peri Sarvesvara Sharma in "Denial of creation and dissolution of the world", StudM 53-77. And 45-47 are translated by Ganganatha Jha in Bilimoria 1990, p. 485.

20.71 "Alternatively, in case all activities have been destroyed, no new creation is possible. Or if (you maintain that) activities manifest themselves (and are the occasion of a new creation), what would cause this?"

20.72 "If you propose God's desire, then let that be the cause of the world. For it would be pointless to imagine (the efficacy of) actions if (the creation of the world) is controlled by God's desire."

20.73 "Moreover, God's desire cannot come into existence without having itself a cause; or rather, the cause of that (desire) will be the cause (of the creation of) living beings."

20.74 (74-82 translated by Helmut Krasser (DTI pp. 219-221) "Now, the (following is our) answer to the one who wishes to establish that the creation of bodies specific to configuration must be governed by a conscious being, like (the creation of) houses, etc."

20.75 "If (you) assume that to govern something means no more than to be its cause, then (you) prove what already is established (for us). For that (fact of being no more than cause) is constituted by the (past) actions (*karman*) of all beings."

20.76 "(The same defect disqualifies you) even if (you take) the alternative (and claim) that (to govern something means) presupposing the will (of that governor). For the actions (themselves) presuppose that (will). (You may assume that to govern something means) to come into existence immediately after that will. But this is not to be found in any example."

20.77 "Moreover, your reason would be inconclusive because of his body, etc. And [you cannot deny that] his body had an origin, because it is a body, like ours."

20.78 "[If the opponent claims] that [God's body] is not a counter-example, for that [body] too is governed by this [God] himself, [we answer that this assumption] is not [possible]. For he would have to be a governor without a body, like [any other] liberated soul."

20.79 "Moreover, if you hold that in the case of the pot and so on the governing agency (*adhiṣṭhāna*) is that of the potter, etc., then [pots, etc.] would not be governed by God. If [on the other hand they] are [governed by God Himself, then [the example] is lacking the property to be proven."

20.80 "And if [you understand] the example as it is normally understood (*yathāsiddha*), then the reason would be contradictory. [For] it would follow that [the subject to be

proven] would have a creator who is a non-God and perishable."

20.81 "And if His activity is not held (to be of the same kind) as that of a potter, how could an entity that is insentient (*acetana*) [like an atom] obey [this] will of His."

20.82ab "Therefore, the atoms do not cling together [in order to constitute the world] due to His [mere] will."

20.82 (KKD 21) "Equally untenable is the doctrine according to which there exists just one self which gets itself transformed in the form of this world; for this self is supposed to be free from all blemish while our world is so full of blemishes."

20.84-86 (KKD 21) "And if a factor like ignorance is posited to account for this anomaly the doctrine will no more be a monist doctrine; moreover, in that case it will be difficult to see how the sole existing self should ever be rid of ignorance."

20.87-88 (KKD 21) According to the Sāṃkhya "version of world-creation, a self is inactive while all activity takes place on the part of [the] *gunas* (=the constituent units of *prakṛti*), but such activity cannot take place at the time when there does not yet exist any factor possibly responsible for such activity (all such factors coming into existence as a result of this activity itself)."

20.89-90 (KKD 21) "Certain people maintain that *karmans* existing in the form of potency really cause the activity in question, but that is illogical, certainly, the capacity to produce curd exists in milks but that does not enable milk to produce curd-products."

20.91-92 (KKD 21) "As a matter of fact, if *karmans* existing in the form of potency really cause the activity in question then it should always be possible for a liberated self to become a worldly self, for *karmans* so described will never cease to be there."

20.99-100 (KKD 21) "Certain others maintain that [the] activity in question goes on so long [as] a self retains the capacity to be an enjoyer and *prakṛti* the capacity to be the thing enjoyed; but since a self's capacity in question is its being a conscious entity and *prakṛti*'s capacity in question its being an unconscious entity, and since the two capacities as thus understood will never cease to be there, the liberation of a self will never come about."

20.101-102 (KKD 21) "Similarly defective is the

Sāṃkhya contention that knowledge causes liberation; true, a *karman* is caused by ignorance but it vanishes not as a result of knowledge but as a result of producing its appropriate fruits."

20.102-111 are translated by John Taber in MVIC pp. 178-179. Since they are of pertinent to the important question about whether Kumārila is a *karmasamuccayavādin*, as contended by Roque Mesquita, WZKM 38, 1994, pp. 451-484 (Taber thinks he is not), we provide his translation here.

20.102-103 "That knowledge is the cause of liberation is not understood by means of the senses; nor is it prescribed by the Veda that liberation comes from knowledge of Sāṃkhya, etc. When it is said that the self is to be known, this is not prescribed for the purpose of liberation. it is indicated [rather] that knowledge of the self is the cause of carrying out *karman*."

20.104-105 "Given that it is for the sake of something else, the declaration of its fruit is an *arthavāda*. There is no other fruit [of *karman*] than heaven, etc. And if liberation is conceived as the experience of happiness, this would be heaven by another name, and that is perishable."

20.106-107 "For nothing that has a cause is understood to be imperishable. Therefore, only through the absence of the cause, due to the destruction of *karman*, is one released. For there is no cause of the eternality of liberation other than that which has the nature of non-being, and non-being is not the fruit of any action."

20.108-109 "For those who know the truth of the self, when previous *karman* is destroyed as a result of experience, since there is no further accumulation [of *karman*], the body does not arise again. A body, which is for the sake of experiencing that which is produced by *karman*, does not come forth (*pravartate*). When [*karman*] is absent there remains no cause of [the body]."

20.110-111 "Someone desirous of liberation should not take up optional and prohibited [actions]. Let him only do regular and occasional [obligatory] rites with the desire of removing sin. But the desired result [of these rites] which is known [from scripture] does not arise for someone who does not desire it, and this is the case for the knower of the self. Thus, that knowledge is of use."

20.114-117 (KKD p. 19) "God is supposed to be a super-ordinary person but nobody can become a super-ordinary person without performing religious observances, nobody can perform religious observances without knowing about them,

nobody can know about them without learning [the] Vedas, nobody can learn [the] Vedas without being in possession of words, etc. All this, in turn, means that the process of employing words is beginningless."

20.118-119 (Objection:) God at the time of creation lays down conventions about the meanings of words.

20.123-125 (KKD 19-20) "If a word yields meaning because it is assigned this meaning by an authoritative person then this person must be recalled whenever this word is used, just as a Buddhist would not put reliance on a religious utterance unless he makes sure that it is [the] Buddha's own utterance."

20.130-131 (KKD 20) "One should not put reliance on a Vedic utterance without recalling its author, but since people put reliance on a Vedic utterance without recalling its author this utterance must be without an author."

20.134-136 (KKD 20) "It might be said that God at the time of [the] world-creation established conventions about the meaning of a word with the help of another set of words that were at His disposal, but the pity is that the only words we know of are those current in our midst."

20.138-139 (KKD p. 20) "It will not do to retort that on this logic—that is, if convention about the meaning of a word cannot be satisfied without the help of another set of words—one might as well assay that the meaning of a word cannot be learnt without the help of another set of words; for it is a matter of everyday occurrence that people learn the meaning of a word by observing the behavior of their elders which takes place in the wake of an employment of words."

20.139-140 (KKD p. 20) "Nor will it do to say that God at the time of world-creation established [the] convention about the meaning of a word with the help of bodily gestures signifying this situation or that, for even the signification of bodily gestures must be already known to the learners concerned—but there could be no such learners in the midst of beings that were first produced at the time of world-creation."

21 *Citrāksepaparihāra* (E483-488; T375-381)

(KKD p. 7-8) "In this section Kumārila makes his start with the following two pieces of inference:

21.1 "(1) A Vedic sentence is true because in respect of its meaning it is independent of a speaker, just as a word is true because in respect of its meaning it is independent of a speaker."

21.2 "(2) The cognition yielded by a Vedic sentence is valid because it is a cognition yielded by an author-less sentence, just as the cognition yielded by any sentence is valid.

21.3-4 "The first inference is fallacious because a word is true in respect of its meaning only in the trivial sense that it means what it means, whereas a Vedic sentence has to be true in the far more important sense that what it says is the case; glossing over this vital difference as regards the meaning of the word 'true', Kumārila argues that a word is true in respect of its meaning because nobody ever gave this word this meaning and a Vedic sentence is true because nobody ever composed it."

21.5 (KKD p. 8) "(Objection:) No relation can conceivably obtain between a word and its alleged meaning and...even if such a relation does obtain it must be a made affair."

21.6-7 (KKD p. 8) "The opponent's point is that the only relation conceivable between a word and a thing meant by it is the relation of contact but that such a relation is apparently absent here just as it is absent between the mountains Hīmalaya and Vindhya."

21.10 (KKD p. 8) "Kumārila retorts that the relation of father-and-son is a relation and yet no relation of contact, while there does obtain between the mountains Himalaya and Vindhya the relation called 'co-residence on the same earth'."

21.11 (KKD p. 8) "His positive point is that the relation between a word and the thing meant by it is that relation of denoter and denoted."

21.12-15 (KKD p. 8) "By way of elaborating his point Kumārila tells us that in the act called denotation the word acts in its capacity as agent or instrument while the thing meant acts in its capacity as object which is all that is understood when the word and the thing meant by it are said to stand in the relation of denoter and denoted."

21.16-20 (KKD p. 8) "Kumārila concedes that once this relation is cognized one can offer an inference to the effect that whoever utters such and such a word means such and such a thing, but he insists that the original cognition of this relation is not a case of inference but a type *sui generis*."

21.30 (KKD p. 8) "Kumārila also describes how the relation in question is first learned. Thus in some cases an expert tells the novice 'such and such a thing is meant by such and such a word'; in other cases, the novice first watches the experts acting in the wake of words having been uttered and

then applying the method of concomitance in presence and concomitance in absence he comes to understand that such and such a thing is meant by such and such a word."

21.33 (KKD p. 8) (Objection:) "If this is how a word comes to acquire meaning for a novice then this word cannot be said to possess an inherent capacity to yield this meaning."

21.34-44 (KKD pp. 8-9) "Kumārila...points out that even if a thing possesses the capacity to yield a certain result this capacity is realized and result yielded usually in the presence of certain accessories. This, however, does not mean that these accessories taken by themselves would yield the result in question. For example, an eye possesses the capacity to see things but it actually sees things only in the presence of an accessory like light; this however does not mean that a blind person would see things only if they are placed in a well-lit compartment. Similarly, a word comes to acquire a meaning for a novice only when he has cognized the relation obtaining between this word and this meaning, but that does not mean that this word could thus yield this meaning even in case it did not possess it originally."

22 *Ātmavāda* (E489-515; T382-408; KKD 113-116)

22.1-7 The authority (*prāmāṇya*) of the Vedas, and all that it teaches, is brought to nought unless there exists a self that is different from the body, the sense-organs and the *buddhi*, and is eternal unlike everything else.

(Objection:) Your self, being eternal and all-pervading, can't perform actions nor experience their results.

(Answer:) No, since a self remains conscious and substantially existent through the changes in its qualities, such as pleasure or pain.

In fact, it is your [Buddhist] momentariness view which undermines the persistence of self-identity through time.

(Buddhist:) The doer and the enjoyer, though different entities at different times, belong to the same series (*saṅgāna*)

(Answer:) That doesn't help, and if the self is permanently unchanging, as Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya hold, that won't help either.

(Objection:) It is the trace (*vāsanā*) left in the agent that connects it to the enjoyer.

(Answer:) That's not possible on your Buddhist view, since everything is momentary—there's no permanent seat for your 'trace'. An awareness cannot move from one mind in one

place to another in another. But our ubiquitous, persisting self can be connected with several bodies and minds.

A self can be the doer of an act even though it doesn't move, *pace* the Vaiśeṣika. It is the body that moves, but to explain pleasures and pains a self is needed as their loci.

22.8-9 (Tr. Rani p. 136) "If somehow the eternality of the self and its nature of being the agent and the enjoyer are assumed, there would be no use of this assumption, inasmuch as, at the time of the enjoyment of the result the enjoying self would not be able to establish any relationship between the action and its result. That is, the enjoying self would not realize that 'the result I am enjoying is the effect of the action—good or bad—performed by me alone.'"

22.10-11 (Sum. Rani p. 136) "And when one does not recognize that the result has been brought about by his own action, there would be no difference whether it is enjoyed by one's own self or by someone else."

"And while doing a vicious deed, one may think that at the time of enjoyment of its result he would not remember (that it is the result of his own vicious deeds), and hence he would not avoid it."

22.12 (Sum. Rani p. 137) "Thus, even in accordance with the theory of eternality of a self, the objections of 'the loss of earned merit and the enjoyment of unearned deserts (*kṛtanāśakṛtāgamau*) remain the same (as have been urged by the opponents against the Buddhists). Therefore, it is useless to establish the eternality of the self."

22.20-21 (Sum. Rani p. 137) "Another argument of the Buddhists is: If your selves, being eternal and all-pervasive, are devoid of action and are unmodified by pleasure and pain, how can they possess the nature of being the agent and the enjoyer? If it be held that at the time of the performance of an action and at the time of the appearance of pain etc. there is a difference in the self from its previous form, its eternality would be lost."

22.32-34 (Sum. Rani p. 142-143) "Kumārila raises mainly the following objections against 'the law of action and its result' (*karmaphalavyavasthā*) in the no-self theory of the Buddhists:

(i) A person, already knowing about his destruction in the next moment, would never wish to perform his duties as he knows that the result of his present actions would be enjoyed by someone else."

(ii) (Tr. Rani pp. 146-147) "When consciousness is

momentary, devoid of any movement (*niṣkriya*) and devoid of all pervasiveness (*avibhu*) according to *jñānamātrātmavādī* Buddhists, how can it go to the other body (after leaving the previous one by death)?"

22.35 (Tr. Rani, p. 143) "We hold that the same series of consciousnesses (*jñānasantāni*), which is the performer of an action, is the enjoyer of its result (and hence the discrepancy in the form of *kṛtanāśakṛtāgama* cannot be imposed upon us. As far as the difference in moments is concerned, it is just like the different conditions of [a] self assumed by you (i.e. the *Mīmāṃsakas*)..."

22.36-37 "and thus there would be discrepancy in the form of *kṛtanāśakṛtāgama* (one's loss of what he has done and one's gain of what he has not done)."

(iii) "What to say of [the] identity between the agent and the enjoyer, even identity of the agent in one action (to be performed in more than one moment) is hard to be got at in this system, as every moment of consciousness is different from the next one, one action would be performed by several moments of consciousness just as an action, begun by a father, is completed by his son, grandson and so on."

22.46 (Sum. Rani p. 145) (Objection:) In spite of their being succession (*pāramparya*) between the agent moments (*kartrkṣana*) and the enjoyer moments (*bhoktrkṣana*) there is no identity (*tādātmya*) between them."

22.47 (Tr. Rani, pp. 145-146) (Answer:) How is the Buddhist able to distinguish between the enjoying moments of the series which perform the action and the enjoying moments belonging to some other series, inasmuch as the enjoying moments of both series are equally different from the preceding moments of that series which has performed the action."

22.51 (Tr. Rani p. 145) (Buddhist answer:) Just as fathers perform duties for the accomplishment of (certain) results for their sons, although they are fully acquainted with the difference (between themselves and their sons), similarly in our (Buddhist) theory, too, the moments in a series of consciousness (*jñānasantāna*) (perform actions although they know that the result would be enjoyed by the coming moments of the same series."

22.52 (Tr. Rani p. 146) "Just as children born in different families do not enjoy the result (of the actions performed by the fathers of different families), although the difference (between the children of the performer's family and

those of the others's) is just the same; so in the same manner the moments, originated in different series of consciousness (do not enjoy the result of the action performed in a moment of a different series)."

22.59-61ab (Tr. Rani p. 147) "Transference of consciousness from one body to the other is not at all tenable, inasmuch as neither the exit nor the entrance of consciousness from one body to the other is ever experienced. Flames etc. travel from one place to the other, being inspired by the air, but there is no one to inspire in [the] case of consciousness. Nor can it, owing to its incorporeal nature, go to the other body by jumping."

22.62,64 (Tr. Rani p. 147) "The hypothesis of an intermediate astral body (*antarābhavadeha*) has been thoroughly rejected by Vindhyavāsin, inasmuch as no proof has been found for its existence. And the assumption that this 'intermediate body', associated with a subtle form of '*rūpā*' (corporeal) etc., suddenly comes into being (at the time of death) and suddenly disappears (at the time of rebirth) (is purely an imagination. If, somehow, the intermediate body is accepted, even then transference of consciousness (from the vanishing body) into it (i.e. in the *antarābhavadeha*) and the assumption of transmitting the consciousness again into the other (new) body is totally groundless."

22.75 (Sum. Rani p. 150) "Consciousness cannot exist in an embryonic stage, as no sense-organ is there."

22.101-102 (Sum. Rani p. 138) "(Vaiśeṣika:) The psychical facts like pleasure, pain etc., being qualities, must have some substrate. Due to certain reasons, [the] body cannot serve the purpose of being the substrate, hence [a] self is assumed as the substrate of pleasure, pain, etc. But the Buddhist, not agreeing with this view, says that pleasure, pain, etc. are not accepted as qualities in the Buddhist system, so there is no use of postulating a substrate in the form of [a] self."

22.103, 106, 109ab (Sum. Rani p. 152) "According to the Buddhists, desire etc. can be maintained on the basis of impressions (*vāsanā*) belonging to the same series of consciousness, no matter if the conscious moments differ from one another."

22.108-110 (Sum. KKD p. 115) "In the statement 'I know' the word 'I' refers to the body inasmuch as going is not possible on the part of a self; but his point is that in the statement 'I know' it could refer to nothing but the knower and

the question is as to who this knower can be. Kumārila feels that this knower can be either a cognition itself or a self acting as the seat of cognition, and that if he successfully argues against the first alternative the second must hold the field."

22.111-114 (Sum. KKD p. 115) "The materialist alternative that this knower can be cognition seated in the body, sense-organs etc. is dismissed off-hand though after some amount of elementary argumentation."

22.115-119 (Sum. KKD pp. 115-116) "With this aim in view this alternative is subjected to criticism as follows: On the supposition that the momentary cognition is the knower it makes no sense to say 'I knew this thing then and I am knowing it now'; for the statement-part 'I knew this thing then' is false of the present cognition, the statement -part 'I am knowing it now' is false of the past cognition, while the two together are false of each."

22.121-122 (Sum. KKD p. 116) "Nor can it be said that the two cognitions in question are somehow one because they are similar, for this explanation will not work in the case of the statement 'I knew a cow then and I am knowing a horse now'."

22.122-123 (Sum. KKD p. 116) "It will not do to say that even in this new case the two cognitions in question are similar *qua* knower, for then one should find it possible to employ the word 'I' not only in respect of oneself but in respect of all knowers whatsoever."

22.123-124 (Sum. KKD p. 116) "Nor can it be said that two cognitions, in order to be referred to as 'I', must belong to the same series, for even there they continue to be two different cognitions, so that the later one should refer to the earlier one as 'it', not as 'I', just as it refers to it as 'it', not as 'I', a cognition belonging to another series or a jar."

22.127 (Sum. KKD p. 116) "A statement like 'I am heavy' or 'I am lean' is false, because we also say 'thy body is heavy', 'my body is heavy'."

22.130-131 (Sum. KKD p. 116) "On the other hand, in the statement 'here is my self' the word 'I' can be said to stand for self and the word 'self' to a temporary cognitive state of this self."

22.140-147 (Sum. KKD p. 116) "Kumārila concludes the section by arguing that it should be a misconceived venture to read denials of self into a Vedic statement, for there are so many Vedic statements - most prominently the sacrificial injunctions - which posit self implicitly and so man - most

prominently the Upanisadic discourse on the subject - which do so explicitly."

23 *Śabdānityatā* (E525-597; T409-485; KKD 21-29)

(KKD p. 21) "In this section Kumāriḷa seeks to clinch finally the problem whether a word is everlasting or otherwise.

23.8-17 Is a word eternal or not?

(Objector:) It can't be, for a word can be heard at the same time at different places. Also words may be uttered loudly or slowly at different times, but a single manifestor like a lamp does not change the volume of its manifestations such as a jar, etc. And since impartite space being the locus of all words and all the changes of vibration, a word uttered at one place still is not heard at all the other places.

23.21-22 (Answer:) But other systems (Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Buddhism) admit that a thing may exist at a place but not be manifest except under certain conditions. Likewise a word exists everywhere at all times but is only heard or spoken at specific places and times.

23.22-23 (Tr. Rani, p. 125) "Destruction preceded by consciousness is called '*pratisamkhyānirodha*', while destruction without a prior knowledge of it is called '*aprasamkhyānirodha*'. Both of these are regarded (by the Buddhist) as non-caused because of their indestructible nature."

23.24-25ab (Tr. Rani, p. 121) (Buddhist:) "Destruction is accomplished by itself, it requires no cause. An entity, which has a cause, necessarily undergoes destruction, just as is observed in [the] case of sprout and the rest; as there is no destruction of the 'destruction', it must be without any cause."

23.25-26 (Tr., Rani, pp. 121-122) "(Buddhist:) It is the production of the series of glowing charcoals and not the destruction of wood that is caused by fire. Similarly it is the production of the potsherds (*kapāla*) and not the destruction of [a] jar that is caused by the stroke of a hammer. In fact destruction is naturally bound with ever produced thing. It requires no extraneous causes for its occurrence."

23.27-29 (Tr. Rani pp. 123-124) "When the homogeneous series of production goes on, the destruction, being in subtle form, remains unnoticed (e.g. the gradual decay of a jar); but when some heterogeneous cause falls upon the homogeneous series of production, the heterogeneous series of production comes forth and the destruction which is naturally

existent there is manifested through that heterogeneous production, e.g. when the stroke of a hammer falls upon a jar, potsherds are produced and the destruction appears itself in gross form."

23.51-65 (Objection:) The ear, which is just space, as well as the word, according to you, are both ubiquitous when a sound is heard by one person it must be heard by everyone.

23.66-79 (Answer:) Perhaps space is made up of parts, as Jainas and Sāṃkhyas say. But if not, still a word is only heard where there is a vibration of air in the ear of a particular person.

23.88-98 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, p. 178) "[The Vaiśeṣika view on the nature of sound] according to Kumāriḷa is not satisfactory as it involves many unverifiable assumptions. We are never aware of a multiplicity of sounds, nor is there any awareness of the heard sound being different from the uttered one. When someone utters some word we believe that we hear the same word and the speaker also believes that the same word that he utters will be heard by others. How can a sound give rise to another sound similar to it? Why is sound heard quickly in the direction of wind and not so quickly in the opposite direction? Why is the supposed series of sounds not produced in all directions and heard by everyone in the world? Why is sound not able to cross such obstacles as a wall, etc.? These questions cannot be satisfactorily answered by the Vaiśeṣika, for according to him sound is a non-corporeal (*amūrta*) quality of the all-pervading space (*ākāśa*)."

23.88-90 (A Naiyāyika:) A word spoken causes a series of momentary words spreading out in space and time; the last member of the series reaching the ears of a hearer.

23.91-99 (Answer:) This is a fanciful account, leaving many things unexplained: Why should a momentary word produce another momentary word? How can something unsubstantial like a word produce waves spreading out in space? etc.

23.106-112 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, pp. 178-179) "According to the Jains, *śabda* is substantial in nature. It is composed of very subtle particles of matter (*pudgala*) possessing form and touch and is heard when it travels to and comes in contact with the auditory organ. This view is even more objectionable than the Vaiśeṣika view. The traveling of sound, a material entity, to the ear is not perceived by anyone. The existence of form and touch in sound, the suppression of these qualities assumed to

explain their imperceptibility, and the existence of subtle parts in sound are simply wild assumptions having no ground. How can the invisible parts of sound be arranged together and how can these arrangements differ among themselves so as to give different words? In the absence of fluidity how can these parts be held together and why should they not be scattered apart by the wind before reaching the ear of the hearer? The parts of sound must be extremely light and loosely held together and when they come in contact with such things as a tree etc. in their way they must fall apart like a lump of clay. Moreover, when they enter the ear of one person they must not be heard by others.."

23.107-113 As for the Jains, they think a word is a physical substance, but it is hard to say which substance this might be.

23.113-119 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, p. 179) "According to the Sāṃkhya the *vr̥tti* of the auditory organ goes out to the locus of sound. The Sāṃkhya assumes two unverifiable things, viz. the existence of *vr̥tti* and its movement. Now when the *vr̥tti* exists at a distance viz. in the locus of sound to which it moves, how can it affect the auditory organ of the hearer? Certainly the hearing of sound presupposes some modification of the hearing organ, but it is inconceivable how much modification can be produced from a distance. If it be said that the auditory organ is all-pervading, then even a very distant sound should be audible. And, why should a sound obstructed by a wall be not audible? The *vr̥tti* of the auditory organ being non-corporeal (*amūrta*) cannot be obstructed by material obstacles. Moreover, the wind blowing in the direction of the sound should not help its perception nor the wind blowing in the opposite direction should hinder it. It is more reasonable to think that the former should hinder and the latter should help hearing because it is the *vr̥tti* that is supposed to move, not sound."

23.119-121 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, pp. 179-180) "The Buddhist says that sound is heard without requiring any contact between the auditory organ and sound. But then near and distant sounds should be equally audible or inaudible, because the absence of contact is common in both the cases. Nor should there be any sequence among heard sounds, and the perception of the same sound as loud by a person who is standing near it and as low by another standing at a greater distance too remains inexplicable."

23.122-130 (Sum. Bhatt 1989, p. 180) "Having criticized

all the above views Kumāṛila gives his own view as follows: When a person speaks the air inside his body struck by his effort moves out of his mouth and this air is helped by the conjunction and disjunction of his palate, tongue and throat. The extent to which the air goes is determined by its initial velocity which depends on the intensity of the speaker's effort. That is why sound is not heard everywhere. When the air forces its way through the surrounding atmosphere which is calm, its parts have conjunction and disjunction with the latter and so the sound is heard in all directions. When this air reaches the space of the aural cavity it imparts a certain potency (*śakti*) to the auditory organ, which produces certain modifications (*samskāra*) in the latter. Different modifications are caused by different sounds and they are the cause of the differences in sound perception. Sound is not heard when there are obstacles such as a wall etc. because they obstruct the passage of air. When loud sounds are heard some pressure is experienced upon the ear. This is caused by the air-current striking the ear with a great force. The initial velocity of the sound gradually decreases and hence the intensity of sound differs at different points of its passage till it disappears completely. Thus the sequence, loudness, lowness etc. of the heard sounds are fully explained by this theory."

23.113-130 As for the Sāṃkhya and the Buddhist accounts, which involves the postulation of a fluctuation (*vr̥tti*) of the appropriate sense-organ, here the auditory organ, that is hard to explain since the auditory organ is part of the body and the word-sound is produced elsewhere. Kumāṛila tries to help explain how the two might come into contact through the intermediation of air, rejecting the solution of some Mīmāṃsakas that it is the ear itself that expands to perform the job.

23.149-150 (Tr. Bhatt 1989, p. 165) "If it is absolutely necessary to deny the assertion of the Naiyāyika [that the ear is made of space (*ākāśa*)], then we must seek to establish the fact of space being the sense of audition on the ground of its being laid down in the Veda."

23.153-154 (Sum. Bhatta 1989, p. 165) "Further, he maintains that this view is as reasonable as that of the Naiyāyika and possesses the additional advantage of being supported by the Veda."

23.223-228 So much concerning spoken sounds. How about other sounds, unspoken—what are they? Three answers

are offered: Kumārila prefers the explanation that inarticulate sound constitutes a third kind of sound (besides syllables and words).

(KKD p. 22:) "In vv. 229-277 it is argued how the establishment of relation between a word and its meaning becomes impossible in case a word is not an eternal entity."

23.243-269 If a word (*pada*) is not eternal then distinct utterances of the same word are as different from each other as the difference between the word "cow" and the word "horse". In teaching a word to a pupil the teacher must repeat the word more than once, the student understanding its meaning after one of the later repetitions; but if each repetition is of a different word all occurrences would be without meaning for the student.

23.278-283 (Objection:) A word is composed of phonemes uttered in succession, but if both phonemes and words are eternal how could this be?

23.284-308 Various answers are attempted, all of which (according to K. K. Dixit) are unsatisfactory, which Dixit suggests is the reason for Kumārila's saying later (in the *Vākyanīyatva*, verse 112 "It is with difficulty that we have established that the phonemes themselves are capable of acting as a word".

23.309-440 In the final part of this section Kumārila provides a number of additional arguments to support the theory of the eternity of a word.

23.424 (Tr. Rani, p. 127) "The Buddhists, due to inexplicability of the gross destruction otherwise, assume an intermediate subtle destruction of things at every moment."

23.427 (Sum. Rani p. 128) "(T)here would be a contradiction with sense-perception etc. If the Buddhist with the example of [a] lamp, etc. claims that existence (*sattā*) is the means of proving momentariness."

23.428-429 (Tr. Rani p. 128-129) "In assuming the destruction of the previous moment as without leaving any residue, there would occur no production of the succeeding moment, because of the absence of any cause. It (the previous moment), being totally non-existent, would have no capacity to act for the next moment. When it itself is swallowed up by destruction, in which moment would it work (for the production of the next one)?"

23.430-431, 433 (Tr. Rani, p. 115) "Although the destruction (of the preceding thing) and the origination (of the

succeeding one) are simultaneous according to the Buddhist, they, being independent of each other, cannot have causal relationship, inasmuch as the previous thing, being evanescent, does not have any moment at its disposal to perform any action for the origination of the next one. Until there is an action in the cause before the appearance of the result, it cannot be called a cause. Only sequence (*ānantāryamātra*) is not sufficient for being a cause."

24 *Vākyanīyatā* (E669-702; T553-555; KKD)

Objection (1-110)

25.2-5 Sentence-meaning is not derived by either taking the words, or their meanings, singly nor from taking them collectively, not by invoking extra words.

25.6-9 Neither a sentence nor its meaning is a whole made of parts. It is hard to prove that a sentence is either the same as or different from its parts, since the parts do not occur at the same time, or if they are one cannot cognize them simultaneously.

25.10-17 There is no relation between the words of a sentence and the meanings of those words.

(Objection to the objector:) Yes there is, since the words co-exist eternally in the same space.

(Answer:) That is true of all words whatsoever and not just the ones constituting a particular sentence.

25.18 Cognizing the meanings of a group of words is not the same as cognizing a sentence's meaning as a single entity. And a group and cognizing a single entity are evidently different cognitions.

25.19-29 The theories that sentence-meaning consists in connection (*samsarga*) of (or exclusion from) e.g. whiteness and cow-ness will not wash, since for two things to be connected (or disconnected) they must be cognized simultaneously (an impossibility for the Buddhist).

25.29-31 And cow-ness and whiteness cannot be related as qualifier to what it qualifies.

25.31-35 Sure, the same body can be connected with whiteness and cow-ness, but a word never means a particular thing, e.g. a body.

25.37-38 As for exclusion, calling a cow "white", i.e., non-black doesn't in any way mean that there are no black cows.

25.39-44 Just speaking certain words side-by-side

doesn't serve to show the connection of their meanings.

25.44-48 Connection and exclusion can't constitute sentence-meaning for they are nothing more than the meanings of the constituent words.

25.49-52 A bunch of words side by side don't constitute a sentence if they don't relate to each other.

25.52 There is not such thing as a word-*sphoṭa* or a sentence-*sphoṭa*. And there is no universal property of sentence-ness, nor indeed as word-ness.

25.52-55 Words merely occurring in succession don't make a sentence, nor do a bunch of phonemes in succession constitute a word.

25.56-83 Here Kumāṛila provides his version of the "Objection" section of the *Bhāvanāviveka*, essentially the material found in the work by that title written by Maṇḍana Mīśra and summarized below.

(The remainder of the objector's remarks pertain to grammatical matters which we forbear to summarize.)

Answer (110-369)

25.111-117 Granted that a sequence of phonemes does not have a single meaning, understanding a sentence's meaning does not have to comprise a single awareness.

25.118 (KKD p. 35) "By way of solution he suggests that the cognition of the first word of a sentence is followed by the cognition of its meaning, then occurs the cognition of the second word followed by the cognition of the meaning, and so on and so forth, while the word-meanings thus learnt are ultimately recalled together and combined into a unitary whole which is what constitutes the meaning of the sentence in question."

25.121-122 It is overly-complex to suppose that a sentence has its own denotation if the words themselves provide the meanings required.

25.123-129 (Objection:) But a sentence doesn't have parts; it only seems to because two sentences are supposed wrongly to be similar; all judgments of similarity of two things require that the things be really composed of parts.

25.137-138 (Objection:) A sentence is an eternal, part-less thing that is made known to us by sounds (*dhvani*).

(Answer:) A sound cannot make a sentence known to us as a whole, but only by expressing its parts.

25.140-141 If all parts of a sentence are unreal then a

sentence that is part of a larger sentence must also be unreal.

(Objection:) But the small sentence itself constitutes a unitary whole since it is a separate entity.

(Answer:) Then the words of a sentence equally should be real, since they too exist separately.

25.143-148 (Objection:) Words by themselves are unreal since they never function practically by themselves.

(Answer:) When studying a text we want to know what each word means. And just as the parts of a chariot are not employed practically by themselves but are nevertheless real, so it is with the parts of a sentence, or of a word.

25.150-167 (Objection:) Then, like a sentence or a word, a syllable too must have parts!

(Answer:) One might then consistently conclude that because a jar is made up of parts an atom must have parts!

25.168-181 (Objection:) The supposed parts of a sentence don't contribute to its meaning, any more than the component parts of the word "*aśvakarna*" play a part in its meaning [it names a tree, which has nothing to do with horses (*aśva*) or ears (*karna*)].

25.182-227 (Answer:) We can determine from context the meaning of a word, and this too even in the case of a word such as you cite. And anyway, a sentence's meaning always involves the meanings of its constituent words.

25.229-232 (Question:) Then what is the relation between word-meanings and the meaning of the sentence they constitute?

(Answer:) A sentence's meaning is implied by, since it is does not arise in the absence of, its words' meanings.

25.232-239 But this is not a matter of inference, since there is no relation of pervasion (=invariable concomitance, *avinābhāvatva*) between the meanings of the words and the meaning of the sentence they constitute.

25.240-246 So the relation of word- to sentence-meaning is a unique one. And here he answers the opponent's arguments about *bhāvanā* that were posed above (25.56-83).

11.2 KUMĀRILA, *Tantravārttika*

Selection from Wilhelm Halbfass, "Karma, *apūrva*, and 'natural' causes: observations on the growth and limits of the theory of *samsāra*", in O'Flaherty, pp. 268-302. This selection is from pp. 273 ff. These paragraphs are based on and refer to pages 365-369 of TV.

"With the transformation of Mīmāṃsā into a comprehensive, fully developed philosophical system, *karman* and *samsāra*, as well as *mokṣa*, become more significant and manifest in its thought and argumentation, not so much as explicit themes, but as tacitly accepted presuppositions or as points of reference and orientation. This is exemplified in a very peculiar and complex manner by the writings of Kumārila, the most successful systematizer of the Mīmāṃsā tradition. Kumārila's basic concern in this connection is to explicate and to justify the specific Mīmāṃsā ideas about the efficacy of the Vedic rituals, which are considered to be the core of *dharma*. He has to do this in the context and atmosphere of ways of thinking for which *karman* and *samsāra* have not only become basic premises but which have also developed sophisticated theoretical models and a keen sense of problems in this area and with reference to causality in general. Kumārila's procedure presents a remarkable example of a highly specialized and idiosyncratic line of thinking which nevertheless illustrates some of the most basic problems of the functioning of *karman* entails its own special and 'trans-karmic' (or rather, 'proto-karmic') causality; the encounter of this type of causality with the wider causal context of *karman* and *samsāra* leads to symptomatic questions of correspondence and mutual adjustment. The discussion of these problems centers around the concept of *apūrva*, for Kumārila that particular 'potency' which gathers and stores the efficacy of the Vedic rituals and makes it possible for transitory sacrificial performances to have lasting effects in the distant future.

"There is no explicit reference to *apūrva* in Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. We find it only in Śabara's *Bhāṣya* and its commentaries and sub-commentaries... The way in which it is discussed by Śabara and his commentators leaves no doubt that, even within Mīmāṃsā, it is a very controversial concept. It is presented in basically different interpretations and at various levels of thematization and reification. Śabara's brief remarks are commented upon in two widely divergent sections in Prabhākara's *Brhatī* and in Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*. Prabhākara's comments are even shorter than Śabara's own remarks; in their brevity, they remain cryptic and deliberately and of causality in general. The efficiency of the Vedic rituals elusive as far as the ontological status of *apūrva* is concerned; for more explicit statements we have to refer to the writings of Prabhākara's follower and commentator Śālikanāthamiśra.

Kumārila's commentary, on the other hand, is very elaborate, and it goes far beyond Śabara's own statements; the *apūrvādhikaraṇa* of the *Tantravārttika* is the most important and most comprehensive discussion of the topic in classical Mīmāṃsā.

"At the beginning of this section, a lengthy *pūrvapakṣa* is presented, according to which the assumption of *apūrva* is quite unnecessary and unfounded. Kumārila's refutation is a special application of the epistemological device of *arthāpatti*, 'circumstantial inference' or 'negative implication'; Vedic injunctions would be meaningless or misleading if the connection between the sacrificial acts and their future results were not established; *apūrva* is this indispensable connecting link. *Apūrva* is a potency produced by the sacrifice which makes it possible that its fruits be reaped at a later time; it is a bridge between the actions and their promised results. In this context, *apūrva* appears as a specific device to account for a specific exegetic problem. Yet Kumārila himself leaves no doubt that it has wider and more general implications and ramifications; basically, the same problem for which the concept of *apūrva* is supposed to provide a solution exists also in the case of ordinary, 'secular' activities such as farming, eating, studying; the results cannot be expected right after the completion of the acts, but only some time in the future. A certain storable 'power' (*śakti*) is necessary as a connecting and mediating principle between act and result. This is a rule which applies to all cases of instrumentality and to the causal efficiency of actions in general. The actions as such are sequences of vanishing moments. They can gain totality, coherence, and future efficacy only if, in spite of their temporal disparity and constant disintegration, their causal power is accumulated and integrated and remains present up to the completing of the appropriate results. This is even more obvious in the case of complete activities which combine various actual performances at various times and occasions; a favorite example in the sacrificial field is the new and full moon sacrifice, *darśapūrṇimāsa*...

"One of the main issues is how subdivisions in the realm of *apūrva* are supposed to correspond to the complexities of the rituals and the Vedic pronouncements by which they are enjoined, how certain subordinate auxiliary actions have or produce their own specific units of *apūrva*, and how these contribute to the final and comprehensive *apūrva* of the

complete sacrifice, which in turn corresponds to the unity and totality of the result, for example, heaven. Basically, *apūrva* comes in 'units' of higher and lower order; incomplete acts do not produce any *apūrva* at all; and the subordinate *apūrvas* of the auxiliary parts of the sacrifice do not accomplish anything independently, if the whole sacrifice is not completed. On the other hand, the distinguishability of the various *apūrvas* or 'units' of *apūrva* accounts for the multiplicity and variety of the results.

"In trying to locate *apūrva*, to account for its lasting presence after the disappearance of the sacrificial act as a physical act, Kumārila ultimately resorts to the soul of the sacrificer—although *apūrva* remains for him a potency or fitness (*yogyatā*) generated by, and in a sense belonging to, not the sacrificing person, but the principal sacrifice (*pradhānakarman*) itself. The causal potencies created and left behind by the sacrificial acts remain present as traces or dispositions (*samskāra*) in the person who has performed them; according to Kumārila, there is no other possible substratum in which they could inhere.

"Throughout his discussions, Kumārila takes it for granted that in its basic dimensions his discussion of *apūrva* responds to problems which concern acting in general, in particular the relationship of acts appears as a case study on the causal efficiency of acts in general. Yet the dividing line which separates *apūrva* from other types of causal potency remains clear and irreducible. *Apūrva* is unique insofar as its separation from and juxtaposition with other, 'secular' types of acting and of causal potency leads to peculiar though mostly implicit problems of coordination and of possible interference.

"There seems to be a basic assumption that if Vedic rites, including all subsidiary acts, are performed in strict accordance with the Vedic rules, they will not fail to produce their proper results. Sacrificial, '*apūrvic*' causality seems to operate within a finite and well-defined set of conditions, a kind of closed system, in which it seems to be secure from outside interference: in bringing about its assigned result, the power of the sacrifice, that is, *apūrva*, will prevail over other possible influences, including those which might arise from the general karmic status of the sacrificer...

"Kumārila's discussion of *apūrva* remains for the most part restricted to 'optional rites' (*kāmyakarman*) and rites for specific occasions, which are aimed at the fulfilment of specific

desires and needs and prevented in terms of positive injunctions (*vidhi*). The question whether there is an *apūrva* corresponding to the violation of prohibitions (*pratiśedha*), that is, resulting from such actions which according to the Veda will lead to punishments or undesirable consequences, is only briefly referred to by Kumārila. Basically, he is ready to accept such a negative counterpart of the positive potential resulting from proper sacrificial enactments: there is an *apūrva* resulting from violating the prohibition to kill a Brahmin, and it will accomplish the punishment of the violator in hell (*naraka*). Yet it is not surprising that Kumārila does not further enlarge on this point. He has obviously reached a rather delicate border area of this theory of *apūrva* which would make it difficult for him to avoid various conceptual entanglements and to keep his discussion within the limits of a specifically Vedic context of causality and from lapsing into the general field of "karmic", that is, retributive causality: What, for example, is the mechanism governing a violator of a Vedic prohibition who is not entitled to the study of the Veda and thus cannot derive any *apūrva* from it? What happens to a Sudra killing a Brahmin?

"Another point which is not really clarified in the *apūrvic* status of the compulsory rites (*nityakarman*), regular performances which are not designed for the attainment of specific results. In the *Slokavārttika* Kumārila mentions them casually in connection with the theme of final liberation, which is not really his own concern; their value consists in their contribution to eliminating past demerit and to keeping off such demerit which would result if they were not performed. The systematic implications of these suggestions are not pursued.

"*Apūrva* is a conceptual device designed to keep off or circumvent empirically oriented criticism of the efficacy of sacrifices, to establish a causal nexus not subject to the criterion of direct, observable sequence. Yet, in trying to safeguard metaphysically the *apūrvic* sanctuary of sacrificial causality, Kumārila repeatedly emphasizes that its basic problems are parallel to those of 'ordinary', 'secular' causality and action: the 'empiricists' are not safe on their own ground; even there they cannot get along without some durable and coordinating 'potency' (*śakti*), which must be analogous to that of *apūrva*.

1.3.27 (Translation by John Taber, MVIC pp. 180-181)

"In every instance knowledge is understood as a purification and as an auxiliary to something else, except for self-knowledge."

"For self-knowledge is known as both *kratvartha* and *purusārtha*, because of connection and separation (*samyogaprthagtvāt*), since without it the performance and non-performance of actions that have their results in another world would not be possible. In the same manner, [there are the injunctions] 'That self which is free from sin, ageless, immortal, free from sorrow, without hunger, without thirst, whose desires and intentions are true—one should investigate it, one should seek to know it' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.7.1); also [there are the injunctions] 'It is to be thought about, to be known' and also 'One should meditate on the self. By means of the particular statements of the *kāma*- and *lokavādas* [there is established] a connection with the two-fold fruit of prosperity and the highest good, obtained from other sentences dependent [in turn] on injunctions of the vivid knowledge of the reality of the self, which culminates in the pure awareness of self-knowledge (*ātmañānakevalāvabodha*) and is accompanied by thinking and the desire to know, [that is to say, this connection is obtained by the statements:] 'He attains all worlds, he attains all desires' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.7.1). By such statements as 'The knower of the self crosses over sorrow' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 7.1.3), as well as 'If he desires the world of the ancestors, then simply due to his desire the ancestors rise up having secured the world of the ancestors, he rejoices' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.2.1), the fruits arising from *yoga*, consisting of the eight powers such as minuteness of size are mentioned. Also, there is the statement of the fruit consisting in the attainment of the highest self and non-return: 'Conducting himself in this way his entire life, he attains the world of Brahman; he does not return again' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.15). And since there is a lack of an exclusive connection with sacrifice, due to its not occurring in the same context, this is not an *arthavāda*, like statements about the ointment, the post made of *khadira* wood, the ladle, and other *phalāsrutis*."

"But a connection with action is not excluded by the injunction of knowledge."

"Regular [i.e., compulsory] and occasional obligatory acts, specified for each *āśrama* and *varṇa*, are also to be carried out for the sake of destroying previously committed sin as well as for the purpose of avoiding future sin occasioned by the non-performance [of those acts]. But, since these [injunctions of self-knowledge, on the one hand, and compulsory and occasional acts on the other] pertain to different purposes and

different paths, they cannot cancel each other out, nor be alternatives, nor stand in a relation of subordinate and superior to each other."

2.1.5 (tr. Ram-Prasad 1999, p. 6) "We call it 'extraordinary potential' [*apūrva*] that fitness in the principal action or the person which comes of a prior action, a fitness duly derived from sacred teachings."

(p. 8) "Even in the ordinary world, the results of actions such as farming, drinking clarified butter or studying come forth only after a while. Inasmuch as it is not possible for them to persist in that manner, it must be thought that they persist through some subtle influence. However, as these [actions] are not Vedic, the subtle influence [that they generate] is not considered to be *apūrva*."

11.3 KUMĀRILA, *Tuṭṭikā*

"*Tuṭ*" means small. This work briefly comments on the last nine books of Śabara's *Bhāṣya*. "It contains interesting passages, such as those about the heaven (MS-SB 6.1.1-3) and about *karman* and rebirth (4.3.28)" Verpoorten p. 30.

11.4 KUMĀRILA, *Brhattikā* on Śabara's *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya*

Verpoorten, p. 30: "The *Brhattikā* 'Great Gloss' handles the same problems as the *ŚlokaVārttika*. We only know it through quotations, especially those made by the Buddhist thinker Śāntaraksita (725-785). In the last two chapters he [Śāntaraksita] upholds some tenets of Buddhism (e.g., the omniscience of the Buddha) and quotes verses of the *Brhattikā* attacking them. *ŚlokaVārttika* and *Brhattikā* might have *ślokas* in common (see *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2855)."

Taber in MVIC pp. 182-183 translates a few lines from the *Brhattikā* found in Someśvara Bhatta's *Nyāyasudhā*:

"(1) Optional and prohibited actions bind a person [who performs them], as do obligatory actions a person who does not perform them."

"(2) And the previous non-existence of actions, when enjoined actions are left undone, does not fail to be excluded from being a real thing by the fact that it brings about something evil (*anarthakaravēna*)."

"(3) A person who fails to do something in its proper time unwittingly does something else. Thus, his sin is not produced by non-being [but by doing the wrong thing at a particular time]."

"(4) One who, knowing the nature of the self, brings about the destruction of *karman* through experiencing [its effects]—some such person is liberated after many millions of years."

"(5) How could someone who does not think he is a Brahmin bring about action?"

"(6) One who is destroying sin by regular and occasional *karman*, purifying his knowledge and bringing it to fruition by means of practice—such a person whose knowledge is ripened as a result of dispassion experiences liberation."

Two more passages are translated by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu in MVIC p. 203, the first from the *Nyāyasūtras*, the second from the *Sāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathi Miśra.

"(Objection:) But the supreme bliss arises from knowledge, not from ritual [action], which is nothing else but the cause of bondage."

"(Reply:) The supreme bliss] does not [arise] from either one [of these two], but [it arises] from the combination of knowledge and ritual."

"Intellect, happiness, eternity, ubiquity and other properties of the self are recognized to be inherent (in the *ātman*) by nature; the self is never separated from them."

A rather lengthy passage, said by Frauwallner to show that the *Brhattikā* was composed after the *Slokavārttika*, is translated by John Taber (Taber 2001, pp. 586-587) as follows:

"Thus, having refuted the connections stated by others it is now declared according to our own view that it is a necessary connection that is the connection [that is required to exist between *hetu* and *sādhyā*]."

"There are two ways for connections such as the relation of cause and effect, etc. (i.e., there are two types of such connections), according to whether there is a necessary connection or not. Only a necessary connection could pertain to an inference."

"For all these which are not necessary connections do not cause the arising of an inferential awareness. Thus, only from a necessary connection is it not [=never] the case that something is not [conclusively] inferred."

"Therefore, a necessary connection is the only connection [between *hetu* and *sādhyā*] that is ascertained here. And that it is understood to be [the relation] of the indicator and the indicated has been stated previously."

"The cognition of the restricting term (*niyamakāṅga*) as

a result of seeing the restricted term (*niyamyāikāṅga*) for someone who correctly remembers the necessary connection is inference in regard to the things which possess those terms."

12 MANDANA MIŚRA (660)

See Volume Three of this Encyclopedia, pp. 346-347, and Volume Five, pp. 181-182, for information concerning this writer, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi* (Advaita) and the *Sphoṭasiddhi* (Grammarian).

12.1 MANDANA MIŚRA, *Vibhramaviveka*

The work has been edited several times, but is hitherto untranslated. The most recent edition is VV. In his Introduction to VV K. T. Pandurangi provides, not a summary, but an analysis of certain aspects of this work. In lieu of a summary we here give some of Pandurangi's findings. In some cases where Pandurangi cites Sanskrit words we have replaced these with their English translations.

(VV pp. iv-v) "Different schools of Indian Philosophy have...worked out their theory of perceptual error within the framework of their metaphysical system. Consequently every school has its own theory of error. These theories are known as *khyāti* theories. These could be broadly grouped into two (i) Idealist and (ii) Realist. The *ātmakhyāti* and *asatkhyāti* theories of Vijñānavādin and Mādhyamika come under the first group. Within the second group of Realists there are two groups, viz, *anyathākhyāti* and *yathārthakhyāti*. The *anyathākhyāti* of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas, *viparītakhyāti* of Bhāttas and *abhinava anyathā khyāti* of Dvaita Vedānta come under [the] *anyathākhyāti* group. The *akhyāti* theory of Prabhākaras, *yathārthakhyāti* of Rāmānuja and *satkhyāti* of [the] Sāṃkhyas come under [the] *yathārthakhyāti* group."

"The *anirvacanīya khyāti* of Advaita is a class by itself. It is based on the *sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa* concept of Advaita metaphysics and epistemology.."

"The theories of *ātmakhyāti* and *asatkhyāti* were utilized by Buddhists to explain their metaphysical view..."

"Almost all schools of Indian philosophy discuss the *khyāti* theories in their major works and defend their respective theory. Mandana Miśra has written a separate treatise, viz., *Vibhramaviveka*, and has discussed five *khyāti* theories..."

"He particularly criticizes the *akhyāti* theory of the Prābhākaras and supports the *viparītakhyāti* theory of the

Bhāttas. He does mention *anirvacanīyakhyāti*."

(VV, pp. ix-xv) "The *akhyāti* theory of Prabhākara is a distinct contribution to the theories of error in Indian epistemology... (We state the main features of this theory briefly and examine the objections in detail.)"

"Prābhākaras take the firm stand that all cognitions are true (*yathārthyam sarvavijñānam*). The content of a cognition and the object referred to by it always agree. That which is presented in a cognition is called *bhāsamāna* and the object referred to by it is called *vedya*. These two always agree."

"Prābhākaras point out that even if in one instance this rule is broken, then there can be no confidence in any cognition conveying its object validly."

The well-known examples of error, viz., *śūktirājata* [i.e., shell-silver] is analyzed in such a way that this does not violate the rule of agreement. According to Prābhākaras the statement 'this is silver' represents two cognition, viz. perception and memory. One who perceives the *śukti* [shell] present before him perceives it as '*idam*', i.e., 'this' in a general way without the comprehension of its special features that distinguish it from '*rājata*', i.e., silver. Due to the similarity of shell and silver he remembers silver. The perception of a shell and the memory of silver occur in such quick sequence that he does not realize the difference between the objects conveyed by these two cognitions."

"The contents of these two cognitions agree with the facts conveyed by them. 'This' refers to the shell that is present before one and 'silver' refers to the silver that is remembered. Therefore, there is no disagreement between the contents of these two cognitions and the objects referred to by these cognitions."

"Though these two cognitions are true and distinct, an erroneous statement 'This is silver' is made due to the non-realization of the difference between the two cognitions and their objects. For the non-realization of the difference the following factors are responsible:

(i) The absence of the comprehension of the distinct features of the shell and its comprehension merely as this in a general way.

(ii) Remembering silver on account of the similarity between a shell and silver..

(iii) Absence of reference to past time in the memory of silver. This is called *sattāpramoṣa*.

(iv) Occurrence of the perception of the shell and the memory of silver in quick succession."

Objections against the *akhyāti* theory.

"(i) The so-called memory of silver cannot be treated as memory as it lacks the main feature of memory viz., reference to past time."

"(Answer:) The cognition of silver is caused by the revival of traces of the previous cognition of it., Being produced by traces is the main feature of a memory. Reference to past time is incidental. The traces are aroused by the similarity between the shell and silver.

"(ii) 'This' and 'silver' are stated to have a common locus (*sāmānādhikāraṇya*). Therefore, the two refer to one and the same thing. 'This' refers to something that is present before. Therefore, 'silver' should also refer to the same. Hence, it cannot be remembered silver."

"(Answer:) The idea of common-locus-ness is based on the assumption the 'this' and 'silver' constitute a single cognition. Since these are two distinct cognitions the question of common-locus-ness does not arise."

"(iii) As it has to be taken as one cognition, and the common-locus-ness has to be accepted since the comprehension of common-locus-ness and qualified awareness (*viśiṣṭapratyaya*) are essential for activity (*pravṛtti*)."

"(Answer:) This objection can be answered by pointing to another actor in the circumstance of the occurrence of the two cognitions. Not only is the difference between these two cognitions and their objects not realized but the difference between the cognition of silver in normal circumstances and in these two cognitions is also not realized. These two cognitions are taken on a par with the cognition of silver in normal circumstances. It is this sameness of features (*samānarūpatā*) that motivates the activity. The difference between the normal cognition of silver and these two cognitions is not realized for two reasons: (i) one of these cognitions is perceptual; (ii) the same object, i.e. silver, is presented in the other cognition, i.e. memory."

"(iv) If the cognitions 'this' and 'silver' are true there will be no scope for sublation."

"(Answer:) This objection also does not stand. By the realization of the difference between the contents of the two cognitions, viz., shell and silver, the observer gets the correct

knowledge of the shell. This enables him to discover that the judgment (*vyavahāra*) 'this is silver' was not *bona fide*. It is more a discovery of shell and the rejection of any earlier cognition. It is a case of a sublating judgment but not that of the sublation of a judgment."

"The above four objections are stated and answered by Śālikanātha as stated above. Later critics have raised some more objections."

"(vi) According to Prābhākaras difference is an integral attribute of the entity concerned. That is to say, it is *dharmisvarūpa*. When an entity is cognized its properties are also cognized. In the present case, when the cognition 'this' is obtained the cognition of its difference from all other cognitions is also obtained. The same is the case with the cognition 'silver'. Therefore, Prābhākaras cannot talk of the non-realization of the difference between the two cognitions 'this' and 'silver'."

"(Answer:) Though difference is an integral attribute of an entity and cognized along with its cognition; it is cognized in a general way since an entity is distinct from all other entities in the first instance [of its comprehension]. To comprehend the difference from a specific other entity the presentation of that entity as a counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) is necessary [i.e., that entity must be contrasted with something else, a counter-positive]. In the present case the cognitions 'this' and 'silver' are not presented as counter-positives of each other since these have occurred in quick succession. Hence, their difference is not realized."

"(vii) The non-realization of difference is of the nature [of] absence. The Prābhākaras do not accept absence [as a category].. Therefore, they cannot make it a ground to explain the error."

"(Answer:) Though the Prābhākaras do not accept absence as a separate category, they have their own explanation for the absence situation. When the ground and the jar are cognized together it is *samsrtaviṣayabuddhi*. When the jar is removed it is *ekaviṣayabuddhi* or *tanmātra buddhi*. The latter is the position in so-called absence situations. There is no need to envisage a separate category as absence(s)."

"In the present case, the cognitions, viz., 'this' and 'silver' are each realized separately as by nature a cognition of a single content (*ekaviṣayabuddhi*). However, in view of their quick succession, this is not realized. This is exactly the non-grasping (*agrāha*) of distinction (*viveka*) or of difference (*bheda*)."

12.2 MANDANA MIŚRA, *Mīmāṃsānukramanika*
This is a summary of Śābara's *Bhāṣya*, available in at least two editions.

12.3 MANDANA MIŚRA, *Vidhiviveka*
Kanchana Natarajan has studied this complex work in VidVT, and has provided a partial summary of it interlarded with an account of Vācaspati Miśra's commentary (i.e., *Nyāyakārikā*). The summary below is a summary of sections from Natarajan account. "E" references are to the edition in VidV, which is also the edition Natarajan refers to.

Summary by Kanchana Natarajan

(E1; VidVT, p. 21) "The study of [injunction] *vidhi* is important, for knowledge of the three Vedas, which enables a man to achieve the goal of life, depends wholly on the correct interpretation of the injunctive passages that are there in them."

(E4; VidVT22-23) "A *vidhi* is expressed through *liṅ* etc., and it has the optative force. Maṇḍana now questions: Is *vidhi* identical with a particular kind of (a) word, or (b) activity belonging to that word, or (c) meaning functions of words? Maṇḍana argues against each one of these views."

"(a) *Vidhi* is a particular linguistic element (*śabda bheda*)."

"A Grammarian argues that the mere presence of verbal suffixes like *liṅ* can inspire the addressee to act."

"Maṇḍana gives five arguments to disprove this position."

"(1) A linguistic element is always an indicator (*jñāpaka*)—it produces understanding—and not merely an agent (*kāraka*)."

"(2) (E5; VidV 23-26) If *liṅ* is merely a linguistic element without meaning it would always be functioning regardless of what its speaker intended."

"(3) One must know the meaning of a word before being impelled by it to act; otherwise there will be no freedom to act withhold activity, or act otherwise."

"(4) A suffix (e.g.) functions to reiterate, clarify or add to the meaning of the root. If it itself were the cause of action it wouldn't perform those functions."

"(Objection:) Suffixes do sometimes themselves convey meaning, but only in conjunction with the root."

"(Answer:) It's not enough that they be conjoined; the

obligatoriness of the act has to be conveyed."

"(5) If merely the suffix were enough those Vedic injunctions, e.g., which fail to mention the result of following a Vedic injunction would fail to move people to act. A mere suffix cannot motivate a specific way of acting."

(E11-14; VidV 28-29) "Is *vidhi* an activity that is performed by using words? E.g., a speaker uses language to get someone to act by e.g. commanding, asking, entreating, etc. This is a different position from the one previously addressed. Those proposing it agree that a word is an indicator and not merely an agent. What a linguistic element does is to inspire in the hearer a desire for a result. So *liñ* does not function merely by its presence to instigate activity, though it has meaning. The meaning is gotten from the hearer's awareness of the relations obtaining among the constituent words in an utterance."

"Mandana rejects this position as well. Orders, etc. are given not by words but by those who speak them. So language does not by itself inspire action. Nor can language by itself constitute the instrument which reveals a command or request, etc., for this would lead to the fallacy of mutual interdependence: language to be understood (i.e. to have meaning) requires an understanding of the relations among the words, but that understanding requires that one already know the meanings of the words."

"(Objection:) A suffix can by itself instigate activity—e.g., a light may inspire a student to study."

"(Answer:) If suffixes could do that on their own then the position being addressed now reduces to the one discussed earlier, which did not allow linguistic elements to have independent meanings. And then all the objections adduced by us previously will apply."

"Language does not always instigate activity, and language is not required to occasion activity. E.g., in the case of a command one must believe the speaker has the authority to issue it."

"(Objection:) No; it is because the hearer believes he will benefit from the results of his action that he acts."

"(Answer:) Then no injunction to act is necessary; only knowledge of the benefits accruing is needed to inspire action. Anyway, an injunction does not ordinarily specify the results to be gained by following it; that specification depends on the hearer's belief that the speaker is trustworthy, etc."

(E30-31; VidV16) "(Objection:) Then it must be that the

meaning (*abhidhā*) of the suffix (*liñ*) is itself the injunction."

"(Answer:) No. Words by themselves do not motivate a person to act, or else every utterance would do so. The utterance of 'pot' does not by itself inspire any activity. But an injunction is a special kind of word that is responsible for instigation of action."

"Anyway, you hold that the instigation to act comes only from injunctions, but the view you are now proposing contradicts that, since it allows that allows non-injunctive language. And another thing: if it is the meaning of the suffix that enjoins, as well as the form of the word itself, that will lead to infinite regress, since only some words are meaningful, and the meaning of those words depend on some other words whose meaningfulness requires the meaningfulness of still other words, etc."

(E18-19; VidV 32-33) "(Objection:) The meanings of the different kinds of suffixes themselves, one being a command, another a request, another an appeal, etc., and thus express the speaker's intention, although all have a common feature, viz., instigation (*pravartanā*)."

"(Answer:) Then the Vedas cannot be interpreted as providing injunctions to act, since according to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā the Vedas are authorless (*apauruṣeya*) and so cannot express speaker's intentions."

"(Objection:) Then let the *liñ* suffix convey only instigation."

"(Answer:) But the particular kind of instigations—commanding, etc.—will still have to be admitted as the particulars to which the universal—instigation—applies, and that is contrary to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as before. Furthermore, since the Vedas are both authorless and beginningless, they cannot change, and thus the different kinds of instigation cannot be tolerated. Instigation requires an instigator, an agent who gives orders, but the Vedas are no such thing. The Vedas are language, and language by itself doesn't have the ability to issue orders."

(E25-35; VidV 44-50) "(Prābhākara:) An injunction is something not cognizable by any instrument of knowledge other than verbal authority (*śabda*). So as soon as it is heard one thinks 'I am required to do this'. [This effect (*kārya*) is given the technical name '*niyoga*' by Prabhākara.] It is timeless, and is conveyed through the optative suffix (*liñ*)."

"(Answer:) Is this *niyoga* the result of the meaning(s) of

the word(s) or the meaning of the sentence heard? A sentence's meaning depends for its comprehension on the meanings of the individual components, the words."

"(Prābhākara:) Yes, and understanding the meanings of the words is sufficient; understanding the sentence-meaning is not a separate mental act. That understanding is due to *niyoga*, which is timeless and causeless, not a quality of any substance."

"(Mandana:) But this *niyoga* then is something that is dependent on an awareness of the relations of the words. So it can't be what that understanding (*niyoga*) itself is dependent on; that would be mutual dependence. And it would also mean that one would come to know the meanings of the words only as a result of knowing the meaning of a sentence, i.e., that the effect appears before its cause. Furthermore, knowing the *niyoga* would then be the result of knowing the words and their relations, but since the reverse is also true—one can know the words and their relations only after knowing the *niyoga*—again circular."

"(Objection:) What the (optative) suffix (*liṅ*) always has at its meaning 'what one ought to do' (*kartavyatā*). But it can have other functions (meanings) as well. E.g., in 'one who desires heaven should perform the *agnihotra* sacrifice' the phrase 'who desires heaven' has an ancillary meaning to the main [timeless] meaning of what one ought to do. Yet since sacrificings are temporary they require a specifying feature to identify the occasions and agents, etc. of this particular command and to connect these features with the result which is to come. This meaning is called '*apūrva*' since it involves the future and so cannot be known by the ordinary instruments of knowledge. And it is this *apūrva* which is the meaning of the (optative) suffix."

"(Answer:) Then, since commanding, etc. are the specific meanings conveying the meaning of *kartavyatā* or *apūrva*, which you say is the meaning of *liṅ*, that meaning must be known by ordinary instruments of knowledge, being *upādhis*, adjuncts, and cannot be the same as your *niyoga*, which you say is author-less and beginning-less. Furthermore, if *apūrva*, which is future and the future is unknowable, one would not feel instigated to act in any particular way. So *apūrva* is not the same as the meaning of the optative suffix."

(E58; VidV 50-52) "Anyway, an order (*niyoga*) requires someone to issue it. Since the Vedas are without an author, there can be no question about *niyoga*'s presence there. And

furthermore for something to be known it must be present or past and knowable, whereas *niyoga* is neither, since it is timeless, i.e., without past, present or future. Indeed, since it is not cognizable by any instrument of knowledge, including verbal testimony."

(E174-175; VidV 54-56) "What exactly is *kartavyatā*? One suggestion [of the Grammarian Bhartrhari] is that it is an intuitive ability (*pratibhā*) to perform an action that is found in all living beings. This ability comes from the linguistic ability (*āgama*) inherited from past lives. So its effect, the intuitive ability to use language (*bhāvanā*), must also be present in the traces inherited by living beings."

"Mandana asks whether this intuitive ability is content-filled (*savikalpaka*) or content-free (*nirvikalpaka*)? If it has a content then the content is the cause of undertaking action; it is the content which indicates the means of action that is desired (*īstasādhanatā*). And a content-free intuition cannot provide us with the knowledge we need to know which action to undertake, and so cannot incite us to action."

(E169-174; VidV 63-72) "Mandana's own answer to the question 'what does an injunctive sentence (*vidhi vākya*) mean?' is that it indicates the means to a desired end (*īstasādhanatā*) and thus induces a hearer to undertake the appropriate action, e.g., appropriate rituals conducive to that end."

"The Vedas cannot contain commands, requests, etc. which are all dependent on the speaker's intention or will, since they are authorless. What they do express are precepts (*upadeśa*). A precept speaks of an action which will benefit the agent rather than the speaker and which induces the hearer to act in a certain way. It can issue from either an authoritative speaker or from an authoritative source such as the Vedas. It is different from a command, which incites to action a person who is not otherwise inclined to act. In a command it is the fear of or respect for a speaker that incites the hearer, and it is the speaker who benefits from the performance of the action, whereas a precept incites the hearer to perform an action which is beneficial to him who follows the instructions. That is why all commands require a speaker to have a special status in the eyes of the hearer; but this is not the case for a precept."

"A precept incites an activity which satisfies a human purpose (*puruṣārtha*)—e.g., cattle, sons etc. for one who acts according to Vedic injunctions. Since one should not be

motivated in this by bad wishes (*adharma*) it is the Vedas—i.e., verbal authority—that must make known the ways of acting that fit the precept and not merely perception and the other instruments of knowledge."

"Can a precept, which is not a command, incite a person to act? Yes. Consider a shepherd advising a traveler to go that way to get to his destination: this is not a command, but it nevertheless motivates the traveler to go that way rather than another. Thus the Vedas, even though without an author, can incite activity even in the absence of any living person who composed them."

"Even though every precept motivates (*pravartanā*) its hearer in a general way to perform some action or other, it requires conviction of the act's being a means to the agent's desires (*iṣṭasāadhanatā*) to inspire any specific activity on the hearer's part. It is not, however, a separate requirement: any *pravartanā* is capable of generating activity through specifying a particular means (*vyāpāra* or *bhāva dharma*). Knowledge of an action's *iṣṭasāadhanatā* operates in a subliminal fashion to motivate one to action even in commands and exhortations, etc."

(E217-223; VidVT 80-84) "Thus the meaning of an injunctive sentence consists in its ability to motivate its hearer to action. There are three kinds of action according to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, compulsory (*nitya*), optional (*kāmya*) and occasional (*naimittika*)."

"Māṇḍana, unlike Prabhākara and agreeing with Kumārila, holds that the compulsory actions have a result, i.e. inspire activity. It is objected (by other Mīmāṃsakas such as those that follow Prabhākara) that this will reduce the class of compulsory acts to a section of the actions falling in the other two classes, viz., optional and occasional, and thus will no longer be compulsory, no longer binding. Instead they view compulsory actions are performed only because they are specific in Vedic injunctions and for no other reason. Māṇḍana's answer is that the distinction between compulsory and optional/occasional actions hinges on the permanence of the desire for the results of the *nitya* type in all agents and at all times, past, present and future, whereas the latter type of action is not so all-inclusive. Furthermore, the compulsory' (*nitya*) type of act produces an always desired type of result, which differentiates that type of act from the other two."

"Here Prabhākara views desire for the specific result--

e.g., heaven--of an act as specified in an injunction to perform it. Heaven is not just a result of performing the action but desire for it is a property of the agent who undertakes the act. Māṇḍana instead views e.g. heaven as a result accruing from the performance, not the nature, of the act. He reviews several kinds of Vedic injunctions some of which enjoin actions with specified results and others of which do not. Within the latter class there is a distinction between actions which are enjoined as to be performed as long as one is alive and which are obligatory, and others which are limited to specified occasions and are not obligatory."

12.4 MANDANA MIŚRA, *Bhāvanāviveka*

"E" and "T" are found in VPB. There is also a summary to be found in the edition by V. A. Ramaswami Sastri and K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri in Annamalai University Sanskrit Series 15 (Annamalainagar: Annamalai University 1952) pp. 91-93). The summary below is found in T, p. 26.

Summary by V. P. Bhatt

"According to Māṇḍana, Kumārila's theory that 'there exists an inherent energy (*pravr̥tti*) or effort (*yatna*) that is conducive to the production of...effects such as heaven; and therefore, the same (energy or effort) must be viewed an 'end-efficient-force (*ārthibhāvanā*)' means that the energy (or the effort) is [the productive] activity (*bhāvanā*) or operation (*vyāpāra*) which is efficient in producing effects such as heaven and is distinct from action. Māṇḍana holds that a separate producing or accomplishing activity must be accepted in addition to the action of offering etc. expressed by a verbal root such as 'yaj' (to offer) etc.; otherwise the production of the desired effect such as heaven cannot be explained. No effect can be accomplished without an accomplishing factor and nothing except the activity can be conceded as the accomplishing factor. Actions such as 'offering...cannot be identical with the producing or accomplishing activity, since the same actions function as merely the grammatical objects of the instruments (means of accomplishment) with respect to the activity."

13 PRABHĀKARA (MIŚRA) (700)

Verpoorten (pp. 31-32) summarizes speculations about the date and times of this author, about whom nothing is

known. About the only relevant firm date is that Maṇḍana Miśra knows of Prabhākara, which helps establish the general location of his date. We are not even sure whether Prabhākara precedes or succeeds Kumārila, since neither refers to the other.

On the other hand, A. Subrahmany Sastri, writing a Preface to his edition of Śālikanātha Miśra's commentary *Prakaranapañcikā* on Prabhākara's *Brhatī* (=PPASS p. vii), is sure that Prabhākara criticizes Kumārila, and thus should be either contemporary or subsequent to him. But he admits that this is nevertheless conjectural, since Prabhākara never refers to Kumārila by name. He also notes that the opinion of, e.g., C. K. Raja in pp. vi-viii of his Introduction to his edition of the *Brhatī*, is that Prabhākara is from Kerala, but again finds the evidence lacking. A. Subrahmany Sastri (PPASS p.vii-8) further cites Śālikanātha as indicating that Prabhākara must have been aware of Dharmakīrti's work, and that since Dharmakīrti criticizes Kumārila, that "the chronological order must be Kumārila, Dharmakīrti, Prabhākara, Maṇḍana and Umbeka". But his reasons for drawing this conclusion are far from clear.

13.1 PRABHĀKARA (700?), *Brhatī* on Śabara's *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya*

The work has been printed only up to Chapter 6, Section 2, although a few passages are available in quotes from other texts. The summary by Ganganatha Jha (in Jha1978) is too voluminous to be reprinted here. A large portion of the text deals with the niceties of Mīmāṃsā tenets concerning sacrificing, etc., which we shall not try to summarize.

The present summary has been prepared by the editor utilizing various sources, primarily Ganganatha Jha's summary but adumbrated by various journal articles which are cited at the appropriate places. Our summary tries to find a plausible interpretation that appears to cover the various accounts we find in the literature surveyed. The reader should keep in mind that many of the views ascribed to "Prabhākaras" are not found in the *Brhatī* but are ascribed to Prabhākara, at least by implication, by later writers ascribing to his "school".

I. Epistemology and Metaphysics

(Prabhākara shares with Kumārila a common interpretation of the views set forth in Śabara's *Ślokavārttika*. Where there is a difference, we try to account for it here. Much

help on understanding the concept of *samvit*, has been gained from reading Chatterjee 1979. "*Samvit*" is translated here, but not by Chatterjee, as "understanding".)

The basic contrast that Prabhākara appears to draw in epistemology is between direct awarenesses (*anubhūti*) and indirect ones, viz. memories (*smṛti*). All direct awarenesses are true (*pramā*); all memories are untrue (*apramā*). There are two kinds of true, direct awarenesses, judgments (*jñāna*) and understandings (*samvit*).

A judging is an action which produces a quality (*guṇa*) in the self called understanding. A judging has a form (*ākāra*), but an understanding, lacking form, is not cognizable. An understanding is momentary and formless. A judging can be persistent, having a form.

All direct awarenesses are intrinsically valid and self-luminous. (An understanding is neither, being not cognizable at all.)

A recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) may be either a direct, true or false awareness or an indirect, true or false one. Dreams are always indirect awarenesses, and false.

Both a construction-free awareness (*nirvikalpaka*) and a construction-filled (*savikalpaka*) awareness have a content, a particular (*viśeṣa*) with a property (*jāti*), but the former is not aware of these since it has nothing to contrast its content with, while the latter involves in addition memories of other things to compare or contrast its content with, some of which other things may involve remembered forms. But both construction-filled and construction-free awarenesses may be correct judgments about their respective contents, and so can be true direct awarenesses, knowledge.

There are five instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)—perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony and presumption. Every perception is a direct awareness of an object, cognizer, and the awareness itself.

There are five sense-organs—visual, auditory, olfactory, tactual, taste and the internal organ or mind. They grasp the corresponding six kinds of sense-objects.

Consistent with the above account, Prabhākara's theory of error, known as *akhyātivāda*, locates epistemic mistakes in our penchant to cognize the contents of direct awarenesses as possessing properties remembered by us from the past (though not necessarily recognized by us as remembered).

2. Inference

(Jha 1978, pp. 43-45) "The next question that presents itself is with regard to that means of knowledge by which we have obtained the valid cognition of the permanent or unfailing character of the relation" between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. "This cannot be cognized by perception, which is operative only with regard to things *in the present*, and in contact with the sense-organs. Nor could it be cognized by inference or presumption, as both of these also would, in their turn, depend upon like relationships; which would thus involve a *regressus ad infinitum*. Nor lastly could it be cognized by perception obtained through the agency of the mind alone; as if the mind alone by itself were to bring about the cognition, then people would become omniscient, as there could be no limitations to the working of the mind, as there are in that of the other organs of perception."

"The question is thus met by Prabhākara:—As a matter of fact, between fire and smoke, all the relations,—of contact of other kinds,—are perceived by the sense-organs; the relations being apprehended as qualifications pertaining to the things (fire and smoke), which also are perceived by themselves; the particular time and place also are perceived as mere qualifying adjuncts of the things; thus the fire and the smoke are perceived as qualified by a certain qualifying relation and by specifications of time and place; as for smoke, on the other hand, it is never found apart from fire; and this gives rise to the conviction that smoke is always (invariably) concomitant with fire,—the relation of smoke with fire being thus recognized as constant. After this conviction has dawned on the mind, all that is needed for the forthcoming inferential cognition of fire is the apprehension of the mere existence of smoke; for which apprehension alone there is need of the operation of a means of knowledge; as when once its existence has been apprehended, the idea of the connection and presence of fire follows naturally from the preconceived notion of the relation between the two being of a permanent character. Thus then, all that is needed for the appearance of the inferential cognition is supplied by sensory perception itself."

"This view is open to the objection that, by the above explanation, the cognition of smoke would include within itself the cognition of fire also; and thus there would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the resultant inferential cognition;

and this last would therefore cease to be *pramāṇa* or valid cognition."

"This objection would have had some force only if '*pramāṇa*' had been defined as that which affords cognition of something not known; as a matter of fact, however, the Prabhākara does not make this a necessary character in *pramāṇa*...where [for Prabhākara] *pramāṇa*' has been defined simply as 'apprehension'; and certainly the cognition of fire following upon the cognition of smoke is apprehension. Then again, as a matter of fact, in all cases of inferential cognition...the previous knowledge of the relation borne by the *pakṣa* to the *hetu* is absolutely necessary; and so the inferential cognition must always pertain to things already known. Then the reason why inferential cognition does not appear with regard to each and every thing that we know is that there can be no cognition of any sort unless we wish it; and as in a case where all that we wish to now of a certain thing is already known by other and more simple means of knowledge,—there is no occasion for us to recall to our minds the various relations borne by the thing; and hence, the idea of the relation not being before the mind, no inferential cognition ensues."

3. Logic

Again we draw from the same work of Ganganatha Jha (p. 47), who notes that Prabhākara only admits only four of the five kinds of fallacies standardly accepted, viz., too-specific (*asādharaṇa* or *avyāpti*), too-wide (*sādharaṇa* or *ativyāpti*), impossible (*asiddha*) and sublated. The fifth, which he rejects, is the counterbalanced (*satpratipakṣa*) kind, which requires "that the valid inference must be one that has no counter-inference vitiating its validity; e.g., when the imperceptibility of air is sought to be inferred from its colorlessness, this is found to be opposed by an equally strong inference of the perceptibility of air from its tangibility; and thus the validity of each of these inferences is found to be vitiated by the other... This view the Prabhākara does not accept; for the reason that, it is not possible for two mutually contradictory characters—(which are held to be the *hetu* in the two contradictory inferences)—to subsist in any one subject; for instance, in the case cited, it is not possible for air to be colorless and at the same time tangible; as what is tangible can never be entirely devoid of color; hence it is only one of the two inferences that is *real* inference; the other cannot be so. Really

contradictory inferences are possible only in regard to substances whose real character is not known; and in such cases of course no inference is possible, and this for the simple reason that the requisite definite knowledge of the two factors of the relation is not available."

4. Verbal Testimony

VPB, pp. 6-8, provides the following account of Prabhākara's views on words and sentences and their meanings.

"According to him, only the Vedic words, which are everlasting and not produced by human beings (*apauruseya*), are valid means of knowledge since they are free from human error. He holds that non-Vedic words cannot be accepted as valid in general, since the verbal testimony (authority) of such words is to be obtained through the process of inference. Further, Prabhākara maintains that syllables/words, which are eternal, become manifest by articulatory wind; and hence convey the sense to the listener through the eternal word-signification."

"Prabhākara holds that the signification or denotative power of words (*padavṛtti* or *śakti*) is also eternal. According to him, since both words and things meant by words are eternal, the signification must also be accepted as eternal and inherent in words. People obtain knowledge regarding signification only by observing elders' usage and do not establish any new signification as such."

"[A] sentence, according to Prabhākara, is a connected utterance of individual words (*sambhivyāhāra*), and conveys the sense of the accomplishment. For instance, consider the sentence: *yasya paṇamayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpaṃ ślokaṃ śrnoti* ('He, whose ladle is made of wood parts, does not hear the evil words'). This sentence conveys the sense of the accomplishment of the ladle by means of the *paṇa*-wood, despite the absence of the accusative case-ending after the word '*juhūr*', [which expresses the ladle] due to the connected utterance of the words '*paṇamayī*' and '*juhūr*' together denoting the subsidiary and the prominent respectively."

"According to Prabhākara, [a] sentence cannot be distinguished from the (utterance of) individual words since the same words too, like [a] sentence, have an inherent capacity to signify (denote) [a] semantically competent and syntactically complete idea."

"As regards the individual word-meanings, Prabhākara

holds a unique theory. According to him, individual words have an inherent capacity or power to denote things 'yet to be accomplished' (*kārya* or *sādhyā*), or things connected with what are yet to be accomplished (*kāryānvīta*). Meanings obtained through the denotative powers of words are never 'what are already accomplished' (*siddha*). Also, according to him, each word is capable of signifying a complete sense as syntactico-semantically connected with a '*kārya*' such as [the] verbal action of offering [i.e., sacrificing] etc. referred to by an expressed or implied verb. He holds so because each word is to be recognized as possessing a particular signification in a sense connected with an action. For instance, the word '*svargakāmaḥ*' in '*svargakāmo yajeta*' (he who desires heaven should offer), refers to the person desiring heaven, which is syntactico-semantically connected with the action of offering which in turn is expressed by the verbal root '*yaj*'. Thus, the word '*svargakāmaḥ*' conveys a complete idea of a person offering an oblation. Prabhākara holds that the words refer to a *kārya* on the ground that reference to an already accomplished entity (*siddha*) does not serve any useful purpose, whereas reference to the entity that is yet to be accomplished (*kārya*) is useful for the accomplishment of the cherished goal of mankind and hence must be accepted as [the] word[*s*] -meaning."

"It should be noted here that Prabhākara accepts that the syntactico-semantical relations or connections (*samsarga*) between different individual word-meanings too are obtained by the signification or denotative power of words. According to him, each word, when denoting its individual word-meaning, denotes its relation with the action as well. For instance, the word '*gām*' ('cow') in '*gām ānaya*' ('bring the cow'), while denoting the sense of cow as the object of bringing, denotes the syntactico-semantical relation of the object-hood of cow with the action of bringing denoted by the verb '*ānaya*', i.e. the conditioning as well. Thus, for Prabhākara, the syntactico-semantical relations between word-meanings too are obtained by words, and therefore, function as the referent-qualifiers (*prakāra*) with respect to actions."

"Now, as regards sentence-meaning, Prabhākara maintains a unique theory known as reference to the meanings related to each other (*anvītabhidhāna*) with respect to sentence-meaning. As noted earlier, according to him each word in a sentence refers to its individual word-meaning as syntactico-semantically related to the action which is to be accomplished.

And thus, the listener, when comprehending the individual word meanings, comprehends the syntactico-semantic relations of the same with the action as well. For instance, consider once again the sentence 'gām ānaya' ('bring the cow'). Here the complete sentence-meaning comprehends is, according to Prabhākara, that the action of bringing, which conditions, i.e. delimits the object-hood of the cow, must be undertaken by the second person. Now, such a sentence-meaning is obtained by the denotation of the cow as related to the action of bringing or the denotation of the action of bringing as related to the cow, the object. Thus, according to Prabhākara, the comprehension of the total sentence-meaning is based on the reference to (denotation of) the cow, the object, as related to the action of bringing etc. by the words."

5. Liberation

"Prabhākara's definition of liberation is simply the disappearance of all *dharma* and *adharma*. When this occurs, there is nothing that could lead the self to be born again into any body; and when the self ceases to have any connection with bodies—and also with the organs, etc.—all this metempsychic troubles are ended and he is free. As to how all this comes about, the following explanation is given:—(1) First of all, the man becomes disgusted with the troubles that he has to undergo during mundane existence;—(2) finding the pleasure of the world also to be invariably accompanied by some sort of pain, he comes to lose all interest in, and longing for, pleasure also—(3) he turns his attention towards liberation;—(4) he ceases to perform such deeds as are prohibited and which lead to trouble, as also from those that are prescribed only as leading to some sort of happiness here or hereafter;—(5) he attenuates all previously accrued *dharma* and *adharma* by undergoing the experiences resulting from them;—(6) he destroys the sole receptacle or abode of his experiences by the knowledge of the self, along with such auxiliaries as contentment, self-control, and so forth—all of which are laid down in the scriptures as tending to put a stop to the further return of that self into the world;—and it is only when all this has come about that the self is free. The Vedic texts speaking of the 'non-return to this world' cannot be regarded as mere *arthavāda*; because the knowledge of the self not being laid down as subservient to anything else, the result spoken of must

be regarded as a qualification for the man entitled to that knowledge."

6. Injunctions

Verpoorten (V, pp. 33-34) offers the following: "Prabhākara sets forth a theory of his own about the Vedic injunction. Whereas Kumārila holds that *vidhi* prescribes an action aiming at a reward (e.g., heaven), Prabhākara declares that it is prompting man to what is to be done, regardless of any result, somehow like a categorical imperative in the Kantian sense. Prabhākara replaces the word *vidhi* by *niyoga* and uses *niyojya* for the person to be prompted."

"An objector is made to say: 'The injunction (*niyoga*) binds (*niyunkte*) man to a certain action (*karman*) and not to anything desired by him; action is something ephemeral, and the (attainment of) heaven is not perceived immediately after (it). Hence it is preferable to accept the sacrifice to be either everlasting or an embellishment (*samskāra*) in the agent or the favor of the deity, but it is wrong to declare that (the reward is obtained) by doing *apūrva*...'"

"The *siddhānta* goes even further: 'What it (= *niyoga*) really does is to bind man (*puruṣa*) to exertion (*ārambha*), not to action. And the particular action (denoted by the root) is (only) the object of that exertion...As this (exertion) occurs in somebody desiring heaven, this latter proceeds from the former" (tr. Jha 1978, p. 160 with modifications)."

13.2 PRABHĀKARA, *Laghuṭīkā*

This commentary is also known as "*Vivaraṇa*". No manuscripts of it are presently available, although parts of its content can be gleaned from references elsewhere.

14 UMBEKA or UMVEKA BHATTA (710)

KKRaja 1970-72 provides some information about this Mīmāṃsaka. With a careful consideration of the relevant evidence he concludes with a date between 700- and 750. He has been identified with various figures of that period—Māṇḍana Mīśra, Sureśvara, Viśvarūpa and Pratyakṣvarūpa, as well as with the famous literary figure Bhavabhūti, author of *Mālatīmādhava*. Of these none of the first four are found plausible by Kunjunni Raja, but he is not able to answer definitively whether Umbeka might or might not be the same person as Bhavabhūti.

14.1 UMBEKA, Commentary on Maṇḍana Miśra's
Bhāvanāviveka

Edited by Ganganatha Jha as No. 6 of the Princess of Wales' Sarasvati Bhavana Text Series, Benares, 1922-23.

14.2 UMBEKA, *Tātparyāṭikā* on Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika*

Edited by S. K. Ramanatha Sastri, K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy. Madras University Sanskrit Series 13 (Madras: University of Madras, 1971). There is an extended discussion of the section of this commentary treating *Śloka-vārttika* on 2.47-53 in Taber 1992, pp. 209-212. And Dan Arnold analyzes the same section on pages 50-54 in Arnold 2001, pp. 607-613.

15 ŚĀLIKANĀTHA MIŚRA (825)

Since this author criticizes both Maṇḍana and Umbeka whose arguments are aimed at overthrowing the Prabhākara school, and "Vācaspati-miśra, on the other hand, overthrows Śālika's views and establishes Maṇḍana's" (A. S. Sastri's Preface to PPASS, pp. viii-ix), Śālikanātha must have lived between the dates of those authors. Śālikanātha criticizes Prajñākaragupta's views, and Prajñākaragupta's dates must have included 780, which we (and A. S. Sastri, PPASS p. ix) take as the upper limit for Śālikanātha's date, the lower limit being that of Vācaspati Miśra, which we take as 940 (see Volume Eleven of this Encyclopedia).

Tradition says that Śālikanātha refers to his teacher, Prabhākara, as "guru", and commented on all of Prabhākara's works.

15.1 ŚĀLIKANĀTHA MIŚRA, *Rjuvimalapañjikā* on Prabhākara's
Brhātī

The *Tarkapāda* section is edited in two volumes by S. K. Ramanatha Sastri in Madras University Sanskrit Series 3; University of Madras 1934-1936, with an additional volume, edited by S. Subrahmanya Sastrin the same Series volume 24, 1962. A passage is translated and analyzed in German by Irene Whicher, "*Svargakāma*", 09-522. WZKSOA 38, 19904.

15.2 ŚĀLIKANĀTHA MIŚRA, *Prakaranapañcikā*

A. S. Sastri edits the work in PPASS, our "E", and on pp. ix-x, provides a brief summary of its contents. The work is

divided into fourteen topics (*prakaraṇa*) discussed in fourteen sections, whose titles and subject-matter is as follows. Verpoorten, pp. 39-40, has also given a summary of this text along with the number of pages contained in each section; we provide some of that summary, indicated by "V" and the page of the passage.

In 2004 K. T. Pandurangi published a book (KTP 2004) in which he gives an analysis with selections of the text. We flesh out the brief summary in PPASS with our own (viz., KHP's) account of some of what is contained in sections of Pandurangi's analysis.

Summary by K. T. Pandurangi and Karl H. Potter

1 (E1-28) (*Śāstramukha*) "The establishment of *niyoga* in the Vedic injunction enjoining teaching of the Vedas, *adhyāpanavidhi*..."

(KTP2004, pp. 1-24) (Bhāṭṭa objection:) "In (A) 'one should study his own section of the Veda' (*svādhyayo adhyetavyah*)"

it is heaven (and not Vedic study, e.g.) that is the thing that is to be brought about (*bhāvya*); study of the Vedas is the instrument (*karana*). It is not a mandatory (*niyama*) injunction to study; only sacrificing can be mandated. Nor does one have to understand the meaning of the Vedas to study, i.e. learn them by heart."

"Only something to be done (*kārya*) can be the *bhāvya* of an injunction, with an activity (*kr̥ti*=*bhāvanā*) being also conveyed indirectly. It is also known as *niyoga*, instruction, and as *apūrva*. Something to be done needs an instructed agent, a *niyojya*. But a student cannot by himself be such a commanded agent; he requires a teacher. So (A) enjoins a student to do what a teacher prescribes and also enjoins the teacher to make the pupil learn the Veda. But he doesn't need to understand the words of the Vedas; all he has to do is recite them. And so there is no need to investigate the teaching, i.e., the meaning of the Vedic words."

"(Answer:) No. The two injunctions are not distinct in the way you describe. The prescription formulated in (A), which requires that the teacher initiate (*upanayana*) the student, also requires that the student learn the Vedas. What the teacher teaches is the meanings of the Vedic words, so it is the understanding of those words that is the purpose

(*prayojana*) of the activity. A student need not be a commanded agent, since what is required is only that he be taught, not that he understand himself to be studying."

2 (E29-42) "(*Nītipatha*) Refutation of the Buddhist theory that words have no connection with meanings and the establishment of the validity of non-Vedic texts through inference." (V)

(Based on KTP2004, 25-32) Are words regularly connected with their meanings, always accurately reflecting reality, never false?

(Objector:) No: a sentence may be meaningful and yet not state a fact, such as, e.g., "there are elephants on the tip of my finger".

(Putative answer:) It is not the language of, e.g., that sentence about elephants that makes it false; it is the speaker's intention that makes any statement true or false, and that truth or falsity depends as well on the correctness or incorrectness of the speaker's understanding of speaker's intention.

(Objector:) No, all the speaker does is to speak, and the understanding of what he says is independent of the speaker's intention. What is said, independently of the circumstances of its production, may not necessarily agree with the facts.

(Answer:) Ordinary (i.e., non-Vedic) assertions merely reflect the speaker's understanding. Falsity of such assertions is due to the speaker's incapacities or lack of knowledge. But language itself does not falsify; it is the person (the speaker) who is responsible for the falsity, either intentionally or otherwise.

Of course, there is no questioning the truth of Vedic assertions.

3 (E43-62) "(*Nayavīthī*) Establishment of *akhyāti* and refutation of *anyathākhyāti*." (V)

(Based on KTP2004, 33-47)¹ Thus every understanding (*vijñāna*) corresponds to the facts (*yathārtha*). Even in error (*bhrama*) and doubt (*sandeha*) what is spoken of exists. [This theory of known as *akhyātivāda*.]

(Objector:) (A) This is silver" said of a shell is an error. One thing, silver, appears as another. [Thus the correct account of error is *anyathākhyātivāda*].

¹A large portion of the following section is summarized and analyzed in Shanbhag.

(Answer:) No. (A) involves two awarenesses—(1) a perception and (2) a memory. The perception is of a present thing (referred to as "this"), the memory is of a past, viz. a remembered, silver. Both are valid awarenesses. But the difference between them and their contents is not recognized, and thus we make the erroneous judgment (A), since we fail to grasp the difference (*viveka-agraha*) between them.

(Objection:) (2) cannot be a memory since one is not aware that the perceived silver is an object from the past.

(Answer:) It is caused by the traces of past awarenesses of silver, which arise because of the similarity between the shell and silver. But due to inattention the past-ness of the silver is not recognized.

(Objection:) But the silver is not remembered; it is ascribed to the thing ("this") which is present.

(Answer:) Well, silver can't be perceived, since it is not actually present, and it's not inferred or cognized by any other instrument of knowledge. So by elimination it must be remembered.

(Objection:) Then it must be that (1) and (2) constitute parts of a series of (perceptual) awarenesses (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*).

(Answer:) No, since evidently there is sense-object-contact between the cognizer and the silver.

(Objection:) Merely failing to recognize a difference will not cause one to institute actions such as reaching out to grasp the object, etc. Only if the object is actually recognized as silver will such action arise.

(Answer:) Not only does the cognizer of such error fail to recognize that the silver is remembered and not presented, he also fails to recognize that his awareness is not an immediate perceptual awareness of actual silver.

(Objection:) If (A) is true why do we find fault with it later on, when we realize that this is not silver. What is at fault?

(Answer:) When the cognizer discovers that (1) and (2) actually have different subjects referred to as "this", he learns that (A) is false.

Dreams, doubts and other such "errors" are actually not false but correspond to the facts (*yathārtha*) on this line of analysis. E.g., errors such as those caused by jaundice (seeing all things as yellow), tasting something sweet as bitter, the double-moon illusion, the "circle of fire" illusion caused by waving a torch, etc.

The *akhyāti* theory is superior to *anyathākhyāti* on at least two grounds. (1) If (A) has no actual object as its content then its form (*ākāra*) belongs only to awareness and not to external entities. This leads to idealism, the non-existence of an external world. (2) On the *anyathākhyāti* view an erroneous judgment has no cause. It can't be caused by defects (*doṣa*) in the senses, etc., which can only cause us not to be aware of things and cannot really cause us to produce new, unreal things.

4 (E63-103) "*Jātinirṇaya*) Refutation of the Buddhist theory of [the nonexistence of universal properties] (*jāti*) and establishment of cow-hood etc. as universals and *brāhmaṇa*-hood, existence etc. as mere attributes." (V)

(V, p. 39:) "Ch. 4 on the notion of universals including the widest 'universal property', namely *sattā* 'being', also briefly on *anvayavyatireka* '(law of) co-presence and co-absence', understanding (*samvid*), and 'whole-part(s) relationship'" (*avayava-ayayavibhāva*)

(KTP2004, pp. 48-79) The real existence of universal properties is attacked on various grounds, such as (1) a universal is just a conceptual construction (*vikalpa*); (2) a universal property is nothing different from the individuals (*vyakti*) it is supposed to characterize; (3) though it exists it is not perceptible, only inferable; (4) it is both different and non-different from the individuals it characterizes; (5) universal properties are mistakenly identified with other entities.

In objecting, the Buddhists not only deny the existence of universals but also of the individuals which they are supposed to characterize. There is no common property experienced among atoms, since we cannot perceive them, and the classifications of atoms is explained by their activities. And there are no actual entities larger than atoms, since inherence (*samavāya*), invoked to explain the production of such entities, cannot connect one atom with one whole (*avayavin*) nor many atoms with a whole, since there are no wholes. Since everything is momentary the idea of wholes and parts is an illusion. Furthermore, a universal property cannot be perceived by the sense-organs, since universals are eternal entities and cannot produce an effect that occurs at a particular time, such as a perception. Nor can a universal be something produced along with the particulars it inheres in, since it is eternal. It can't be both the same as and different from the particulars. [These are only a selection from a variety of Buddhist views and

arguments. They appear to mostly be drawn from Dharmakīrti's *Pramānavārttika*.]

(Answer:) We have stated previously that every understanding corresponds to the facts. Thus the wholesale rejection of, e.g., wholes, the difference between substance and quality, persisting individuals, etc. cannot be accepted, since these things are contents of our perception.

(Objection:) There are only two instruments of knowledge, perception and inference. The contents of these are always particulars, not universals.

(Answer:) Universal properties are perceived. It is true that on the first presentation of a thing, though its universal property is cognized it is not recognized; it is on the presentation of another thing of that kind that one recognizes that it is of the same kind as a previous one, i.e., that one cognizes the universal property they share. The relation between a universal property and the thing is inherence, which does not die or move elsewhere when a particular ceases to exist. A universal is different from its particulars, but both are cognized at once.

However, there is no such separate universal as existence (*sattā*), supposed by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to inhere in substances, qualities and universals. *Sattā* is an imposed property (*upādhi*), not a universal property (*jāti*). All six of the six positive categories (i.e., those other than absence) accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas naturally exist (have *svarūpasattva*), not just the last three (viz., universals, individuators and inherence). The Vaiśeṣikas themselves accept the last three as having natural existence.

5 (E104-112) "*Amrtakalā*) Brief exposition in verse form of the nature of [the] instruments of knowledge accepted by Prabhākara." (V)

(KTP2004 pp. 80-94) There are five instruments of knowledge: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), scriptural injunction (*śāstra*), comparison (*upamāna*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*). They are understood in the same way as in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Absence (*abhāva*) is not an additional instrument of knowledge. E.g., in "the pot is not on (i.e., absent from) the ground" the content of the cognition is the ground alone, i.e., without (e.g.) a pot on it. Such a cognition—of one content alone (*ekaviśayajñāna*)—is merely a different kind of cognition from the cognition of two objects together

(*samsr̥stavisaya*jñāna). But neither necessitates the postulation of an additional category of things. And there is no category of things called "absences" either. When Śābara speaks of six kinds of objects of knowledge (*prameya*) he did not mean to endorse six as the number of *pramānas*, he was merely contrasting two kinds of practical uses of language, positive and negative.

6 (E113-300) "(*Pramānapārāyaṇa*) Treatment of five *pramānas*, namely perception, inference, comparison, *śāstra*, and presumption *in extenso*, and refutation of other views in regard to number and definitions of *pramānas*." (V)

(KTP2004, pp. 95-112) The Buddhist definition of *pramāṇā* is that a *pramāṇa* is an awareness that does not deviate (*avisamvādin*), that agrees with the facts. This definition overextends (*ativyāpti*) to include memory.

(Buddhist objection:) Memory only cognizes a conceptual construction, not an actual thing, a pure particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). Constructions are unreal; only pure particulars are real.

(Answer:) Then inference must under-extend (*avyāpti*), i.e., be non-veridical for you, since inference also cognizes memories which you say are constructions.

(Buddhist:) But the after-cognition (*anuvyavasāya*), the conceptual awareness immediately after the inference is initially cognized, cognizes the pure particular and so is valid.

(Answer:) Then (since that after-cognition, cognizing a persistent content, must be invalid) inference itself must be always invalid! Furthermore, the content of a judgment and its after-cognition must be the same, contrary to what is required for your contention to succeed.

(Buddhist:) Then we'll add to our definition (viz., "does not deviate") the requirement that a *pramāṇa* must not have a content that has already been cognized. (*aprāpta prāpakatva*).

(Answer:) But both memory and after-cognition do have a content that has already been cognized, viz., a pure particular!

(Objection:) Then we'll specify that a *pramāṇa* must incite activity toward an object. A pure particular is only grasped by a construction-free (*nirvikalpaka*) perception, which does not inspire activity.

(Answer:) Then cognizing a pure particular is not a *pramāṇa* at all! And your refined definition also rules out a series of perceptions of 'the same' object (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*),

since the content of each perception is not cognized as the same.

Anyway, since you do not accept wholes (*sthūla*) as real, perception of them must be invalid, and inference based on such perception must also be invalid.

As for the Bhāttas, they define a *pramāṇa* as being undoubting (*dr̥dha*), non-deviating (*avisamvādin*), and grasping something not already grasped. Much of this definition fails for the same reasons as already rehearsed. The exclusion of doubting is unnecessary, as doubt is accepted as a variety of valid cognition by both parties, Bhāttas and Prābhākaras.

The correct, Prābhākara definition of a *pramāṇa* is that it is *anubhūti*, i.e., direct awareness. This clearly excludes memory but includes the (otherwise valid) awarenesses in a series with the same content. It also excludes recognitions, which are not necessarily memories but may be produced from sense-object contact, and faulty memories (*smṛtipramoṣa*)—i.e., awarenesses which are about the past but not recognized as being so. As for the series of valid awarenesses, they are not dependent on other awarenesses and so are direct awarenesses.

All valid cognitions conform to their objects (*yathārtha*) but not all awarenesses that conform to their objects are valid. Memory, e.g., is *yathārtha* but not *pramāṇa*, since a memory does not grasp something not already grasped. And the term "*bhrama*", standardly understood as meaning error, is properly applied to a judgment which conforms to its object (*yathārthya*) but nevertheless invalid since activity based on it fails.

So in "this (shell) is silver" the "this" part is not false, though the "silver" part is. Thus a single awareness may be both valid and invalid depending on the aspects of the objects referred to.

Śālikanātha now takes up each of the five types of knowledge, reviewing the Nyāya position on each in turn. As these accounts reflect accurately the contentions reviewed in the volumes of this Encyclopedia dealing with Nyāya we merely summarize his objections to those accounts.

1. Perception. Since the Prābhākara does not accept absence as a separate category, as well as rejecting universal properties of quality-ness, color-ness etc., the Nyāya list of the six kinds of sense-object connection undergoes certain modifications. The only kinds left are three: (sense-object) contact (*saṃyoga*), inherence in what is in contact (*saṃyukta samavāya*), and inherence (*samavāya*).

The problem of how does the eye manage to grasp the forms of objects far away has different answers given in the literature. These answers are reviewed, and the correct account offered in their place. As in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika it is held that the eyes send out rays, but Śālikanātha adds that the light issuing from the eye mixes with the light outside and spreads all over. That is why, e.g., one can see a star far out in space and also the ground below his feet. He also invokes *adrṣṭa* as a factor.¹

The requirement that a visually perceived object must be colored or have form (*rūpavattva*) is rejected, since air (*vāyu*) is perceived though colorless, formless. The requirement should be replaced by the possession of touch (*sparśavattva*).

Opposed to the Nyāya contention, motion (*karman*) is not perceived but only inferred.

The specification in the Nyāya definition of perception that it must be *avyapadeśya*, i.e., not verbal, is unnecessary, since the rest of the definition suffices to exclude verbal elements. And since there are no false awarenesses (as explained previously) the requirement that perception be "non-wandering" (*avyabhicārin*) is not applicable. And as for *vyavasāyatmaka*, the requirement that is added to exclude doubt being a kind of perception, a doubt is composed of two memories and is not a case of perception at all.

But since the remaining elements in the Naiyāyika's definition of perception merely require that a perception be born of sense-object contact, that definition is too narrow since it fails to cover a perception of, e.g., an inference, as well as one's awareness of himself as a knower.

Dharmakīrti defines perceptual knowledge as awareness free from error (*abhrānta*) and construction-free (*kalpanāpodha*). Buddhists divide perceptions into four kinds: sensory, self-awareness (*svasamvedana*), mental (*mānasa*) and yogic. But Śālikanātha argues that it is wrong to confine perception to construction-free awarenesses. We perceive the names and properties of things as well as the things that have them. And the specification "free from error" is unnecessary. There is no error involved in any (single) perceptual awareness. The third kind of perception in the Buddhist list, mental, is

¹A portion of this section is translated into and analyzed in French by Jean-Marie Verpoorten, "La théorie optique au chapitre VI de la *Prakaranapañcīkā* de Śālikanāthā", in EMH, pp. 117-246.

merely the class of *dhārāvāhikajñānas*, series of perceptions of the same object already discussed.

It may be admitted that all awarenesses are self-revealing. But bliss is not self-revealing. Nor is yogic knowledge perceptual. Rather, it is a kind of memory.

The proper definition of perception is that it is *sāksāt pratīti*, direct awareness. "Direct" here covers three features: (1) it is cognized in itself and not in relation to anything else; (2) it is not dependent on the cognition of another object; (3) the object that is its content is present when that cognition arises. (1) does not exclude construction-filled (*savikalpaka*) perception. Nor does (2) confine perception to construction-free awareness, since it is the content of a perception that the properties of a thing seen are seen are parts of that very thing and not outside it. (3) excludes inference.

This definition allows the scope of "perception" to extend beyond merely sense-perception to include one's direct awareness of oneself and the awareness itself. This theory is known as *triputīkaraṇa*. This theory has various features that make it an important and distinct element in the Prābhākara account. For instance, it entails that awareness is *svaprakāśa*, self-revealing. Every awareness is of itself. No after-cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of it is required to make it known. But the other components of a perception, the awareness of an object and of oneself, the knower, are not self-revealing. For example, during deep sleep they are not known. This position, e.g., precludes the Buddhist position that no external objects are ever known.

Though there is no distinct portion of this section devoted to the topic, this may be the place to review the categories (*padārtha*) accepted by the Prābhākaras. There are nine of them: (1) substance (*dravya*), (2) quality (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), (4) universal property (*sāmānya, jāti*), (5) inherence, (6) power (potency, capacity) (*śakti*), ((8) number (*samkhyā*) and (9) similarity (*sādrśya*).

Returning to the paragraph before the last one, Prābhākara's self-revealingness (*svaprakāśatva*) is not the same as the Buddhist's. For the Sautrāntikas, e.g., an awareness (or grasper (*grāhaka*) and its content (the grasped, *grāhya*) are not different, since they are always experienced together. The mistaken notion that they are different is due to beginningless traces. Thus the notion of an object different from consciousness is an error. The Yogācāras (Vijñānavādins) draw the conclusion that there are no external objects at all.

In response to the Buddhist Prabhākara points out that if there are no objects there is no reason why an awareness and its content should not be different. They might be. Moreover, since Buddhists believe there are only momentary awarenesses of momentary events and the objects we apprehend are continuants it is not the case that they are always experienced together. Furthermore, if the notion that grasped and grasper are different is due to traces why do we feel as if they are being directly experienced and not merely remembered?

2. Inference. Before explaining Śālikānātha's definition of inference Śālikānātha first considers the Buddhist account, which turns on the notion of constant concomitance or "not being without each other" (*avinābhāva*). They say that there are two relations which exemplify this relation: identity and causality. But Śālikānātha argues that though it may be perceived, e.g., that whenever there is smoke there is fire, there is no evidence that when there is no fire there is no smoke. The identity of the two absences—of fire and of smoke—requires a perception other than that between the presence of smoke and the presence of fire, and that perception has to be verified by another perception, leading to infinite regress. This argument holds whether the relation concerned is conceived as identity or causality.

The Vaiśeṣika account of the grounds of inference include causality, contact, inherence, co-inherence in the same entity, and contradiction. But there are inferences that turn on none of these: e.g., that tidal changes are caused by the rising of the moon. And contact, inherence and co-inherence are not grounds for inference: one can't correctly infer from a color that earth must be present, nor can one infer that a thing must have taste because it has color on the ground of their both inhering in the same instance of a thing of that kind.

Prabhākara's definition of inference is: one thing is inferred from another on the grounds of their being known to be necessarily related (*jñātasambandhaniyatasya ekadeśāsya darśant ekadeśa āntaro buddhi*). But how can one be certain that the relation between, e.g., smoke and fire is a necessary one? Prabhākara's answer was that perception justifies the assumption of the relation of causality between them. In some cases repeated observation of the concomitance (e.g., between fire and smoke) is required, so as to meet, e.g., the argument from the fact of smoke's occurring when the fire is made with wet wood. We come to perceive that though fire can occur

without smoke the reverse is never found.

A series of proposals to alter or improve Prabhākara's definition are offered and dismissed through argument.

Māndana Mīśra criticizes Prabhākara's theory that motion is only inferable from the series of contacts and disjunctions that constitute it. If that were so, he argues, (1) we should infer motion when one bird is perceived to sit on a tree and another bird leaves it. And (2) since in a stable object there is a series of contacts and disjunctions it should be moving—but it isn't, *ex hypothesi*. And (3) since space (*ākāśa*) is not perceptible we could not perceive a bird's flight. And (4) we cannot know such a series of contacts and disjunctions through inference: if the series is everlasting we could not cognize it, and if the series is non-eternal a non-inherence cause (*asamavayikāraṇa*) should be adduced for the contacts and disjunctions, not for the motion itself.

Śālikānātha's answers are as follows: (1) The motions of the two birds is seen, but the tree is not seen to move. (2) When an object stops moving the series stops. (3) Light, which pervades space, is perceptible. (4) A body's motion can cause a series of contacts and disjunctions outside that body, but that contact cannot cause the series. Thus motion must be the cause.

The reasons why the Prabhākaras add power (*śakti*) to the list of categories is explained. Fire causes heat, but fails to do so when certain obstructing factors (*mantra*, a certain kind of plant (*ausadhi*)) are present. So we must postulate something which is present when fire causes heat but is blocked when it fails to do so. And we must accept that every entity has such a power, eternally in eternal things and produced along with an non-eternal object when it comes to exist.

Coming to the members of an inference only three are needed; the fourth and fifth in the Nyāya form of inference are unnecessary. Furthermore, the negative example (*vipakṣa*) required in Nyāya is unnecessary; the positive example (*sapakṣa*) should be understood as pertaining to all relevant examples, i.e., to all places, e.g., where smoke is found.

In the standard list of ways to lose an argument (*nigrahasthāna*) one, viz., unproved qualification (*asiddhaviśeṣanātā*) is not a fallacy, while violating the thesis (*pratijñāhāni*), renouncing the thesis (*pratijñāsannyāsa*) and changing one's thesis (*pratijñāntara*) are not distinct types but can be reduced to one. And reason and thesis being contradictory (*pratijñāvirodha*) is not a single distinct type of

fallacy but can be broken down to two already listed fallacies, unproved *hetu* (*asiddha*) where the *hetu* is not known, and unproved *pakṣa* where the *hetu* is known.

3. Scriptural knowledge (*śāstra*). It has been noted that Śālikanātha calls the third *pramāna śāstra* and not *śabda*. Prabhākara does not accept ordinary language (*laukika śabda*) as an instrument of knowledge, since it is only a restatement (*anuvāda*) of what has already been cognized by the speaker.

He defines *śāstra* as "the knowledge of something not known by any other *pramāna* and which is cognized through contact between the self and the internal organ arising from knowledge of a scriptural injunction". A word (*pada*) is composed of syllables (*varṇa*) which are pronounced in an order, each causing a trace (*saṃskāra*), the last in the series conveying the meaning of a word. (This kind of trace is different from the kind that leads to memory.) There is no separate entity called a "word" distinct from the series of syllables.

This view is to be contrasted with the (Grammarians') *sphotavāda* account according to which a word is a different entity from the series of syllables whose utterance conveys it. In the Prābhakāra Mīmāṃsā position there is no such separate entity.

Furthermore, a word's meaning is learned from experiencing conversations with elders in which usages are established in connection with the activities with which they have always been associated. Meanings of words are inherited timelessly. They are not of human origin.

What (Vedic) language conveys is injunctive, *niyoga*. Its subject-matter (*prakṛti*) is conveyed by the verb-root. The other words contribute by naming the agent (e.g. the sacrificer), the kind of act (sacrifice, etc.). All of this is implied when the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* speak of *codanā*.

(Objection:) Some statements (e.g., those about Brahman) speak of what is already known by another *pramāna* and not necessarily only of activities. E.g., (A) "a son is born to you" does not speak of anything to be done or already known. So what is *siddha*, established, and not only what is to be done (*kārya*), is meant by Vedic words.

(Answer:) That the father or the speaker understands (A) in the way you are interpreting it is not necessarily clear without, e.g., a smiling expression of joy to identify the meaning. Vedāntic statements of the sort you indicate—those

speaking of Brahman as ultimate bliss, e.g.—have to be taken as involving an implied injunction such as "one should know the self (=Brahman)". But inasmuch as we do not find oneself to be possessing bliss, or find one's self to be Brahman, such understandings of the Upanisads are not valid. But it is not the Vedas that are wrong; it is our understanding of them and the inferences we draw from them that are mistaken.

4. Comparison is defined as the knowledge of similarity in one object on the basis of observing it in another object. (*sādrśya*). Similarity is a separate category. It is found in qualities and motions as well as substances, is not a universal property, and is not inherence.

The Vaiśeṣika category of individuators (*viśeṣa*) is rejected in this system, since separateness (*prthaktva*) does the job.

Comparison is not perception, for its object is not in contact with the eyes. It is not memory, since it was not experienced when one first saw a cow, and it is not an inference since the two similarities—one with the cow, the other with the *gavaya*—are not regularly found together.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of comparison actually analyzes away the need to make comparison a separate category. In their understanding comparison involves three steps: hearing someone say a *gavaya* is like a cow, perceiving this similarity, and then inferring that the animal in front of one is a *gavaya*. Perceiving, hearing and inferring are already covered in the ontology shared by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā.

5. Presumption is given two definitions: an explanation involving postulation of an unobserved fact to explain the perceived incompatibility with a known fact, and postulating something without which a known fact becomes doubtful. An example of both is the presumption that someone is elsewhere since he is alive and is not in his house. This is not a valid inference since the reason—that he is alive and not in his house—is not validly known by any of the instruments of knowledge (he might be dead), so is doubtful.

Others distinguish two kinds of presumption, presumption on the basis of what is seen and on the basis of what is heard. An example of the latter is: Devadatta is fat but does not eat in the daytime, so he must eat at night. The Bhāttas analyze this situation in terms of what is said about Devadatta, not a perceived fact about his eating habits. So it is



presumption based on what is heard. Śālikanātha rejects this distinction. It is not known that Devadatta must eat at night until it is known (not merely said) that he eats at night.

As was pointed out earlier, others add to the list of categories that of absence, e.g., that in order to explain how we can know that there is no pot on the ground we must invoke absence (here, of pot) as a category. This absence cannot be perceived, they say; what is perceived is the (bare) ground. It cannot be inferred, since it cannot be perceived. So, since we can and do know it, it must be an additional category of things known.

The answer of the *Prābhākaras* is that in order to explain the knowledge of an absence it is sufficient only to admit positive, not negative entities. What we cognize, in this case see, is a positive entity, the ground. There are only two possible kinds of awareness: of one thing and of more than one thing. "There is a pot on the ground" states an awareness of more than one thing. "There is no pot on the ground" states an awareness of one thing.

(Objection:) In the case of an awareness of a posterior absence (*dhvaṃsābhāva*) awareness of one thing is inapplicable unless we postulate an absence, namely a posterior absence, as what is denoted.

(Answer:) After the pot, e.g., is broken and there is posterior absence of pot some potsherds remain and they become the content of an awareness of two things.

Those who accept absence as a separate kind of thing have to explain how one comes to know it, by its mere occurrence or by knowing it as an absence of knowledge. In visual perception only an eye is needed for there to be a perception; while in an inference it is not enough that the *hetu*-object be there, it has to be cognized to be understood as constituting the *hetu*-reason. This involves remembering the *hetu*-object. If the *hetu*-object is an absence then, since on this basis it is required that valid awareness of an absence requires valid memory of another absence and so on, there will be infinite regress. But if, as in our contention, the ground for the cognition of a (so-called) absence is the cognition of another entity (the potsherds) (*bhāvāntarasamvitti*), since this kind of cognition is self-illuminating (*svaparakāśa*) nothing else is needed to cognize it.

7 (E301-314) "*Vimalāñjana*" In *Vimalāñjana* is established the relationship between [a] word and its meaning

as eternal and [the] existence of *īśvara* [is] refuted." (V)

(KTP2004, pp. 268-275) The account (found above) of how we learn the meanings of words is contested by the Vaiśeṣikas. Meanings are not beginningless, they say. They must originate somewhere, just as the contact of the first two atoms at the beginning of a cycle is caused by the *adrṣṭa*, the *karmans* of those who will experience the products of the atoms, and *karmans* presuppose living beings who perform and experience them. It is God (*paramātmān*), omniscient and omnipotent, who associates words with their meanings. This account applies to all words.

The Mīmāṃsaka rejects all this. The God they posit, being without organs (mental or sensory), cannot cognize the *adrṣṭa* hypothesized, and there is no such thing as eternal awareness, so He cannot control those *karmans*. He cannot even be connected with them; it would have to be by either contact or inherence and neither is possible, since *adrṣṭa* (= *karman*) is a quality and cannot be connected to another quality either by contact or inherence. Anyway, He cannot have a body, as even the Vaiśeṣikas admit.

8 (E314-352) "*Tattvāloka*" establishes the existence of a self (*ātman*) different from body, mind, etc., his bondage along with its causes and his state of Final Release and causes which bring about that release." (V)

(KTP2004 pp. 276-313) The Vijñānavādins say that there is no self other than awareness (*buddhi*) itself. But in reply we experience directly the difference between the two. The believers in the authority of the *Purāṇas* take the sense-organs themselves to be the self. But if it were so the one who sees could not also touch the same object. The Cārvākas say the body is the self, and that the body (=self) is composed of the elements (whether there are four or five of them). If it were so the self/body would not be perceptible, since one (or two) of the elements, viz. air and space, are imperceptible. But the body is perceptible. So it is made of earth alone.

The Prābhākaras treat space (*ākāśa*) as imperceptible, colorless like the self. They also do not accept darkness (*tamas*) as a separate category, explaining the experience of darkness as due to the absence of light. But they do accept space as a distinct element, since sound is a quality and needs a substance in which to inhere.

There are only three—not four—kinds of bodies. Trees do not have sense-organs or have experiences. So there is no *udbhija* kind of body. One cannot be reborn as a tree. Nor can a body be not born from a mother's womb (*ayonija*).

Understanding (*samvit*) is self-illuminating (*svayamprakāśa*), though the self is not. If it were it would still be presented to us in deep sleep. What *samvit* knows is the cognizer, the content of his cognition, and the *samvit* itself. So in deep sleep, since no object is cognized, the self is not cognized either.

Liberation is the cessation of all worldly miseries. This includes worldly pleasure, which is a kind of misery. There is no evidence that the liberated one will experience bliss.

(Advaitin:) Liberation is the cessation of ignorance, gained by knowledge of Brahman, who (which) is free from all associations, without a second, the only existent (*sat*) or actual entity (*vastu*).

(Answer:) Which are the cognized actual entities: (1) both universal(s) and particular(s)? (2) these two together? (3) only particular(s); (4) only universal(s), e.g., only *sat*? You say (4) is the correct answer, but we say (2) is. And your position cannot be confirmed by scripture (*śruti*), since scripture mentions only what is to be done (*kārya*), as we said earlier. Anyway, scripture is constituted of sentences. A sentence has many words with different meanings, so how can scripture convey non-dualism?

At liberation all embodiments are ended through the ending of both *dharma* and *adharma*, which are the occasions for embodiment. The self, however, is eternal. It is of the largest size (*paramamahat*). Still, there are many selves, a separate one for each body, since each body experiences different pains and pleasures.

9 (KTP2000, pp. 353-364) "*Nyāyasuddhi*" refutes the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas that words are the products of conjunction and disjunction and *śabda* and the theory of the author of *Śikṣā* [?] that wind is transformed into words and establishes the theory that words are eternal." (V)

(KTP2004, pp. 314-329) (Objection:) A syllable (e.g., "ga"), and word, must be everlasting. If each occurrence of "ga" is different we could not understand the meanings of words.

(Objection:) But all "ga"s share the universal property of "ga"-ness.

(Answer:) No, since erroneous identification of "ga"s occurs due to the similarity between them, but such identification is open to error, and never gets sublated. "Ga"-ness is not a proper universal.

(Objection:) Manifestation of a syllable (or word) can occur in two ways, manifestation or production. Manifestation occurs when a veil is lifted or when something is newly present to sight. But since sound is a quality of the ear (which is nothing but space (*ākāśa*)) and so cannot be manifested or newly present, it cannot be manifested.

(Answer:) Air in the body, moved by effort, rises to the auditory organ and provides a trace that allows the manifestation of sound through its contact. Even though sound itself is single, differences in the efforts of the speaker and in the levels of contact between air and the vocal organs explain the differences. So the manifestation of a sound is unobjectionable.

10 (E365-375) "*Mīmāṃsājīvarakṣā*" Refutation of the Buddhist theory of momentariness of the universe." (V)

(KTP2000, 330-347) Arguments to show that neither perception nor inference support the Buddhist's momentariness thesis are reviewed. We don't perceive everything as momentary; indeed, we experience things as being of a kind seen before. And we cannot cognize the relation between a reason (*hetu*) and something inferred (*sadhya*). Inference cannot prove momentariness.

(Buddhist:) Everything that exists is momentary, since what exists is the object of efficient action (*arthakriyākāritā*). Efficient actions must have momentary objects, since efficiency requires either sequence (*krama*) or simultaneity (*yaugapadya*) of moments. Now this efficiency cannot be a property of a non-momentary object: if it were it must be either natural to that object or not. If it is natural then it must produce all its effects immediately, after which it has no function and is nonexistent (*asat*). If it is not natural, i.e., if an object does not have by nature at the first moment it will never have it and again must be nonexistent.

After reviewing the proposed answers to this argument, answers ascribed to "some", by the Bhāttas and by the Bhedābheda-vādins, the Prābhākara reply is given, as follows. Persisting objects can produce efficiency as well as momentary ones. They produce actions in an order which depends on the presence of ancillary conditions (*sahakārin*) which do not by

themselves produce that efficient action. Anyway, being efficient is not the same thing as existing. What exists is what is known by an instrument of knowledge. An object exists even though it may not produce efficiency. And as has been argued earlier there are no "absences"; everything that exists is positive.

11 (E376-450) "(*Vākyaṛthamātrkā*) Refutation of *abhihitānvayavāda* of Kumārila and establishment of *anvitābhīdhānavāda* in Chapter I...Establishment of *niyoga* as the meaning of optative case-endings. Establishment of *apūrva* as the meaning of Vedic optatives and the effect of actions as the meaning of non-Vedic optatives in Chapter 2." (V) Fuller summary found at (KTP2000, pp. 348-428). An even more capacious treatment is provided in Rajendra Natha Sarma, *Mīmāṃsā Theory of Meaning (Based on the Vākyaṛthamātrkā)*, Sr Garib Das Oriental Series No. 75. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1988.

12 (E451-456) "(*Viśayakarāṇya*) Establishment of verb-sense as the subject and cause of *niyoga*." (KTP2000, pp. 429-434)

13 (E457-488) "(*Aṅgapārāyana*) Discussions about the two kinds of *aṅgas*." (KTP2000, pp. 435-456).

(V40) Here "Śālikanātha points out two new ways of knowing the sacrificial auxiliaries (*aṅga*), viz. the *vinīyoga* and the *upādāna*". (KTP2000, pp. 457-459)

14 (E489-99) "(*Atideśapārāyana*) Explanation of *atideśa*."

(V40) "The *Atideśapārāyana* scrutinizes the transference of ritual details (*atideśa*)."

15.3 ŚĀLIKANĀTHA MIŚRA, *Bhāṣyapariśiṣṭa* on Śabara's *Bhāṣya*
This is a brief commentary on the *Tarkapāda* of Śabara's *Bhāṣya* explaining the meaning of the first *sūtra* only. It is edited in KTP 2006, pp. 315-359. In his Introduction, pp. xlv-xlvii, Pandurangi sums up the gist of the work.

Summary by K. T. Pandurangi

"Study of the Vedas must be undertaken as a result of the injunction to teach. Then there will be understanding of the topic/purpose (*artha*). To understand the meaning of the Vedas deeply and correctly, *Mīmāṃsā śravaṇa* is necessary."

"Discussing the import of *sūtra* he says: '*codanā lakṣaṇaḥ arthaḥ dharmah*. He raises the question of truth and falsity. He

presents the views of the different schools of Indian philosophy. Finally he presents the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* view: Validity is intrinsic, invalidity extrinsic. According to *Prābhākaras* the *Veda* conveys what should be done. Then he proceeds to the *sūtra* on perception and gives the details of the procedure of word and meaning to be natural and permanent."

"Before proceeding to establish the eternity of the word to sustain in order to sustain the eternity of the relation of words to their meanings he discusses the *Vṛttikāra's* view quoted in the *Bhāṣya* itself. The *Vṛttikāra's* presentation of *śūnyavāda* and its refutation are briefly summarized. Then he briefly presents the *pramāṇas* inference, comparison, presumption and absence. The purpose of stating these is only to show that they are not useful in comprehending the *dharma*s described in the Vedas. He rejects absence as a category and an instrument. Then he takes up the question of the nature of *śabda*."

"He rejects the view that there is a *pada* over and beyond the *varṇas* and summarizes the *Bhāṣya* on that. The arguments stated in *sūtras* against the eternity of words are stated and refuted.

"After establishing the eternity of word and object and laying the foundation for the Vedas being authorless there is the question of sentence-meaning. An objector claims that though words, objects and their relations are not of human origin mere words cannot convey the import of *codanā*, viz., *dharma*. The answer informs us that words are employed for conveying meanings. Therefore these words get connected to accomplish this purpose and form a sentence. In view of this no intervention of persons to formulate a sentence is necessary.

"After establishing the authorlessness of the Vedas at the sentence level also, certain minor arguments against the non-human origin of the Vedas are mentioned. The names of certain seers connected with different branches (*śākhā*) are cited. This indicates the human origin of the Vedas. This objection is rejected by pointing out that the seers stated for different branches are the teachers of those branches but not their authors."

15.4 ŚĀLIKANĀTHA MIŚRA, *Dipāsikhā* on
Prabhākara's Laghvi- or Vivarana-tīkā

In *Nayaviveka* ((the edition by S. K. Ramanatha Sastri) the editor, in his Introduction on pp. xi-xii, says the following:

"I was able to get a manuscript of a work called *Dīpaśikhā*...According to tradition...Śālikanātha's *Dīpaśikhā* is a commentary on a work of Prabhākara. The manuscript of *Dīpaśikhā* belongs to a Namboodiri Brahmaṇa house, named Katanāśseri, near Irinjalakuda in Cochin State and I was able to secure it through the courtesy of His Highness Rama Varma, (Parīksit), the Eighth Prince of Cochin. The manuscript covers the commentary for the second six chapters (i.e. Chapters 7-12), and there are about 7,000 *granthas* in it. It is an old palm-leaf manuscript written in Malayalam. It is in an extremely injured condition. There is a semi-circular cut in the middle of the leaf extending to about half the width. Thus in every line a large number of syllables are missing for half of every page. This damage has affected a large number of leaves in the beginning; there are many holes in the leaves; some leaves are broken and only one half is retained in the bundle now. As such it is impossible to get useful copy from the manuscript...In the colophons it is sometimes said that the work is called *Pañcika*; not even once does the name of Śālikanātha occur. Since the work of Prabhākara, of which this *Dīpaśikhā* is the commentary, is not available it is not possible to make out this commentary nor is it possible to reconstruct even a tentative text of the original from this commentary. But the discovery of this manuscript confirms the tradition that Prabhākara has written two works and that Śālikanātha has commented on both of them."

On pp. xxi-xxiii of Ramanatha Sastri's *Nayaviveka* a specimen of this *Dīpaśikhā* is provided.

16 MAHODADHI (850?)

(VARS, pp. 50-51) "Next to Śālikanātha come Mahodadhi and Mahāvratā in chronological order. The commentary *Candrikā* on verse 3 of Act II of the allegorical drama—the *Prabodhacandrodaya*—

"*Naivāśravi gurormatam na vīditam Kaumārīlam darśanam
Tattvajñānamaho na Śālikagīrām Vāxaspateḥ kā kathā
Sūktam nāpi Mahodadheradhigatama Māhāvratī neksita
Sūksmās vastuvicāraṇā nṛpaśubhiḥ svasthaiḥ katham
sthīyate.*"

makes clear that Mahodadhi is a contemporary of Śālikanātha and a representative of the Prabhākara school. Mahodadhi is credited with the authorship of a *Nibandhana* work."

17 MAHĀVRATA (850?)

(VARS, p. 51) Mahāvratā, a contemporary of Mahodadhi, belonged to the Kumārila school; he is said to have refuted in his work the views of his rival Mahodadhi. The *Nayaviveka* of Bhavanāthabhāṭṭa of about 11th century refers to these two authors."

18 (BHATTAPUTRA) JAYAMIŚRA (950)

Nothing is known about this author.

18.1 JAYAMIŚRA, *Śarkarikā* (continuation of Umbeka's *Slokavārttika-Tātparyatikā*?) on Kumārila's *Slokavārttika*

The work is edited in Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 17 (University of Madras: 1946) by C. Kunhan Raja. C. K. Raja thinks this is a separate work and not a continuation of Umbeka's, though Jayamiśra's commentary begins exactly where Umbeka's leaves off. The portion edited in by C. K. Raja extends from the *Ākṛtivāda* through the *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*.

19 VĀCASPATI MIŚRA (950)

Well-known to students of many of the schools (*darśana*) of Indian philosophy beyond this one, Vācaspati Miśra has written important commentaries on a variety of important works and commentaries dealing with a variety of Indian philosophical systems. Information on his place and time is to be found in the other volumes of this Encyclopedia that discuss his works, notably Volumes Two (*Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*) and Three (*Advaita Vedānta*).

19.1 VĀCASPATI MIŚRA, *Tattvabindu*

V. A. Ramaswami Sastri gives the following "Analysis" in VARS, pp. 151-197: "E" references are to the edition of the work in *Tattvabindu* 1936; "S" references are to the pages of Ramaswami Sastri's summary in the same volume (=VARS). The "E" references are from the text of VARS. Translations of technical terms are replaced by those in use in the present Volume of the Encyclopedia.

Summarized by V. A. Ramaswami Sāstri

(E1-7; S152) "What is the *nimitta* or instrumental cause of verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*) is the main theme of the *Tattvabindu*. A full elucidation of this question obliged Vācaspatimiśra to discuss elaborately the five traditional views on verbal cognition: (1) The Vaiyākaraṇas (the *sphoṭavādins*) hold that the sentence- (*vākya*-) *sphoṭa* conveys a sentence's meaning (*vākyaṛtha*); and they describe the *sphoṭa* as being devoid of parts though it is experienced as possessing parts through our *avidyā* (ignorance). (2) The old school of Mīmāṃsakas explains it thus: The cognition of the last phoneme (*varṇa*) (of the sentence) coupled with the traces (*samskāra*) produced by the experiences of the previous words with their meanings is the cause of the understanding of the sentence's meaning. (3) Some among them, however, hold that the cause of the understanding of sentence-meaning—the group of phonemes which are reflected in the mirror of recollection produced by the family of traces generated by the experiences of each phoneme, word and the meanings of words. (4) The *Tīkākāra* (Prabhākara) maintains that the cause of the understanding (*pratīti*) of the sentence-meaning is the cognition of the words themselves which convey meanings related to one another on the basis of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), fitness (*yogyatā*) and contiguity (*sannidhi*). (5) Ācārya Kumārila whom Vācaspatimiśra closely follows in this work, suggests that words convey their meanings (*padārtha*) which, in their turn (while mutually related) generate the verbal cognition of the sentence's meaning.

(E7-12; S152-154) "According to the *Sphoṭavādins* the sentence-*sphoṭa* which is an *akhaṇḍavastu*—an object devoid of parts and properties—is the efficient cause of verbal cognition. The division of a sentence into phonemes and words is not real but is based on a superimposition caused by eternal ignorance (*anādyavidyā*).

"In the elucidation of the *Sphoṭavāda* Vācaspatimiśra first puts a question with two alternatives—whether the partless *sphoṭa* is to be accepted as the denotative meaning (*vākyaṛthavācaka*) on the basis of the time-honored experience of the world, or on that of the difference of the imports of words and sentences which cannot be otherwise explained. Again, in the first alternative another question is raised—whether the sentence is to be considered as one unit possessing many parts like phonemes and words, or whether it

is completely devoid of any such parts. Of these three, the alternative that a sentence possesses parts is unsound, because it is accepted by the even the Vaiyākaraṇas that phonemes are all-pervading (possessing the largest size (*paramamahattva*)), and that no whole bigger than the largest parts can therefore be produced. Even according to the Naiyāyika theory that sound is a quality of space, phonemes or words as qualities cannot be the material cause of the sentence, since it is held unanimously that only a substance and not a quality is a *śamavāyikāraṇa* (inherence-cause). If one takes the view of the Śikṣākāras that a phoneme is produced from the particles of *vāyu* (air), these air-particles are to be associated with one another for the production of a sentence, but after a moment's existence the contact or association of one phoneme with another cannot be possibly conceived of; if phonemes succeed one another, they cannot produce any whole as an effect; nor do they possess the contact which, as the *asamavāyikāraṇa* (non-inherence cause) is very essential to the production of effect. The supposition that the part is one and produces the whole is absurd, in view of the fact that there is no *kāryadravya* (substance as effect) conceivable, if two or more parts do not produce the effect. And it is not possible to maintain that the cognitions of phonemes, associated with one another, become the material cause of the sentence, since the cognitions of phonemes or phonemes themselves do not co-exist. So it cannot be held that a sentence is one whole with many parts—phonemes and words.

(E12-25; S154-156) "The other alternative that a phoneme is one unit devoid of parts is equally unsound. According to this view, a sentence conveys the meaning but phonemes or words do not, as they are not unitary. Moreover, phonemes and words have no real existence in language. The sentence alone really exists; it is everlasting and as such is to be manifested. The successful manifestation of this real element in speech—the sonant substratum—is effected by sounds (*dhvani*) which, due to their different places and modes of articulation, generate an (invalid) cognition of the real linguistic *sphoṭa* as possessing many parts like phoneme and word. This resembles the experience of a person who looks at his own face through a gem or mirror of varied shape (E19). The suggestion that the second and succeeding sound in a word or sentence are superfluous since the first sound itself is capable of manifesting the *sphoṭa*, does not arise, in view of the fact that the manifestation by the first sound is not so successful and

complete as it would be at the end of the series of manifestations by different sounds. Similarly, it cannot be held that the last sound manifests the unitary *sphoṭa* since the last sound has not the full capacity to manifest it unless it is strengthened by the traces produced by the experiences of the previous sounds. The manifestation of *sphoṭa* by sounds bears comparison to the examination of a gem by an expert jeweller who satisfies himself as to its genuineness after a series of detailed examinations.

"The question how the sound-cognitions (which are invalid in that they present non-existing properties like the shortness (*hrasvatva*) of the phoneme manifest *sphoṭa*, can be easily answered by the fact that invalid cognitions sometimes lead one to a valid knowledge.

"Again, the *sphoṭavādin* advances his arguments in favor of the acceptance of *sphoṭa* as a unitary sound. The unitary experience of 'a word' and 'a sentence' cannot be satisfactorily explained unless a unitary sound called *sphoṭa* is accepted. He asks—do the phonemes each separately produce the cognition of the unitary sound or in their combination? The first alternative is untenable, since it goes against our ordinary experience and since it makes other phonemes superfluous. The second is treated as consisting of two alternatives—whether phonemes are in reality associated with one another or they are cognized together. Since the phonemes are both eternal and all-pervasive, they are not associated with one another; and since they are also to be cognized separately and with some time-sequence (due to the generations of different cognitions), it is not possible to maintain that phonemes are cognized together.

(E25-36; S156-159) "Again, the *varṇavādin* [i.e., he who favors the independent meaningfulness of phonemes] maintains his position by saying that the last phoneme in combination with the traces produced by the experiences of the previous sounds in a word or sentence conveys the idea, and that thus the popular experience of the unitary sound as the conveyor of ideas—*śabdāt arthadhīḥ udīyate*—can be explained. Here the *sphoṭavādin* questions the nature of the trace cited by the *varṇavādin*—is it that trace which produces a *smṛti* (memory) or is it of that type which one finds in corn (*vṛthi*) by sprinkling (*prokṣana*)? The second is inexplicable in view of the fact that the uncombined phonemes cannot produce in themselves one trace; nor can it be said that each phoneme produces a trace and that all these traces of different phonemes and the

experience of the last phoneme generate the understanding of the meaning, for, it accepts many *adr̥ṣtas* [lit. 'unseen' elements] which are not known by popular means of knowledge like perception. The citation of the well-known *āgneya* and other Vedic sacrifices, which, being enjoined by scriptures (*śruti*)s. compel us to accept such unseen elements in the instance of corn does not favor our acceptance of many traces for the production of the understanding of the meaning; for, here no such injunction is known to us. The first alternative that the trace otherwise known as *vāsanā*, the cause of recollection, helps much the last phoneme in a word not only in recollecting the sound but also in understanding the idea [conveyed?] by the last phoneme, so much so that there is no additional unseen element excepting the assignment of an additional function to the existing trace, is also untenable, on the ground that such a thing (as described above) goes against the very nature of a trace; and it also drags us to accept another unseen element, for the traces which rests in the self produces the memory in him [the self] and in none else; otherwise we will have to accept that all will remember an object which one alone has previously experienced. Moreover, the trace, *vāsanā* or *bhāvanā*, is only the capacity of the self for recollecting an object which *he* has experienced; and in this capacity we have preferably to posit in the self *not* in the trace (according to the objector), for 'its very existence is based on the cognition of ideas (from the words in the sentence) by the same self. The argument that no additional unseen element is accepted except an additional function for the existing trace falls to the ground, since it also involves the acceptance of another unseen power (*śakti*) and so on *ad infinitum*.

"The *varṇavādin* again comes forward with an explanation that all phonemes in a word or sentence being recollected together convey the idea, so that there is no necessity for accepting the unitary word, viz., *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭavādin* rejects this explanation as unsatisfactory, in view of the fact that the phonemes in words like *nadī*, *dīna*, etc. being the same in one recollection, do not convey the same idea. It cannot also be held that the different traces produced by the experiences of the various phonemes produce one memory which has all phonemes as its object with the same sequence as they were in the previous experiences, so that these phonemes together with their individual traits being held by one recollection institute different words and as such convey

different ideas; for, the bundle of the traces cannot produce one recollection of different phonemes. Moreover, phonemes, being all-pervasive substances, do not possess any *krama* (sequence); and if they are spoken of as possessing that, it is only in reference to a cognition which presents them as such; and if the cognition is one, how can one explain any sequence among phonemes on the basis of cognition?

"The *sphotācvādin* therefore concludes that a unitary sound called *sphoṭa* is to be accepted as satisfactorily explaining the popular experience that 'a word conveys an idea', and that *this* sound cannot be the phonemes (as explained above) and it being eternal is to be accepted as manifested by sounds which we experience. The successful manifestation and full experience of *sphoṭa* is possible only when all sounds separately manifest it; and as the manifestation or experience of *sphoṭa* being a perception can have various degrees, there is no reason for placing the meaningfulness of phonemes on a par with the manifestation of *sphoṭa* by sounds. So the unitary *sphoṭa* is to be accepted.

(E36-48 S159-162) "The *varṇavādin* begins his refutation of the *sphoṭavāda* by raising a question—whether the cognitions of phonemes present only those phonemes or a sound-element devoid of any form or property in addition to those phonemes. In the former, no *sphoṭa* is known in addition to the phonemes, which, as different elements in themselves, cannot be spoken of as the manifestations (*vivarta*) of another sound-element. In the latter, a sound-element apart from phonemes is to be accepted, which while cognized is known as *śabda*—the conveyer of ideas. What is this sonantal element? Is it soundness (*śabdatva*)...which is to be considered as the conveyer of ideas? If so, soundness being a common property of all sounds, all ideas, it may be objected, may be known to the hearers from each and every sound. But the experience of differences in ideas is to be explained only by the differences in their expressions, viz., sounds. The explanation that soundness, though one and devoid of any form or properties, has got its own different manifestations like *gokāra*, *aukāra* and *visarga* in the word 'gauh', which, however, produce the cognitions of different ideas, is unsatisfactory (E39) on the ground that the same can be well explained by sounds themselves, which are acceptable to both parties. Moreover, just like soundness, other properties—*sattā*, *varṇas*, etc.—may be taken as conveyers of ideas through their own manifestations. Hence there is

vinigamanāviraha—no reason to prefer one property to the others.

"The *varṇavādin* adds that soundness, being an eternal property, exists in phonemes that are cognized previously in a word or sentence; it may not necessarily depend on the unitary awareness of the last phoneme (*anusamhārabuddhi*) to convey the idea, so much so that it will have to be accepted that even the first sound or sounds in a word, while cognized, may convey the idea.

"In this connection Vācaspatimiśra hits the Prābhākaras who have denied the existence of the universal property soundness, lest they should have to attribute to it the function of conveying ideas. He says that *śabdatva* never stands in the way of the reality of the different phonemes which are to be accepted as eternal.

"Can the term 'śabda' ('sound') then mean *śrotragrahaṇa*—that which can be experienced by the ear? Since like phonemes the experiences (*grahaṇa*) (the grasping of those phonemes) also are different, nothing can be said about the unity of sound (which is to be experienced universally). The ear also (being space) is inferable and as such is beyond the senses; and the cognition of the ear, like all cognitions, is inferable (according to the Bhāttas), so that nothing can be regarded as the object of this unitary experience of sound by the senses. If the ear and its cognition in the body of sound (as explained above) are not cognizable by the senses, how can the cognition of such a qualified thing (sound) arise as conveyed by the word 'sound'?

"Is it then the *sphoṭa* which is cognized as uniform in all phonemes in a word or sentence, but different in different words and sentences? And are the phonemes, the seeming manifestations of the unitary *sphoṭa*, to explain the difference in the cognition of *sphoṭa*? The *varṇavādin* again puts a question to the *sphoṭavādin*—do the cognitions of the previous phonemes help that of the last phoneme in its combination with the previous phonemes? If so, the cognitions of the previous phonemes do not exist when the cognition of the last phoneme arises, and so the non-existing things are said to be helping in producing a real thing—a fact which always goes against popular experience. It is an accepted fact that all cognitions do arise, exist for a while, perish and are never brought back to life. So even if they are supposed to be existing at the time of the cognition of the last phoneme in a word, they do not function

at all in collaboration with that of the last phoneme...The argument that the phonemes, while cognized, manifest separately the *sphota* without depending on their mutual combination in one unitary cognition falls to the ground since it does not help us to propound the existence of a part-less category separate from the experienced phonemes; in other words, the part-less *sphota* does not exist like the horn of a man or rabbit. So it is to be accepted on the basis of valid experience, the *varnavādin* contends, that the perceptions of different phonemes produce unitary cognition with those phonemes as its object and none else.

(E49-76; S162-167) "Again, the *sphoṭavādin* raises many objections to the *varnavādin*'s view. The experience-*'gauḥ'* is one word-well speaks of the unitary aspect of the word *'gauḥ'*, and this unitariness cannot be satisfactorily explained if we accept only phonemes as its content (*viśaya*). Nor can it be argued that this unitariness is based on an *upādhi* (limitation) like that of the experiences of 'army', 'forest' etc., because nothing is to be said as the limitation in this instance. Here two limitations are suggested and refuted: (1) *ekavijñānaviśayatā*-being the object of one cognition, and (2) *ekābhidheyapratyayaheturā*-being the cause of the cognition of one idea. The former cannot be accepted, for, the cognition in the body of the limitation must be known before the delimited object is cognized through that limitation; and that cognition is not cognized when its object is known and it is either to be cognized by the perception called *anuvyavasāyajñāna* (after-cognition) or by inference. So the unitary cognition does not bear the cognition as the content, much less its unitariness. The second also is untenable since it involves the fallacy of interdependence (*itaretarāśraya*). The argument that the distinction of a word from another is known by that of the idea conveyed by it leads to the fallacy of interdependence between cause and effect: the conception of one word is based on that of its conveying an idea and vice versa. So the capacity of the denotativeness of a word is to be explained only in reference to the unitary *sphota*. Moreover, if we explain the cognition of unitariness (*ekāvābhāsa*) as due to some limitation, nothing would be possibly explained as a real and unitary object, for some limitation may be invented to explain the same. If so, it can also be suggested (the *sphoṭavādin* concludes) that there will be no plurality among objects, since the plurality of objects is only a manifestation of one real object or entity.

"The *varnavādin* refutes the *sphota* theory thus: The cognition of unitariness is not an authority to prove the existence of a unitary object, viz. a word-*sphota*, but only the possibility of a usage which bears out the oneness of the object cognized. Though elephants, horses, chariots and footmen are different entities and though the *campaka*, *aśoka*, *kimśuka* etc. are different species of trees, they become objects of the unitary cognitions 'it is an army', 'it is a forest' etc., which (through some limitation) present unitary objects like army and forest. It cannot be held that the experiences 'it is an army', 'it is a forest', 'it is a word' have as their objects another entity—a whole—separate from the parts; (for no separate entity is accepted in such cases). Nor can it be argued that for the lack of an *upādhi* as explained above, the unitary word may be accepted, for it can be held that the three phonemes in the word *'gauḥ'*, while they become the objects of one recollection, become the cause of the knowledge of one idea, just like the three or more stones supporting one *piṭhara* (oven). The fallacy of interdependence (cited above) does not arise, in view of the fact that the conception of one word is based on that of its capacity to convey one idea. The word 'word' (*pada*) connotes that particular *kāra*—in relation to the awareness, since it is derived from the root *pad*, to be aware, with the suffix *lyuṭ* (*ana*) in the sense of instrument (*karana*); and as it is a *kāra*, it ought to be related to a *kriya*, viz. awareness. The difference between one word and another found in the pairs (1) *gauḥ* and *aśvaḥ*; (2) *vṛṣa* and *vṛṣabha*; and (3) *nadī* and *dīna*, etc. is not possible to explain before it becomes the object of one cognition and conveys a unitary idea. So it is maintained that the unitary conception of word is based on that of the idea conveyed by it.

"Again the *varnavādin* criticizes the conception of *sphota* by pointing out some gross absurdities involved in it. The view that the previous sounds (*dhvani*) manifest *sphota* not so clearly as the last sound does not hold good, in view of the fact that the *sphota*, devoid of any parts, cannot be spoken of as being partly or fully manifested by sounds. Full or clear manifestation is possible only for a thing which has got parts of qualities, both common and special. The *sphota* cannot be said to have a full or partial manifestation. It should or should not be fully manifested and cognized. The middle course is not possible.

"The view that the manifestation of *sphota* is based on superimposition cannot be held, since no superimposition can be explained in reference to an object—the substratum of

it—previously unknown. Even if it is held that the *sphoṭa* can be and is previously cognized, it is not possible to maintain that it is devoid of any parts. So the *sphoṭavādin's* view that the *padatattva* (the essence or entity of a word) is experienced as one devoid of parts, contains no truth and as such is not reliable. The ordinary experience—we learn from language—has not special significance in favor of the *sphoṭavādin's* view. Ordinary experience is sometimes acceptable and sometimes unacceptable. If it is argued that the validity of ordinary experience is any way to be accepted, it can be maintained in one way only—that the unitariness or oneness of *śabda* (which conveys an idea) belongs to the phonemes themselves when they become the object of one recollection, and as they form one group (with the name 'word' (*pada*)), they convey one idea. This explanation is possible in the case of *śabda*, since it is so experienced in the world, but it is not possible in other instances (since no such ordinary experience occurs).

"The *varṇavādin* now begins to condemn the second main alternative of the *sphoṭavādin's* view—that the unitary *sphoṭa* is to be accepted on the basis of the difference in ideas, which cannot be otherwise explained. The *sphoṭa* which is not perceptible cannot be known by inference from its function, viz., its conveying an idea, for that involves the fallacy of interdependence. It is this—a sound by itself cannot convey an idea, but only through its knowledge; otherwise, it being eternal, it may have to be accepted that all people know forever ideas from words. But its knowledge is derived, as has been already said, by inference from the...cognition of the idea derived from it, so much so that the awareness of the word depends on the understanding of its meaning, which again depends on the awareness of the word.

"Moreover, there is no need for accepting a unitary linguistic entity like *sphoṭa*. The knowledge of an idea is well brought about by the single cognition of phonemes (in words), which, as they appear different on account of the order, sequence or properties like shortness, convey different ideas, as in the instances *nadī*, *dīna* etc. The *varṇavādin* mentioned many conditions—*krama*, *nyūnātiriktatva*, *svara*, *vākya*, *śruti* and *smṛti*—for differentiating one word from another. If the phonemes or words are uttered at one time by different persons, there arises no cognition of the meaning (*artha*). So it is held that these words are to be uttered in a particular sequence by one and the same person, and that this fact is

necessarily cognized by the person who knows ideas from words. Moreover, this being cognized by one person is a *jñāpakahetu*—a cause of cognition, and so it need not be necessarily cognized just like the sound which, as uncognized, becomes the cause of inference.

"So the *Varṇavādin* concludes that since the sense or meaning of the sentence or word can be well cognized from the knowledge of the words in the combination of phonemes, it does not drive one to the necessity of establishing the partlessness of words, viz. *sphoṭa*, devoid of any parts and properties.

II

(E77-82; S167-169) "After the refutation of the *sphoṭavāda*, the second view is taken up for discussion. Its superiority to the *sphoṭa* doctrine lies in the fact that it does not postulate a thing like *sphoṭa* which goes beyond one's easy comprehension; and it lays stress on the phonemes and words as the cause of comprehension of the meaning, i.e., the cognition of the meaning of a sentence arises from the cognition of the last phoneme in it by the sensory organ—the ear, which is helped to do its function by the traces produced by the cognitions of words and their meanings, just as the cognition of the last phoneme of a word coupled with the traces produced by the cognitions of the preceding phonemes of the word generates the recollection of the word-meaning.

"This view is rejected with the question—Does the last phoneme generated the knowledge of the sentence's meaning after producing the recollection of the relation between the last word (of the sentence) and its sense? If this is accepted, the *siddhāntin* says: at the time of the mental impression ready to produce its effect, viz., the recollection (of the word's meaning), the perception (of the word), the cause of the trace, does not exist; and no one can explain the existence of the cognition of the last phoneme in a word or a sentence when one recollects the relation between word and meaning (since it is to be explained that the recollection of the last phoneme arises first, then that of the word containing the last phoneme, and then that of the word's meaning). It cannot also be argued that the understanding of a word's meaning arises from the cognition of the last phoneme even without the recollection of the relation between the word and its meaning, for the experience of the relation between the word and its meaning is of no use if it does not produce a recollection (of the same). Hence it

cannot be explained why one does not have the verbal cognition if one does not get oneself sufficiently acquainted with the import of the words which one hears. Nor can it be said that these three—the cognition of the last phoneme, the trace of the word's meaning, and the recollection of the word's meaning are simultaneous, in view of the fact that cognitions do arise in a self only one succeeding another. The cognition of the last phoneme does not arise a second time, i.e. at the time of the recollection of the word's meaning, for want of the cause, viz., the trace produced in the ear of the hearer by the speaker which is characterized as so fleeting and transient as a flash of lightning on a dark cloudy night. It cannot also be said that the last phoneme or word by itself cannot convey the import of the sentence, except through its cognition; and since the cognitional unity of the last phoneme along with the traces of the previous phonemes, words and meanings cannot be explained, this view also is described as wholly untenable.

III

(E83-90; S169-170) "Then the third view—the group of phonemes (*varṇamālā*) in one mirror-like recollection is the cause of the understanding of the meaning—is taken up. It is explained thus: The relation between word and word-meaning depends upon time-honored usage. Our elders have not used phonemes and words alone for the intercommunication and exchange of ideas, but have used sentences. It is not the *sphota* (already described) but the phonemes. When it becomes the content of one recollection it produces the verbal cognition (of the sentence's meaning). The memory of the objects meant by words arising from the awareness of word in a sentence is an accessory to this group of phonemes in the production of the understanding of a sentence's meaning.

"This view also is refuted on various grounds. The first defect is heaviness (*gaurava*). It consists in this: if the group of phonemes is accepted as the cause of the understanding of the meaning, then in the sentences "*arbhaka! gām ānaya! arbhaka! gām badhana, śiśo! gām ānaya, śiśo! gām badhana*, etc. each of which possesses at least one different word, one has to accept that such group of phonemes, which is a sentence, possesses different powers to convey the sentence-meaning, so that numerous powers are to be accepted. But for the one who favors words (*padavādin*) that power is to be accepted for words only, and the power of one word in different sentences

is not different [from its power in another] and hence there is no infinite regress (*anavasthā*).

"Another defect described is *viśayābhāva*. It is explained thus:—the group of phonemes cannot express the sentence-meaning, viz., the relation among the meanings of the words, without the words having meanings, since the latter, being the related object, must be known before the relation is cognized. So the cognition of the word-meanings as expressed by the words is indispensable for the cognition of the relation of the word-meanings. And since the very same awareness of word-meanings is capable of producing knowledge of the sentence's meaning, the group of phonemes is said to be superfluous.

"Moreover, it is very difficult to maintain that the group of phonemes in a long sentence becomes the object of one collective awareness. It is therefore possible to maintain the *abhīhitānvayavāda* as explained by Kumārilabhaṭṭa, viz., that words convey their ideas—*padārthas*—which however produce the cognition of the sentence's meaning.

IV

(E91-101; S171-175) "Now, the *anvitābhīdhānavādin*, the follower of the *Ṭikākāra* alias Prabhākara, puts forward his view that words themselves convey the *anvitapadārthas*, viz., their meanings and their mutual relation, so that the word-meanings conveyed by words do not convey the sentence's meaning, i.e., there is no *abhīhitānvaya*.

"The meaning of a sentence is said to be one and qualified (*viśiṣṭa*). It is related to many subordinate ideas conveyed by words. So it can be well said that the words themselves while they convey the word-meanings, convey them only as related to one another on the strength of the three well-known accessories—verbal expectancy, fitness and contiguity. Hence there is no necessity to accept the word-*sphota*, the last phoneme or the possessor of that last phoneme as the cause of the cognition of the sentence's meaning.

"Now the *abhīhitānvayavādin* comes forward with certain objections to the *anvitābhīdhānavāda*. First he puts a question to the *anvitābhīdhānavādin*: When a word, say the first, in a sentence conveys its idea and its relation (to the other ideas), are the other ideas conveyed or not by their own expressions (in the sentence)? If other ideas are not conveyed by their own expressions, it is to be admitted that ideas that are to be generally conveyed by words in a sentence are conveyed by the

first word itself and so, there is the superfluity of the second and other words in the sentence. If it is argued that other words also convey their own ideas and that all words convey them and their relations as conveyed by other words, then in the sentence 'he cooks in a pot' (*ukhāyam pacet*), for example, since the phrase 'he cooks' does not convey the idea of cooking as related to a pot, the words "in a pot" do not convey the locus pot; so also, the words 'he cooks' do not convey their content until the words "in a pot" convey theirs. Hence the fallacy of interdependence.

"The argument that words first convey their own meanings (*padārthasvarūpa*) and then those word-meanings as related (*anvitārtha*), so that there is no fallacy of interdependence (*parasparāśrayadoṣa*), involves the acceptance of dual designative functions (*abhidhāna*) for a word—a fact which is not warranted or accepted by authority. It cannot also be argued that words convey only ideas with their relation (*anvitapadārtha*) but those ideas were first recollected by their mere juxtaposition (*sāhacarya*) (and not by the words themselves with any significative potency), so that there is no double meaningfulness in words. For the recollection of the meanings of words is to be based on the experiencing of them which presents them as not isolated but as related to one another. So in the example "bring the cow" (*gām ānaya*) the word 'cow' conveying the meaning of cow as related to the action of bringing produces in the hearer a recollection of the cow as related to the motion, bringing (*ānayanānvita-gopadārtha*) and not of a mere cow. This explanation would land us in the difficulty that the same word 'cow' in the sentence 'bring the cow' would not convey seeing the cow (*darśanāntiāgo*) since it had been originally related to the activity of bringing. So also in the example 'see the palace' (*prtāsādam paśya*) the word 'palace' conveys seeing as related to the palace and it does not convey the same as related to the cow. This would set aside the possibility of explaining the word-meanings (and sentence-meanings) in all verbal propositions.

"The argument that the word 'cow' on the basis of invariability (*avyabhicāra*) generates in the hearer a recollection of its meaning only, viz., cow, and not the meanings of other words, falls to the ground since invariability is not recognized the cause of recollection. It is *bhāvanā* (mental impression?) that when it is deep-rooted on account of the strong and constant previous experiences, is roused and produces

recollection. And invariability has no place among the causes of the rousing (*udbodha*) of *bhāvanās* (mental impressions?), since, among the causes of the rousing of *bhāvanā*, meditation (*pranidhāna*) and others are mentioned and not invariability. Juxtaposition is however accepted as one of the causes of the arising of *bhāvanā*, since relation in the list includes juxtaposition and not invariability. And this juxtaposition is common to both the meaning of a single word and to the meaning of other words, so that there arises from words a recollection of accompanying (*anvita*) word-meanings both whether single or varied. So the meaning of the word 'cow' cannot be said to be related to the activity of seeing by expectancy. Hence there is no possibility of cognizing the meaning of a sentence from a verbal proposition if *anvitābhidhāna* is accepted.

"So words, the *abhihitānvayavādin* contends, convey only their own meanings, and those meanings, incomplete and incoherent in their isolation, are related to one another by the threefold conditions—expectancy, fitness and contiguity—and convey the sentence-meaning.

"The *anvitābhidhānavādin* answers all charges leveled against him by the *abhihitānvayavādin*. He says first that there is no fallacy of interdependence (as was charged above if *anvitābhidhānavāda* is accepted), for though the words through their accompanying powers convey their meanings and their mutual relation (*anvitapadārtha*), the meanings of other words are not invariably recollected from one word for want of practice (*abhyāsa*), so much so that there arises from a word a recollection of its own meaning and its relation. It can therefore be said that words invariably convey only their own meanings along with their concomitants (*anvaya*) and not the meanings of other words also.

"In support of this argument the *anvitābhidhānavādin* puts a question to his opponent—what kind of cognition is that which one derives from words? Only four kinds of cognitions are recognized—valid experience (*pramāna*), doubt (*samśaya*), misapprehension (*viparyaya*) and recollection (*smṛti*). The cognition of the meanings of words is not valid experience, since it does not possess as its content anything previously unknown. To say that it is a doubt or an error is out of place. As there is no fifth variety, it is to be accepted that it is a recollection and that words, like meditation (*pranidhāna*), are the conditions of the arousing of traces. And this memory of the

meanings of words presents both objects and their relation.

(E101-111; S175-177) "Again, the contention (of the *abhihitānvayavādin*) that the meanings recollected by the power of denotation (*abhidhānaśakti*) of words—and not by their mere accompaniment (*sāhacarya*)—become the contents of the understanding of the sentence's meaning, is of no avail, in view of the fact that in instances like '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ prativasati*' ('he dwells in a village on the Ganges') the bank, which is only a secondary meaning of the word '*gaṅgā*', is related to dwelling, the primary meaning of the word '*prativasati*'.

"Moreover, one meaning recollected by the denotative power of one word can be related to another recollected by mere accompaniment on the basis of expectancy, so that it may not be again related to (the other or) last idea conveyed by its own denotative power. If this is possible, the meaning of the whole sentence would not be cognized at all. So it is to be admitted that there arise first the recollection of the isolated meanings (*nānvitārtha*) by the mere accompaniment of words and then that of the accompanying meanings from those words. It cannot be said that the word-meanings are not mutually related for want of expectancy, for expectancy is said to be nothing but the knower's desire for knowledge. It is explained on the basis of the incompleteness of denotation as in the example '*dvāram*'—which, being in then nominative case, does not convey any new idea other than that of the stem (*prātipadika*); so, the knower seeks some other idea which can be related to the word-meaning, viz. door (*dvāra*). It is also explained on basis of the incongruity or incompatibility of the idea already known from a word. In the Vedic passage '*viśvajitā yajeta*' ['one should perform the *viśvajit* sacrifice'] the *viśvajit* sacrifice is known by the instrumental case and the instrument (*karana*) of the effect, (*kārya*, i.e. that which is to be done), which is incompatible with the instrument without a person enjoined to act (*niyojyapūrusa*) and as such leads to the explanation of a specific something enjoined (like the desire for heaven).

"The argument of the *abhihitānvayavādin* that words convey their meanings without their mutual relation and that those meanings produce awareness of the meanings of the words on the strength of the threefold accessories expectancy, etc., so that words have no direct capacity to generate verbal cognition, falls to the ground in view of the fact that unless

those ideas are conveyed by words they are not considered as the cause of the awareness of the meaning of the sentence.

"The *abhihitānvayavādin* further argues that one who perceives a white object and hears the neighing (*heṣā*) sound and the noise of galloping experiences that 'a white horse is galloping by' even without the cognition of words expressing it. The *anvitābhidhānavādin* answers that this awareness is arrived at either from inference or from presumption and not from words. In the explanation of the same he raises a question—whether in this instance one experiences the *heṣā* sound and the noise of galloping as co-existing in the white object, or whether all the three are independently known. In the former case the knowledge is inferential, involving a reason (*hetu*); in the latter, it is knowledge from presumption, in case no other object (possessing these qualities) is definitely known.

Moreover, if verbal cognition is generated by the meanings of words, it would be *aśabda* i.e., not based on words; and as it is not definitely known whether the objects seek the help of the mind which does not operate on external objects, it would result in the acceptance of a seventh instrument of knowledge (called word-meaning and separate from the six well-known instruments). It is therefore to be accepted that the word-meanings not conveyed by words do not become the cause of the awareness of the meanings of sentences, and that the ideas conveyed by words do possess the power to generate the same (verbal cognition). This would mean for the *abhihitānvayavādin* the acceptance of two powers—one over the word-meanings to generate the awareness of the sentence's meaning and the other over words capable of creating (the first) power over the word-meanings. But for the *anvitābhidhānavādin* only one power is to be accepted over the words which convey their meanings on the basis of the intention of the speaker, and through that power one word conveys its meaning as related to the meanings of the other words (in the sentence) on the strength of the three accessories—expectancy etc. Hence it is appropriate to say that words which convey meanings are the cause of the cognition of the meaning of a sentence.

V

(E111-130; S178-183) "The *abhihitānvayavādin* begins the refutation of the *anvitābhidhānavāda* with an introductory remark that it is a general rule that in the absence of any strong

objection (*bādhaka*) that which stands very near to the effect becomes the cause of it'; hence the recollection of the word-meanings, which are nearer to the awareness of the meaning of the sentence than the words [themselves], can be well considered as the cause of the knowledge of the sentence's meaning. He adds that one would never know sentence-meaning from the mere awareness of words without recollecting the meanings therefrom but knows it invariably after recollecting the meanings from the juxtaposed words.

"On the basis of this observation he puts forth his view of the *abhihitānvayavāda* that the recollections of the word-meanings associated with one another become the cause of the awareness of the sentence's meaning on the strength of the three accessories expectancy, fitness and contiguity.

"It is again argued (by the *anvitābhīdhānavādin*) that the recollections of the meanings (of the words) which are in reality associated with those (of other words in a sentence) do not bear them as objects in their isolation. For example, if one recollects a palace without its locality, viz., Pātaliputra and Māhiṣmati (another place which has nothing to do with the palace referred to), one is not capable of understanding these two meanings (—palace and Māhiṣmati—) as related to each other. So words have no inherent capacity to denote their meanings as unrelated to one another. This is considered to be the main objection—*bādhaka*, viz., *sāmarthyābhāva* [absence of capacity]—to the assumption that the word-meanings (the immediate neighbor of the awareness of the sentence's meaning) are the causes of that awareness.

"The *abhihitānvayavādin* answers this easily. He says: the mental trace has no such capacity to produce a valid recollection as would invariably present those objects which had and had not been previously experienced (as related to one another); but (it possesses a capacity) to generate recollections of the meanings of words) from the group of words in juxtaposition. Those memories of the meanings of words have the support of the three accessories—expectancy, etc.—and as such become [the cause] *karāṇa* (of the understanding of the sentence's meaning) in that they immediately produce the valid cognition of the mutual relation of the word-meanings, viz., the sentence-meaning.

If such an awareness of a sentence's meaning is not an instrument of knowledge, then the cognition known as recognition will never arise (validly, since it is generated by

recollection or a mental trace). And it may be objected: how may a trace or recollection produced by the trace, which owes its existence to an experience presenting an object within certain limitations of space, time, etc., generate another cognition presenting the same object with the limitations of a different place, time, etc. To answer this objection it is to be accepted that the traces or recollections do possess extraordinary power to produce recognition which would present objects uniformly existing at different time and places when they attain new features by their association with the accessories like the senses. Such an explanation, viz., the possession of a power in the memories of objects and their traces, is possible here also if one views it without any prejudice. It is also explained in [Vācaspati Miśra's] *Nyāyakanikā* that no object becomes varied or different through the difference of time, space and the various stages of the object.

"It is argued again by the *anvitābhīdhānavādin* that as has been already said, the word-meanings, if they are recollected from any source (other than words) do not possess the power to produce an awareness of sentence-meaning. If it is said that they have such a power, they would be recognized as the seventh instrument (*pramāṇa*); or verbal testimony (*āgama*) would merge into the categories (*padārtha*). And they (the categories) should have been explained (by the author of the *Vṛtti* and others) along with perception and the other means of knowledge, and verbal testimony should not have been mentioned (as a separate instrument) since it is only a sub-division of [another] *pramāṇa*, viz. word-meaning. Experienced people do not use words denoting unequal divisions (in a compound (*dvandva*)) such as 'Brāhmana and Yudhisthira' (one a caste-name and the other the name of an individual) but use such words expressing equal divisions as 'Brāhmana and Rājanya' (two caste-names) and 'Vāsiṣṭha and Yudhisthira, names of separate persons. By the mention of one sub-division, another sub-division (of the same class) cannot be taken as mentioned. So this class (viz., the class of *padārtha*) should have been enumerated in the list of instruments of knowledge. To say that the *Vṛttikāra* and the *Bhāṣyakāra* [Śabara] who began to elucidate all instruments of knowledge left out some little instrument unexplained would be attributing to them unsound scholarship; so (to avoid that) it is to be stated that word-meanings which become objects of experiences of

recollections resulting from words do possess a special power to generate the cognition of the sentence's meaning. If this is accepted, three or two powers are to be explained—two powers in words and one in their meanings¹, or one power in words and one in their meanings,² (if words generate a recollection of their meanings). But, if *anvitābhīdhānavāda* be accepted, only one power in words is to be accepted and (as there is no power (in the word-meanings) there is much saving of labor. Hence the *anvitābhīdhānavāda* is acceptable.

"The *abhihitānvayavādin* while replying to this accepts first the principle of [simplicity] *lāghava* enunciated by his opponent and remarks that in order to find that out that an impartial investigation is to be made.

"The one power of words accepted by the *anvitābhīdhānavādin* has reference to the meanings of words as mutually related, i.e. words convey by their denotative power both the meanings of those words and their relation. This power cannot be said to have reference to concomitance only. If so, the meaning-relation being one and the same for all, all words would become synonymous.

"Again, it is argued: words convey particular things (*vyaktiśakti*) but do not convey their relations, just as words connoting universals do not convey the idea of particular individuals. The relation is known when the related objects are cognized, and since the related objects are different, there is no fallacy of all words becoming synonymous.

"This is also refuted as inconclusive. In the refutation of the same a question is raised—whether by the word *vyaktiśakti* ("particular things") is to be understood only the object or the object as well as the relation. Words which denote concepts (*padārthasvarūpa*) cannot convey the relation also, just as a word connoting a universal by its denotative power does not convey the idea of an individual. A quality like color cannot

¹Words possess a *śakti* called *abhidhāna* to convey their meanings; the meanings possess a *śakti* to convey their mutual relations and words have another *śakti* to give power to the *padārthas* (to convey their relation.)

²The *padārthas* have one *śakti* to convey the *vākyaārtha*, while words possess a *śakti*, which enables the *padārthas* to generate the *vākyaārthājñāna*.

exist without a substance; so, a word connoting a quality expresses its own locus, a substance. Can a similar thing be spoken of word-meanings? No; it is held that the word-meanings can be well-known (from the words) even without their mutual relation. If it is said that the word-meanings are not known without their relation, it will have to be accepted that the *hetu* (or *liṅga*) term cannot be known without the cognition of the *sādhya* (or *liṅgin*) in the *pakṣa*; so then the status (actually) of being a *hetu*-term (*liṅgatva*) cannot be known. Hence the whole domain of inference would become very difficult to explain. So to say concomitance is known by words would mean that both word-meanings and their relation are conveyed by words.

"Now the *abhihitānvayavādin* questions whether one is contented with the fact that on the basis of simplicity (labor-saving), words by the power of capability do not convey the relation but only the concepts themselves, which however generates the cognition of the sentence's meaning (so that one should refrain from attributing to words the power to convey the relations between the meanings), or whether they by their power convey both the nature of the objects meant and their relations, without which no cognition of sentence-meaning would possibly arise even though one makes a thousand and one efforts to obtain it.

(E130-151; S183-188) "Of these two, which is to be accepted? On the strength of their being used together (*samabhiivyavahāra*) words become capable of conveying the relation between one word-meaning and another; or the juxtaposition or co-utterance would be of no avail. Any object is said to possess a particular capacity (*sāmarthya*) if its effect cannot take place without that object. The knowledge of the relation (between one word-meaning and another) arises from a visible or invisible thing other than words; so there is no authority for us to attribute it to words. Those learned in the three Vedas observe that the meaning of a word (*śabdārtha*) is that which is not known from any other source. On the basis of this observation they have held the view that the personal word-endings (*ākhyātapratyaya*), etc., do not convey by designation (*abhidhā*) the agent (*kartā*) of an action, etc. On the basis of the juxtaposition or expectancy, again, words by their secondary significative power convey the mutual relation of their meanings (*anvitāvasthā*), since they are uttered by the speaker with the intention of conveying their concomitance.

Even unjuxtaposed words do not stop their functioning with generating the knowledge of their own meanings. The learned people in the world do not use words for conveying their meanings merely, they [also] utter words with the intention of conveying (to their hearers) their ideas through those words. If words do not convey the intended ideas of the speakers, then those speakers are to be considered as men without the knowledge of the world or true judgment. Nobody seeks to know meanings they already know. So the (learned) use words in a particular order so as to make others know an idea as yet unknown to them. Hence the particular order or juxtaposition of words which have as their sole object to convey an idea hitherto unknown, without which the co-utterance of words in a particular order or the sentence itself would be impossible, helps (the words) to convey by their secondary significative potency the relation that subsists between the meanings of one word and another. To this effect the [Mīmāṃsāśloka] Vārttika says that the cognition of the *viśiṣṭārtha*, viz., the mutual relation of the word-meanings, is generated by the co-utterance of words.

"So on the basis of the recollection (of the meanings) produced by words in juxtaposition, which cannot be otherwise explained, and strengthened by the expectancy and congruity of the meanings, words therefore convey by secondary meaning (*lakṣanā*) the relation between one meaning and another (*anvitāvasthā*), which does not therefore impose on words any special power for its own knowledge.

"Words that are used by honest people with the intention of conveying certain ideas to the hearers may bring out the unknown idea viz., the sentence meaning, by the secondary significative potency which is generally adopted on the basis of the incompatibility of the intended idea of the speaker; but words in the Vedas, which are believed to be self-revelations, cannot convey meaning of the sentence by secondary meaning, since there is no author in the case of the Vedas and since there is no possibility for the explanation of the appropriate intention by the speaker. It may be accepted that (on the basis of the [location of the Vedas in the world] *lokavedādihikaranā*) there is no difference between ordinary (*laukika*) and Vedic words (so that there will arise valid verbal cognition from the Vedic words just as from other words). This does not hold good in view of the fact that (if such a comparison be held between the world and the Vedas), another similar thing would have to be

accepted in the ordinary words used, i.e. that the word '*gaṅgā*' (in the sentence '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣah*') which means 'bank' by secondary significative potency, would have to mean the same in the sentences '*gaṅgāyām payāmsi, yādāmsi gaṅgāyām*' ('waters of the Ganges, animals in the Ganges'). The argument that there is no incompatibility (*anupapatti*) of the primary sense in the context, so that there is no basis for secondary meaning, does not in any way favor the position of ordinary words inasmuch as the same might be said of the Vedic words.

"The *abhihitānvayavādin* argues that if *anvitābhīdhānavāda* be accepted the Vedic words (in a sentence) would not generate an unknown kind of awareness, viz., awareness of sentence-meaning (since it emphasizes only the recollection of *anvitāvasthā* from words. To this the *anvitābhīdhānavādin* however replies that just as ordinary words (i.e. words in ordinary conversation) convey ideas along with the relation (of those ideas), so also the Vedic words convey both their ideas and relations (since the ordinary and Vedic words are said to be identical). This is again refuted by the *abhihitānvayavādin* on the main ground of simplicity (already explained) and also on the ground that words, while used by speakers, convey invariably the intended ideas (on their individual capacity) and as such, are not capable of conveying the *anvitāvasthā*, so that there is no room for attributing to words the power of conveying their own ideas as associated with the ideas of other words.

"Again, the *anvitābhīdhānavādin* contends that the authoritativeness of the Vedas cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the complete understanding of the import of the Vedas would be impossible (if *anvitābhīdhānavāda* is not accepted). At this the *abhihitānvayavādin* coolly remarks: If such a thing happens, well and good! Nothing is lost to them who accept everything on sound reasons. So it is to be ascertained without any prejudice but following the path of a true *āstika* what is acceptable as an indispensable factor which contributes to our understanding of the meanings of the Vedic words. It is an admitted fact that the means of the knowledge of the relation between words and their meanings is the beginningless tradition of the old (who used words to convey certain definite ideas); so even without a person responsible for that relation, the knowledge of the meanings of words can arise. Hence the relation between words and their meanings is considered to be but natural.

"It is questioned—does that relation (of words viz., power) pertain to (the meaning of one word related to the meaning (of another) or to the meaning of one word only? In the second case, do words convey (by their power) their meanings alone or their mutual relation also? If words convey their meanings only, they do not produce the cognition of the sentence-meaning, and as such cannot be considered to be the efficient cause of the cognition of the relations among the meanings of the words. Hence the two other alternatives are open to explain that words have the utility of generating the cognition of the relation of the word-meanings.

(E152- end; S188-197) "So the *abhihitānvayavādin* says that though words bear out the intention of conveying the relation of word-meanings, they convey by their denotative power their natural meaning only, and since the relation of the word-meanings is known (by other instruments of knowledge), there is no room for presumption, on the authority of which words are said to possess a peculiar power to convey (not only word-meanings but also) the meaning of a sentence. When we hear a particular statement from a reliable person, we are sometimes prompted to action or to keep ourselves aloof; sometimes we realize pleasure, pain or fear; and from this a careful observer infers our awareness—the cause of our mental state. He verifies also that such a thing does not take place in the presence of other things but words. And this knowledge does not present word-meanings merely to produce such effects as action but the qualified meanings—the meanings and their relation. So words used by the learned bear out the intention of conveying the qualified meanings; and this cannot be explained without the recollection of the isolated meanings (through words), which may be inferred from the experience of the meaning of the qualified sentence arising therefrom. The capacity of words to produce a recollection of their meanings does not suffice to destroy (the power of) their being the vehicle of the intended qualified meaning, since nothing (in this world) will destroy its own instrumental cause, much less its own self. So words do not convey the qualified meanings by denotation. Hence as in the case of ordinary words, Vedic words in a sentence do by secondary meaning generate a cognition of the qualified meanings on the basis of their conveying (by denoting) unqualified or isolated ideas. To say that words bear out the intention of conveying the isolated ideas only, which by themselves do not bear any fruit to the

hearer, would be denying one's understanding of a sentence's meaning through the cognition of words.

"Concerning this the revered author of the *Vārttika* [Kumārila] says: 'Phonemes directly however convey meanings (concepts), yet they do not stop with them, the mere awareness of which is of no use to the hearer. The conveying of meanings by words is indispensable for the cognition of sentence-meaning, just like fire for cooking by means of pieces of wood.' So also (says he) 'That the meaning of a sentence is everywhere conveyed by the words by secondary meaning only is an accepted fact for us.'

"It cannot be argued that words, which bear out the intention of conveying their meanings and their relation, convey both by denotation; if this be accepted, one will have to accept that the word 'Ganges' in the sentence '[there is] a village on the Ganges' (*gaṅgāyām ghoṣah*) would on the basis of speaker's intention convey the idea of the (river's) bank by its denotative function. To say that the idea of a bank is conveyed by the word "Ganges" (by secondary meaning) on the basis of its relation (proximity) to the river itself (viz., the current), and as such is not, in spite of the speaker's intention, conveyed by its denotative function, is favorable to what has been said with reference to words. So the speaker's intention does not invariably prove the existence of a special power of words for conveying the meaning of a sentence. The pieces of wood, though they are intended for cooking, never directly accomplish their fruit; but fire alone (accomplishes it); and through that, they also accomplish it. The priority of words to meanings in generating the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence has no special significance and as such would not anyway indicate the existence of a special power of words. That words and their meanings stand on a different footing has been already explained by the fact that words convey by denoting their meanings and not their relation too, because of the complaint of heaviness. It need not be said that the word-meanings even with the support of the accessories like expectancy do possess a special power to generate the cognition of the qualified object, for even without it such a cognition arises from the word-meanings.

"Not only the meanings recollected through words but also others (recollected) through other instruments of knowledge are capable of generating awareness of a qualified object. Just as presumption and inference produce an

awareness of a qualified content, so also meanings recollected through words which are considered as bearing out the intention of the speaker generate the awareness of a qualified object. The speaker's intention, which is known from the incompatibility (of the primary sense) and the relation to the meaning of the sentence, does not anyway explain or suggest the existence of a new power of words, in view of the fact that such an explanation would result in our accepting its power of words like "Ganges" and over objects like pieces of wood to have the sense of bank and cooking respectively.

"Secondary meaning is not always adopted for a word to the exclusion of the primary sense; but there are both acceptance and abandonment of the primary sense according to the nature of the secondary sense. For example, in the sentence '(there is) a village on the Ganges' the primary sense of the word 'Ganges' is abandoned on the adoption of the secondary meaning of bank capable of supporting a hamlet; but in the example 'those with sticks are going' (*dandīno gacchanti*) the primary sense of the word 'stick' merges into the body of the secondary sense—the group of both sets of people with and without sticks. In the Vedic example also, viz., *sṛṣṭirupadadhāti*, the word '*sṛṣṭi*' by secondary meaning means the bricks that are associated with a group of *mantras* with and without the word '*sṛṣṭi*'. Similarly, when the relation of the meanings is conveyed by words through secondary meaning, the primary meanings also are included in the body of the secondary sense, for without them the secondary sense is of no avail and as such will have to be discarded.

"It cannot be argued that words convey the meaning of a sentence by secondary meaning inasmuch as it does not satisfy its own definition; for secondary meaning is to be so defined so as to include within its scope the present instance also.

"Can this be then the secondary meaning as explained by one author:—that which is adopted to convey a new sense that can be related to the sentence-meaning through the cognition of its relation to the primary sense, when the primary sense (of the word) is incompatible with the intended sense of the sentence? In the sentence "Caitra cooks food in an oven" (*odanam pacati Caitraḥ pithara*) the idea of Caitra, oven, etc. involves nothing unrelated to the sentence's meaning. Nor has the accompanying situation (*anvitāvasthā*) which is to be conveyed by the words through secondary meaning been

related to any other concomitant (as the secondary sense of the word 'Ganges' relates to the meaning of the sentence ['there is a village on the Ganges']). So no secondary meaning need be adopted in words indicating an accompanying situation.

"To this the *siddhāntin* replies in a jeering tone: if there be no secondary meaning, then are the things that can be known by other instruments of knowledge accepted to be conveyed by words? Nobody accepts denotative power in the word '*agnihotra*' in the Vedic passage '*māsāgnihotram juhoti*', though it cannot convey the idea of the *māsāgnihotra* by secondary meaning. If it is said that on the basis of similarity (between the *nityāgnihotra* and the *māsāgnihotra*) the word is metaphorical (*gaṇa*) and that there is no necessity for accepting denotation for '*māsāgnihotra*', it may be asserted even here that without any special denotation the accompanying situation may well be cognized as explained above. If the use of words (by which words convey the accompanying situation) does not satisfy the definition of secondary meaning, a fourth kind of use of words may be accepted on the basis of experience; or it may be asserted as secondary meaning itself which may be given a different definition simply to avoid an unknown kind of use. Two conditions of secondary meaning as given in the definition cited above may well be acceptable, viz. (1) the incompatibility of the primary sense and (2) the relation of the secondary sense to the primary sense; but not other conditions like the incompatibility of the primary sense with the meaning of the sentence.

"It is experienced that words that are juxtaposed or uttered with the intention of their conveying a qualified meaning will have no significance if they convey only the word-meanings, so that they convey (by secondary meaning) the accompanying situation as related to the word-meanings. This definition is applicable to both ordinary and Vedic instances without any violence. Though words by denoting express the concepts (*padārthasvarūpa*) only, yet they do not stop with them; they directly express the words' meanings for the sake of occasioning the awareness of the meaning of the sentence, and so they convey the sentence-meaning by secondary meaning.

"The objection that the accompanying situation cannot be taken as the secondary sense of words for the reason that it is not previously known as associated with the meanings of the words may be easily answered. It is said that the accompanying situation is previously known in its general capacity, though it

is known afterward in its special feature at the time of its association with the word-meanings. The accompanying situation is said to be nothing but the related word-meanings—concepts with their relation, so that no duplication in the capacity (*sāmarthya*) other than that to convey the meanings of the words has to be admitted...

"If the cognition of the word-meanings generated by the potency of the words does not come under the classifications valid cognition, doubt, and error, and if no kind of cognition other than recollection is recognized, it may be by all means recollection itself, which however arises not on merely by rousing up traces, but by those traces roused by words having their denotative power. To say that words have utility in rousing up the traces (and as such, possess a power to convey the relation of their meanings), would lead us to accept a similar power of things; for they also by their power become the condition for rousing the traces of their own words and as such may well be considered as expressing the words also. It is therefore to be asserted that words do not convey by denotation any positive connection which is not known by other instruments of knowledge.

"Now a question is raised (against the *anvitābhīdhānavādin*): What is that denotative power of words which convey also a positive connection? It is not movement (*parispanda*), which exists in objects possessing form. And sound (word) either as an all-pervading substance or quality does not possess any form. Form (*mūrti*) is defined by those who have understood (the essence of) the phenomenal world as the measurement of a substance that is not all-pervasive. And there is no authority to say that it is an invisible kind of movement like volition. The cognition of the concomitance among the word-meanings will arise from that of words when that relation (between those words and objects) has been already known (and recollected). So this cognition presenting language as such is the instrument (*vyāpāra*) of the cognition of its objects. To this effect says the revered *Bhāṣyakāra* [i.e., Sabara] 'Verbal cognition (*sāstra*) is the cognition presenting an object having no contact with the senses by the cognition of *śabda*.'

"That alone is called 'denoting' (*abhidhā*) in that linguistic entity possessing an inborn potency to generate the cognition of the word-meanings through that power. It does not independently produce the cognition of things but through

rousing the traces (of those objects previously known). So there is no room for the presumption that the cognition of things first rouses the traces of words and then produced the recollection of those words and such is called denotation (*abhidhāna*). But it is the cognition of a sound, which invariably generates the recollection of the word-meanings. So have the experienced people in this world explained the use of words ((for communicating one's thoughts to another).

"It may be objected that *śabda* never rouses traces since it is not studied in the list beginning with meditation. This is answered thus: *śabda* also may be said to be included in the list. (E160) The conditions of recollection are enumerated by authoritative people (*prāmānika*)—*pranidhana*, *abhyāsa*, *liṅga*, *lakṣana*, *sādrśya*, *parigraha*, *āśraya*, *āśrita*, *sambandha*, *ānantarya*, *viyoga*, *evakārya*, *virodha*, *atīśaya*, *prāpti*, *vyavadhāna*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *bhoga*, *artitva*, *kriyā*, *rāga*, *dharma*, *adharmā*. Though *pada* is not found (in the list), *sambandha* (relation) is found in the list of the conditions of recollection; and it easily includes words (as the thing related, just as the pupil reminds one of the teachers, and the priest of the sacrificer. The relation between words and ideas is eternal and it is nothing but the relation that subsists between the conveyor and the conveyed (*vācyavākakabhāva*). The cognition of a sound coupled with the traces produced by the experience of its object will generate the recollection of its concept (*svārtha*), since a word is uttered with the intention of generating the awareness of the concept (in the hearer). The relation between the conveyor and the conveyed is nothing but that between the cognizer and the cognized, or strictly speaking, that between the recollector and the recollected.

"It is again objected that the disciple reminds one of his teacher through the relation between the teacher and the pupil and not necessarily by that between the recollector and the recollected, and that, in the instance of a word some other relation should therefore be found out; and that since there is no other suitable relation, the association with the object denoted [is the appropriate relation] and as such, the power or capacity of words for reminding the hearer of the ideas may be established.

"Now the *siddhāntin* retorts that if *anvitābhīdhānavāda* be accepted, is there any other relation on the basis of which words would convey the ideas and their relation (*anvitārtha*)? The eye and other (senses) and the smoke and other (*hetus*) are

observed as generating cognitions of such objects as are invariably associated with them, through the relations such as their contact with the objects in vision and their invariable concomitance. If it is said that even without any other relation there may arise from words the cognitions of ideas through the eternal significative potency (*śakti*), the existence of which is properly inferred from their time-honored usage, the same may be said here also. The relations between word and object may be that between the recollector and the recollected, since it is observed that words do possess a potency to generate a recollection of things; and that relation is nothing but the cognition of a word which is also known as a denoter, as explained above.

"So the capacity of words to convey ideas (*abhidhātrva*) cannot be satisfactorily explained if *anvitābhidhāna* be followed. It is therefore appropriate to say that on the ground of simplicity (saving labor) the meaning of a sentence is known from the words by their secondary significative potency in that it is generated by the word-meanings recollected by means of words co-uttered or juxtaposed and associated with accessories like expectancy.

"So it has been well said—Words convey their ideas (concepts) and refrain from any other functioning; and then the meanings being cognized produce the cognition of the sentential meaning."

19.2 VĀCASPATI MIŚRA, *Nyāyakaṇikā* on Maṇḍana Miśra's *Vidhiviveka*

In VidVT, the summary of the *Vidhiviveka* which we used for our summary of that work above, Kanchana Natarajan has also provided a summary of selected portions of Vacaspati Miśra's commentary. We provide selections here. "E" references are to VidV.

Summary by Kanchana Natarajan

(E9-10; VidVT pp. 21-22) "The study of the *vaidika vidhi vākyas* may be considered important for the following reasons:

- (a) to establish the validity of the Vedas.
- (b) to establish the relation between words and their meaning in a sentence.
- (c) to act as a means for the attainment of the desirable and the removal of the undesirable.

Vācaspati points out that none of these three purposes

shown have real significance to a discussion on *vidhi*. [The] validity of the Vedas, according to Vācaspati, is not relevant because the Vedas are not dependent upon any *pramāna* other than themselves. They are believed by the Mīmāṃsakas to be intrinsically valid. Nor is the second reason the case, for the words in a sentence remain meaningful even without an examination of verbs that convey an injunction. For example, the knowledge of the meaning of [the] words in the sentence "*sthālyam odanam pacati caitrah*" ('Caitra cooks rice in a pot') is independent of the knowledge of the verb in an optative mood, for the sentence is in a simple present tense. This is because the conditions of the meaningfulness of a sentence are *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *samnidhi* and *tātparya* and not just a study of the nature of *vidhi liṅ*. The third reason too is not the case; for a mere discussion on *vidhi* does not lead to the attainment of the desirable. According to Vācaspati, the knowledge of good and bad comes from experience and not from a study of the nature of the *liṅ* suffix that expresses an injunction.

"Having rejected all the above three as valid reasons for the study of *vidhi*, Vācaspati Miśra says that the importance of a discussion on the nature of *vidhi* lies in the fact that such a study enable us to have a clearer understanding of the nature of *vidhi* and thus what the *vidhi* enjoins, namely *dharma*."

(E35-36; VidVT44) "*Vidhi*, it is pointed out, is something that is not found by in time and hence it is regarded as timeless, ...something which cannot be cognized by...any other *pramānas* than *śabda*."

(E37-38; VidVT53) "The Vedas which are not dependent for their validity on any ordinary *pramānas* like perception or inference, enjoin actions which are also in no way dependent for their meaning or motivation on anything like the desire for fruit of the action etc. The Vedas, according to this position, reveal what ought to be done; they do so independently of any postulation of the fruit. The Vedic injunction requires a doer to do the prescribed action. The doer, if he is qualified, ought to follow the injunction without any consideration for the fruit. When occasionally injunctions refer to the fruit it ought not to be construed as something that is postulated to inspire the agent to perform the sacrifice but as the qualification of the doer of the action rather than prescribing a fruit for the action. In injunctions like *yāvajjivam agnihotram juhuyāt* ('as long as one is alive one must perform the *agnihotra*'), the life of the doer of the action is itself a cause for the performance of the

action. In such cases it is the Vedas alone that are to be considered as authority for goading one into action and not anything else like [the] fruit etc."

(In an article entitled "Yogipratyakṣa in Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyakanikā*" (EPM pp. 347-353), Jeson Woo translates a few lines and provides an analysis. We provide here the portion of the article (pp. 349-352) that contains the translated passages with Woo's analysis.)

"Vācaspati Miśra...raises the...question of whether it is really possible to gain *yogipratyakṣa*. In doing so he pays attention to the doctrine that everything is without self (*samastavastunairātmya*). In order to argue his point, Vācaspati introduces a logical formula (*prayoga*) brought forth by Kamalaśīla (ca. 740-795).

Vyāpti: Whatever practices of meditation are done with attention, without interruption and for a long time, have as their effect a cognition which makes its object appear like an *āmalaka* fruit in the palm of the hand, just as for a lovesick man the love for (his) beloved endowed with these three qualifications is the cause for the fact that (his) cognition which has (his) beloved as object has a clear appearance.'

Pakṣadharmatā. And in the same way the meditational practice upon (the doctrine) that everything is without self has these three qualifications.' (The last two paragraphs are Woo's translation of NK (i.e., *Nyāyakanikā*, ed. Pemwieser p. 114, 1-5.)

"The conclusion derived from this formula is that when the practice of meditation upon the selflessness of all things reaches completion, it produces a cognition which vividly manifests selflessness. In other words, the *yogin's* cognition is perception.

"Now, let us turn to the question Vācaspati asked and see how the Buddhists prove that the practice of meditation upon selflessness is possible. This is done by demonstrating that the logical reason (*hetu*) in the above formula is not non-established (*asiddha*). For this, Vācaspati Miśra states the following Buddhist view:

For, the practice of meditation endowed with the three qualifications is possible for people who, fearing the cause of suffering in the world of *samsāra*, are firm in the cognition of *śrāvakas*, and for people who have overcome inner obstacles through performing *pāramitās*, such as giving, who have

compassion which removes the causes of all sufferings, and who consider all sufferers as equal to themselves.

Here, the Buddhists present the view that because of the whole world's suffering, people try to practice meditation either out of fear of suffering or owing to the compassion they feel toward those who suffer. In Buddhist thought it is possible to become free from suffering because suffering is not eternal, but has causes.

Yet a question arises regarding the above Buddhist view. Why does the *yogin* seek to remove suffering by means of the practice of meditation upon selflessness and to attain *yogipratyakṣa*? If this question is not properly answered, the conclusion in the logical formula cannot be established. Vācaspati shows how the Buddhists attempted to solve this problem in the next logical formula:

'*Vyāpti*: If a thing [X] which is incompatible (*viruddha*) with another thing [Y] exists at a certain place, the other thing [Y] never exists there. For instance, coldness does not exist where fire exists.'

Pakṣadharmatā: And the realization of [the doctrine/fact] that everything is without self, which is incompatible with the view of an eternal self, is possible in the mind.'

"Ever since the time of the Buddha, Buddhists have understood that the cause of suffering consists in unwholesome qualities (*doṣa*), such as greed and passion. These unwholesome qualities, which produce suffering and themselves become part of suffering, are based on the view of a self (*ātmadarśana*). Hence, suffering disappears when its basis, the view of a self, disappears, just as fever goes down when its cause, a cold, goes away. Now, how can one abandon the view of a self? For this, Buddhist philosophers turn to the notion of *virodha*, the relationship of incompatibility, which is crucial to their logic. The views of self and non-self are incompatible with each other. They cannot belong to the same person. For this reason, the *yogin's* abandonment of the view of a self is nothing other than his maintaining the view of non-self. The meditation upon selflessness is a powerful antidote to both the view of a self and the suffering that arises from it. Accordingly, Buddhists maintain that by means of the practice of meditation it is possible for a *yogin* to achieve *yogipratyakṣa*.

Vācaspati Miśra does not object to the claim that the *yogin* experiences the contemplated object. He rather directs his

criticism at *yogipratyakṣa* from the point of view that its object is not an actual thing. The problem to which Vācaspati turns his attention is this object's difference from the object in the actual world. For instance, the *yogin* may continue to meditate upon the image of fire and clearly manifest is in his mind. Vācaspati argues that this image of fire is not the same as an actual fire which burns or cooks. He presents the reason as follows:

"Therefore it is not the case that this (result of the intensive practice of meditation) does not deviate (from a real thing) because of a relationship of identity with (it), nor (does it not deviate) because of a causal relationship with it.' (VidV p. 105, 22-23)

"The object of *yogipratyakṣa* is not identical with a real thing because it is an act of mental consciousness; the thing is obviously distinct from the cognition. Nor is it produced from a real thing because it originates from a concept that the *yogin* acquires by means of reasoning (*yukti*). Hence, the object of *yogipratyakṣa* has no relation with a real thing. On this basis Vācaspati insists that it deviates from the thing.

"Another issue Vācaspati Mīśra raises regarding *yogipratyakṣa* is related to the Buddhist proof of the omniscience (*sarvājñatva*) of the Buddha. Buddhist philosophers claim that the object of *yogipratyakṣa* is the fact that everything is without self (*samastavastunairātrmya*). Because 'cognizing everything' is the condition for 'being aware of everything as selfless, the object of this cognition' is concerned with all things. Thus a question arises: How can the *yogin* know everything and manifest it in his consciousness? The following is the Buddhist reply which Vācaspati Mīśra uses for his argument:

'Sentient beings, who are (now) being seen but exist extending to the limit of the threefold world, are of the nature of a main cause or effect which is a multitude of aggregates in the past or the future obtained during the recurrence of other lives. Hence, the cognition of them (by the *yogins*) has even past and future things as its object, as something specified by them (i.e., these past and future things) inasmuch as they are identical with the (present) things being perceived. (VidV, p. 106, 18-21)

"This deeply reminds one of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in Yogācāra Buddhism which provides the ultimate metaphysical foundation of the Pramāna school. This *ālayavijñāna* is the storehouse of all seeds of *dharmas*. Sentient

beings, transmigrating from beginningless time, have been accumulating *dharmas* in this storehouse by way of experience throughout their lives. Their cognitions are the place where all *dharmas* are located. Being produced from the continuum (*santāna*) of the *yogin's* mind, *dharmas* themselves are the object-condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) for *yogipratyakṣa*.

"Vācaspati argues against this Buddhist view, making two points. First, he does not agree that, like the present thing, past and future things are the object of *yogipratyakṣa*. Vācaspati's position is that 'the fact that a thing is the object-condition for a cognition' is pervaded by 'the fact that it depends on the senses.' (VidV p. 106.10) In other words, the object of perception is what is present (*vidyamāna*). Vācaspati refers to the idea that although a certain fuel is the cause of smoke, it cannot produce smoke without a fire even after a hundred attempts. Past and future things do not depend on the senses. They are included in the realm of concepts. Thus it is not proper to claim that all *dharmas* are the object of *yogipratyakṣa*.

"Further criticizing the Buddhist view, Vācaspati asks: If all *dharmas* are the object-condition for the cognition of *yogins*, why do they not function thus for the cognition of ordinary people? Buddhists may answer that the difference lies in the presence or the absence of *kleśas*. Although all *dharmas* are potentially the object-condition for the cognition of both *yogins* and ordinary people, they do not become the object of ordinary people's cognitions because they are covered by the impurity of *kleśas*. (VidV. 106., 21-24) Arguing against this Buddhist view, Vācaspati rejects the idea that the absence of *kleśas* allows for the perception of real things. He argues that if the *yogin* gets rid of *kleśas*, he may indeed see all *dharmas*. However, this does not mean that he is capable of turning something unreal into something real.

"But it is not proper (to maintain) that the (*yogin*) has the skill to turn unreal things (into something real) owing to this (removal of *kleśas*, etc.). For it is suitable (to claim that) *kleśas*, etc. cover the truth. However, they do not have any relation to changing concepts (into real things).' (VidV p. 107, 5-7)

What the Buddhists are confused about is the difference between perceiving something clearly and perceiving a real thing. The removal of *kleśas* is related to the purity of mind, but it is not concerned with the true character of reality. The *yogin*

may continue to practice and purify his mind of all *kleśas*. This results in the vivid manifestation of all *dharma*s. However, they remain fictional concepts (*vikalpa*). Vācaspati concludes that it is therefore impossible for Buddhists to establish the validity of *yogipratyakṣa*."

20 DEVASVĀMIN (1000)

In SSSastri 1965 we are told that "Devasvāmin has...written commentaries on *Śrautasūtras* and *Grhyasūtras* of *Āśvalāyana*. His *Grhyasūtrabhāṣya* has partly been published by the late Dr. C. Kūnhan Raja in the Adyar Library Series. His *Saṅkarsakāṇḍa Bhāṣya* has been quoted by Hemādri (12th cent.), Appayya Dīkṣita and other later writers but not by earlier authors. Hence Dr. P. V. Kane concludes that he must belong to the 11th century of our era."

VARs, pp. 58-59: "Devasvāmin, according to the *Prapañcahrdayam*, has written a *Bhāṣya* on the sixteen chapters of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*, which is only a résumé of Upavarsa's *Vṛtti* thereon. He says in his *Saṅkarsakāṇḍabhāṣya* that he has reproduced Bhavadāsa's *Bhāṣya* in XIV.11.1...

"In the history of the *Kalpasūtras* one Devasvāmin is known as the author of commentaries on the *Āśvalāyana*-, *Śrauta*- and *Grhya-Sūtras* and it is on these that later commentators have based their works. That Devasvāmin seems to have also written a digest of *smṛtis* where he has discussed all topics relating to *dharma*, such as *ācāra*, *vyavahāra*, *āśauca* and *prāyaścitta* is evident from the references made by the *Smṛticandrakakāra* and other subsequent authors in the field. Mr. P. V. Kane concludes that sufficient data are not available to establish the identity of the two Devasvāmins; but we may identify them on the ground that the *dharmaśāstra* is only supplementary to the *mīmāṃsāśāstra*. If this identity is accepted, his period may be fairly fixed towards the close of the tenth century or the first half of the eleventh century; in any case he cannot be later than A.D. 1050, since he is mentioned in the *Prapañcahrdaya*, a work which can well be assigned to the 11th century if not earlier."

20.1 DEVASVĀMIN, *Bhāṣya* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

SSSastri 1965, where the portion of this commentary on the *Saṅkarsakāṇḍa* is edited, summarized and published, comments that the *Bhāṣya* of Devasvāmin resembles the *Bhāṣya*

of Śabara. Being old and out of use for a very considerable period, the correct text of the work has not been preserved. We find from the work of Bhāskaraṛāya (18th century) that it was read and taught in his time but later it was neglected by scholars who were satisfied with the first twelve chapters for *Mīmāṃsā* and the last four for *Vedānta*."

Subrahmanya Sastri knew of four manuscripts, which seem to be of the same origin. He describes (pp. vi-viii) the considerable problem he dealt with in arriving at the text, and how he managed to carry out his edition.

21 BHAVANĀTHA MIŚRA (1050)

In *Nayaviveka* p. xiv S. K. Ramanatha Sastri says: "Regarding the date and personality of Bhavanātha...very little material is available, and it would be risky to commit oneself to any conclusion. Bhavanātha mentions some previous authors, viz. Śabarasvāmin, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Umveka, Śalikanātha, Vācaspati Miśra, Śrīkara, etc. He is quoted by *Vedānta Deśika*. He cannot be earlier than the 11th century; that is all that we know."

21.1 BHAVANĀTHA MIŚRA, (*Mīmāṃsā*) *Nayaviveka*

The work has been partly edited by S. Subrahmanya Sastri in MNV and by S. K. Ramanatha Sastri in *Nayaviveka*.. Subrahmanya Sastri in his Introduction says: "It is a brief résumé of the two commentaries of *Brhatī* and *Laghvī* written by Prabhākara otherwise called Guru on the *Bhāṣya* of Śabarasvāmin on the *sūtras* of Jaimini..."

"*Nayaviveka* while putting forth the purports of *Brhatī* and *Laghvī* of each section condemns the views of Kumārila in each section. The first *pāda* of Chapter I is called *Tarkapāda* wherein (1) the necessity for the study of *Mīmāṃsā*, (2) the definition of *dharma*, (3) *pramāṇas* acceptable to *Mīmāṃsakas*, (4) the nature of selves, (5) the eternality of phonemes (*varṇas*), (6) the nature of verbal cognition, and (7) the eternal nature of the Vedas are explained.

"From *pāda* II the examination of the purport of Vedic texts begins....It is because of *Nayaviveka* that we are able to find out the views of Prabhākara regarding the subject matter of this school beyond *pāda* II of Chapter VI."

22. CANDRA (1050)

UM1930, pp. 974-975, writes: "Of Candra, we cannot say exactly when he lived and what he wrote, but we know that Varadarāja, who must be distinguished from the authors of *Tattvanirṇaya* and *Bodhanī*, refers to him in his *Dipikā*, a commentary on the *Nayaviveka* of Bhavanātha Miśra. Śālikanātha Miśra also in the beginning of his commentary named *Rjuvimala Pañjikā* or *Pañcika* refers to Candra. Caṇḍeśvara Thakkura, the great Maithila *Nibandhakāra*, also refers to this Candra as *Gurumatācārya* [in his *Kṛtyaratnākara*, p. 82 of Bibliotheca Edition of 1882]]. In the Introduction to MNV S. Subrahmanya Sastri informs us that Bhavanātha Miśra mentions Candra. This suggests they might be contemporaries.

GG 1995-96 (p. 209-210) says Candra was a Bengali (and not a Maithila, *pace* Umesh Mishra) and belonged to the twentieth century. Gerschheimer reports that Candra postulates the number of categories (*padārtha*) as eleven, basing her account on a work by a certain Nārāyana Jaipuri, author of "un commentaire de la *Prakaranapañcika* de Śālikanātha" (p. 210). These are the usual eight traditional Prābhākara categories plus sequence, auxiliary (*upakāra*), and trace (*samskāra*), the second perhaps (suggests Gerschheimer) to accommodate some requirements due to the ritualistic preoccupations of the school.

22.1 CANDRA, *Amṛtabindu*

Panse 1990, footnote 33, agreed to in GG 1994 and 1995-1996, says this work has yet to be published.

22.2 CANDRA, *Nyāyaratnākara*

GG 1995-1996, p. 209, reports that the text has been edited by Umesa Mishra, *Prabhākaraikadeśīyamahāmahopādhyayanāravicaritāḥ Nyāyaratnākaraḥ (Ekādeśādhyāyāḥ)* (Darbhanga 1963).

23 BHAVADEVVA (1050)

VARS pp. 68-70: "As Mr. P. V. Kane says in his *History of Dharmaśāstra* (p. 304), the earliest reference to Bhavadevabhāṭṭa in a literary work is found in Hemādri's *Caturvargacintāmani* (of the 14th century). He also refers to an inscription found in the temple of Anantavāsudeva at Bhuvaneśvara in the Puri district of Orissa eulogizing Bhavadevabhāṭṭa with the epithet '*Bālavalabhībhujaṅga*'. From that inscription (according to Mr. P. V. Kane) Bhavadeva is

known to have belonged to the Sāvānagotra of Kauthumī school of Sāmaveda. His family originally belonged to a village-Siddhala *grāma* in Rādhā (west of the Hugli and south of the Ganges). Bhavadeva, one of the remote ancestors of our Bhavadeva, got the gift of an *agrahara* of Hastinībhāṭṭa from the Gauda King." VARS gives (our) Bhavadeva's genealogy.

"Our Bhavadeva was a protégé and adviser of King Harivarmadeva who reigned long in prosperity. Besides being an author of works on astrology, *smṛti* and *mīmāṃsā* he is described as the builder of a reservoir in Rādhā and of temples of Nārāyana, Ananta and Nṛsimha. The title *Bālavalabhībhujaṅga* is explained by Dr. P. V. Kane with reference to the fact that Bhavadeva probably made some innovation in the structure of the roofs or balconies of the temples he built and he was therefore styled 'a lover of little *valabhis*'.

"Dr. Kielhorn conjectures from its character that this inscription belongs to the twelfth century. Mr. P. V. Kane supports this date of Bhavadeva i.e. c. A.D. 1100 by internal evidence. He cites a passage from the *Vīramitrodaya* which makes the *Pradīpa* [?] anticipate Bhavadeva. The *Pradīpa* was composed before A.D.1150. So Bhavadeva should have belonged to the closing decade of the eleventh century and the first decade of the 12th century."

"Bhavadeva's other works are the *Vyavahāratilaka*, the *Vyavaharatantra*, the *Karmānuṣṭhānapaddhati* and the *Prayaścittanirūpana*."

23.1 BHAVADEVVA, *Tautītamatatilaka* on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*

This is edited by A. Chinnasvami Sastri and Pattabhīrama Sastri in Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts 79, in three volumes, Varanasi: Government Sanskrit Library 1939-1944, and reprinted in *Sarasvatibhavana-granthamala* 79, Varanasi 1999.

24 PĀRTHAŚARATHI MIŚRA (1075)

K. S. Ramaswami Sastri (KSRS 1937) reports that Pārthasārathi Miśra "does not mention in his works the period in which he flourished or the place in which he was born...He had only stated his name..and that of his father as Yajñātman from whom he learned the *śāstras*...The prevalent belief is that

he was a native of Mithilā or Behar and Bengal even though the name Pārthasārathi is rarely used in the North. The designation 'Mīśra', however, leads us to think that he was probably a Maithilī, since this designation is rather common to this country".

After an extended discussion Ramaswami Sastri determines Pārthasārathi's date as between 900 and 1100. Though he speculates further in trying to be more specific and arrives at a somewhat earlier date than ours his reasons are not very compelling.

VARS pp. 60-61: "The earliest direct reference to this author is found in the *Nyāyamālāvistara* and the *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* of Mādhavācārya of the 14th century. Parameśvara II makes us understand that Cidānanda of the 13th century has referred in his *Nītitattāvīrbhava* to Pārthasārathimīśra and his works.

24.1 PĀRTHASĀRATHI MĪŚRA, *Nyāyaratnamālā*

KRSRSastri 1937 suggests that this is Pārthasārathi's first work. The following summary is found in ASSastri 1972, pp. 3-9. There is also a (briefer) summary in Verpoorten, pp. 42-43.

VARS p.63: "It is written on the model of Śālikanātha's *Prakaranapañcikā* and as such is an advanced *prakaraṇa* work on the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra. Its importance lies in the fact that in many *prakaraṇas* it answers the views of Prabhākara as elaborated by Śālikanātha in his *Prakaranapañcikā*, and maintains the views of Kumārila...."

Summary by A. Subrahmanya Sastri

Chapter One

"This chapter deals with the injunction of Vedic study. Kumārila says the injunction *svādhyāyavidheyavyah* lays down the study of one's own branch of the Veda (studied traditionally in his family.).

"Here the *pūrvapakṣin* says that this injunction does not lay down the study of the Veda for getting the knowledge of the purport since it is nothing new, but for getting heaven according to the *nyāya* of Viśvajit, or for getting the gratification of the forefathers according to the *nyāya* of Rātrī Śātra. The *sidhāntin* says that when a seen result is available in hand there is no going to the Viśvajit-nyāya. If the knowledge

of the Vedic purport is not new, we shall have the *niyamavidhi* (restrictive injunction) by which the student is restricted to the study of the Veda from a *guru* alone. He is prohibited from studying the Veda by himself and getting at the knowledge of its purport. The correct knowledge of the Vedic purport being impossible without the study of Mīmāṃsā, the study of Mīmāṃsā is also implied in the injunction.

"Prabhākara on the other hand holds that this injunction, in which no *niyojya* (eligible person) is mentioned, is not at all an injunction. On the other hand the text '*astavaryam brāhmanamupanayīta, tamadhyāpayīta*' mentioned in the (*Nyāya*)*Vivaraṇa* text of Prabhākara as Vedic, is the subject of discussion, or the *smṛti* text

*'upanīya tu yah śiṣyam vedamadhyāpayedadvijah
sakalyam sarahasyam ca tamācāryam pracaksate'*

based on the above text is the subject. This text enjoins *adhyāpana* or teaching for the attainment of *ācāryatva* (teachership). To become a teacher one has to teach a student and a student has to study. The study of the student implied in the injunction pertaining to teaching is plainly told in '*svādhyāyo'dhyetavyah*'. But this alone is not the purpose of this text. The knowledge of the purport of the Veda is also implied here. This knowledge being impossible without the study of Mīmāṃsā the study of Mīmāṃsā is also implied here.

"Pārthasārathi Mīśra condemns vehemently this procedure, saying *adhyāpana* (teaching) being an occupation for getting livelihood need not be enjoined by a *vidhi*. The absence of *niyojya* in the *vidhi* '*svādhyāyo'dhyetavyah*' is common to the *vidhi* of teaching also. The *smṛti* text quoted only gives the meaning of the word '*ācārya*' and there is no *vidhi* for teaching there because of the words *yah* and *sah*. If a *niyojya* is to be understood in this *vidhi* why not in the *vidhi* of Vedic study?

"Thus it stands that [the] *svādhyāya* injunction enjoins the study of the Vedas for getting the knowledge of their purport, and this being impossible without the study of Mīmāṃsā, the study of Mīmāṃsā is also enjoined in it."

Chapter Two¹

"The second chapter deals with the establishment of [the] self-validity (*svataḥprāmānya*) [of] the Vedas. Though there is no controversy over this subject between Bhatta and Prābhākara the latter does not accept this directly. He raises the question that since in ordinary experience there is no connection of words with their meanings because of inconstancy in respect of words from unreliable sources, there cannot be connection of Vedic texts with their meanings because of possible inconstancy. He answers this question saying that even in non-Vedic usages there is connection between words and their meanings but this it to be inferred while, there being no author for [the Vedas, the word-sense relationship is constant, What the Vedas say is valid. This is self-validity for the Vedas.

"Kumārila on the other hand states that non-Vedic usages are also self-validating."

(Taber 1992, pp. 210-212, discusses what Pārthasārathi has to say in this Chapter about verses 48-53.)

Chapter Three

"The third chapter deals with *vidhi*, injunction. Pārthasārathi condemns the view of Prabhākara that *kārya* or *apūrva* is the meaning of optatives."

Chapter Four

"For both Prābhākaras and Bhāttas the relationship between the *hetu* (indicator) and the *sādhya* (what is indicated) is *vyāpti* or pervasion. This is deduced by the cause-effect relationship, the substance-quality relationship etc. This pervasion is realized by perception, says Prabhākara. He says that when one looks at the smoke and fire in a kitchen they are realized as being connected with a certain space and a particular time but their conjunction (*saṃyoga*) is not limited to any particular space or time and hence the relation between the smoke and fire which is perceived pertains to all places and all times and hence pervasion can be perceived. Pārthasārathi vehemently opposes this view saying that conjunction also is cognized as pertaining to some particular space and time and

¹Pp. 520-533 of Arnold 2001 provides a rich analysis and translates many of the passages in this Chapter.

hence the *vyāpti* cannot be an object of perception. In the view of Pārthasārathi, however, the *vyāpti* is realized by perception aided by perception of the relationship of many instances."

Chapter Five

"In this chapter Pārthasārathi explains how Prabhākara supports the view of *anvitābhīdhānavāda* and condemns that theory, supporting the theory of *abhihitānvayavāda* which involves less complications and which has the support of the *Bhāṣya* text."

Chapter Six

"Here Pārthasārathi discusses the distinction between compulsory rites and optional rites. The view accepted by all is that optional rites require all the subsidiaries related to it while the obligatory rites require the performance of the principal in full and the performance of the subsidiaries according to the capacity of the performer.

"In supporting this theory Prabhākara says each *vidhi* or *karman* which generates some fruit requires all the subsidiaries in generating the fruit mentioned. This is with regard to optional rites which have fruits invariably. But [some say] in the *vidhis* which enjoin obligatory rites there being no fruit the *kārya* or *niyoga* requires only the content of the verb for its fulfilment. Thus even without the performance of all the subsidiaries the principal alone can be performed.

"Pārthasārathi condemns this view, saying that even in obligatory rites where fruits are not mentioned there cannot be any inducement without fruits and if any fruit is to be presumed for them, then there cannot be any distinction between the obligatory and optional rites. Giving the view of [the] Bhatta[s], Pārthasārathi says that the mention of *yāvajjīvam* "as long as one lives" found in regard to obligatory rites implies [the] necessity of their performance and this necessity implies the origination of results (expiation of sins, etc.), by the performance of [the] principal alone with as many subsidiaries as possible."

Chapter Seven

"treats exclusively the nature of *aṅgas* or subsidiaries. What is an *aṅga*? The author say that what is enjoined by a Vedic text or a *smṛti* text which follows the Vedas as conducive to some desired effect is *aṅga*. Subsidiariness or *aṅgatva* is revealed by

the accusative or instrumental case, as in 'vr̥h̥navahanti' (he should pound the corn), 'vr̥h̥maryajñet' (he should sacrifice with corn). In both cases when a thing is mentioned as *uddeśya* (the desired effect) or as *kāraka* (being conducive to that) the *aṅgatva* is called *śrotra* (content of the Vedic text). *Śruti*, *līṅga*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, *sthāna* and *samākhyā* are the six *pramāṇas* with the help of which *aṅgatva* is established. This subject is discussed in Chapter Seven. According to [the] Bhāṭṭa there are two *prakaraṇas* (contexts), *mahāprakaraṇa* (the main context) and *avāntarā prakaraṇa* (intermediate context). Prabhākara does not admit the necessity of the latter. Pārthasārathi supports [the] Bhāṭṭa view and gives reasons why this is to be accepted."

Chapter Eight

"discusses *krama* or sequence. Pārthasārathi condemns the view of Prabhākara that sequence is not a thing to be enjoined by *vidhi* and maintains the view of [Kumārila] Bhāṭṭa that sequence is also an object of *vidhi*."

Chapter Nine

"In Chapter Nine the author explains *atideśa*, transfer of the subsidiaries of the archetype (*prakṛta*) sacrifices to the ectypal sacrifices (*vikṛti*). What is transferred is the 'help' (*upakāra*) derived from the *aṅgas* of the archetypal sacrifice followed by those *aṅgas* and not the Vedic texts (*śāstra*) which enjoin those subsidiaries in the *prakṛti* as accepted by Prabhākara, since these latter are not wanted by the ectypal sacrifices. Then...Pārthasārathi explains the two kinds of *bādhas* or 'sublations', sublation of what is obtained and sublation of what is not obtained. The latter [kind] is the content of Chapter Three, wherein it is said that it is observed when an inferior *pramāṇa* for e.g. *līṅga* is cancelled by a superior *pramāṇa śruti*."

Chapter Ten

"Here the *śruti*, etc., cancels the contents of *līṅga*, etc., before they begin to function, namely revealing a subsidiary in relation to a principal. The former kind of *bādha* [viz., cancellation of what is obtained] is discussed in Chapter Ten. Here some of the *aṅgas* transferred from the archetypal sacrifices to the ectypal sacrifices are cancelled because of (1) mention of a different *aṅga* in the ektype, (2) [the]

impossibility of the effect produced in the archetype, and (3) prohibition. In these cases Prabhākara says that the presumed text which transfers the subsidiaries of the archetypal sacrifice to others does not become invalid or it is not invalidated (since invalid cognition is not accepted by him) but such *aṅgas* are not to be performed in the ektype. This is their invalidation.

"Pārthasārathi opposes this, saying that in regard to those subsidiaries which are liable to be cancelled in the ektypal sacrifices the presumed text 'the ektypal sacrifice is to be conducted in the same manner as the archetypal one' is not valid in some respects, that is to say the knowledge derived from this sentence is partially incorrect. This is what is meant by cancellation of what is obtained."

Chapter Eleven

"In the last chapter he discusses how 'He who desires heaven' etc., mentioned along with 'should sacrifice', is connected with the *vidhi*. Prabhākaras say that it is connected with the *vidhi* as *niyojya* (the person who considers the sacrifice etc., as his). Refuting this, Pārthasārathi says that this will amount to the desire of heaven being a *nimitta* (accident) which entails one to perform the sacrifice, and will not reveal heaven as the fruit of the sacrifice. Therefore it should be accepted that the portion 'he who desires heaven' declares the fruit of sacrifice by implication (which is the view of Kumārila)."

(This work is edited in NRM by K. S. Ramaswami Sastri, who provides a lengthy Introduction including an extensive summary. It also appends a short section (pp. 325-336) entitled "Vyāptivāda" which is not referred to in either this Introduction nor in the summary in ASSastri 1972. Following KRSastri's lead, but with trepidation, we add a brief summary of an interesting passage from this *Vyāptivāda*, which appears on pp. 327-338. The summary of this section, by Tomoyasu Takanaka, is found on pp. 109-111.

Summary by Toyosaka Takanaka

"The view that *niyama* is determined by *mānasapratyakṣa* (mental perception) is not only referred to in Pārthasārathimiśra's works, but also Sucaritamīśra's *Kāśikā* (commentary on the *Ślokaṅgīkā*) and Śālikanātha's *Prakaranapañcikā*. But it is not clear who argues this. We can summarize Pārthasārathi's criticism of this view as follows—

"(i) Because *manas* (mind) works as the internal organ (*antahkarana* or the inner instrument of knowledge), it is not possible for this to connect external objects (*bāhyārtha*). Therefore *manas* cannot determine the *niyama* which is between external objects, namely smoke, fire and so on.

"(ii) It is the case with the *manas* accompanied with the impression [trace] (*samskāra*) which is made by a repeated cognition (*bhūyodarśana*)...Because the trace is the cause for only recollection (*smṛti*)...it cannot assist the *manas*."

In the same section (pp. 330.5-331.14) Pārthasārathi criticizes a view put forward by Sucaritamīśra which involves the apprehension of *niyama* by construction-filled perception.

"(i) Because perceptions apprehend the object existing before our eyes, they cannot apprehend *niyama* which has the relation with other times and places as [its] own nature. *Niyama* must be what pervades every time and every place.

"(ii) It is not right to say that *niyama* is the nature of smoke, therefore, it is apprehended at the very moment when smoke is observed. Even if *niyama* be the nature of smoke it must not deviate. In other words, the *niyama* must apply to fire which exists at all the times and all the places that smoke exists. Therefore, if the *niyama* were apprehended by perception, the relation of *niyama* with past and future time or remote places would be apprehended by the same perception. But this is unreasonable.

"(iii) On the contrary, if the relation of *niyama* with other times and places is not apprehended, even when *niyama* should be apprehended by perception, inference will not work.

"Umbeka says in his *Slokavartitika Tātparyāṭikā* 'When we observe a hundred times where fire is, and recognize [the] non-existence of smoke where fire is not, the knowledge of the *niyama* that smoke is invariably connected with fire occurs to us by presumption.' It is because we cannot explain this fact, which was gained by repeated experience, otherwise than by presuming the *niyama* that smoke is concomitant with fire.

"Pārthasārathi, however, rejects this view. It is quite proper that our perceptions and experiences should be limited by time and place. Therefore, even though we should observe [the] non-existence of smoke a hundred times where fire is not, we cannot determine the non-existence of smoke at all the places where fire is not. Likewise, even if we should observe smoke many times where fire is, we cannot determine the existence of smoke at all the places where fire is. So it is not

valid that presumption is the right instrument (*pramāṇa*) for determining the *niyama*.

"Lastly, let's examine Pārthasārathi's own view. He also, following Kumārila's view, admits that we know *niyama* from a repeated cognition (*bhūyodarśana*), but he says that we cannot specify the *pramāṇa* which brings it. His explanation is as follows: 'We cannot mention some specific *pramāṇa* [to determine *niyama*]. But when the co-existence of the *līṅga* (smoke) and *līṅgin* (fire) is repeatedly known by one of the recognized *pramāṇas*, for example, perception, inference, etc., the very *pramāṇa* accompanying the non-apprehension of [*līṅga* in] contrary instances (*vipakṣa*) comes to be admitted as the *pramāṇa* of *niyama*.' Even if a repeated cognition be admitted as the *pramāṇa* of *niyama*, it is only the co-existence limited by particular time and place that it can determine. In other words, a repeated cognition proves the co-existence of *līṅga* and *līṅgin*, namely the *līṅga-līṅgin* relationship only in a limited number of cases, not in all cases, and non-observation of contrary instances proves the relationship between the absence of *līṅgin* and the absence of *līṅga* only to the extent to which non-observation has actually gone.

"Nevertheless, it is not possible to know the above two types of relationships in all cases. According to Pārthasārathi it is not necessary to know them in all cases in order that we may infer validly, because we can validly infer the presence of fire from the observation of smoke so long as we know the two relationships in a limited number of cases, which work fully as the primary factor of inference. Therefore, he argues that we do not need the *niyama* in the form of the *vyāpti* that applies to all times and places to infer validly. He says, 'The invariable co-existence (*sāhityanīyama*) of smoke with fire in all the places where smoke has been observed, and the non-observation of smoke where fire has not been observed, only these two are the cause which can give us the right inferential knowledge.' It is the very *sāhityanīyama* of *līṅga* with *līṅgin* in the perceptible time and place that he calls *niyama*, which is regarded as the primary factor of inference.

"Now, what *pramāṇa* does determine the *niyama* which takes the form of *vyāpti* (*vyāptinīyama*)? Pārthasārathi says that this *vyāptinīyama* is known by inference and provides the following syllogism:

(Thesis) Except [the cases already observed], whatever thing, past, future, or remote, has smoke, has fire

(Reason) Because it has smoke;

(Example) Like the hearth already observed.

"Why did he accept two kinds of *niyama*, that is, *sāhityaniyama* and *vyāptiniyama*? Why did he give a different *pramāna* to each *niyama*? Commonly speaking, it is true that *vyāptiniyama* seems to be the so-called *niyama*. But it is not determined by perception, because perception can grasp only the object which exists presently and near. In order to solve the problem, he thought out that it could not be determined otherwise than by inference. If *vyāptiniyama* were determined by inference, and inference were accomplished by means of *vyāptiniyama*, that would involve the fault of mutual dependence or infinite regress (*anavasthā*) For fear that he might commit such a fault, it was necessary for him to admit *sāhityaniyama* as the primary factor of inference, and regard *bhūyodarśana* as the *pramāna* to determine it."

24.2 PĀRTHASĀRATHI MIŚRA, *Tantrarātna* on Kumārila's *Tuṭṭikā*

VARs p. 61: "his *Tantrarātna*, unlike the *Nyāyaratnākara*, is not only a very elaborate commentary on the *Tuṭṭikā* but also an exhaustive treatise on *Mīmāṃsā śāstra* which discusses many topics connected with the *adhikarana* and *pramāna prasthānas*. From the references in his own works this can be said to be the earliest production of the author."

24.3 PĀRTHASĀRATHI MIŚRA, *Śāstradīpikā*

"E" is SD 1988, and "T" is Venkatramiah 1940. The work is organized to follow the order of things in the *Tarkapāda* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* with Śabara's commentary and Kumārila's sub-commentary, but it deviates in various respects and is not really a commentary but a separate work. Still, to show the relations between the sections of this work and the earlier works, the following summary has been organized into sections that correspond as far as possible to that of those in the summaries of those earlier works. "E" refers to SD. "T" to Venkatramiah.

This work is virtually impossible to summarize adequately within the space limitations required here. What we have given below is merely an analysis, following the lead of Venkatramiah, of the topics discussed in the sections of T, which are numbered.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

1. Thesis (*pratijñā*)

(E1-40; T1-15) *Sūtra* I "Then therefore the inquiry into *dharma*."

(Objector:) 6 This injunction (*vidhi*) only commands a pupil to learn the Vedic passages, which is sufficient to provide him with their meaning, since the *sūtra* is an injunction neither of the *apūrva*, of the *niyama*, nor of the *parisamkhyā* sort.

(Answer:) 7 It is of the second sort, enjoining study on the members of the first three castes until the meaning is understood, and that requires inquiry.

(Prābhākara:) 8 No, study is enjoined ancillary to the injunction to teach, which is the primary meaning of the *sūtra*.

(Answer:) No, the result of teaching is enjoined as a part of the injunction to study.

(Objection:) The injunction to study Vedic texts says nothing about *dharma*, so how does *dharma* come into the picture?

(Answer:) Because *dharma* is what the Vedic texts mean, and the Veda is the instrument for knowing *dharma* (as well as what is *adhharma*).

2 *Codanā*

(E41-95; T16-34) (*Sūtra* 2:) ("Dharma is what is enjoined in the Veda and produces good results")

(Prābhākara:) 2 The meaning of the Veda is what is to be done (*kārya*, *apūrva*, *codanā*), not something already known.

(Answer:) 7 No. Vedic passages speak of things already known by other instruments of knowledge, notably in the Upanisads, which are surely part of the Vedas.

11-13 Now the author provides a résumé of the first five *sūtras* of the *Tarkapāda*

15 The Veda is the only instrument of knowledge for determining *dharma*.

16-17 Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas criticized.

18 Intrinsic validity of the instruments of knowledge.

19 Sāṃkhya view.

20 Buddhist view

21 Bhāṭṭa view

22 Objection: *Śabda* may be included in *anumāna*.

23-24 Bhāṭṭa answer.

25 Nature of *dharma*

26 The literal use of the word 'artha' and its refutation.
 26-29 Bhātta reply
 30-35 (Objection:) Killing is only wrong when done for personal pleasure, which it is not in *jyotiṣṭoma* .
 (Answer:) No, both optional and compulsory actions of killing are prohibited.

3 Nimitta

(E96; T36) *Sūtra* 3: Examination of the (validity of the) means of apprehending that (viz, *dharma*).

4 Pratyakṣa

(E97-119; T37-48) *Sūtra* 4: What constitutes *dharma* cannot be established by perception.

1 Perception cannot apprehend *dharma* since it cognizes only objects present to the senses.

2 Prābhākara: Pleasure, e.g., though not present to the senses, can be apprehended by perception, since it is a quality of the mind (or internal organ)..

3-4 (Answer:) Rather, we infer the existence of an internal organ from the occurrence of pleasure, etc., which are qualities of the body initially.

9-10 Buddhist: Perception is awareness of a pure particular only.

(Answer:) Even construction-filled (*savikalpaka*) awarenesses are perceptual, since they involve the cognition of a thing as of a kind, i.e. as having a property.

11 Refutation of the view that perceptive awareness is of necessity construction-filled.

12-16 Advaita view presented and refuted.

17 Refutation of the Buddhist view of construction-free awareness.

18 (Objection:) Recognition is a sixth kind of construction-filled cognition (but the Mīmāṃsikas count only five kinds).

19 (Answer:) Your "recognition" is precisely such a construction-filled cognitive awareness we are speaking of.

20-21 Perceptibility of substances defended.

22-23 Naiyāyika: A cloth is a different substance from the threads that make it up.

Answer: Whole and part are not completely different entities; the parts make up the whole.

5 Autpattika

(E121-132; T49-54) *Sūtra* 5: "The relation between the word and its sense is eternal. Vedic mandates are *pramāṇa* in the matter of that (i.e. *dharma*). As their subject-matter transcends human experience it is not contradicted. Therefore Vedic mandates are acknowledged by Bādarāyana (*Brahmasūtra* I, 3-28) on the ground that they are not dependent upon any (agency) such as an author." (Tr. Venkatramaiah, p. 49)

3 Non-human origin of the Veda

4 Analysis of the definition of *pramāṇa* in the *Sūtra* .

5-7 Definition of *pramāṇa* according to the Prābhākara school.

9 (Another definition:) A *pramāṇa* is that whose validity needs no other *pramāṇa* to establish it.

10 This refuted.

11 The passage of time is not perceptible.

12 Apparent exceptions explained.

6 Vṛtti

(E135-140; T54-56) 13-19 Upavarṣa's reading of *sūtra* 5 refuted.

7 Nirālambanavāda, (8 Śūnyavāda?)

(E141-165; T57-62) 20 The Buddhist position: All (waking) awarenesses are without external objects, like dreams.

21 (Answer:) Perception, which shows us external objects, cannot be refuted by any other *pramāṇa* .

22-24 Yogācāra: It is consciousness itself, manifesting as external objects, that is cognized.

25 Sautrāntika position

26-27 Discussion between Sautrāntika and Yogācāra

28 (Answer:) By what awareness do we come to know that an awareness (say, of blue) cognizes itself? Not by that awareness itself nor by any other awareness.

29 Is it known by inference? But inference either knows something else or knows itself, and since there is nothing else that won't help!

30 Yogācāra: Since both awarenesses and objects (assuming there are any) are momentary it doesn't matter if they exist independently or not.

Answer: Even so, since we do cognize things that are other than cognition

32 Proof that awareness (*jñāna*) is inferable.

35-36 As for dreams, they are recollections arising from traces, e.g. memory, and re-arranged in sleep. This is called *viparītakhyāti*.

37-38 Explanation of the double-moon illusion.

9 *Anumāna*

(E166-201; T76-96) 41 Pārthasārathi identifies the definition of inference in Śabara's *Bhāṣya* (viz., inference occurs when an object not in contact with the senses is known because the knower sees the object with which the unseen object is invariably connected) as the *Vṛttikāra*'s.

42 (Objection:) The object (e.g., fire) is not unseen; so inference is not a *pramāna*, for a *pramāna* only gives us knowledge of what is not already known.

(Answer:) That is not the mark of a *pramāna*; rather, it is that it is an *anubhava*, thus not a mere memory.

43 (Prābhākara:) The experience of silver has been forgotten, and so when the inference occurs that experience arises again through memory.

44-49 (Answer:) This fear is groundless. We have seen cases of smoke accompanied by fire, but not all such cases; when inference occurs we learn what was not previously known, viz., that this present, previously unobserved case is a case of smoking fire.

50 The five members of an inferential argument according to Nyaya are reviewed, and the Buddhist critique of it. The Buddhists reduce the members to two, the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) and the application (*upanayana*).

51 The correct Mīmāṃsaka number of members is three, involving a *pakṣa*, a *hetu* and a *sādhya*.

52 Fallacies are threefold: *asiddha*, *anaikāntika*, and *bādha*.

53 There are two varieties of *anaikāntikatva*, viz. *savyabhicāra* and *sapratīśādhana*. An example of the latter is: air is imperceptible, because of its being a substance, but air is perceptible because it is middle-sized.

54 There is no such case as *sapratīśādhana*. In the example just given, only colored substances are perceptible, middle-sized objects excludes atoms which are imperceptible but possess touch, while having touch excludes space which is perceptible though possessing middle-sized-ness.

Answer: We do not say that the two alternatives are

equally strong, only that it has not been discovered which one is stronger.

55 The *bādha* fallacy is called *viruddha* in Nyāya.

57 Examples are either positive or negative.

58 (Prābhākara:) Śabara speaks of two kinds of inferential result (*anumiti*), one perceived and the other not. "Unperceived" refers to motion (*kriyā*), the cause of contact and disjunction.

59-61 (Buddhist:) Since everything is momentary there is no such thing as motion.

(Prābhākara:) This will be refuted later (in the section 10). Motion is inferable from the persistence of substance.

62 (Answer:) There is no need to postulate motion as the cause of contact and disjunction, since they are otherwise provable.

(Prābhākara:) Then there is no such thing as motion.

(Answer:) No, since we perceive motion, e.g., a snake's slithering. We do not need inference to prove its existence.

10. *Śabda*

(E202-207; T96-99) 63. Verbal testimony is of two kinds: human and non-human, i.e. Vedic. Vedic sentences are again of two kinds: those which speak of something existent and those which are injunctions to act.

(Prābhākara:) All language is veridical, *yathārthajñāna*.

64. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists include verbal testimony in inference. This refuted.

11. *Upamāna*

(E210-213; T99) Comparison (*upamāna*) is the cause of the awareness of similarity between an object not present, e.g. a *gavaya*, with one that is, e.g. a cow.

(Objection:) Then it must be (not a new *pramāna* but) inference. E.g., a cow is similar to a *gavaya*, because it is the counter-positive of the similarity (to a cow) observed in the *gavaya*; just as in the case of the similarity of two twins.

(Answer:) No, since both cow and *gavaya* are not observed; it is assumed a *gavaya* has never been seen before.

12. *Arthāpatti*

(E214-233; T100-112) 66-68 The Nyāya counts presumption as a kind of inference, e.g., Devadatta is outside his house, because he is alive and is not seen in his house.

69-70 (Answer:) But how do we know he is alive? Maybe he is dead. It is the combination of the two awarenesses --: that he is alive and not in the house -- that constitutes presumption.

71 (Naiyāyika:) Then inference is included in presumption. E.g., we know that wherever there is smoke there is fire, and also that the hill is smoky. If on the hill there is no fire then either the hill being smoky would be false or the notion that all places having smoke contain fire would be false, and in order to show how both these are not untrue the possession of fire (by the hill) is presumed. Thus inference is presumption.

(Answer:) But we have to know that wherever there is smoke there is fire, and it is that knowledge that requires inference, an inference from past perceptions. And furthermore, the knowledge that Devadatta is not in his house is presumptive and not inferential for one who is not in Devadatta's house and cannot observe his absence.

72-76 Extension of this reasoning to other cases of presumption.

13 Absence (*abhāva*)

(E234-247; T112-120) 77. How can something absent be an instrument of knowledge? The answer is that every thing can be viewed either in its own form or in its form of not being something else. What is cognized in the latter way is termed an absence (*abhāva* or *anupalabdhi*).

78-79. Refutation of the Prābhākara view that there is no such cognition as, e.g., the pot doesn't exist on the ground - rather, only positive ones such as that the ground is pot-less.

80-84 Ramifications of this dispute.

14 *Citrākṣepa*

(E248-253; T120-123) 85-87 (Objection:) "When it has been proved that what are regarded as texts of nonhuman origin like '*citrayajeta*' etc. do not deserve to be credited with validity is it only right to extend this inference to texts like '*svargakāmo yajeta*', so that the whole body of the Veda (maintains the opponent) is discredited as a valid means of knowledge.

(Answer:) "What was said before was only this-that once it is universally admitted that perception etc. are self-valid *pramāṇas*, *śāstra* also as coming under them is self-evident; but

no refutation of the defects in the source was made. Here on the contrary what is stated is that Vedic testimony is free from defects and therefore is a valid *pramāṇa*: the relation between the word and the thing is eternal and as such there is no possibility of man's interference herein..." (T, pp. 122-123)

15 *Sambandhākṣepa*

(E254-259; T123-129) 88 (Objection:) There is no relation (*sambandha*) between a word and its meaning, since both are, according to you (Mīmāṃsakas) eternal.

89 It is the relation between a denoting thing and what is denoted.

(Objection:) But a word when first heard does not convey any meaning.

(Answer:) Yes, its meaning has to be learned.

90 (Objection:) Then language (word) is of human origin (*pauroṣeyatva*).

16 *Sphota*

(E259-275; T129-132) 91-92 Refutation of *sphoṭavāda* and of the Jaina view that words are constituted of material elements (*puḍgala*).

(Objection:) But how, if sound is eternal, can we explain that fact of sounds being short or long, loud or soft, etc.?

93-94 (Answer:) Syllables (*varṇa*) only appear to be long or short, etc. A word is not a whole.

95 (Objection:) But syllables are not the only linguistic elements, since by themselves they cannot convey meaning. (Memory)-traces are also required.

96 (*Sphoṭavādin*:) The postulation of many traces is heavy; simpler is to suppose there is only one *sphoṭa* for each syllable/word.

Refutation of *sphoṭavāda*.

17 *Ākṛti*

(E275-295; T132-146) 97 Properties (*ākṛti*) must be assumed to be the meanings of words in addition to particulars (*vyakti*).

98-100 (Buddhist:) Universals, which you term ("properties") *ākṛti*, are conceptual constructs (*vikalpa*) and do not exist. There are in reality only pure particulars.

101 (Answer:) Perception itself shows that generality (*sāmānya*) pertains to reality (*vastutva*). The opponent will

have to reason: whatever is real must be either different or non-different. So if generality is real it must be either different or non-different from the particulars. But it is neither. So generality doesn't exist. Thus one who speaks of reality must admit generality.

102 Some (viz., Naiyāyikas and Prābhākaras) invoke inherence to account for the relation of universal to particular. But since e.g. the parts of a thing cannot move without the whole, and vice-versa, the *ayutasiddhi* relation required by inherence cannot apply in the case of whole and part. ("Ayutasiddhi" means the incapacity of one thing to have distinct locations from the other.)

103 There is no problem about difference and non-difference being posited as properties of the same pair of things, any more than the postulation of length and shortness to the same thing in virtue of its relation to distinct relata.

104-106 Criticism of the view that identity and difference have the same locus. This answered. An object has different forms.

107 Contact is an entity distinct from either of the things in contact. In this it resembles the relation of similarity.

108 Defense of the view that both universals and particulars are real entities.

18 Apoha

(E295-299; T146) 109 (Buddhist:) There are no universals, only similar entities.

(Answer:) Similarity itself cannot be understood without assuming universals.

19 Vana

(E300-305; T146-148) 110 Is the whole different from its parts or not? The Vaiśeṣikas say yes, appealing again to inherence as the relation between whole and part. We prefer the relation of difference-and-non-difference. Also, criticism of the Vaiśeṣika view that the qualities of the effects, e.g., their color, are completely different from the qualities of their causes is unnecessarily heavy.

111 Criticism of "variegated (*citra*) quality" as constituting an additional color to red, etc.

20 Sambandhāksepaparihāra

(E307-334; T149-165) 112 The relation between word and meaning is not made by man.

113 (Objection:) One may fail to understand a word's meaning on first hearing because they do not know the convention. So meaning must be man-made.

(Answer:) No. A word has a natural meaning, but one may not understand that meaning. And since the universe is neither created nor destroyed there is no reason to suppose meaning to be man-made. If it were the Vedas would not be authoritative, as they are.

114 (Advaitin:) The Self, Brahman, is the only existent entity; everything else is *mayā*.

115 (Answer:) Perception shows that the world exists.

116 (Advaitin:) But at the time of liberation the world is correctly found to be unreal; so the correct solution is that it is both real and unreal, i.e. inexplicable).

(Answer:) At the time of liberation a self is without sense-organs, and without them awareness of any kind is impossible. And one who says the world is the product of ignorance must be asked: what is this ignorance? Is it false awareness or a cause of that? In either case you admit something existing in addition to Brahman. (Other arguments reviewed.)

117 (Another Vedāntin:) Brahman (the Self) transforms himself into the form of the world.

118 (Answer:) If there is only one Self then pains in any body would be experienced by all.

(Objection:) It is the mind (*manas*) that experiences pain. (Answer:) No. The mind is insentient.

119-123 The Sāṃkhya position is refuted.

124-126 Refutation of Vaiśeṣika. What causes atoms to move at the beginning of an age? Not God, who is disembodied. And the *adr̥ṣtas* (i.e. *karman*) of the various individual selves cannot bring about effects by themselves, for even with a hundred *adr̥ṣtas* the palm-tree will not come into being without the palm-seed.

(Vaiśeṣika:) Even without the seed God's power assures the appropriate result.

(Answer:) Perhaps, provided you accept the Vedas as eternal and authoritative. And at no time (even the time of creation of the world) can God bring about the relation between words and their objects.

21 Citrākṣepaparihāra

(E335-337; T165-166)

22 *Ātmavāda*

(E338-356; T166-177) 132 What instrument of knowledge proves the existence of a self? The features of the body's breathing as well as the experiencing of pleasures and pains constitute a reason to infer the self's existence. Those features, requiring consciousness (*caitanya*), are not properties of the body since they do not last as long as the body does.

134 (Yogācāra, here termed 'Saugata:') Awareness (*jñāna*) can occur without a locus, and may be admitted to be an entirely independent entity. And pleasure, etc., being contents of awareness do not have an ontic status from awareness, since they are not found to have a separate locus. "I see blue" reports only the cognition of an awareness; the "knower" is a fiction.

135 (Objection to the Yogācāra:) If awarenesses are momentary how can memory, desire or recognition occur?

(Yogācāra:) Awarenesses occurring at different moments may have the same content.

(Answer:) But since in recognition one recognizes oneself as having been the experiencer of what is recognized, a distinct knower has to be admitted.

136-137 (Objection:) We say "I am lean", "I am stout" etc., so the self must be the body.

(Answer:) Everyone knows the difference between one's self and the body.

138 (Prābhākara:) If so, in "I am stout" the self is both the knower and the object known.

(Answer:) The self is not cognized as being itself stout; though it is the content of the mental perception of that ego whose body is stout. There is proof of the notion of an ego distinct from the body and the senses in the *Bhagavadgītā* and other texts.

139 (Prābhākara:) The self is only cognized as subject, never as object.

(Answer:) Then for them memory and recognition of oneself would be impossible, but such memory and recognition has to be accepted, since otherwise how could we prove a self's agency of some action in the past?

140 The self is not self-illuminating (*svaprakāśa*). All objects are illumined by something other than themselves. If the self were self-luminous it would be experienced even in sleep.

(Objection:) But when we awake we report "I slept happily".

(Answer:) "Happiness" here means absence of pain.
141 A self is all-pervading, though there are many selves.

22A *Mokṣa*¹

(Because of the relevance and importance of this topic for Indian philosophy we provide here portions explicatory of this section found in Ram-Prasad 1999 referred to below as "RP" together with translations of important passages by Ram-Prasad and by Venkatramiah 1940, here cited as "T".)

(E356-378; T177-191) 142 Review of Yogācāra and Advaita views on liberation. At the conclusion of this section we find the following passage:

"The world binds the man in three ways: through the body which is the home of enjoyment [through] the senses which are the means of enjoyment and [through] the objects - like sound and so on - which are enjoyed. Enjoyment is that which has happiness and suffering as its objects and it is said to be immediate experience. Thus, liberation is the permanent dissolution of these three bonds. What is this permanent dissolution? It is the destruction of the already existing body, senses and objects, and the non-origination of that which has not already arisen. How does this permanent non-origination come about? Through the utter extinction of virtue and vice that are the originators [of bondage]. Thus, bondage is being bound to the world and liberation is liberation from it." (Ram-Prasad 1999, p. 2, translation of E p. 358, lines 5-14)

143 (Objection to the Advaitin:) "When (as here stated) the whole of *dharma* becomes extinct there would be no happiness to the person who has obtained liberation and as such liberation ceases to be the highest human end.

"(Advaitin's answer:) There is nothing wrong here—The bliss of liberation is not generated by *dharma*. If it were so it would, being a thing born, be liable to destruction—a result which would be in conflict with the scriptural text "They do not return to mundane life" (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.15.1). The bliss of the self (*ātmānanda*) which there by its very nature (e. uncaused) having been; shrouded in *samsāra* manifests itself to one who is rid of *samsāra* and becomes fit for his enjoyment. (To substantiate) that bliss (*ānanda*) is such by its very nature

¹Numbered thus since there is no such section in Jaimini's *sūtras* nor in Śabara's *Bhāṣya*.

there are *śrutis* such as 'ānanda is Brahman' in thousands..." (T179)

Ram-Prasad explains: "Liberation from the conditions of embodiment and cognition is possible only when disembodied, so liberation cannot include any cognition. Pārthasārathi is motivated by the defense of this claim in his tight and sustained argument against the Advaitic notion that the content of liberation is given by blissful awareness. He concludes that the proper interpretation of Mīmāṃsā liberation is an absential one." (Ram-Prasad p. 4)

"His [Kumārila's] doctrine is in the statement of [the] absential nature [of liberation] alone...It is not possible for the freed one to experience bliss, for there are no organs. Could it be said that the mind exists [in liberation]? No, as the sacred text says of mindlessness 'Without mind, without speech'." (Ram-Prasad, p. 3, translation of E p. 362, lines 3-7; T181)

144. "The main issue for Pārthasārathi, then, is to meet the worry that liberation, as he understands it, would be no different from annihilation."

"In brief, Pārthasārathi's solution is to claim that, while the self is not conscious in liberation, it has cognitive potency (*jñānaśakti*); this potency could not be there if the self were not, and therefore the self in the non-cognitive state of liberation is not itself non-existent." (Ram-Prasad p. 4)

"Pārthasārathi's development of the idea of cognitive potency in fact derives from the well-established and crucial Mīmāṃsā idea that ritual action creates and stores up the potential [*apūrva*] for eventual consequences for the agent of action." (Ram-Prasad p. 4)

"The particular problem for the Mīmāṃsaka is that certain passages [of the Upaniṣads] seem to indicate that liberation is a supremely cognitive matter, in which consciousness of self is all. How can this be squared with the extinction of cognition, which the Mīmāṃsaka says is the very nature of liberation?"

"Pārthasārathi's basic defense is that in liberation the cessation of cognition is not the loss of the capacity for cognition. Annihilation would mean that there could never be anything left that could cognize again. But in Mīmāṃsā liberation the self persists (it is what is liberated, after all), and its persistence means that there is something left which could cognize again. (Ram-Prasad 1999 pp. 10-11)

"The import of the text 'No destruction of the cognition

of the cognizer is known' is that there is cognitive potency; or else, it will have to be said that cognition continues even in deep sleep. It has been said that that text just goes against all understanding. The import of cognitive potency is very clear; for it is taught, 'When it does not see, even while seeing it does not see'. There is no destruction of the sight of the seer; for it is not annihilated; 'Apart from it, there is no second that, being other and distinct from it, it could see' (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.3.23) (E362, lines 8-14; T181)

"Having denied content-less consciousness as the appropriate description of the state reported as being both a seeing and a non-seeing in this Upaniṣad, Pārthasārathi has to postulate potency in order to secure the seeing. The seeing is a capacity to see, while the not seeing is the simple absence of consciousness in the post-embodied state. The Advaitin, in contrast, takes seeing to be the intrinsic persistence of consciousness, the not seeing as the end of merely intentional consciousness." (Ram-Prasad 1999, pp. 11-12)

"If here [in sacred texts on the matter] the self does not see in sleep and freedom, [this means that] although seeing - although having the capacity to see - it does not see. There is never any loss of the cognitive potential of the seeing self; that is indestructible. In that state [sleep or freedom], there is no second thing apart from the seer to be the means of seeing; there is no perceived object upon whose form the eye could function, [and] whose existence could have secured [any such] seeing. Even though perceived objects, forms, etc., remain existent by themselves (in their own right), it is said that, nevertheless, in that state, the visibility (the fitness to be seen) of the visible [objects] is not possible, so that there is no seeing of forms. Thus, the absence [of any seeing of objects] is figuratively spoken of as the non-existence of the visible object. Hence, because of the deprivation of a distinct means [of seeing], it [the self] does not see in that state, but it is not deprived of its potency; the potency is never lost." (E p. 364, lines 10-20; T183)

"In the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (II.4.13), Maitreyī says that it is confusing of Yājñavalkya to say that 'sentience is absent in it' (*na cāsti samjñeti*) when it (the self) is dead and freed. He has, after all, earlier said of the self that it is 'nothing but sentience' (*vijñānaghana*). Pārthasārathi states and interprets Yājñavalkya's response thus:

"Oh, but I do not say anything that confuses through

contradiction. It is indeed able to cognize.'

"This means that the truth about the self is that in all its states it has the capacity to cognize. It is, then, the case that the explanation that the self is nothing but sentience is intended to point out such capacity...All such sacred texts on sentience intend to point out potency." (E pp. 365-366; T183)(Ram-Prasad p. 13)

146 "Due to the non-existence of the means [of cognition], the cognition of objects other than the self is ruled out. But there is yet the doubt as to why it is not admitted that the self cognizes itself in freedom; so it is said [in the sacred texts], 'by what could cognize the cognizer?'. The self indeed does not have the capacity to cognize without the means. It does cognize through the mind in the state of worldly existence, but there is no relationship with the mind in freedom. Hence, how could the self cognize itself? Obviously, self-cognition is therefore absent in one who is free. The sacred texts have pointed out that only the potency for cognition is resident [in the self]." (E366, lines 12-19; T184) (Ram-Prasad 16-17)

147 (Advaitin:) The self persists both in sleep and in liberation.

(Answer:) Since even though objects persist while asleep, since they are not seen in sleep consciousness is not intrinsic to a self. Thus bliss, e.g., cannot be intrinsic to a self either.

148. It is explained how the self can be said to return to its pristine condition when liberated.

150. The eternity of a self is attested in scripture.

23 Śabdānityatva

(E379-430; T192-227) 1-2 (Objection:) If the meaning of a word were, as you contend, natural and eternal, we could not explain how its meaning is not understood on the first hearing of a word. What is the proof for the non-eternality of words?

(Answer:) Though the meaning is eternal its revelation requires a particular condition, an added feature.

(Objector:) Does this added feature qualify the word or the hearing of it? Since (you say) a word is part-less its parts cannot be purified, and since the sense of hearing is just space again it has not parts that could be purified, and further it will follow that a sound has to be heard everywhere and there can

be no hearing of different sounds at different places at the same time.

3-7 (Answer:) It is the ear, not space, that is purified, and my ear, like my awareness, is distinct from yours. And the differences between sounds is due to the differences in the bodily elements that play their part in the production and the hearing of a sound (or word). Just as the sun, though one, can be experienced in different places and times by different persons, or an object reflected into different places and times by the presence there of a mirror, so is the case with (a) word.

8 (Objection:) The reflection (in a mirror) is a different object from the thing reflected.

(Answer:) No, the ray from the eye is repulsed by the ray proceeding from the mirror and is so turned back and so constitutes both the image of the object and of its experiencing.

10 The Buddhist view of *śabda* is refuted. They cannot admit any contact between a sense-organ and an object, since both are momentary. This also shows that the Nyāya view of the brief existence of a word is mistaken.

11 (Objection:) Though a word is momentary, after repeated utterances in different places one recognizes their relation through cognition of the power of the word through the similarity and differences between those utterances.

(Answer:) The similarity is what proves the unity of the word.

12 (Objection:) Though there may be recognition, that does not prove there is a universal property of meaning (in a word).

(Answer:) If there is no universal property how can there be recognition?

13 This (recognition,) is not a distinct instrument of knowledge but is merely a kind of perception that arises from hearing, a kind constituted of both apprehension and recollection.

14-16 (Buddhist:) Since everything is momentary *śabda* cannot be eternal.

(Answer:) What is the instrument that establishes universal momentariness? Not perception, which is confined to the knowledge of what occurs at the present moment only.

(Buddhist:) The instrument is that inference which has a thing's nature (*svabhāva*) as its *hetu* and existence (*sattā*) as its *sādhyā*. Only that which exists has causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*), and only non-eternal things (can) have

that, since all the effects of an eternal entity must be eternal.

17 (Answer:) Not every object has causal efficacy. E.g., the seed is the cause of the sprout only when there is contact of the seed with earth and water.

(Buddhist:) So it is not the seed that is causally efficacious, but the contact between the seed and the other two.

(Answer:) But contact by itself doesn't produce a sprout, so it is not causally efficacious. Moreover, your view (of momentariness) entails that a thing does not require a cause for its destruction—that happens naturally. But it is evident that destruction—otherwise called the posterior absence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*)—of a thing such as a pot requires some exterior cause, like smashing, to bring it about. Otherwise there could be no recognition of an object.

18 (Objection:) If there were only one sound there could be no universal property soundness (*śābdatva*).

(Answer:) But there must be, since we do recognize a sound as the same sound. Thus we must recognize an instrument of knowledge called recognition. By it we recognize the syllable "ga" in this word as the same syllable as the "ga" in that word.

24 Vākya

(E434-464; T217-227) (Footnote 2, p. 217 of T) "We have no means of ascertaining that a particular sentence has a particular meaning; we know only the denotativeness of words (*śabdaśakti*). *Yāga*, which is the desired objective alone, constitutes *dharma* and that is known through the sentence and not through words; hence the impossibility of ascertaining the denotativeness of a sentence."

2 (Objection:) But it is the meaning of the sentence we want to know and not merely the meanings of the words.

3-4 (Prābhākara:) (p. 220, footnote 6 of T) "The sentence itself is directly denotative of its sense by *upalakṣaṇa-sambandha* and not through the meanings of words (*padārtha*)."

(Answer:) (p. 220, footnote 6a of T) "In the sentence ["bring the cow", "*gāmānava*"] its denotativeness is understood through inference based on positive and negative concomitance..., but when the same sentence is heard later, the *śābdabodha* is not, says the Bhāṭṭa *siddhāntin*, got from the sentence direct but only from a recollection of the meanings of words comprising the sentence for, as it is pointed out, even when a few words are forgotten one is able to construct the

sense, and there need be no verbal recollection."

5-9 These passages review some of the arguments involved in the debated between the *ānvitābhīdhanavāda* and the *abhihitānvayavāda*, as well as a brief refutation of the doctrine of sentence- (as well as) word-*sphoṭa*.

25 Vedānityatā

(E435-474; T228-233) 1 (Naiyāyika:) (Quoting *Nyāyamañjari*) "The Vedas owe their origin to human agency because they are in the form of sentences like the (*Mahā*)*Bhārata* etc. [in which] the mention of names like 'Katha' also becomes significant (if it is admitted that) the Veda is the work (of someone)."

2 (Prābhākara:) (p. 229, footnote 2 of T) "The construction of a sentence presupposes the comprehension of the subject which forms the content of the sentence...The meaning of the Vedas (*vedārtha*) however is *apūrva* which is incomprehensible by anyone of the ordinary means of knowledge. Hence how could man construct sentences relating to such transcendental matter?"

3 (Naiyāyika:) (p. 229, footnote 3 of T) "The Mīmāṃsakas point out the inadmissibility of the human origin of the Veda on the ground that prior to the comprehension of the sense the formation of sentences is impossible and that such comprehension is ruled out in the case of the Veda since it speaks of super-sensuous objects. This counter-argument consists of reminding the Mīmāṃsaka (of the Prābhākara school in particular) that he is in no better position in construing the Vedic mandatory sentences. The optative form (*liñ*) he has to admit expresses action or *kārya* in general and it can be understood to denote *apūrva* only by what is known as inference by elimination (*pariśeṣānumāna*). When one has acquired the primary sense, viz. *apūrva*, in this manner one could certainly write, says the Naiyāyika, passages denoting *apūrva*."

3-4 (Answer:) If the Vedas were of human origin their author(s) would be remembered. But no such author is remembered. So there was no such author.

5 (Explained thus by the translator (Venkatramiah) in footnote 7, p. 232 of T): "The first *sūtra*, '*athāto dharmajijñāsā*', enunciates four propositions [rather, questions], viz., (i) What is the nature of *dharma*?, (2) by which *pramāṇa* is *dharma* to

be ascertained?, (3) what are its aids, and (4) what is its objective?

"As regards (1), i.e. the nature of *dharma*, it is incidentally known when what constitute the *pramāṇa*(s) of *dharma* are known. As regards (2) it has been seen that the Veda alone is the *pramāṇa* by which to understand the nature of *dharma*.

"Now the validity of mandatory statements (*vidhivākya*) alone has been established in the first section of the first Chapter. But authoritative-ness has to be established not only of mandatory statements but also of *arthavāda*, *smṛti* and *nāmadheya* and this is done respectively in the second, third and fourth sections of the first Chapter.

"The *arthavādas* are laudatory passages extolling the *yāga*. The *smṛtis* are works composed by such eminent personages like Manu and Yājñavalkya and have their source in the Veda. The names, such as *jyotiṣṭoma* etc., are intended to create interest in the performance of *yāga*. Hence all three are assigned equal authority with the *vidhis* or mandatory texts.

"(3) and (4) are detailed in the remaining Chapters, i.e. from two to twelve."

24.4 PĀRTHASĀRATHI MĪŚRA, *Nyāyaratnākara* on Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*

VARs p. 64: "It gives in many places a lucid summary of the contents of the [*Śloka*]Vārttika and refers to various *ācāryas*—Bhavadāsa, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Bhikṣu [?] and Bhartr̥mitra—whose views are said to have been refuted by the Vārttikakāra. This work is very brief and clear and as such renders great help in the elucidation of the obscure verses of the *Ślokavārttika*."

The section of this work commenting upon *Ślokavārttika* II.47-48 is analyzed at length in Taber 1992, pp. 210-211, and the following three stanzas he translates thus (p. 211):

II 49-51 "Even though a cognition has arisen, an object will not be determined (by it) so long as the purity (*śuddhatva*) of (its) cause has not been ascertained from another *pramāṇa*. For that purpose, another cognition must arise from another cause. Indeed, as long as the purity (of the cause of the first cognition) is not determined, it will be as though it did not exist. (But) that (second) cognition (which ascertains the purity

of the cause of the first cognition) will be valid only if its cause is pure, and so for the (cognition required to ascertain the purity of the cause of the second cognition). Considering matters in this way, one never reaches an end."

25 SUCARITA MĪŚRA (1120)-

Little or nothing seems to be known about him.

25.1 SUCARITA MĪŚRA, *Kāśikā* on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* NCat VIII, 95 lists location(s) of this work.

25.2 SUCARITA MĪŚRA, *Kāśikā* on Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*

Edited several times. Passages from this work are translated and/or explained by Ganganatha Jha in GJ. T. Takenaka, in StudM p. 111, translates a sentence from this work (Trivandrum Skt. Series No. 90 ed., 1934, p.16.14-15 and 16.20-17.15) and summarizes in the following exposition:

"Sucarita says in his *Kāśikā*, 'At the final perception accompanied with impressions which occurred from many previous perceptions, one comes to know that smoke possesses the nature of being inevitably connected with fire (*vahniniyatasvabhāvatva*).' We have had many experiences of the relationship of co-existence between smoke and fire repeatedly, and these experiences are retained in the mind in the form of latent impressions [traces]. And at the final perception, these traces remind us of the co-existential relationship which had been experienced in repeated cognitions. At this moment, the organs help bring forth the knowledge of *vyāpti* in the form of grasping (perceiving) smoke. Therefore, even though recollection (*smṛti*) works here, as far as the organs also work it is doubtlessly perception. In this final perception, first a smoke is grasped in an construction-free (cognition, and then the construction-filled cognition whose object is the nature of smoke that it is inevitably connected with fire, occurs. It is the *niyama* that this determinate cognition apprehends as its object.

26 PARITOSA MĪŚRA (1150)

"Probably a native of Bengal", says VARs, p. 70.

26.1 PARITOṢA MIŚRA, *Ajitā* or *Nibandhana* on Kumārila's *Tantravārtika*

Edited by Kosor Nath Jha, Kamalyana Sarma and Arcana Caturvedi from Prayag in 1988. VARS p. 70: "It is brief and more helpful than *Nyāyasudhā* in understanding the *Vārttika* with its involved style. The earliest reference to the work and its commentary *Vijayā* by Anantanārāyaṇa is found in Parameśvara III's *Sūtrārthasamgraha*. The *Ajitā* is otherwise known as *Tantratīkānibandhana*."

27 HALĀYUDHA BHATTA (1180)

Ramulu, p. xi, says he's from Bengal. Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya has written an article about him and his works, which is summarized in PAIOC 17, Summaries, p. 4.

27.1 HALĀYUDHA BHATTA, *Mīmāṃsāsāstrasarvasva*

Edited by Umesh Mishra in Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 17-18, 1931-1932.

28 DĀMODARA (1200)

No information.

28.1 DĀMODARA, *Tarkārṇava*

Manuscript citations in NCat 8, 135; 9, 18. See V. A. Ramawami Sastri, "*Tarkārṇava* (*Prameyaparāyaṇa*) of Dāmodara—a rare work on the Prābhākara-mīmāṃsā", PAIOC 16, Summaries 1951, 217-219.

29 VATSVEŚVĀRA (1200)

DB, p. 94 reports that "Gaṅgeśa quoted the opinions of Vatsēśvara, the Mīmāṃsaka of the Prābhākara school, to whom the *Mīmāṃsāmahārṇava* is attributed."

29.1 VATSVEŚVĀRA, *Mīmāṃsāmahārṇava*

DB, p. 94, cites a reference in the manuscript of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* with Pragalbha's *Tīkā* located at the Asiatic Society of Bengal, #88b.

30 MURĀRI MIŚRA (1210)

Umesh Mishra in the Introductory section of his article UM1930 carefully distinguishes this Murāri Miśra from several others with whom the presently-discussed writer is (mistakenly) identified. After an extended discussion, he concludes that this Murāri Miśra is the composer of the two works discussed below but not of the drama *Anargharāghava*, whose author must have lived earlier, nor of other non-philosophical works ascribed to a Murāri, nor even of the work entitled *Āṅgatvanirukti*, which though a Mīmāṃsā work refers to other Mīmāṃsā works that were written by later authors such as Appayya Dīkṣita and Khandadeva.

Umesh Mishra speculates that the two works now to be discussed were perhaps two parts of a complete commentary on all the sections of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*.

Ujjwala Panse, in Panse 1990, p.5, sums up the history of the collection of Murāri Miśra's works. "In 1928 one fragment of Murāri's work was published in the Journal of Oriental Research (JORM). This text was the *Arthavādādhikarāna* which forms a part of the *Tripādīnītinayanam* (i.e. the *Arthavādādhikarāna*, the *Mantrādhikarāna* and the *Smṛtyadhikarāna* of Murāri, edited by S. K. Ramanatha Sastri of the University of Madras" [Cf. Journal of Oriental Research 2, 1928, pp. 270-278.]... "In the following year another section i.e. the *Ekādaśādyādhikarāna* appeared in the Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona (ABORI)... This was edited by Umeśa Miśra of Allahabad University." [See Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, Volume 10, 1929, pp. 238-243.] "In 1920 Umeśa Miśra wrote" UM1930... In 1931 again Journal of Oriental Research, Madras published two remaining *adhikarānas* of the *Tripādīnītinayana*... namely, the *Mantrādhikarāna* and the *Smṛtyadhikarāna*." [Journal of Oriental Research 5, 1931, pp. 1-8.] Both she and Umesh Mishra suggest that Murāri Miśra may have written an entire commentary on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*.

Ms. Panse (p. 13-14) also discusses Murāri Miśra's date and comes to the same conclusion as Umesh Mishra. The earliest author who refers to Murāri Miśra is Gaṅgeśa, who lived in the fourteenth century (cf. Volume Six of this Encyclopedia, p. 85-86). Murāri himself refers to Candra and Bhavanātha in our list of Mīmāṃsā authors, who are dated to the eleventh century. This suggests that Murāri Miśra's date

may be estimated to fall in the 12th-13th centuries.

Gerdi Gerschheimer (GG 1994) is unwilling to accept Panse's conclusions on the date, and calls for further investigation.

30.1 MURĀRI MIŚRA, *Tripādīnītinayana*

As we saw above this may have been the title of an entire commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, of which only fragments are now available.

Ujjwala Panse (Panse 1990, pp. 14-21) provides "A Brief Outline of Murāri's Texts", from which we provide excerpts. Many of the interpretations and readings provided by Panse are questioned and attacked in GG 1994, which needs to be considered carefully before basing one's readings on Panse's interpretations.

Summary by Ujjwala Panse

Arthavādādhikaraṇa

(pp. 15-16) "The aim of the *Arthavādādhikaraṇa* is to establish the validity of the *arthavādas* which form one part of the Vedas. Murāri in the very beginning states the *pūrvapakṣa* of Prabhākara as attested in the *Brhātī* of Prabhākara. Prabhākara's *pūrvapakṣa* is: Since it was decided that only that portion of the Veda is valid which enjoins some activity to be performed (*kārya*) and since the *arthavādas* neither convey any *kārya* nor can they form a sentence-unity with the injunctions, they cannot be authoritative.

"Murāri, not agreeing with the *pūrvapakṣa* of [i.e., against] Prabhākara, states the *siddhānta* or conclusion of Prabhākara which is as follows: Since the injunction to study enjoins the study of the whole Veda, in order to maintain the authority of this *vidhi* the *arthavādas* have to be authoritative. And for that the *arthavādas* must form sentence-unity with the injunctions even by changing their forms. Another point is that the *vidhis* also require...praise in order to induce a person to take up an activity.

"Murāri, after stating these two points, rejects both the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *siddhānta* of Prabhākara. The reason is...that the *pūrvapakṣa* formed by Prabhākara fails to establish the consistency and relation with the first *pāda* of" Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*.

"Then Murāri suggests a new *pūrvapakṣa*. He says, it is

necessary to form a *pūrvapakṣa* on the basis of sentence-unity. Why? Because if the *pūrvapakṣa* is formed in that manner, then alone the consistency in the argument can be shown by objecting to the authority of the injunctions which have formed sentence-unity with non-authoritative *arthavādas*.

"...Murāri ultimately offers a solution to the problem of the sentence-unity between the *vidhis* and the *arthavādas*. There is no question that the *arthavādas* serve the purpose of either praise or censure. But Murāri discusses clearly how the *arthavādas* get related to the *vidhi* through praise or censure. He says, in [the] case of the *nindānuvādas* (i.e. the *arthavādas* condemning some particular action), firstly, the knowledge of word-meanings takes place, and then, by illusion the understanding of the sentence's meaning arises. The form of that understanding happens to be as follows: (in case of, say, 'Barhisi rajatam na deyem-Rudrah kila ruroda') 'Since the silver is produced from the weeping of Agni (i.e. Rudra) its offering will cause weeping.' After this understanding which has taken place by illusion, one realizes that giving silver in the Barhis sacrifice is not good. In other words, not offering it in that sacrifice is what is to be achieved. And, ultimately, the injunctive sentence of that sacrifice produces the understanding of its own meaning along with this above-mentioned meaning of the *arthavāda*.

"Similarly, the case of the *praśamsārthavādas* (i.e. the *arthavādas* praising some particular action), by *lakṣaṇā* praise is understood first. Here *lakṣaṇā* arising through illusory cognition has been accepted..."

Panse 1990, pp. 102-201, provides a complete text and translation of this section.

Mantrādhikaraṇa

(p. 17) "The *Mantrādhikaraṇa* discusses the authoritativeness of [the] *mantra*-portion of the Vedas. The main doubt raised is whether the *mantras* help the sacrifice only by their recitation or through expressing their meanings.

"The stand of [the] *pūrvapakṣin* is that they [the *mantras*] do not express their meaning but they help the performance of the *yāga* [sacrifice] merely by their recitation. This is refuted by the *siddhāntin* and it is established ultimately that the *mantras* help the sacrifice through expressing their meaning..."

"Murāri points out that it is not the case that all *mantras*

are enjoined by *vidhis*. It is also not the case that all *mantras* are enjoined by *liṅga pramāna*. Because in some cases the meaning of a *mantra* is something else and it is employed by an injunction to a rite which has no relation with that meaning. Such injunctions are called *anyārthasāstras*. Again there are some *mantras* which are employed by *vidhi* in a specific sense since on the basis of the general meaning of the *mantras* there is likelihood of their being employed in an unwanted case. Thus, the purpose of the *vidhi* is to specify the employment of the *mantra*. Again there is another set of *mantras* which are enjoined by some *vidhi* the meaning of which does not differ from that of the *mantra*. These *vidhis* are called *tadarthasāstras*. In such cases it is accepted in the *siddhānta* that the injunctions simply repeat the meaning of the *mantra*.

"Thus, from all these a general rule can be evolved that unless otherwise specified a *mantra* will be employed taking into account its meaning.

Smrtyadhikarāna

(Pp. 18-19) "In the *Smrtyadhikarāna* the authoritativeness of the *smṛti*-literature is being established.

"There are certain acts like the *aṣṭakākārya*, the digging of a well, preparing a shade and making an arrangement for distribution of water and the like which are part of the Vedic culture and which are performed to earn *dharma* by way of service to the departed soul or people at large.

"The question is on what authority these acts are performed. Obviously there is no *vidhi* in the Vedic lore to enjoin these acts. Nevertheless these acts are part and parcel of the Vedic culture and are performed on the authority of the *smṛti*-literature. Naturally, the question arises whether *smṛtis* have authoritativeness with regard to these rites which are aimed at producing unseen results and hence are *dharma*. In other words, whether the source of the *smṛtis* on the basis of which these rites are performed is illusion or the Veda itself.

"The *pūrvapakṣin* denies its [i.e., a *smṛti* work's] authority on the ground that they [*smṛtis*] are based on illusive cognition. And since the *smṛtis* are non-authoritative, the Vedic *mantras* which are united with them are also non-authoritative and since the *mantras* are the Veda the entire Veda becomes non-authoritative. Now, since the main proposition is challenged in this way, it is relevant to discuss here in this section the authoritativeness of the *smṛtis*.

"One cannot argue that the particular Vedic injunction on which the *smṛti*-rites depend is not available now because the branch of the Veda to which that sentence belonged is lost. Because, if this argument is allowed there should have been no branch left now, which is not a fact...

"Here Murāri presents the *siddhāntin's* view. According to the *siddhāntin*, although it is a fact that we do not find today the Vedic injunctions corresponding to the *smṛti*-rites, still we can infer those injunctions. Now the question remains, on what ground can we infer those injunctions? Murāri turns down the possibility of employing *smṛtitva*, [i.e.] 'being a *smṛti*', or *Manvādismṛtitva*, 'being a *smṛti* of Manu', etc., as the ground or reason for such an inference, and finally suggests that one can infer those Vedic injunctions by *pariśeṣānumāna*."

Ekādaśādhikarāṇa

(pp. 19-21) Śābara "defines *tantra* as: 'Yat sakṛtkṛtam bahūnām upakaroti tattantra ity ucyate', i.e., that which helps many things being performed only once is called *tantra*. For instance, a lamp lit once illumines many *brāhmanas* at a time.

"...Murāri...attempts to reach a clear definition of *tantra* and accordingly he discusses many possible definitions of" it... Disagreeing with all these definitions of *tantra*, Murāri gives his own definition as follows: '*Ekasyānuṣṭhānasya sarvārthatvam*', i.e. 'a *tantra* is that single performance which is meant for all'. He explains this definition further and says that since there is no purpose in performing the same act again and again, it is not performed. But that itself is not *tantra*, i.e. not performing the rite again is not called the state of being *tantra*. In other words, *tantra* is not a negative concept but a positive one. *Tantra* is actually a single performance that is meant for many."

Umesh Mishra (UM1930, pp. 980-994) provides us with an analysis of the philosophical points on which Murāri Miśra provides an account which differs significantly from those of the two "schools" of Mīmāṃsā, viz., Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara. From his comments it is apparent that he is drawing his information from references in texts themselves defending the Nyāya system. It is not clear whether these points should be associated with Murāri's beliefs or those of others related in some fashion to the "school" of which Murāri is alleged to be the founder, or perhaps to other Murāri Miśras. Nevertheless, his points are intended to relate to our Murāri, and they are of more philosophical interest than the matters addressed in the four

works (selections) from Murāri's works summarized above. So, with trepidation, we provide in what follows the greater portion of Umesh Mishra's analysis.

Categories

[On the topic of the categories in Murāri Miśra one should consult Gerdi Gerschheimer's GG 1995-1996.]

"Of the...references about Murāri Miśra, the reference of the views given by Jayarāma [Nyāyapāñcānana in his *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā*] is very helpful and important. It gives us an enumeration of the categories of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā accepted by Murāri Miśra. According to Murāri, says Jayarāma, there is only *one* reality and that is Brahman. But like the Vedāntins of the Māyāvādin school, he also believes, for the sake of worldly usage (*vyavahāre tu*) in *dharmaviśeṣa*, *dharmaviśeṣa*, *ādharaviśeṣa* and *pradeśaviśeṣa*...

1. *Dharmaviśeṣa*: This may be explained as 'a definite substratum' (*niyata āśraya*), i.e. as a *ghaṭa* which is a definite substratum of *ghatātva*.

2. *Dharmaviśeṣa*: It means 'a definite *ādheya*', that is, an attribute: as for instance, *ghatātva*, which is a definite *ādheya* of *ghata*.

3. *Ādhāraviśeṣa*: This, an 'indefinite support' (*aniyata ādhāra*) in the form of moments of time, as for example '*idānīm ghaṭaḥ*', '*tadānīm ghaṭaḥ*' etc., where the words...denotative of time are an indefinite support of *ghata*.

4. *Pradeśaviśeṣa*, which means 'an indefinite support in the form of space', as in '*grhe ghaṭaḥ*', '*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*' etc., where the words '*grhe*', '*bhūtale*' etc., stand as an indefinite spatial support of *ghata*.

"This makes it clear that according to Murāri Miśra, truly speaking, there is only *one real entity*—Brahman, which is beyond the limits of time and space. The other four categories, which represent substance and attribute, are accepted as far as this unreal (*aparamārtha*) world is concerned. This is exactly what the Advaitavedānta teaches. Hence it can be said that the two schools are identical in this respect.

"Now this fact lends support to the belief that the final aim of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā was also originally the same as that of the Advaitavedānta. It may be pointed out here that Kumārila also supports this view in his *Vārtika*, where it is said that the final aim, that is, the realization of the nature of the self, is to be found in the Vedānta; and thereby Kumārila gives an advice

to his readers indirectly that they should not think the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is an independent system having nothing to do with Brahman. This view further gets support from Rucipati Thakkura, who in his commentary on [another?] Murāri Miśra's *Anargharāghava* says "*brahmamīmāṃsā bhattamatam. brahmapratipādatvātr tasy*". Thus it is evident that as late as the 15th century A. D., which is the probable date of Rucipati Thakkura, it was a recognized fact that Kumārila Bhatta was a Vedāntin and had expounded the theory of Brahman.¹

The Theory of *Prāmānya*

"The next more important point about Murāri Miśra is his independent view on the *prāmānyavāda*. We know that about the validity of a *pramāna* there are two most important recognized theories, one, as the *svataḥprāmānya* held by the Mīmāṃsākas and the other as the *parataḥprāmānya* accepted by the Naiyāyikas. Even amongst the Mīmāṃsākas themselves there are three different views attributed to Prabhākara, Kumārila and Murāri Miśra. To clear the point we would like to put the whole theory as follows:

1. The Naiyāyikas hold that (a) due to sense-organ-and-object contact a simple recognition is produced in the form of '*ayam ghaṭaḥ*' (*vyavasāyātmakajñāna*) after the *nirvikalpaka-jñāna* of the same; (b) then there is the after-cognition of the same and [it] is expressed in the form of a judgment 'I possess the knowledge of a pot'; (c) then follows the remembrance of the two possibilities—that the judgment may be veridical or not—, (d) then a doubt as to whether the *jñāna* is valid or not comes up; (e) and lastly, after the perception of the distinguishing feature (*viśeṣa*) the valid [form] is recognized in the form of '*idam jñānam pramā, samarthapravṛttijanakatvāt jñānāntaravat*', that is, 'this piece of cognition is valid, as it leads to an effective effort, like another piece of cognition'. This is how a Naiyāyika proves the validity of a cognition.

"2. Coming to the Mīmāṃsākas, on the other hand, we find they have got their independent views about this problem which may be classed under three different heads attributed to the three distinguished exponents of the theory:— Prabhākara, Kumārila and Murāri.

¹This is Pañse's theory; it is not the standard view of scholars generally.

"(a) Prabhākara school. According to Prabhākara, after the sense-organ-and-object contact a construction-filled awareness is produced which is afterwards expressed in the form of a judgment which includes an object of awareness (say, a pot), a subject of the awareness (the self), and the awareness is, of course, there already. An awareness, according to him, being self-illuminated (*svaprakāśa*) reveals itself along with its object and subject as well as the validity of its own self. Thus it is through the first awareness (*vyavasāya*) itself that the validity of that awareness is cognized. In other words, the implements which led to the production of an awareness also proves the validity of that awareness..

"(b) Kumārila, on the other hand, holds that an awareness is super-sensuous (*atīndriya*) and its presence is inferred from a property called knownness (*jñātata*), which is produced in that awareness after the latter's production, and together with that knownness the validity of that awareness is also inferred. In other words, according to him, after the cognition expressed in the form of a judgment "this is a pot" (*ayam ghataḥ*) a kind of property called "knownness" is produced in the pot and then we get the perception of this knownness, which is then expressed in the form of a judgment "a pot is known to me" (*jñāto mayā ghataś*), after which the presence of the awareness which was produced by the sense-organ-and-object contact is inferred and is expressed in the form 'aham ghatatvakārajñānavāt, ghatatva-prakārajñātātāvāt' and along with this inference the validity of that inferred awareness is also arrived at. Thus it is clear that Kumārila does not depend upon the effectiveness of the effort to prove the validity of the awareness. That is, the validity is not arrived at through some external element.

(c) Now, coming to the last exponent of the theory, we find that the school of Murāri Mīśra holds that after the sense-organ-and-object contact an awareness is produced, which is expressed in the form of a judgment "this is a pot" after which comes the after-cognition of the same awareness in the form of a judgment 'I possess the knowledge of the pot'. This very after-cognition gives us the validity of the awareness expressed in the form of a judgment "this is a pot". Here also for the validity of the first awareness Murāri Mīśra does not depend upon any other external source but upon the second awareness itself. Thus it is called a process of "intrinsic validity" (*svataḥ prāmānyavāda*).

"Now we find that the line of thought adopted by Murāri Mīśra closely resembles that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But there is a difference between their views. In the case of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika we have seen above that there is a *doubt* regarding the validity of the awareness, which doubt is not possible in the present case. The reason is, that in the present case, the implement of arriving at the validity is the very presence of that organ of awareness (*jñānendriya*), namely the mind or internal organ (*manas*), which is ever present. In other words, it is through the after-cognition that the validity is arrived at and hence in unrepeatable cases (*anabhyāsadaśāyām*) no doubt arises as to whether, for instance, the cognition of water is valid or not. Thus it is clear that according to the school of Murāri Mīśra it is through the sufficient condition (*sāmagrī*) of the direct perception of the awareness—the after-cognition—which is produced by an awareness (a determination, *vyavasāya*) that the validity of that determination is recognized.

"Keeping aside the details of the three views we find, in simple words, that (a) Prabhākara holds that the *same thing* which produced an awareness also gives us the validity of that awareness. (b) Kumārila holds that it is through the knownness, which is produced by the awareness, that the validity of that awareness, which has produced the knownness, is inferred and not through the awareness itself. (c) Murāri Mīśra, on the other hand, is of [the] opinion that the validity is arrived at through the awareness (, the after-cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) or mental awareness (*mānasika*)—of the first, determining awareness."

"The analysis of the views of the three schools given above shows that truly speaking it is the view of Prabhākara only which deserves the name of "intrinsic validity" (*svataḥ prāmānyavāda*), according to whom the validity is known through the very instruments (*svataḥ*, that is, *svajñānanajanakasāmagrī*) which produces the awareness, in the true sense of the word.

"According to Kumārila it is not directly through an awareness of the awareness of the first awareness that its validity is cognized. Hence, the true implication of the word 'svataḥ' is not possible here. Here the awareness is produced through the sense-organ-and-object contact, as usual, although we are not aware of the awareness before the establishment of the validity of that awareness through the perception of the knownness. We should not forget here that according to Kumārila awareness is supersensuous and it is through the

knownness produced by that very awareness and which is sensuous that the existence of the cause of the knownness, namely, the awareness, is inferred. In other words, the awareness is produced by one kind of instrument while the validity is cognized by another kind of instrument of knowledge. Hence Kumārila cannot claim to be a true exponent of the theory of intrinsic validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*). No doubt thereby no one can deny the *relative* intrinsicity (*svatastva*) of the theory, but truly speaking Kumārila's view is more or less that of extrinsic (*parataḥ*) validity..

"Similarly, the view of Murāri Miśra is far from being satisfactory. Murāri is only indirectly following the intrinsicity theory by holding that the validity is arrived at by the awareness of an awareness. In this respect his position is better than that of Kumārila, but truly speaking his is also an extrinsic-validity position, as the instrument of knowledge is not the same in both the cases..."

The Theory of Error

"Next we pass on to the Theory of Error. Murāri Miśra, like Kumārila, holds that it is an *anyathākhyāti* according to which, in the words of Pakṣadhara Miśra 'the knowledge of potness as a chief qualifier (*prakāra*) is possible even when a pot as a qualificand is not present, although being the qualificand of pot (*ghaṭaviśeṣyakatva*) cannot be the limiter of a joint presence (of pot and potness) (*anvayitāvachchedaka*) which is only possible when they are both present, which is not possible in the present case, as the pot is absent".

Causality

"As to the question of causality also we find that Murāri Miśra differs from the usually recognized views of the schools of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The view of the Mīmāṃsā school, as expounded by Prabhākara, is that the particular kind of power (*śakti*) inherent in the cause produces the particular kind of effect; as for instance the particular kind of power favorable to *dāha* (burning), present in the fire, produces the burning sensation.

"The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, hold that as there is overcomplexity in the above view, we should say that a cause is that which is qualified by the absence of obstacles. In other words, the fire, for example, is the cause of burning only when

that fire is qualified as possessing the absence of obstacles (*pratibandhakābhāvaviśiṣṭa*).

"Murāri Miśra does not believe in either of the two above views. He holds that neither the absence of obstacles nor the presence of a special power in the cause can produce an effect. Rather, a cause is that which is other than that which is obstructed and which is characterized by the particular moments of time in which that cause exists; as for instance, a fire, which is other than that fire which is obstructed, and which is characterized by the particular moments of time of its existence, is the cause of the effect (burning) which is characterized by the moments of its production. Absence of obstacles, he adds, is just like being a stick in the case of the effect pot, although that absence of obstacles is a limiter of the cause's causality. In other word, he does not believe absence of obstacles to be a cause.

"Now a question is raised against this view: Space, for instance, which is the cause of sound and which is only one (*ekavyaktika*), will no longer be a cause of sound; for according to the view of Murāri the cause of sound should be that space which is characterized by the moments of the time of its existence and which is other than the space which is limited, that is, along with the obstacle. But as there is only one space, how can we have one attributeless space and another limited space? To this Murāri gives as answer that we should take a particular drum, which is characterized by the absence of a limiter, to be the cause of a particular sound. As there are several drums, for instance, there will be no difficulty in finding a particular drum which will be different from that particular drum. It is also clear from this that Murāri may not accept space to be the inherence-cause of sound.

Theory of Knowledge

"It is clear that Kumārila does not accept the perceptibility of awareness. According to him an awareness is cognized through presumption. It is only a property of awareness-named 'knownness' (*jñātata*)-which is an object of direct perception.

"Prabhākara, likewise, has got his own independent view on this topic. He holds that awareness is *svaparakāśa* (self-illuminated). It is necessary, according to him, as the nature of his self is essentially inert (*jada*).

"But Murāri, a follower of the third path, has got

altogether a different view. He thinks that awareness is perceptible. There seems to be enough influence of the Naiyāyikas on his view.

31 SOMEŚVARA BHATTA (1250)

VARs p. 71: "The earliest reference to him and to his work is probably made, according to Parameśvara II, the commentator on the *Nītitattvāvīrbhava*, by Cidānanda in his work. Later authors like Somanātha Dīksita and Khaṇḍadevamīśra profusely quote him in their works.

"Some seem to have opined that he is the son of Vidyāranya Mādhava of the 14th century on the ground that he has mentioned in a colophon one Mādhavārya as his father. Evidently he is a different person. The only thing that suggests a later date for him is his style which is very coarse and resembles that of a much later writer. But the reference by Cidānanda suggests the period to which we have assigned him."

VARs gives "1200" as Someśvara's date, and adds a long footnote showing that this Someśvara is not the same as "Bhatta Someśvara the son of Vāmana Bhatta and grandson of Mahādevabhāṭṭa of Maura family".

31.1 SOMEŚVARA BHATTA, *Nyāyasudhā* on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*

It has been edited by Mukunda Sastri in Chōwkhamba Sanskrit Series 14, 1902-1909.

31.2 SOMEŚVARA BHATTA, *Tantrasāra*

According to T. R. Chintamani there is a manuscript of this work held (somewhere) in Santiniketan.

32 MAHĀDEVĀŚRAMA or ANANYĀNUBHAVA or AVAYABHAVA (1250)

No information available.

32.1 MAHĀDEVĀŚRAMA, *Cintāmani* on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* (NCat I, 430-431; VIII, 94)

33 VARADARĀJA (1250)

Nothing seems to be known, but there is a possibility that references for "Varadarāja" are not to this 13th-century

author but rather the Varadarāja who appears to have flourished in the 16th century, #58 below.

33.1 VARADARĀJA, *Arthadīpikā* (NCat I, 383)

33.2 VARADARĀJA, *Dīpikā* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

This work is edited by Srinivasa Sastri Subrahmanya Sastri, along with Jaimini's text, Bhavanātha Miśra's *Nayaviveka*, and Ravideva's *Vivekatattva*. Volume One, New Delhi 1977.

34 NANDĪŚVARA (1280)

VARs p. 74: "After Bhavanātha comes Nandīśvara who has written a very good *prakarana* work called *Prabhākaravijaya* in the Prābhākara school. He says in one of the introductory verses (= [quoted] that the essential doctrines of Prabhākara have already been fully elucidated by two Nāthas--Sālikanātha and Bhavanātha--and that his further attempt has not much of originality in it. The upper limits of his period is about A. D. 1200. He is said to have been criticized by Sudarśanācārya, the famous commentator on the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānujācārya and a contemporary of Vedānta Deśika. So Nandīśvara may fairly be placed between A. D. 1200 and 1300. He has referred to and criticized Pārthasarathimīśra's *Nyāyaratnamālā*."

34.1 NANDĪŚVARA, *Prabhākaravijaya*

Ananta Krishna Sastri in his Foreword to the edition contained in Nandisvara (cf. Bibliography), offers the following comments on pp. 5-8:

"It is generally believed that the Mīmāṃsakas and especially the Prābhākaras are atheists...In the chapter on *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* Kumārila denies that God whose existence is attempted to be established by inference, but not that God whom we know from the Vedas....Hence so far as the Bhāttas are concerned it cannot be said that they are atheists. The Prābhākaras do also hold the same view...Now, in this book [i.e., the *Prabhākaravijaya* which A. K. Shastri is about to edit] it is stated in unequivocal terms that the inferential existence of God which is propounded by others is denied by the Prābhākaras and that God is not denied--'īśvare paroktamanumānam nirastam, neśvaro nirastah'..

"The second point which it makes clear is that the

Prābhākaras are not opposed to the Advaitins. The Mimāṃsakas apparently condemn some views of the Advaitins, but really they are not opposed to them. All that they want to impress is that the Advaita doctrines are not suitable for those people who have not been able to subdue their senses... (I)t is now very gratifying to find that in *Prabhākaravijaya* the very same line or reconciliation is indicated.

"The third error that is removed by this work is that the atomic theory of causation comes from the Naiyāyikas, and is not compatible with Vedic doctrines. It goes further to elucidate that the view that things have beginnings (*ārambhavāda*) should not form the basis of the theory that effects are but the manifestations of their causes (*vivartavāda*)..

"The fourth error which is dispelled is that *indriyātmanvāda* [i.e., the view that the sense-organs are the self] belongs to the Cārvākas alone. It is shown that the doctrine is held by the Paurāṇikas also.

"This work serves to correct many such errors. Its discussions on the requisition of the injunction for learning, corroboration of *akhyātivāda*, atomic theory, and the existence of a super-sensible power, acceptance of presumption as a separate instrument of knowledge, the distinction of the body from the self, the defense of pervasion, the refutation of the view that there are real differences in the world, etc. are very significant. It is not a mere reproduction of *Prakaranapañcīkā*, and in many places its expositions are more lucid and impressive than those of the latter."

The following are the titles and pages of the chapters of this work:

1. *Prayuktinirnaya* (1-6)
2. *Vaktrjñānānumānatā* (7-15)
3. *Akhyātisamarthana* (16-23)
4. *Pramānalaksana* (24-25)
5. *Pratyakṣalaksana* (26)
6. *Samvitsvaprakāśatā* (27-29)
7. *Mānaḥsamghāvatadūšana* (30-32)
8. *Jñānānumeyatā* (33-34)
9. *Kriyānumeyatā* (35-36)
10. *Atīndriyaśaktisamarthana* (37-42)
11. *Paramāṇusamarthana* (43-46)
12. *Kāryavyutpattisamarthana* (47-52)
13. *Arthāpattyanumānavaiśamya* (53-56)
14. *Abhāvapramāṇyanirāsa* (57-61)

15. *Sattāsāmānyanirākarana* (62-65)
16. *Apauruṣeyatva* (66-69)
17. *Svarūpābhedasamarthana* (70-75)
18. *Īśvarānumāmolatānirāsa* (76-83)
19. *Ātmanāḥsarīradibhedasamarthana* (84-97)
20. *Vyāptisamarthana* (98-100)
21. *Bhedābhedanirāsa* (100-102)

35 GAṄGĀDHARA MIŚRA (1290)

Ramulu, p. xi, gives the date as 1230, and says he's from Śalmali, confirmed by VARS, who (p. 77) makes him the son of Bhaṭṭa Someśvara.

35.1 GAṄGĀDHARA MIŚRA, *Nyāyaparāyana* on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* (NCat IX, 243-244)

VARs p. 77 says this work is "otherwise known as *Tantravārttikavivarāṇa*."

36 CIDĀNANDA (1300)

He was "probably of Kerala" according to Unithiri 1983, p. 36. VARs p. 75 also thinks "he might be a Keralīya".

36.1 CIDĀNANDA, *Nītitattvāvirbhāva*

N. V. P. Unithiri discusses and compares the way in which inference is treated in this work and in the *Mānameyodaya*, which appears to be "more or less an abridgement" of the present work. However, Unithiri after comparing the two works' treatment of the various topics discussed in this section concludes (p. 47) that the comparisons he has provided "show that MM is not an abridgement of NTA but, at least, as far as the chapter on inference is concerned, it is rather an expanded version of NTA."

The summary that follows is based on that to be found in KTP 2008, pp. iv-xxxiii, to which the page references are given as "S". Sanskrit terms are regularly replaced in our summary by the English equivalents used in the present Volume. The pages of the edition found in KTP 2008 are given as "E".

Summary by K. T. Pandurangi

"Cidānanda gives an exposition of Pūrvamīmāṃsā doctrines, particularly, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā doctrines...It reviews the Prābhākara's doctrines on each of these topics. It also criticizes Buddhist doctrines wherever these are opposed to Vedic doctrines in general, and Pūrvamīmāṃsā doctrines in particular. Interestingly [the] Advaita Vedānta view that there is only one Self is criticized and the plurality of selves is established. The scriptural passages that are quoted in support of Advaita are interpreted differently.

"The work is modeled on [the] *Śloka-vārttika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and [the] *Tarkapāda* portion of Pārthasārathi's *Sāstradīpikā*. The topics are arranged in the same way in which they are arranged in *Sāstradīpikā*. However, a few sub-topics are considered as separate topics and the total number of topics is raised to forty-four.

(Śiv-v; E1-11)"The discussions start with the injunction for the study of Veda, i.e. 'svādhyāyo adhyetavyā' ('one should study one's own [section of the] Veda'). The Prābhākaras claim that this is not a separate injunction: it is consequential on the injunction to teach the Vedas. They quote the statement 'astavaṛṣa brāhmaṇam upanayita taṃ adhyāyayīta' in support of their contention.

"This statement enjoins study to be a teacher. Teaching cannot be managed with out study. Hence teaching also is enjoined as a consequential program.

"The important difference between the instruction to learn and the instruction to teach is that for the latter there is an enjoined result, viz. eligibility to be an instructor (*niyojya*). One who wants to teach is an instructor here, while there is no instructor for the instruction to study. This is because no result is mentioned for *study*.

"This contention of the Prābhākaras is rejected by the Bhāṭṭas. Teaching is meant for earning livelihood, while study is an everlasting duty. The statement 'yo anadhītya dvijo vedān' states *pratyavāya* for *anubadhyāyana*. Hence study is an everlasting or compulsory duty while teaching is only for livelihood. Hence it is not an eternally prescribed duty. Such actions cannot supercede acts that are forever commanded. Further, by teaching one boy the purpose of teaching is over. Consequently, the other boys will lose the opportunity. As regards the point made that no result is stated for *study* and

hence it does not elicit instruction, it may be clarified that elderly persons advise the initiated (*upanīta*) boy to undertake the study. Therefore injunction to study is a separate injunction and not a consequence of the instruction to teach.

(Svi-viii; T12-25) "In the next chapter *Nītitattvavirbhava* takes up the concept of *kārya* [what is to be done] for discussion. It is a very important concept of Prābhākaras. It has three dimensions. It is conveyed only by Vedic injunctions but not by any other instrument of knowledge. For this reason it is designated as

(1) *Apūrva* [lit. without a predecessor], i.e. without something else to make it known (*mānāntarāpūrva*).

(2) It elicits an agent who is entitled to undertake the thing to be done. Such a person is called one eligible to be an instructor (*niyojya*) and the injunctive suffix that elicits him is *niyoga*.

(3) It inculcates a sense of accomplishing a task as 'this is my task'. Therefore it is called '*kārya*', 'what is to be done'. It is this *kārya* that is conveyed by the Vedic injunction.

In view of these three roles the meaning of the injunctive suffix is called *kārya*, *niyoga* and *apūrva*, the task to be achieved by the performance of sacrifice (*yāga*). Hence, *yāga* is the subject matter or content (*viśaya*) of *kārya*. It is also a *karana*, i.e. instrument. This role of *yāga* is stated as *visayakaraṇīyam*.

"The injunctive suffix conveys *kṛti*, i.e. initiative also. No effect (*kārya*) can be accomplished without initiative. Therefore *kṛti*, i.e. initiative, is also included in the meaning of the injunctive suffix. Initiative has to operate throughout an activity. The sacrificial activity (*yāgakṛtyā*) gives a form to the *kārya* conveyed by the Vedic injunction. Therefore *yāgakriyā* is the content of *kārya*.

"It is also [a] cause *par excellence* (*karana*), not in the sense that it produces the effect, what is to be done, but in the sense that it gives a form to it. The initiative (*kṛti*) is called '*bhāvanā*' as it leads to what is to be accomplished, i.e. is *bhāvya*, what is to come to be, the goal. Keeping this role of *kṛti* in mind *kārya* is defined as '*kṛtyuddeśyam*' and '*kṛtipradhānam kāryam*'. When sacrificial activity is duly performed *kārya* is accomplished. In this accomplished state it is something unique. Therefore it is called '*apūrva*'. To distinguish the two usages of '*apūrva*' it is called *pandāpūrva* in that state..

"According to Prābhākaras it is with this result of action

(*kārya*) that all other items get connected. The instructor (*niyojya*), the sacrifice (*yāga*) and the *aṅgas*, i.e. auxiliaries, get connected. In view of this a Vedic sentence conveys its meaning as connected with *kārya*. This is technically known as *kāryavyutpatti*. This knowledge of what is to be done (*kāryatājñāna*) is conveyed by the injunctive suffix, i.e. the instigator (*pravartaka*).

"One proceeds to undertake sacrificial activity with the thought *idam mama kāryam*, 'this is my task (as conveyed by the injunctive suffix)'. This scheme of the operation of *kārya* and the concept of *kārya* is not acceptable to the Bhāttas. They question the very definition of *kārya* as '*krtyupadeśa*' and '*krtipradhānam*'. These two terms cannot properly be explained by the Prābhākaras [they say]. They also do not accept the theory of the comprehension (*kāryavyutpatti*) and instigation to activity occasioned by the knowledge of what is to be done (*kāryatājñānam*). Even such statements that have no verb with the injunctive suffix do convey meaning. For example, the statement 'perform the *agnihotro* sacrifice' (*agnihotram jyuhetam*') does convey its meaning. Therefore it is not necessary to accept *kāryavyutpatti* and consider knowledge of what is to be done as the instigator. There can be understanding of what is already accomplished (*siddhavyutpatti*). Knowledge of the means to a desired end (*īstasādhanājñāna*) is an instigator. Hence the Prābhākaras' concept of *kārya* and the scheme of *niyojya* etc. getting connected with *kārya* cannot be accepted.

"It may be noted here that the Prābhākaras do not accept the Bhāttas' scheme of *śābdhībhāvanā* and *arthībhāvanā*. However, the very concept of *kārya* corresponds to *arthībhāvanā*...

(Sviii-ix; E25034) "The Sāṃkhyas consider that both truth (*prāmānya*) and falsehood (*apramānya*) are intrinsic (*svataḥ*). This claim of the Sāṃkhyas is based on their theory that the effect is extant in its cause (*satkāryavāda*). Hence, the *Nītitattvāvirbhava* examines that very theory, quoting the well-known Sāṃkhyakārikā verse, viz. '*asadakaraṇāt upādānagrahānāt*' etc., stating the arguments of the Sāṃkhyas in detail, rejecting the *satkāryavāda* theory and also rejecting the concept that both truth and falsity are intrinsic.

"The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas state that both truth and falsity are extrinsic (*paratas*). Truth constitutes a positive property (*guṇa*) while falsity requires a mistake (*doṣa*). Hence both are

extrinsic. This theory is also rejected. According to the Bhāttas Mīmāṃsaka truth is intrinsic, i.e. it does not require any other causes than the causes required for the generation and the cognition of truth. The expression 'extrinsic' (*paratas*) means that falsity does require some additional causes other than the causes required to generate a false awareness. For example, the cognition of the validity of actual silver does not require any additional cause to comprehend it, while the cognition of the invalidity of shell-silver (i.e., a shell wrongly judged to be the metal silver, *śukti rajata*) requires knowledge of a mistake.

In respect of the intrinsicity of truth a question arises: How to determine the truth when there is a doubt? and if the instrument is intrinsic how can a doubt arise? It is already stated above that for falsity mistakes are the ground. Such awareness of the possibility of a mistake leads to doubt in the case of a true awareness also. This is removed by checking the efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) of the cognition concerned for providing knowledge and also its ability to instigate successful activity (*samarthapravrttījanakatvam*).

"Now a further question arises, viz., efficiency for providing knowledge has the form of a cognition. Therefore this also has to be verified by another cognition. This leads to infinite regress (*anavasthā*). This contention is rejected by pointing out that efficiency is of the nature of a result (*phala*). Once the result is obtained there will be no doubt any more.

(Sx; E34-38) "*Kāla*, i.e. time, is perceptible, because it is omnipresent (*vibhu*) and other than the mind. Those who consider time as inferable argue that we have experiences of earlier, later, simultaneous etc. From these experiences time has to be inferred. Here the position is these very terms refer to time, and thus it is perceptible. Therefore there is no need to infer time from these experiences.

(Sx-xi; E38-44) "In the definition of a true awareness (*pramā*) two clauses, viz. 'not already known' (*anadhigata*), and 'as it is' (*tattva*) are included. The first clause is included to exclude memory and repetition (*anuvāda*), while the second clause is included to exclude false awareness. The Prābhākaras object to this. According to them all cognitions are true. Even the shell-silver (*śukti rajata*) cognition is true. The 'false' statement 'this is silver' (*idam rajatam*) represents two [true] cognitions. The expression '*idam*' refers to a shell without reference to its special characteristic, viz. shell-ness (*śuktitva*), in a general way as 'this' (*idam*). It is true. '*Rajatam*' refers to

remembered silver. It has the nature of a memory and is also true. But the distinction between the two is not realized. There is failure to appreciate the difference (*bhedāgraha*). It is this failure that leads to the ordinary-language expression 'this is silver'. According to the Prābhākara there is no common-locusness (*sāmānādhikārya*) here, but there is only similarity (*sārūpya*). This is sufficient for ordinary usage and activity. When it is realized that this is not silver (the metal) it is only the practicality of using the expression ('silver') that is sublated. This theory of Prābhākaras is known as the *akhyāti* theory. This is discussed in detail in this section and it is pointed out that the concept of *bhedāgraha* cannot be properly explained. It ultimately leads to *anyathākhyāti* [commonly ascribed to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika]. . . Though the larger portion of this section is devoted to the discussion of *bhedāgraha* and mainly deals with the Prābhākara theory of *akhyātivāda* it is given its title in the light of the conclusion arrived at in favor of *anyathākhyātivāda*.

(Sxi; E44-46) Prābhākaras define perception as 'direct awareness' (*sākṣāt pratītiḥ pratyakṣam*). Here the *Nītatattvāvirbhava* points out that the expression 'direct' (*sākṣāt*) cannot be properly explained. If it is explained as that which only presents its content at the time of the awareness (*sākṣāt evayam sat tadavabhāsatvam*) then an awareness of a pot cannot be considered as direct, since the pot may be present before and afterwards. It is true that inference also presents its content as occurring at the same time as itself (*svakāle svataḥ eva arthasya avabhāsa*). But it is not naturally (*svābhāvika*) so since inference also conveys objects belonging to the past and the future...

(Sxiii; E50-54) "The mind is considered a means to comprehend pleasure etc. It is by nature all-pervading. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas two all-pervading objects can have contact (*samyoga*). This is not generated as in the case of the contact of all-pervading objects with limited objects. The mind is not only the means of the cognition of pleasure, pain etc. but even for cognition of outside objects it is the means through the respective sense-organs.

(Sxiii-xiv; E54-55) "In this section it is stated that though the mind and the self are all-pervading entities there can be contact between the two. In the experiences '*prak ākāśa, udak ākāśa*' we do find contact between space and spatial direction (*dik*). Both are all-pervading. At the same time we have also experiences such as 'the pot is east' (*prācīnoghataḥ*), 'the pot is

west' (*prācīno ghataḥ*). This means that spatial direction, which is all-pervading, is in contact with a pot which is a limited object. Thus an all-pervasive object can have contact both with another all-pervasive object and with a limited object.

(Sxiv; E55-57) "According to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas air is perceptible, that is established by the syllogism *vāyuh pratyakṣah sparsavattvāt*, 'air is perceptible, because it has touch'. When one experiences hot and cold touch experiences the substance air having these attributes. Here he does not cognize only these touches but cognizes the substance that has these tangible qualities. This establishes the perceptibility of air.

"The Bhāṭṭas consider space also to be perceptible. It is not to be inferred from its being the locus of the quality of sound, because sound is not a quality.

(Sxiv; E57-62) Movement (*karman*) is also perceptible because it is cognized by the senses. When sense-organs are employed, then movement is cognized. When senses are not employed movement is not cognized. By this positive and negative concomitance (*anvayavyatireka*) inference the perceptibility of motion is established. It is not to be inferred from the contacts and disjunctions with other things. These are the results of movements, which are also perceived.

(Sxiv-xv; 62-65) "Bhāṭṭas do not accept inherence (*samavāya*). It is not perceptible as it is not cognized by any sense-organ. Moreover inherence cannot be stated to be related with an inhering thing, as that requires another inherence to relate it. This will lead to infinite regress.

(Sxv; E65-70) "Since inherence is rejected, some suitable relation has to be envisaged between a universal property and a particular instance of it. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas envisage equivalence (of locus) (*tādātmya*) as the relation between universal and particular. As per this relation, the universal and the particular are not exclusively distinct from each other nor completely identical. This relation is of the nature of identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*). The statement '*ayam gauḥ*' ('this is a cow') conveys difference between the cow and cow-ness and at the same time non-difference between these two. As these are from different points of view there is no contradiction. The common-locus-ness (*sāmānādhikārya*) of the individual cow and the cow-ness universal is the ground for non-difference. The objection, that if there is non-difference between universal and particular then the contingency will arise that a universal has also to be considered as non-eternal

and a particular as eternal, is not correct, since both have their respective attributes in their respective capacities.

"In view of this a substance, its quality, its universal property and its motion have the relation of equivalence of locus.

(Sxv-xvi; 70-72) "Buddhists contend that there is no such thing as a whole substance. What is generally considered a whole is only the collection of atoms (*paramāṇu*). It is born of atoms. This is not correct, because we have the perceptibility of a whole as 'one big pot' (*ekī mahān ghataḥ*). It is not merely something born of atoms. Atoms don't have large size (*mahattva*)..

"Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas do accept atoms. However, their concept of a *paramāṇu* is quite distinct from that of the Vaiśeṣikas. When the sun's rays enter through the windows, small particles are observed. These are *paramāṇus*. These have large size (*mahattva*) and many parts, while according to the Vaiśeṣikas an atom has neither size nor many parts. The process of the forming of objects through double-atoms (*dvyanuka*) and minimal perceptibilia (*tryanuka*) is not accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas.

(Sxvi; E73-75) "Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept darkness (*tamas*) as a separate substance. The objection that there is no originating (*ārambhaka*) substance having darkness as its quality is answered by pointing out that dark atoms are envisaged as the ultimate atomic components of the earth etc. Darkness is perceived by the eye just as other objects are perceived by the eye.

"The only difference is that for perceiving other objects a common locus with light (*āloka sahakāra*) is necessary while for perceiving darkness that is not necessary. It may be noted here that for light itself association with light is not needed for perception. Darkness has the qualities of color, number etc.

(Sxvii-xviii; E75-79) "Buddhists do not accept universal properties...A universal is conceived of as everlasting, an individual as non-eternal. When an individual arises, the question arises how [a] universal gets connected with it. It cannot move to newly produced objects from the existing objects, because it is without movement. It cannot be stated that the universal is already there before the newly created object and gets into that object when it is created. Further when the object is destroyed the universal cannot remain in it. It does not move out as it is immaterial (*amūrta*). It is also not

destroyed along with the object that is destroyed as it is everlasting.

"In view of these contradictions the Buddhist says that he is very sorry for the miserable state of universals. The question is also raised whether the universal remains in the particular occupying the whole of the individual or in parts of it. These objections are answered by pointing out that a universal property is every where and manifests in an individual that is newly created. It does not move from another individual to a newly produced one nor does it perish. It only manifests when the new individual is created and ceases to be manifested when that individual is destroyed.

"The relation between universal and particular is equivalence (*tādātmya*). Therefore the question whether the universal is spread over the entire particular or present in parts does not arise. A universal property is also useful in order to know the meaning of a word by comprehending it with reference to one word comprehending the meanings of all the things that possess the common property signified by that word.

(Sxviii-xix; E82-89) In Mīmāṃsā tradition Advaitins are called *aupanisadah*. Advaitins reject the ordinary experienced world of differences (*bhedaprapaṅca*) consisting of instruments and objects. They try to establish non-difference (*advaita*) on the basis of certain scriptural passages. They argue that difference is of the nature of a mutual absence (*itaretarābhāva*). This cannot be cognized by perception, since there is no contact of sense-organs with absence(s). Difference also cannot be considered as a category itself. In that case the statement '*nīlam bhinnam, nīlasya bhedah*' etc. cannot be justified. The Mīmāṃsaka asks whether the difference between a pot and a pot is real or not. If it is real you have agreed with us. If it is not real we ask a further question whether this difference which does not exist is comprehended by someone at some time or not. If it is not comprehended it cannot be denied.

"The Advaitin claims that Advaita scripture establishes the absence of any differences. But the very statement about it consisting of something establishing something else involves difference.

"Difference is cognized by perception. Perception is superior to that of scripture. Hence difference has to be accepted.

(Sxix; 89) Advaita claims that Brahman alone is real. Here the question arises whether there is any instrument of

knowledge in this respect or not. If there is an instrument then that is an additional reality. Consequently the doctrine that Brahman is the only reality is given up. If there is no instrument then also the doctrine that Brahman alone is real collapses. If it is claimed that the instrument is illusory (*māyāmāya*) then its object will be non-ultimate (*aparamārtha*). The Advaitin argues that Brahman need not be *ultimate* to establish the [position concerned. For example, the syllables, i.e. *varṇas*, have longness and shortness, etc., forms that are not real, but still these lead to real meaning. Similarly a reflection (*pratibimba*) is not real. However, it leads to the knowledge of a prototype (*bimba*) that is real. In the same way an unreal instrument of knowledge can establish the Advaita's Brahman.

"This claim is not correct. In the case of the reflection and the prototype it is awareness of the reflection that leads to awareness of the prototype. It is that awareness which is real. Similarly it is superimposed awareness of shortness and length that leads to awareness of things through syllables. Then these are not cases of unreal instruments leading to the knowledge of the real.

(Sxx; E96-102) "Vijñānavādins claim that everything is consciousness (*viñāna*). All objects that appear are consciousness. They argue that what appears to be real is non-different from appearance, e.g., a blue light appears but its appearance is nothing but blue light. Further, blue etc. objects are always found together with consciousness. Therefore these are identical with consciousness.

"This claim of the Vijñānavādins is rejected by pointing out that the entities that are together are distinct from each other. This is clear from the fact of their togetherness. Therefore the attempt to establish the non-difference of the entities that are together establishes the opposite of it.

"Some claim that awareness is self-illuminating (*svaprakāśa*). This is not correct. Illumination (*prakāśa*) can enlighten other objects. It cannot reveal itself. Those who claim that awareness is self-illuminating argue that when awareness arises there will be no doubt about it. Therefore it illuminates itself.

"This cannot be accepted. There is no relation between not being dependent on awareness (*asaṅgadhīva*) and being illuminated (*prakāśamānatva*). Further an awareness requires another awareness for its practical utility. Consciousness does not become self-illuminating because it is an actual entity. The

smṛti passages 'yatra ayam puruṣaḥ svayam jyotiḥ', 'ātmevāsya jyotiḥ', etc. do not convey the self-illuminating-ness of the self. These have to be suitably interpreted.

(Sxxi; E106-107) "Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that awareness has to be established by inference. When an object is revealed to us we have to infer that the awareness of that object has arisen in our self. Therefore awareness is not perceptible.

"There are statements like 'a pot is revealed' (*ghaṭaḥ prakāśate*), 'a pot appears' (*ghaṭaḥ bhāti*). In these statements the word 'is revealed' or 'appears' (*prakāśate, bhāti*) conveys revealed-ness (*prākātyaḥ*). Awareness (*jñāna*) and appearing (*prakāśa*), are not the same. In that case, like 'the pot appears' (*ghaṭo bhāti*), 'the pot knows' (*ghaṭo jñānati*) could also be said

"*Nītitattvāvirbhava* explains the procedure of *prākātya* in respect to the objects of the past and future and also objects that are not perceptible. *Prākātya* is considered as a kind of attribute of the object revealed. The process of perception is explained by Bhāṭṭas as follows: When the eye is in contact with an object, an activity arises in the self. This leads to the revealed-ness (*prākātya*) the object. The action arisen in the self is awareness (*jñāna*) and the quality of the object revealed is revealed-ness. Awareness is not perceptible; it is inferred from revealed-ness

(Sxxii-xxiii; E110-111) "Some claim that *yogins* have revealed-ness due to their exceptional *bhāvanā*. But it is only a kind of memory. It is not perception. *Yogins* do not have a special kind of perception.

(Sxxii-xxiii; E111-116) "Inference' is defined as 'the awareness of an object not in contact (with the senses), which awareness is produced by seeing that the content of that awareness is pervaded'. For instance, when pervaded smoke is cognized, then there will be the awareness of fire: while smoke is actually seen fire is not seen. This fire is not in contact with the senses. Pervasion (*vyāpti*) is explained as *sādhyena sādhanasya nirūpādikaḥ*, i.e. the unconditioned association of the *hetu* (*sādhana*) with the *sādhyā*. The unconditioned-ness (*nirūpādhikatva*) of the association of the *hetu* and the *sādhyā* has to be ascertained by repeated observation (*bhūyodarśana*) and *reductio ad absurdum* (*tarka*).

"Inference is of two types, viz. *drṣṭa* and *sāmānyato drṣṭa*. The inference of an object from another known object is

dr̥ṣṭa. For example: 'svareṇa putrānumānam.' 'Svara, the voice of the son, is known'. From this it is inferred that the person who is speaking is his son. *Sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa* is an inference that is based on a shared property (*sāmānya*). For example, the inference of fire from smoke is *sāmānatyo dr̥ṣṭa* inference. The inference is further classified as for oneself (*svārtha*) and for another (*parārtha*). For the statement of the latter the Nyāyadarśanikas work out five steps, viz., thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*udāharana*), application (*upanayana*) and conclusion (*nigamana*). However, Mīmāṃsakas take the stand that only three steps are sufficient, i.e. thesis, reason and example. The *Nūitattvāvīrbhava* works out fallacies of the reason (*hetvābhāsa*) in detail.

(Sxxiii-xxiv; E116-121) Verbal cognition (*śābda*) is defined as follows: "Verbal cognition is that which is produced by words through their meanings about an object not known by any other *pramāṇa*.. Here the meaning of the word(s) has to be taken as remembered according to Cidānanda, i.e. as *smṛti*. But according to Pārthasārathi it is to be taken as conveyed by denotative power i.e. *abhihita*. Verbal cognitions are of two types, those made by persons (*pauruṣeya*) and those not so made (*apauruṣeya*). It is argued that the words of persons cannot be an instrument of knowledge because these are affected by the suspicion of drawbacks such as (1) the speaker's ignorance about the fact stated by him, (2) deliberately misleading, (3) grammatical and syntactical errors and (4) logical errors in the statement. In view of the possibilities of these errors statements made by persons cannot be considered as valid.

"In fact a person's statement does not convey its meaning in the very first instance. The speaker's meaning has to be inferred from his statement. Only if his cognition is free from the above drawbacks will the statement be valid.

"This contention is not correct. As in the case of the awareness obtained by the senses, doubts concerning possible drawbacks like (1)-(4) are removed by checking on the absence of the same. Similarly in the case of *pauruṣeya* statements also doubt about the drawbacks can be removed by appropriate verification.

"Further, if an ordinary-language utterance does not convey any meaning then there cannot be any activity even after hearing the statement of a reliable person.

"Though in the case of unauthoritative sentence

(*anāptakavākya*) drawbacks are found, since the Vedas are not statements of unauthoritative speakers there is no ground to suspect any drawback in the case of Vedic statements. Vedic statements are not the statements of either authoritative or non-authoritative speakers as these are not made by persons at all, being authorless.

(Sxxiv-xxviii; E116-121) "Śabarabhāṣya explains the nature of comparison (*upamāna*) as: the perception of similarity in an object produces the cognition of similarity in its correlate that it is not in contact with the sense of the observers. For instance, the perception of similarity in the forest cow, i.e. *gavaya*, produces the cognition of similarity in the village cow seen earlier and now remembered. The process of this cognition is explained as under: a person goes to the forest and happens to see a forest cow which is similar to the village cow. He remembers the village cow and cognizes the fact that the village cow is similar to the forest cow. In this process the perception of similarity of the village cow to the forest cow is the means and the cognition of the similarity of the forest cow to the village cow is the result. It is a case of perception of similarity in one correlate, i.e. *pratiyogin*, producing cognition of similarity in the other correlate, i.e. *pratiyogyantara*.

"The cognition of similarity in the forest cow is of the nature of perception, since the forest cow is actually perceived. However the cognition of the similarity in the village cow cannot be considered perception since the cow is presently not in contact with the observer's eye. The cow is remembered. But the similarity with the forest cow cannot be considered as remembered since it was not experienced earlier. The observer of the cow was not aware of the similarity with the forest cow as he had not yet seen the latter. Therefore the cognition of similarity is not a case of memory. It also cannot be considered as inferred.

"Those who try to include comparison under inference formulate the syllogism as: the village cow has similarity with the forest cow, because the latter has similarity with it. This is a maxim or a general rule but not a relation of pervasion between the two similarities or similar objects. Similarity is dual. The similarities found in the two correlates are not found in one together. Therefore one cannot be the reason to infer the other.

"Since the cognition of similarity cannot be classified as perception, memory or inference, a new instrument of

knowledge is conceived. As this new *pramāna* is based on similarity it is designated as comparison.

"The Nyāya explains the nature and purpose of comparison differently. A forest dweller informs a villager that the forest cow is similar to a village cow and it is called *gavaya*. The villager when he visits the forest happens to see the forest cow that is similar to the village cow and understands that this forest cow is called *gavaya*. The knowledge of the import of the statement of the forest dweller is the means and the comprehension that the forest cow is called *gavaya* is the result.

"The earlier Naiyāyikas consider the knowledge of the statement is the means as stated above and the later Naiyāyikas consider perception of similarity in the forest cow is the means. In either case similarity is the basis of comprehension of the relation between the name '*gavaya*' and the forest cow. Therefore, this cognition is called *upamāna*. In the Nyāya tradition the means is called *upamāna* and the result is called *upamiti*.

"On a careful analysis of the above procedure it will be found that it does not make any room for a new *pramāna*. The statement that a forest cow is similar to a village cow gives only the meaning of the word '*gavaya*' indicating its special nature. The listener has to wait for actual observation of such an animal to comprehend the meaning of this word. When he actually perceives the animal, he comprehends the meaning of the word '*gavaya*'.

"On seeing *gavaya* he remembers the statement and comprehends that the object perceived by him is conveyed by the word '*gavaya*'. Thus the relation between the word '*gavaya*' and the object *gavaya* is comprehended from the statements, i.e. *śabdajñāna* aided by the perception of the object.

"Hence there is no need of envisaging any new *pramāna* for this purpose. It is already stated above that the Mīmāṃsā concept of comparison cannot be included under inference or perception.

"For the Mīmāṃsaka the instrument called comparison serves a practical purpose in organizing the sacrifice in two respects: (1) Details of the *āgneya* sacrifice are applied to the *sairya* sacrifice on the ground that these have a common deity and are similar in this respect. (2) When *vrīhi* grains are not available for preparing *purodāsa nīvāra* grains may be used for the purpose since these are similar in nature.

"The Prābhākaras also explain the nature and role of

upamāna in the same way. However, they consider similarity as a separate category while the Bhāttas consider it as an assemblage of common attributes in the two correlates.

(Sxxviii-xxx; E126-136) "The concept of presumption (*arthāpatti*) is the special contribution of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. It is primarily formulated to establish the concept of *apūrva* which is very vital to Pūrvamīmāṃsā. A thing's power is also established by presumption.

"Postulating another fact when a fact that is seen or heard is found incompatible in the absence of such a postulation is presumption. For instance, on finding that Devadatta who is known to be alive is not found in his residence, it has to be postulated that he is outside. This is *arthāpatti*.

"Presumption has two important aspects, viz. (i) identifying incompatibility, i.e. *anupapatti* between two known facts and (ii) postulating a third fact, i.e., *upapādika kalpanā*, to resolve the incompatibility.

"In the stock example the fact that Devadatta being alive but not found in his residence are incompatible. This incompatibility is resolved by postulating his presence outside.

"Presumption cannot be included under inference. The Nyāya does not accept presumption as a separate instrument of knowledge. It is included under inference. The stock example is put in the form of a syllogism thus: Devadatta is outside his residence, because he is alive and not available at his residence. However on closer examination it will be found that this inference does not serve any purpose. The reason (*hetu*) given here has two clauses, viz. Devadatta is alive and he is not found at his residence. The first clause clearly implies that Devadatta must be in some place, since he is alive. This place is naturally other than his residence. Therefore the conclusion to be drawn by the inference is already known at the stage where the reason is stated. The two clauses of the reason remaining incompatible with the presence of Devadatta outside his house is not envisaged. In view of this presumption cannot be included under inference.

(Sxxx-xxxi; E136-145) Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept a sixth *pramāna*, viz. non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) or the cognition of absence. Non-cognition by any of the five previous instruments of knowledge is a means of cognition of absence, i.e. represented as *nāsti*, i.e. it is not. The cognition that there is no jar on the ground is the cognition of the absence of jar.

The entity represented by the knower is an absence. The ground is the location. However the absence is different from the ground. The jar is the counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) of this absence. The counter-positive which is capable of being cognized is not cognized on the ground. This very cognition of jar is the means of the cognition of its absence. Here both the means and the result are of negative type.

"However the Nyāya argues that an absence can be cognized by perception. Though there is no contact between the sense-organ and an absence there is a contact between the locus of the absence and the sense. The eye is in contact with the ground. The absence of jar is an attribute of the ground. It has the relation of being the ground's qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). This is sufficient to establish the contact between the two. But this argument is not sound. To be an attribute some positive relation is a necessity. Negation is negative in its nature and therefore it cannot have a positive relation. Hence it cannot be considered as an attribute in the strict sense of the term.

"The Prābhākaras do not accept the category of absence. Consequently they do not accept absence as a *pramāṇa* either. To understand the Prābhākaras' stand that *abhāva* is not a separate category their concept of an awareness with a combined content (*samsr̥staviśayabuddhi*) and an awareness with a single content (*ekaviśayabuddhi*) have to be understood. When two positives are cognized together it is *samsr̥staviśayabuddhi*, while cognizing only one of them is *ekaviśayabuddhi*. The latter serves the purpose of the category of absence..

"For instance, when one cognizes a jar on the ground it is *samsr̥staviśayabuddhi* since two objects, viz. ground and jar, are cognized. When the jar is removed, one cognizes the ground only. This is *ekaviśayabuddhi*. The absence of jar is not a separate object.

(Sxxxii-xxxiii; E172-181) In this section it is pointed out that a self is distinct from a body, a sense-organ, or a mind. Even awareness (*jñāna*) is not the self because the self is cognized (*jñātā*). There cannot be any identity between what is cognized and the cognition of it.. Selves are many and are distinct from one another. An individual self is distinct from Brahman. A self undergoes pleasures and pains etc. during the *samsāra* stage.

"In the liberated state there will be no frustrations or pain (*duḥkha*) and the self's blissful nature will be manifest.

The concept of there being only one self is rejected. If it is accepted then when one is released all will have to be released. The scriptural passages '*eka eva na bhūtātmā bhute bhute vyavashitaḥ*', '*eko devaḥ sarvaḥ bhūtesu gūḍhaḥ*' etc. (which appear to endorse the theory that there is only one self) are *arthavādas*, i.e. merely explanatory or supplementary.

(Sxxxii-xxxiii; E181-190) "Prābhākaras advocate the *anvitābhidhāna* theory of sentence meaning. According to this theory *kāryā*—the meaning of the injunctive suffix—is the center of semantic organization in a sentence. The meanings of all other words get connected with it. Expectancy, fitness etc. are the aids for the formation of a sentence.

"In support of this theory they quote the very process of learning a language. The eldest person asks for a cow to be brought (*'gām ānava'*). The elder person brings the cow. The boy standing nearby observes the statement and the action. He comprehends the meaning of the sentence '*gām ānava*' and comes to know that the *gau* is connected with the action of bringing. Thus his understanding is of the *kāryānvita* type—its meaning follows from the action produced. On this basis Prābhākaras claim that '*kāryānvite vyutpattiḥ*'.

This is not acceptable to Bhāttas. Bhāttas point out that the meaning of the word 'cow' needs the meaning of the word 'bring' to get connected with it, and vice-versa. This leads to mutual dependence). Further, a word occurs in several sentences. It has to get connected with a meaning of the words in all those sentences. This entails endlessness.

"Rejecting *anvitābhidhāna* on these grounds, Bhāttas advocate the *abhihitānvaya* theory. According to this theory words convey their meanings and these lead to sentence meaning by secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*). Compatibility with the speaker's intention (*tātparyānopapatti*) is the ground for this *lakṣaṇā*.

(Sxxxiii; E190-193) Those who oppose the non-human origin of the Vedas formulate the following inference in support of the Vedas' being humanly composed: 'The sentences of the Vedas are of human origin because they are sentences.' They also point out that the phonemes are duly arranged to make a word, and the words are duly arranged to make a sentence. This kind of arrangement involves human effort. Therefore the Vedas are of human origin.

"This contention cannot be accepted. If the Vedas were composed by some persons, their names would have been

remembered as in the case of the *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata*. Very learned people perform the *vyotistoma* etc. sacrifices that require a lot of effort to accomplish. These are described in the Vedas. If the Vedas were composed by some persons, these persons certainly would have been remembered. Since the so-called authors are not remembered, we have to conclude that there are no authors for the Vedas.

37 VEDĀNTA DEŚIKĀ (1350)

VARs pp. 78-79: "Born at Tūppil, a village near Conjeeveram in 1259 A.D., Deśika was the son of Anantasūri Somayājīn, an orthodox Vaisnavite and a descendant of one of the seventy-four *simhāsanādhipatis*. His mother was Totarāmbā, the sister of Ātreya Rāmānuja, otherwise known as Rāmānuja Appullār, the successor of Varadācārya as the *ubhayasimhāsanādhipati*. Tradition says that his parents had no children for years, and while they were at Tirupati on a pilgrimage they saw God Venkateśvara in a dream and got a bell of the temple from Him to be swallowed by Totarāmbā, which resulted in the birth of an illustrious son to them. This story attributes some divine origin to Vedānta Deśika. As Prof. V. Rangachari, M.A. has observed' ['in the Journal of the Bombay Royal Asiatic Society 24, pp. 267-279'] "he (Vedānta Deśika) was throughout his life a man of great penance and prayer and an extraordinarily precocious genius. He was a Hindu in his crusades against the Mohammedan, a Vaisnava as against Saivite (or Advaitin) and a Sanskrit-Tamilist as against practically exclusive Tamilist in the holy studies...More than 120 works he has left; most of these are now extant, and prove how thorough his teachings were, how fertile his intellect was and how exalted his views of life and conduct were. Humble and modest in his deportment, profoundly learned, saintly in his habits, he was the embodiment of all that was good and great, of the divinity in man and man's devotion to the divinity.' His great contempt for riches or temporal supremacy is evident in his blunt refusal of Vidyāranya's many invitations to the Court of the then King of Vijayanagar including an invitation to a discussion with the chief Madhva scholar-Akṣobhyamuni, though he complied with Vidyāranya's latter request by sending him his judgment in writing in very ambiguous language. As a staunch Vaisnava propagandist, he has considered it even sinful to speak the Advaita view of identifying man-individual

soul-with God-the Supreme soul. In most of his writings he has expressed his faith that the relation between God and man is that between a master and a servant and thus he has inculcated his religious fervor and devotion to God and prayers to Him by man, besides imparting his religious fervor to his readers."

37.1 VEDĀNTA DEŚIKĀ, *Mīmāṃsāpāduka*

This is a commentary in verse on the *Tarkapāda* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*. VARs p. 78: "A critic of very violent temper, he [Vedānta Deśika] has elucidated in these works [i.e., *Mīmāṃsāpāduka* and *Śeśvaramīmāṃsā*] the *siddhāntas* of the Bhāttas and the Prābhākaras in many sections, now and then criticizing both. Naturally therefore, his explanations of the *sūtras* are not in many instances acceptable to an orthodox student of Mīmāṃsā, in view of the fact that they are deviations from the *siddhāntas* of the two great *ācāryas* of the Mīmāṃsā *śāstra*. His aim seems to be not to explain the *siddhāntas* of the Mīmāṃsā *śāstra* but to attempt a synthesis, as far as possible, of the two systems of Mīmāṃsā, Pūrva and Uttara. His work is rich in reference to many *ācāryas* and works, such as [the] Vrttikāra, Upavarṣa, Bodhāyana, Sabarasvāmin, Kumārila, Prābhākara, Dramidācārya, Yāmunācārya, Śrī Rāmānuja, Bhavanāthabhaṭṭa, the *Kāśikā*, the *Dīpa* and the *Tattvaratnākara*."

The work has been edited, with the *Śeśvaramīmāṃsā*, and commentaries by Uttamur T. Viraraghavacarya, Madras 1971, and earlier by A. Sampatkumaracharya, also Madras, 1940.

37.2 VEDĀNTA DEŚIKĀ, *Śeśvaramīmāṃsā*

A commentary in prose on the rest of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* (other than the *Tarkapāda*). Varadachari 1983, p. 20, comments "Among his [Vedānta Deśika's] independent works on the system, the *Śeśvaramīmāṃsā* was written to prove that the *karmakāṇḍa* portion of the Vedas should be treated as forming part of a whole, namely Veda, of which the Upaniṣads form also a part. There could not be any antagonism between the two parts as imagined by the school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā which has developed on the basis of Sabara's *Bhāṣya* on the *sūtras* of Jaimini. It is also shown here that God is required to be admitted unlike in the Pūrvamīmāṃsaka school which refutes God's existence independent of *mantras*. He is to be propitiated by performing the sacrifices. The author thus saves the

Mīmāṃsā system from being atheistic. This work appears on the face of it as a commentary on the *sūtras* of Jaimini but it is more an independent work on the system. The author notes that objections could be raised to holding the views of the Pūrvāmīmāṃsā school on the ground that they do not agree with the views contained in Rāmānuja's *Vedārthasaṃgraha*, *Vedāntadīpa* and others and effects a very happy reconciliation of the views in question. This work is incomplete, stopping with *mantropādīkaraṇa* in the second Section of Chapter I of the *sūtras* of Jaimini."

38 VIDYĀRĀNYA or MĀDHAVA (1350)

VARs p. 80-81: "A younger contemporary of Vedānta Deśika, "his time has been fixed by scholars to be A.D. 1297-1386, and this is in agreement with the tradition that he lived for 90 years. From his own works, like the *Prarāśaramādhaviya* and from an inscription of the Arulāla-perumāl temple at Conjeeveram, it is known that Mādhava was a Brahmin of Bharadvājagotra, of Bodhāyana *sūtra* and a student of Yajñākhā, that Māyana was his father and Śrīmātī his mother and that he had two brothers--Sāyana and Bhoganātha...It is also known that he had a sister Siṅgale whose son Lakṣmaṇa or Lakṣmīdhara was a minister of the Vijayanagar king Devarāja I. Mādhavācārya is said to have had three *gurus*--Vidyātīrtha, Bhāratīrtha and Śrīkantha of whom Vidyātīrtha was considered by Mādhava (and Sāyana) as an incarnation of Maheśvara. Inscriptional evidence also shows that Vidyātīrtha *alias* Vidyāśaṃkara was highly esteemed both as the temporal and spiritual guide not only of Mādhava but also of Bukka I, the famous king of Vijayanagar, whom Mādhava eulogises in his *Nyāyamālāvistara* and other works."

"It is still [in 1936] a matter of controversy whether Mādhavācārya is identical with Vidyārānya. Tradition holds that Mādhavācārya in his fourth *āśrama* is known as Vidyārānya."

38.1 VIDYĀRĀNYA, *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*

The twelfth chapter of this work, the most well-known of a number of such works describing the views of the systems of philosophy known to the author in his time, is devoted to (Pūrvā)Mīmāṃsā. In StudM, pp. 342-343 and 360-361, Haruo Kurata provides a summation of the contents of Chapter Twelve.

Summary by Haruo Kurata

"The philosophical system of the Mīmāṃsakas is dealt with in the twelfth chapter, named Jaimini-darśana, the contents of which are--

- (A) Introductory remarks (1-3)
- (B) Contents of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (4-17)
- (C) Significance of the Mīmāṃsā (18-127)
- (D) Authorlessness of the Veda (128-216)
- (E) *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda* (217-285)
- (F) *abhīhitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda*

The numbers in parentheses show the lines in the Chapter of Jaimini-darśana in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* of *Sāyana-Mādhava*, edited with an original commentary in Sanskrit by Mahamahopadhyaya Vasudev Sastri Abhyankara (Poona 1924).

"Mādhava does not explain each Section, but only refers to the contents of Sections in the course of describing each Chapter.

"The significance of starting the study of the Mīmāṃsā is considered very important by Mīmāṃsaka philosophers Śabarasvāmin, Kumārila, Pārthasārathimīśra and others. It has been the subject of study under the title of *śāstrārāmbha*, *śāstramukha* or *jijñāsādhikaraṇa*, and it is reviewed first.

As for (D), "The theory that the Vedas are authorless, or not composed by any man, not even by God" is explained. "That the Veda is only one valid means of attaining the knowledge on *dharma* is the fundamental position of the Mīmāṃsakas. According to them, the Mīmāṃsā is nothing but *dharmavicāraśāstra*, [the investigative study of *dharma*] and *dharma* is known only by *codanā*, Vedic command. The theory of the authorlessness of the Veda is shown to give the authority to the theory of intrinsic validity of the Vedas to know *dharma*. Mādhava reviews the argument with the Naiyāyikas, who think Parameśvara is the author of the Vedas. The main text of the Naiyāyikas quoted by Mādhava is the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana...

"In the course of explaining the non-authorship of the Vedas (*vedāpauruṣeyatva*). Mādhava reviews the theory of everlasting nature of words (*śabdānityatva*) of the Mīmāṃsakas. He calls the Mīmāṃsakas '*śabdadravyatvavādins*' ['those who hold that words are substances'] and he quotes some passages from the *Nyāyabhūṣana* (properly speaking *Nyāyasāra*) of Bhāsarvajña and the *Mānamanohara* of

Vāgīśvara. Mādhava does not quote the works of the philosophers of the Prābhākara school while he quotes some verses in the *Slokavārttika*...

"In the theory of knowledge of the Mīmāṃsakas one of the most important ideas is that of intrinsic validity. According to Mādhava, Mīmāṃsakas developed the theory of intrinsic validity in order to clarify the intrinsic validity of the Veda, through which they gain the knowledge of *dharma*. Schools referred to as *pūrvapakṣins* are Sāṃkhyas, Naiyāyikas and Bauddhas. When Mādhava introduces the *siddhānta* view he quotes verses from the *Slokavārttika*, but not from the works of Prabhākara, though he calls the Mīmāṃsakas 'Vedavādins'...

"*Abhihitānvayavāda* is the theory of sentence construction of Kumārila, and *anvitābhīdhānavāda* is that of Prabhākara...Mādhava reviews the two theories with an impartial attitude."

38.2 VIDYĀRANYA, (*Jaiminīya*) *Nyāyamāla* or *Bhāttasāra* and *Vistara* thereon

Kurata in the article entitled "Mādhava on Mīmāṃsā with special reference to his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*" (StudM pp. 341-369) writes: "Mādhava is credited with the authorship of many works. In the field of the Mīmāṃsā, he wrote the *Jaiminīnyāyamālā* (JNM), in verse, attended with his own commentary, named *Vistara* (JNMV) in prose. It follows the order of Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (JS), not by way of paraphrase but as a summary.

"In the preface of JNM, he says that he will begin to explain the revealed (*śrauta*) *dharma* for those twice-born (*dvija*)s, after completing the explanation of the traditional (*smārta*) *dharma* treated in the *Parāśarasṃṛti* for all the classes and states or life (*varnāśrama*). So JNM appears to have been the next performance undertaken after the completion of his commentary on Parāśara's Institutes of Law; and it suitably enough preceded the great commentaries on the whole of the Vedas, as will be clear later. Anyway, we can easily point out that JNM and the *Parāśaramādhvīya* were composed by the same author, Mādhava.

"He says in one of the introductory verses that of [i.e., due to] the fact that Pārthasārathimīśra's *Sāstradīpikā* has not in all sections given the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *siddhānta* views in verse, he proposes to do that uniformly in JNM.

"He sometime explains separately the doctrine of

Kumārila and of Prabhākara under each head; but more commonly [his discussion is] confined to that of Kumārila alone.

39 (RṢIPUTRA) PARAMEŚVARA I (1350)

Ramulu, p. xi, specifies a Parameśvara I from "Guruvayur" (according to Ramulu all three Parameśvaras are from Guruvayur), and ascribes to him the works listed below.

VARṢ pp. 87-88: "Probably between A.D. 1300 and 1550 just before Śrī Āppayya Dīkṣita, the great literary luminary of South India in the 16th century, flourished the three famous Parameśvaras and one Vāsudeva of the Payoor Bhattatiri family in the Porkulam village of Kunnankulam near Guruvayur in the Cochin State. In the Payyur family of Bhattatiris (Malabar brahmins) flourished one Rṣi (Rṣi I)—who had a son Parameśvara (Parameśvara I) by his wife Gaurī. This Parameśvara has written two commentaries" [listed below] "on the *Nyāyakanikā* of Vācaspatimīśra—the former being his first production. He had two paternal uncles, Bhavadāsa and Saṃkarapūjyapāda, the latter being his *guru*. He had five sons—Rṣi II, Bhavadāsa, Vāsudeva, Subrahmanya and Saṃkara."

39.1. PARAMEŚVARA I, *Jusadvam Karaṇi* on Vācaspati Mīśra's *Nyāyakanikā*

This and its companion entry (the next, 39.2) are available in manuscript according to T. R. Chintamani.

39.2. PARAMEŚVARA I, *Svāditam Karaṇi* on Vācaspati Mīśra's *Nyāyakanikā*

See previous entry.

40 VIṢNUBHATTA (1360)

VARṢ p. 85: "Towards the close of the fourteenth century might have belonged Bhatta Viṣnu, the celebrated author of the *Nayatattvasamgraha*. The earliest reference to this work is found in the *Nītitattvāvirbhāvavyākhyā* of Parameśvara II; so Bhatta Viṣnu is earlier than Parameśvara II. In an introductory verse of the former he has referred to Bhavanātha, the author of the *Nayaviveka*; so he is later than Bhavanātha.

40.1 VISNUBHATTA, *Nayatattvasaṃgraha*

VARs pp. 85-86: (This work) "contains a succinct and lucid account of the important tenets of the *Tarkapāda*, according to the Prābhākara school and so, though brief, it resembles Cidānanda's work. It is both a commentary on the *sūtras* of the *Tarkapāda* as well as an independent treatise discussing important topics like perception's being an instrument of knowledge, the object-less-ness of awarenesses (as held by Buddhists), inference, presumption, absence, God, the everlasting nature of words, the cause of the knowledge of the meaning of sentences, the falsity of the world, etc. It ends with the *vedaprāmānyādhikaraṇa*—the last section of the *Tarkapāda* (I.1.8)."

41 ŚĀYANA (1380?)

The son of Mādhayācārya, according to tradition. For an exhaustive discussion of Śāyana's life and times cf. B. R. Modak, *Makers of Indian Literature* (Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, p. 1995), as well as Munuganti Kripacharyulu, *Śāyana and Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya: A Study of Their Lives and Letters* (Guntur: Rajyalakshmi Publications 1986).

41.1 ŚĀYANA, Introduction to *Rgveda*

Edited in *Rk-Sūktavaijayanī* and published with Śāyana's Introduction to the *Rg-Veda*, Poona: Vaidika Samsodahana Mandala 1965. For a translation of this work see *Riksangraha or a University Selection of Vedic Hymns with the Commentary of Śāyanācārya*, edited with notes in English by Visṇu Govind Bijapurkar, Krishnadas Sanskrit Series 163 (Varanasi: Krishnadas Academy, 2000); and the study by Indrani Kar, *Śāyana's Methodology in Interpreting the Rgveda* (Kolkata: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 2005).

In Moghe 1975, pp. 266-268, S. G. Moghe provides a critical review of the work. We excerpt the appreciative comments, while in fairness omitting the negative ones.

"One will have to admit that Śāyana's comments on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* are useful for any serious student of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. He comments on each and every word in the *sūtra* and comes nearer to Saṃkarācārya in the matter of treatment to the topic. He also introduces popular examples in the course of his discussion on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*. He, at

times, reproduces them *verbatim*, or quotes them with slight changes or even incurs the fault of repetition or suggests a better reading useful enough to substitute even in the *Sabarabhāṣya*. In the case of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras*, however, he suggests the new readings of the *Sūtras* not recorded by the grand masters like Śabara and Kumārila. His originality lies in introducing the Vedānta argument in the treatment of the *Mīmāṃsā* topics. At times, however, his treatment of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* does not cover all the points originally introduced either by Śabara or Kumārila. His contextual explanations are most useful to understand any recondite matter in the right perspective...."

"Generally Śāyana is traditional in interpreting the Vedic texts. He is also sharp enough to record the minute difference of opinion among the grammarians and the well-known *Mīmāṃsakas* only to prove the utility of the *Mīmāṃsā* branch of learning."

"His incidental comments between the two *Mīmāṃsā sūtra* with [the] expression 'nanu' are really useful to prepare our mind not only for the subject-matter of the next *sūtra* but also for the possible reply of the *siddhāntin* to the point at issue becoming available in some later *Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras*. ...He also exhibits his complete knowledge of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* by expressly referring to the *Mīmāṃsā* maxims and *Mīmāṃsā* technical terms, and also by virtually following the principles of the maxims not actually quoted in the body of the text."

42 PAYYŪR VĀSUDEVA (1390)

V. A. Ramaswami Sastri (VARs 1946, pp. 268-269): "To the celebrated family of Payyūr Bhattatiris belonged Vāsudeva, the author of the five works: *Kaumārīlayuktīmālā*, *Acyutalīlā*, *Devīcarita*, *Satyatapaḥkathā* and *Śivodaya*. Two more works, *Vākyaṅgalī* and *Cakrasaṃdeśa*, are also attributed to his authorship. It is known from the colophon of *Kaumārīlayuktīmālā* that he was the son of Maharsī (or Rṣi) and Gopālikā belonging to the Śrutikantara—forest of the Veda (the modern Vellākratu village in the Cochin State)."

Ramaswami Sastri goes on to place this Vāsudeva in relation to a Parameśvara [our 47. Rṣiputra Parameśvara II below]; author of commentaries on Mandanamiśra's *Sphoṭasiddhi* and Vibhramaviveka, Vācaspati-miśra's *Tattvabindu* and Cidānanda's *Nītitattvavirbhava*, who Ramaswami Sastri

conjectures was a brother of our Vāsudeva, suggesting that Vāsudeva had five brothers all of whom were "great *sahṛdayas*". He was as well the grandfather of Parameśvara III, author of *Mīmāṃsāsūtrārthasamgraha* and a commentary on Sucaritamīśra's *Kāśikā*. "All members of the family of Payyūr Bhattatiris are known as great poets and philosophers..." it is worthy of note that nine scholars of repute in their family had adorned the court of Zamorins of Calicut and were prominent among the famous 'eighteen and a half poets' (18 poets in Sanskrit with Punam Nampūtiri, a great Malayalam poet counted as half).

42.1 PAYYŪR VĀSUDEVA, *Kaumārilayuktimālā*

Ramaswami Sastri (VARS 1968), p. 270 reports that "an incomplete manuscript of this work is available at the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras", and that he is working from an incomplete manuscript of this "got down by the Travancore University Manuscript library.

Summary by V. A. Ramaswami Sastri

(This summary is drawn from Ramaswami Sastri (VARS 1968), pp. 270-275.)

"The opening verse...explains the meaning of the *pratijñāsūtra*...

Sūtra 1. The *sūtra* enjoins the *vicāra*—the investigation of the texts—by the study of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā śāstra*... The Vedic student who is anxious to know the different interpretations should not leave the residence of his teacher immediately after he has finished the study of the Vedas, for the performance of the *snāna* or *samāvartana* as enjoined by the *smārtavidhi*: he should remain till he has finished the study of the *vicārasūtra*, which contains the rules of interpretation to be applied in case of doubt in the meaning of the Vedic *mantras*.

Sūtra 2 "gives the definition of and authority on *dharma*. *Dharma* is that which is enjoined by *codanā*, viz. *vidhi* or Vedas, and not by *bāhyāgamas*—the *āgama* texts of the *bāhyas* like Buddhists; and *dharma* is the *artha* in that it produces good and auspicious fruits like cows and wealth and so it is to be understood as different from sacrifices like *śyena* and other *karmans* like *caityapūjā* which produce only inauspicious and evil effects on the performer.

"Verses three and four speak of the creation of the world and of the Vedas by *īśvara*. The Vedas are of divine origin in that they explain the nature of supernormal things like *dharma* and *mokṣa* that cannot be understood by ordinary means of knowledge... Some people, for instance, the Advaitins, go to the extent of saying that *karmans* give the performer their fruits only through the agency and control of *īśvara*, who creates and destroys this world at His will and desire.

4-6. "The validity of the Vedas on supernormal matters is beyond question and they are independent of any other *pramāṇa*. Knowledge of the Vedic contents, particularly the Upaniṣadic *ātman*, removes the innate darkness [of] *avidyā* or *māyā*; so that *codanās* like that enjoining sacrifice for the fruit of cows cannot be explained by perception (since they are going to be produced only on a future occasion). Other *pramāṇas* like inference that are based on perception also cannot be authorities on these *alaukika* matters like *dharma*.

8-13 "Incidentally the author discusses the Prābhākara view whether *kārya* (or *niyoga*) is the sense of the *lin-pratyāya* in Vedic texts and dismisses it with the remark that this is not based on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras* and the *Bhāṣya* thereon.

"14-24 speak of the infallibility and greatness of the Vedas. *Karman*, which is understood properly with the help of the *vicārasāstra*, would help one to free oneself from bondage and traces. The Vedas, particularly the *jñānakānda*, explain the true nature of the self and *māyā* and the illusory characteristic of the phenomenal world. They also proclaim the importance of listening, reflection (and meditation) to attain the knowledge of the supreme self. In these matters, also of supernormal character, *pramāṇas* like perception and inference are of no value and importance, and the Vedas just like the divine tree reveal all truths which are of great help to mankind for its eternal bliss...

36-45 "The study of the Vedas under the teacher is the most important [duty]. This is enjoined... Whether the teaching has as its fruit understanding of its meaning (*arthajñāna*) or training to be a teacher (*ācāryakaraṇa*) is a matter of dispute. The Bhāṭṭas hold the view that study is for one's own instruction (*svavidhiprayukta*), i.e. enjoined by the injunction to study (*adhyayanavidhi*), and it has as its direct fruit understanding of the meaning (besides the perceiving of the letters, *akṣarapratyakṣa*), while the Prābhākaras assert that study is not for one's own sake, since it does not necessarily

make one an adept (*adhikārin*) but is for satisfying the injunction to prepare to teach (*adhyāpanavidhiprayukta*) and as such has its fruit the training of a teacher..

51 "Whatever may be its direct fruit, the importance of understanding the meaning of the Vedas for the performance of *karmans* cannot be overestimated, and so the Vedic student is forced to remain in the residence of his teacher for study (*vicāra*) even after studying the Vedic texts along with the Vedāṅgas...

55 ff. contain a glorification of the Vedas as self-revelations and the infallible authority on *dharma* and other supernormal matters in contrast with other *pramāṇas* like perception.

43 ANANTANĀRĀYANA (1400)

VARs p. 86: "His father's name is Sūryaviṣṇuśiśra. His full name is Anantanārāyaṇārya or Anantanārāyaṇamiśra after his father's surname 'Miśra'. The earliest reference to the *Vijaya* is found in the *Sūtrārthasaṃgraha* of Parameśvara III, where the *Vijayakāra* is eulogised as one of the great authors of the *Mīmāṃsā śāstra*.."

43.1 ANANTANĀRĀYANA, *Vijaya* on Paritoṣa Miśra's *Tantravārttikājita*

VARs p. 86: "From the introductory verse and the colophon it is known that this work is not only a commentary on the *Ajitā* but also a *nibandhana* work which is intended for the learned."

44.1 KṢĪRASAMUDRAVĀSIN or KṢĪRASĀGARA MIŚRA (1400) *Arthavādavicāra*

Edited by T. A. Venkatesvara Dikshitar, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan 1951.

44.2 KṢĪRASAMUDRAVĀSIN, *Dīpa* on Śabara's *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya*

In *Nayaviveka*, p. xiii, S. K. Ramaswami Sastri writes: "I may mention another important work belonging to the Prābhākara School which has recently been discovered, and that is a work called *Bhāṣyadīpa* by Kṣīrasāgara. There is a manuscript of it in the Srīgeri Mut, and recently a transcript

of it has been secured for the Adyar Library. That is a direct commentary on the *Bhāṣya* as its name signifies. The manuscript is incomplete..."

45 KUMĀRA VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA (1316-1401)

Otherwise known as Varadācārya, he is a well-known figure and prolific author of many works on Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. He was the son of 37. Vedānta Deśika.

45.1 KUMĀRA VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA, *Paritrāṇa* on Vedānta Deśika's *Mīmāṃsāpādukā* Edited twice (cf. 793.13.2, 4.

46. VALLABHĀCĀRYA (1400)

From Andhra, says Ramulu, p. xi.

46.1 VALLABHĀCĀRYA, *Pūrvamīmāṃsākārikās* (? Only in manuscript says Ramulu, p. xi.

47. (RṢIPUTRA) PARAMEŚVARA II (1410)

This seems to refer to the same person as the author of a *Gopālikā* on Maṇḍana Miśra's *Sphotasiddhi*, a brief summary of which appears on pp. 213-214 of Volume Five of this Encyclopedia. Ramulu, p. xi, speaks of him as "Parameśvara II from Guruvayur".

VARs pp. 88-89; "Rṣi II [a son of Parameśvara I, see # 39 above] had a son Parameśvara II by his wife Gopālikā...He" "says in his *Nītitattvāvirbhāva* [commentary] that he was the disciple of his uncle, Bhavadāsa, and that his uncle Subrahmanya helped him to write the commentary on the section *Kāryavāda*. [in the *Nītitattvāvirbhāva*] and that he commented on the *Svataḥprāsmānyavāda* [section] as his uncle Vāsudeva explained it to him."

See above under 42. Payyūr Vāsudeva, for more information.

47.1 (RṢIPUTRA) PARAMEŚVARA II, *Vyākhyā* on Cidānanda's *Nītitattvāvirbhāva*

A manuscript of this is cited in Ad IX, p. 90.

47.2 (RṢIPUTRA) PARAMEŚVARA II, *Tattvabhāvanā* on
Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvabindu*

Edited by V. A. Ramaswami Sastri in Annamalai University Sanskrit Series 3, 1936. See 42. Payyūr Vāsudeva (above) for an account of his relations.

47.3 (RṢIPUTRA) PARAMEŚVARA II, *Vyākhyā* on Maṇḍana
Miśra's *Vibhramaviveka*

Mentioned in Ramulu, p. xi. VARS p. 90 says this is the earliest of the author's four works.

48 RAVIDEVA (1450)

Nothing is known about him. Ramulu gives his date as 1450. VARS p. 87 dates him 1400.

48.1 RAVIDEVA, *Vivekatattva* on Bhavanātha's *Nayaviveka*

This commentary is edited in *Nayaviveka*. "It is quoted at length by Parameśvara II in his *Tattvavibhāvanā*." (VARS p. 87). VARS p. 87 says "His commentary is helpful in clearing up the obscurities of Bhavadeva's style which is characterized by careless syntax."

49.1 INDRAPATI (1450), *Mīmāṃsāsārapallava* (NCat II, 253)

50 GOVINDA THAKKURA (1500)

According to Janardan Mishra, in his Introduction to *Mantrakaumudī*, p. i, "Mahamahopādhyāya Govinda Thakkura was a great scholar of Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and he was a Lion of Nyāya (Tarkapañcāna). He has been mentioned by [his son] Devanātha [Thakkura] with great reverence and in highly eulogistic terms for his great scholarship and other qualities. He learnt Nyāya and other *śāstras* at the feet of his father."

50.1 GOVINDA THAKKURA, *Adhikaraṇamālā* (NCat I, 111;
VI, 192, 196)

51 RĀMĀNUJĀCĀRYA (1500)

KTP 2008, p. xxxiv: "In the introductory verses to *Tantrarāhasya* he informs us that he hails from Dharmapuri on the banks of the Godāvāri. He mentions the temple of

Navasimha of that place and pays respects to Navasimha as one of the forms of Viṣṇu. At the commencement of *Śāstrārāmbha pariccheda* he informs us that his *guru* is Veṅkatādri, an expert on the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānujācārya.

Freschi, pp. 160-161, attempts to fix the date: "Rāmānujācārya's dates are far from certain. He quotes from works by Pārthasārathi and Bhavanātha, proving that he was not active before the twelfth century, but he does not quote from any later authors...Rāmānujācārya must also have lived after Śrī Rāmānuja (possibly 1170-1280), the founder of Śrī Vaisnavism, whose name he bears and whose tradition he follows. The learned author of the second printed edition of the *Tantrarāhasya*, Pt. K. S. Ramaswami Sastri Siromani, in his introduction, has carefully analyzed any available evidence for the author's dates. On the strength of 'the genealogical details of the author, available from an existing member of this ancient family, at Tirupati', of a *Nāyakarātna* manuscript which can be dated to A.D. 1595, and of tentative identifications of the teachers Rāmānujācārya mentioned, he offers two possible dates, i.e. either 'a little later than the middle of the 14th century A.D.' or '1500 A.D.'," citing NRM, pp. lxxv-lxxvii.

Actually Ramaswami Sastri on those pages provides a lot more information while speculating about Rāmānujācārya's date. We learn the his teachers were named Veṅkatādri and Jātaveda—Ramaswami Sastri tries to identify these figures. We learn also that our author was from Andhra country, and that (after eliminating two other Veṅkatādris) this appears to suggest the later date he suggested [above] for Rāmānujācārya, around 1500. And if the other teacher, Jātaveda, can be identified (Ramaswami Sastri speculates about that, pp. lxxvi-lxxvii) the date given by us for Rāmānujācā is further confirmed.

51.1 RĀMĀNUJĀCĀRYA, *Nāyakarātna* on Pārthasārathi
Miśra's *Nyāyaratnamālā*

VARS p. 148: "Though this author was a follower of the Prābhākara school, he has commented, as he says in one of the introductory verses, on the *Nyāyaratnamālā* because of his great reverence for that great writer in the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṃsā *śāstra*."

The summary that follows is found in NRM, pp. lix-lxviii of the Introduction. The same NRM is our "E".

Summary by K. S. Ramaswami Sastri

"*Nayakarātna* is the only commentary available on the *Nyāyaratnamālā*, and the popularity of this work can be gauged by the fact that manuscripts of this commentary are available in all Indian manuscript libraries from Kashmir in the North down to South India. The chief reason for the popularity of this work seems to be its simple style and forceful expressions by which even the very obscure theories of the Prābhākara of the Bhāṭṭa school are made easily understandable, and its thoroughness in elucidating all sentences of the *Nyāyaratnamālā* is really remarkable. There will remain nothing unknown or doubtful regarding the text if it is studied with the help of this commentary. Rāmānujācārya, who is a follower of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, while commenting on this text obtained an opportunity to explain the tenets of his own school, which were condemned by Pārthasārathi. He made it a point, throughout this commentary, to avoid unnecessary complications by introducing new topics which are not altogether relevant in explaining the text. In other words, Rāmānuja did not like to parade his learning, as other commentators are so fond of doing. In the commentary, the author correctly explains many of the technical terms of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā which, otherwise, would have remained unknown even to the present day, since only a fraction of the Prābhākara literature is made available in print. The greatest advantage that we derive from this publication consists in our obtaining correct explanation for many technical terms of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. We, therefore, propose to give here the elucidation of some of the most important terms, since this is considered to be one of the most useful contributions made by the author to the Mīmāṃsā system as a whole."

Niyoga

"*Niyoga* is a force which mediates between the sacrifice and its resultant benefit. This is called *apūrva* because it is not known by any other means of knowledge except the Vedic *liṅ*. *Niyoga* is also learnt as *kārya* or duty because it is required to be performed in consequence of the same *liṅ*. The *niyoga* exists as the result of the actions till the production of the beneficial result expected from the temporary sacrifice. It is called *niyoga* (E4) because persons desiring heaven and the rest are directed to work it out. This is signified as principal among the imports

of a sentence, and all other words convey their meanings subordinated to and connected with it. This is accepted as the meaning of *liṅ* because the sacrifice, being of short duration, cannot be called *kārya* or duty for the persons desiring heaven and the rest, which are obtained after a great lapse of time. This is not, however, the case in the non-Vedic sentences where the suffix *liṅ* can denote the actions expressed by the principal roots as the duty to be executed."

Niyogya

"One who understands the duty as appointed for him is called a *niyogya* or functionary in respect of that duty, and thus, that duty is called a *niyoga*. In some Vedic injunctions the *svargakāma* or one who is desirous of heaven is appointed for him; or, in other words, as he is directed to perform the duty. In some other Vedic injunctions, certain duty is prescribed for a person so long as he is living. In a case like this, the functionary is the person who is living. In those Vedic injunctions that prohibit certain actions one who is induced by his own desire to perform the prohibited actions is to be considered as the functionary."

"In the case of non-Vedic injunctions the persons who are addressed in the sentences and who undertake to perform the duty are functionaries. The functionaries in the Vedic injunctions are slightly different from those in non-Vedic injunctions, and this difference consists in their understanding the duty which they are required to perform. In the former, the one desiring heaven cannot consider a duty as his own unless it has the power to produce the benefit sought for by him. He cannot take, therefore, the Vedic sacrifice as his duty because it does not exist at the time of the resultant benefit. The relation of such functions as desire for heaven etc. in these injunctions makes it necessary to invent a permanent *niyoga* or *apūrva* as his duty. This *apūrva* is taken as expressed by the *liṅ* through its principal significative power. It is also accepted as produced by the sacrifices. But, on the other hand, it is believed that the functionaries in the non-Vedic injunctions understand the *dhatvartha* or the meaning of the principal root of the sentence as a duty enjoined on them, because there is no necessity to invent a *niyoga*. But, in these cases, the *liṅ* expresses the *kriyā* or the meaning of the root as the duty by their *lakṣaṇā* or the secondary power of expression."

Adhikārin

"One who understands the *dhatvarthakriyā* or the meaning of the root as to be performed by him because it is a means to the duty imposed upon him, is known as *adhikārin* or the person having a right to undertake its performance. One considers himself as an *adhikārin* or rightful person to an action when he understands that he himself is meant to be the functionary to the duty indicated by the *liñ*. An injunction, which imposes *niyoga* as a duty, requires efforts of the performer to accomplish that duty. The person who is to exert his efforts must know, before undertaking the sacrifice required by that duty as his own, that the duty is meant for him, and one who knows thus and undertakes the sacrifice is called the *adhikārin*. *Adhikāra* or eligibility accrues always to him who is stated as a *niyojya* or functionary. It may be understood, therefore, that an injunction which does not appoint a functionary at the same time, cannot indicate a person on whom the right to perform the action falls, and without a rightful person no action can be imposed as duty by the suffix *liñ*. It is, therefore, that the injunction '*sādhyāyo adhyetyah*' is considered by the Prābhākaras as incapable of imposing the study of the Veda as a duty, because the functionary is not mentioned there and thus there can be no *adhikārin* or rightful person to undertake the study of the Vedas." (E4)

Kartā

"One who actually performs the action indicated by the principal root in an injunction is known as *kartā*. One undertakes the action when he understands that he himself is meant to be the rightful person to discharge it on account of his being a functionary to the duty imposed upon him by the injunction. The three offices of *niyojya*, *adhikārin* and *kartā* are, therefore, combined in one person who is stated to be the functionary in an injunction and is related to the three activities." (E4)

Nityavidhi

"This is an injunction which enjoins a certain duty imposed on a functionary under particular conditions in which he is permanently placed. The content of that duty is generally an action or sacrifice which is the meaning of the root to which the *liñ* is joined as a suffix. This action also is known as *nityakarman*. Here the functionary must undertake the duty

with its content simply because it is imposed upon him, and he does not get any benefit out of it. It is, therefore, possible for him to neglect the performance of certain *aṅgas* or auxiliaries of that sacrifice, because the sacrifice alone was the object of the *niyoga* or duty when he undertook it and not all auxiliaries enjoined under the head of that sacrifice in the Vedas." (E133-134)

Kāmyavidhi

"This is an injunction (E10) which enjoins a *niyoga* as a duty imposed upon those persons who are desirous of obtaining certain benefits such as heaven, animals (*paśu*) and the rest. The sacrifice or the action which is the content of the duty is also called optional (*kāmyakarman*). Here, unlike a *nityavidhi*, the functionary should perform all auxiliaries described under the head of that sacrifice, because in these cases the sacrifice with all its auxiliaries and the method which is to be followed becomes the content of the duty. This deviation is due to the following reason. The person (E132) who is desirous of obtaining certain benefits would naturally undertake only those duties where the sacrifices, the content of the duties, are capable of producing the desired benefits. It is, therefore, necessary in the optional injunctions that the sacrifices should be settled as leading to the desired benefits before the functionary undertakes the duties as his own. The sacrifices in these injunctions, therefore, must already be known to be complete with all auxiliaries in order to be settled as the means leading to the desired benefits. The functionary then undertakes the duty with its contents—the sacrifice with all auxiliaries—and proceeds to perform them."

Nisedha

"This is an injunction which imposes a duty whose content is negation of a certain action on those persons who will otherwise be inclined to do that action. Here the functionaries will comply with the injunction by simply restraining themselves from those actions, the negation of which was the content of the duty imposed upon them. (E10) By this restraint from prohibited actions the functionaries do not gain anything except that they have the satisfaction of complying with the injunction, nor do they incur any sin by doing the prohibited action except that they do not comply with the injunction."

Grāhakagrahana

"To consider one as a *grāhaka* [lit., a 'grasper'] or as to be included by a *grāhaka* is called *grāhakagrahana*. (E199). The one whose principal duty it is which is denoted by the *liṅ* and imposed on a functionary in the main sentence is known as a 'grasper' (*grāhaka*) because that duty includes all other imports signified by that sentence and also by the other sentences in the same chapter as subordinated and connected with itself. The subsidiaries, thus included in the principal duty, are of two kinds, and these subsidiaries are prescribed in the same chapter with the help of separate sentences having separate *liṅs* as the suffix. The *liṅs* in these sentences do not indicate a command different from that of the main sentence, but they are taken to express the principal duty itself. This is called 'being considered as the one who has the principal duty' (*grāhakagrahana*). The principal duty, to repeat, includes the subsidiaries expressed by the root in that sentence."

Sannipātin

"One kind of auxiliary included in the principal duty is known as 'direct' (*sannipāti*) (E205) because it forms a part of the principal sacrifice which is the object of the principal duty. The *liṅ* in the sentence that prescribes the direct auxiliary and repeats the principal duty which is again connected with the meaning of the root as its own content. But this content cannot be its *karana* or chief cause because the principal sacrifice is already known as the chief cause of the duty in the main sentence. The same duty, therefore, includes the direct auxiliary as a part of its chief cause because without it the principal sacrifice cannot be complete."

Ārādupakārii

"The second kind of auxiliary included in the principal duty is called *ārādupakāri* because it does not lend support physically to the principal sacrifice which is the object of the principal duty. These auxiliaries are minor sacrifices, complete in themselves, and give support to the principal sacrifices in forming the principal duty. The sentences that impose these auxiliaries express only the subordinate sacrifices, and the *liṅ* therein do not mean any duty at the outset as their meaning is not settled at that time. The sacrifices alone, however, are included as subsidiaries to the principal duty which is nearer to and in need of them. These subsidiaries cannot be the chief

cause of the principal duty as the principal sacrifice is taken already as the chief cause, nor can they lend support physically to form the principal sacrifice itself as direct auxiliaries do. But they merely become subsidiary to the principal duty because they help the principal sacrifice in producing the command or *niyoga*. (E199) This help they can render only by producing a separate *apūrva* which will last up to the completion of the principal sacrifice. Now, the *liṅs* which were kept so long without expressing any meaning in those sentences that prescribe the *ārādupakāri* subsidiaries are again taken to express this *apūrva* which forms as subordinate to the principal duty. They are not meant to repeat the principal duty itself as it was in the case of the direct auxiliaries. This subordinate duty is expressed by the *liṅ* through its *lakṣanāvṛtti* or secondary significative force, because the *liṅ* is always taken to express only the principal duty by its inherent significative power (E199).

Upādāna

"This is considered as the seventh instrument (*pramāṇa*), by which the auxiliaries are determined. The direct auxiliaries are taken as auxiliary to the principal duty by the one who has the principal duty, and to their immediate effects by *śruti* or direct expression [of scripture]. But they are not known as auxiliaries to the principal sacrifice by any other means than *upādāna* (E208) because they are performed in order to complete the principal sacrifice."

Upadeśa

"Vedic texts that express a *niyoga* or duty and other things required by that duty are called 'precepts' (*upadeśa*). Besides this, the things that are not actually stated in the Vedic texts and are suggested by the duty imposed by these texts so as to make the Vedic injunctions complete, are also considered as known through precepts. For instance, ektypal (*vikṛti*) sacrifices that are to be performed on the analogy of the archetypal (*prakṛti*) sacrifices are not complete in all aspects. The texts that impose these ektypal sacrifices require the method adopted in the archetype for the complete performance of the ektypes so that they may express a complete injunction of the ektypal sacrifices. The method thus suggested by these texts for the ektypes is also considered as known through the ektypal text itself, though it does not contain any word to

express the method adopted in the archetypes. This kind of precept is treated as the subject-matter in the first six chapters [of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras*]."

Kārya

"This is the subject-matter of the latter half of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras*, and *kārya* means the help rendered by the auxiliaries to the principal duty to the sacrifice."

Prāptabādha

"The method and auxiliaries that were adopted in the archetypal sacrifices are transferred to the ektypal sacrifices. And of those auxiliaries thus transferred, some could not be performed on account of certain objections. But they remain as auxiliaries to the ektypes though they are not performed. This is called '*prāptabādha*'."

Anvitābhidhāna

"The words in a sentence convey their meanings in relation to the meanings of the other words. Thus; the *vākyaṛtha* or the collective sense conveyed by a sentence is caused by the words which convey both their meanings and their mutual relations. It is meant, here, that a word has not got separate existence, and it always conveys complete sense only in relation with the other words. Every word, therefore, expresses its meaning as connected with an action which is denoted by other words, and these cumulative expressions of all the words in a sentence are called *anvitābhidhāna*." (E97)

Dharma

"The duty that is imposed by the Vedic injunction is called *dharma*. This is nothing but the *niyoga* which is imposed as a duty on the *niyojya* or the functionary through the Vedic *liṅs*. The benefit that accrues from its performance consists in compliance with the injunctions for which one happens to be a functionary and a rightful person to perform the sacrifices."

Adharma

"This is an action which is prohibited by the Vedic injunction. One who obeys merely acts in consonance with the Vedic injunctions. But, on the other hand, if one does not, he meets with no bad result except that blame attaches to him for non-compliance with the Vedic injunctions."

51.2 RĀMĀNUJĀCĀRYA, *Tantrarahasya*

The work is edited by K. T. Pandurangi in KTP 2008, pp. 195-312. This is our "E". In his Introduction to E (pp. xxxiv-xliv) Pandurangi provides the following summary.

Summary by K. T. Pandurangi

(pp. xxxv-xxxviii; E197-222) "In this the first Chapter the general definition of '*pramāna*' as direct experience (*anubhūti*) is given. It is stated that this excludes memory from the scope of knowledge. Prābhākaras claim that all cognitions are valid (*yathārthya sarvaṃ vijñānam*). They include the instances of doubt, dream (*svapna*) etc. also under valid awareness (*yathārthajñāna*) by appropriate explanations. The statement 'this is silver' (*idaṃ rajatam*) conveys two cognitions. '*Idam*' refers to remembered silver. However, the distinction between the shell that is being grasped and the silver that is remembered is not realized as these two occur very quickly one after the other. Both these cognitions are true, as the objects referred to by them are actually present. The presentation of the objects in this cognition is technically called *bhāsamāna*. The objects referred to are called *vedya*. These two should agree, to make a cognition accurate. In the case of 'this is silver' what is presented in experience and memory actually agree with the facts. Therefore both these cognitions are true and distinct. However, the distinction between these two is not realized. Because of this the statement "this is silver" does not lead to successful action.

"In the instance of doubt, viz. 'is it a post or a man?', the observer observes a pole and remembers a post and a man. However he is not able to identify the pole, either as a post or as man. But his memory of post and man are true, it is only his inability to identify the pole with one of them that leads to the doubt. But the two cognitions involved in it are true.

"In the instance of the yellow conch-shell (*pīṭah śaṅkhah*) the bile (*pittadravya*) present in the eye is projected on the shell. Therefore the shell is taken as yellow. Here also it is true that bile is yellow and that it is a shell is also true. Therefore the cognition of a yellow shell is true. In this way Prābhākaras explain all experiences to be accurate. This is an important doctrine of the Prābhākaras.

"After discussing the accuracy of all cognitions the *Tantrarahasya* takes up Kumārila Bhāṭṭa's definition of

pramāṇa, viz. *ḍṛdham avisamvādi agrhīta grāhi vijñānam pramāṇam* for discussion. This definition is reviewed clause by clause and rejected. The problem of intrinsic validity is discussed in detail.

"The five instruments of knowledge, viz., perception, inference, comparison, presumption and verbal testimony are stated. "Perception" is defined as direct awareness (*sākṣāt pratīti*). The expression '*sākṣāt*' means the direct cognition of the very nature (*svarūpa*) of the object. In the case of inference the object is cognized in its capacity as pervader (*vyāpaka*) while in the case of perception the object is cognized as it is. This is the implication of "direct".

"With respect to inference the nature of pervasion and the steps in inference for others and all other details of inference are discussed.

"The Prābhākaras' explanation of comparison is quite different from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Observing an object and comprehending its similarity to another object which is similar to it is comparison.

"When a person who has seen a cow in the village sees a forest-cow, by observing the similarity to the forest-cow he becomes aware of the similarity to it in the village-cow. This awareness of similarity is comparison. Comparison cannot be included in inference.

"The instrument of knowledge called presumption is a distinct contribution of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. When two known facts become incompatible, unless a relevant other object is envisaged, the envisaging of the concerned other object is presumption. For example, Devadatta is known to be alive but is absent from his home. To resolve this conflict his presence outside has to be envisaged. This is presumption.

"Prābhākaras do not accept the category of absence. Consequently they do not accept absence as an instrument of knowledge. They explain the situation of absence as follows. When there is a book on the table it is the combined awareness of table and book. When there is no book on the table then it is awareness of a single thing, the table. Those who believe in absence(s) claim that this latter awareness is awareness of an absence. There is no need of envisaging the category of absence here.

(Sxxxviii-xxxix; E223-228) "Prābhākaras accept eight categories, viz., substance, quality, motion, universal property, inherence, potency, number and similarity. Among these the

first five are common with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Under substance nine substances are listed, the same as in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It should be noted that darkness (*tamas*) accepted by Bhāttas is not accepted by Prābhākaras. Verbal testimony, is accepted by the Bhāttas but it is considered a quality by the Prābhākaras. A universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*) is stated to be distinct from an individual (*vyakti*) and it is perceived only in perceptible substances. The Bhāttas consider a universal to be different-cum-non-different with the individual.

"The category of individuator (*viśeṣa*), accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, is not accepted by Prābhākaras.

"The relation between inseparables (*ayutasiddha*) is inherence. It arises along with the very object which is to be related by it with the cause. It is not perceptible. It has to be only inferred...

"Potency (*śakti*) is present in all positive (*bhāva*) objects meant by words. For instance, fire normally burns but when it is prevented by a gem, a *mantra* etc. then it does not burn. Therefore we have to envisage the potency, i.e. what is prevented by the gem, the *mantra* etc.

"Number (*samkhyā*) is a separate category as it cannot be included under substance, quality etc. Similarity (*sādrśya*) is also a separate category.

(Sxxxix-xlii; E229-260) "The word '*śāstra*' refers to verbal testimony through the Vedas. The *Tantrarāhasya* explains it as 'a group of words that convey a meaning on the basis of the comprehension of the relation between the word and the meaning (*sambandhagrahanānavaśena arthapratyāpakam padajātam*). It is also explained as 'that which conveys objects that are not conveyed by perception etc. (i.e. other instruments)' (*pratyakṣādyasannikṛṣṭārtham śāstram*). The relation between the words and their meanings is natural and eternal. This is stated in the *Jaiminīyasūtras*-*autpattikastu śabdasya arthena sambandha*'. Phonemes are everlasting and all-pervasive. Therefore the relation between the two [word and meaning] is eternal.

"Here a question is raised whether the phonemes are produced or manifested. Those who hold the view that they are produced argue as follows:

(i) Different speakers pronounce the phonemes *ka*, *na*, etc. differently. Therefore these are produced.

(ii) '*Varnaḥ dhvastah, varnaḥ utpannah*' states that phonemes are produced and phonemes perish. This indicates

that phonemes are produced.

(iii) If phonemes are manifested then by one effort of manifestation all phonemes should have been manifested.

"These arguments are not acceptable to those who hold the view that phonemes are manifested. By the efforts of vocal organs phonemes are manifested but not produced. We have the experience that the letter *ga* is not single; rather, we have the experience of recognition. This establishes the everlasting persistence of phonemes. These are manifested, not produced.

"The relation between a word and its meaning is comprehended through previous usage (*vrddhavyavahāra*). The present generation of elders learnt it from the previous generation of their elders. They will have also learnt it from the elders of previous generations. In this way previous usage is beginningless. Therefore the relation between a word and its meaning is also beginningless.

"In this context a point is raised that, at the time of reabsorption (*pralaya*) all are simultaneously withdrawn. At creation the omniscient, omnipotent God creates objects and persons. He fixes the relationship between words and their meanings. Therefore this relation is not beginningless but is fixed by God.

"This theory is not valid. All objects and persons are not simultaneously destroyed at the time of reabsorption. Therefore the question of an omniscient and omnipotent God creating them and fixing the relation between words and meanings does not arise.

Before presenting the Prābhākara view of *anvitābhīdhānavāda* the *Tantrarahasya* presents the view of the Grammarians (*vyākaraṇa*), viz., *sphoṭa*, and rejects it. It is rejected by pointing out that there is no such thing as a word (*pada*) over and above the syllables. Therefore the idea of *sphoṭa* has no basis. Then the *Tantrarahasya* presents the view that the words convey word-meanings (*padārtha*). These lead to sentence-meanings by secondary meaning or *lakṣanā*. Expectancy, fitness and relation (*sannkarṣa*) are the aids for it.

(Sxlii; T261-298) "What is to be done (*kārya* is also called *apūrva* because it is not conveyed by any *pramāna* other than Vedic injunctions. The entire literature (*śāstra*) conveys what is to be done alone.

"Kumārila Bhatta explains the meaning of the optative suffix (*liṅ*) differently. The optative suffix has two aspects, *liṅtva* and *ākhyātatva*. The former conveys the verbal force

(*bhāvanā*) and the latter aspects convey actual force (*arthabhāvanā*). These two constitute the import of the injunctive suffix.

"Māndana Mīśra holds the view that a desired means of action (*īstasādhanatva*) is the import of the injunctive suffix. Quoting the view of a few others, the *Tantrarahasya* states the Prābhākara view. According to the Prābhākaras what is to be done, i.e. future action (*kārya* is the import of the optative suffix. This *kārya* elicits a commanded person (*niyojya*) and a content. Sacrifice (*yāga*) is both its content and its instrument (*karana*). *Liṅ* also conveys initiative (*kṛti*), i.e. force (*bhāvanā*). This *bhāvanā* is different from the *śābdhībhāvanā* and *ārthībhāvanā* envisaged by the Bhāttas. Achieving *apūrva* itself is the end of implementing what is to be done. Heaven is a secondary result. All auxiliaries also get connected with what is to be done through sacrifice.

(Sxliii-xliv; E299-312) "To determine the correct import of the Veda Pūrvamīmāṃsā is an aid. In view of this whether the study of Mīmāṃsāśāstra be undertaken or not is discussed in Mīmāṃsā works. This problem is discussed in the present chapter. The *Tantrarahasya* presents objections and answers on this topic, both according to the Bhāttas and the Prābhākaras.

According to the Bhāttas an objector argues that knowledge of objects is not a purpose of this injunction (viz., the injunction to study) because awareness of objects can be obtained in a natural way without any injunction. It cannot be considered a prescribed act because there is no *kratusamsparsa*, that is to say, that this injunction is not connected with any sacrifice. Hence no knowledge of objects is necessary. Consequently, investigation (*mīmāṃsā*, *vicāra*) need not be undertaken.

"The *siddhāntin* points out that knowledge of objects is necessary for understanding of prescribed acts and through that is connected with sacrifices. Hence it is prescribed that knowledge of objects has to be obtained by study only, but not by any other means.

"From the Prābhākara point of view *Tantrarahasya* states the objection and answer as follows: Study of one's own sections of the Vedas is prescribed in the injunction to teach. Therefore the purpose of study is to become a teacher, not to learn about objects. So undertaking the study of Mīmāṃsā is not necessary.

"The *siddhāntin* points out that teaching is a mediate auxiliary (*bahirāṅga*) while study is an immediate auxiliary (*antaraṅga*). Therefore both are purposes. There is no clash between the two purposes. Since knowledge of objects is considered a purpose Mīmāṃsā study, which provides that knowledge, has to be undertaken."

In Freschi a section (unsummarized above) is studied and summarized by Elisa Freschi as follows: "In essence, Vedic prescriptions urge people to undertake actions. This prescriptive core requires an instrument and a procedure. The hermeneutical device to identify instrument and procedure, and to determine their priority of connection with the prescriptive core, is expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*), a typical Mīmāṃsā concept, derived from the *Srautasūtra* exegetical praxis. According to this type of gradual incorporation of new elements on a syntactical and semantical basis, the author constructs the prescriptions enjoining the Full and New Moon Sacrifices and integrates them with all subsidiaries."

52. BHATTA KEŚAVA (1500)

The date is Ramulu's, p. xi, who says he's from Andhra.

52.1. BHATTA KEŚAVA, *Mīmāṃsārthapraṅkāśa*

Ramulu, p. xi. It has been edited by S. P. V. Ranganathasvami in *Granthapradarsinī* (Vizagapatam) 2, 39, 41: 1895-1914.

53 (RŚIPUTRA) PARAMEŚVARA III (1500)

Apparently this is the grandson of Parameśvara II, whom we have dated at 1410. Ramulu, p. xi, gives "1450", but VARS has 1550..

VARS pp. 90: "Parameśvara II had a son named Rṣi III who had in his turn a son called Parameśvara III."

53.1 (RŚIPUTRA) PARAMEŚVARA III, *Jaiminīyasūtrārthasamgraha* on Sucarita Miśra's *Kāśikā*

P. K. N. Pillai, pp. 144-145, gives a succinct summary, which appears to be a straightforward commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*. Pillai makes a number of interesting observations about the style of this work, which he describes as a "simple style, clear elucidation and direct appeal." (p. 147)

VARS p. 91: "It begins with a eulogy of the important *ācāryas* of the Pūrvaṃmīmāṃsā *śāstra*... He also pays a tribute to his teacher Vāsudeva, probably his own paternal uncle."

54 MĀDHAVA SARASVATĪ (1515)

Madhava Sarasvatī is the first listed author in our Encyclopedia, Volume 13. For information on him consult that entry.

54.1 MĀDHAVA SARASVATĪ, *Sarvadarśanakaumudī*

This general work is edited by K. Sambasivar Sastri in Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 135, 1938.

55 DEVANĀTHA THAKKURA TARKAPAÑCĀNANA (1564)

Information about this writer can be found by consulting number 11 in the list of authors whose works are referred to in Volume 13 of this Encyclopedia.. Most of his works concern Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Janardana Miśra, in his Introduction to *Mantrakaumudī*, pp. i-ii, gives us the following information: "Mahāmahopādhyāya Tarka-pañcānana Śrī Devanātha Thakkura was the fifth of the seven sons of Mahāmahopādhyāya Govinda Thakkura and elder brother of the famous Naiyāyika Madhusūdana Thakkura..."

"Devanātha was born c. 1490 A.D. and lived up to a ripe old age. The exact date of his death is not known. But he wrote the *Tantrakaumudī* [a work on Tantra] at the age of 75, in 1564.

"Devanātha is famous as 'Saptakaukaumudikāra'. These *Kaumudis* are-

1. *Adhikaranakaumudī* on Mīmāṃsā
2. *Kālakauṃudī* on *smṛti*
3. *Kāvyaikaumudī* on rhetorics
4. *Tantrakaumudī*
5. *Mantrakaumudī*
6. *Siddhāntakaumudī*
7. *Smṛtikaumudī*.

"It appears that after the downfall of Oinwar (?) dynasty in 1526 A.D, he left Mithilā and went to the court of Malladeva, the king of Kamalā, i.e. Coochbihar. This Malladeva has been praised profusely in beautiful panegyrics. From a verse in the *Tantrakaumudī* (Intro. v. 5) it appears that he enjoyed the

patronage of another king Gajapati Govindadeva. It is difficult to say who this Gajapati was.

"He also wrote (*Ālokapariśiṣṭa*) on Navyanyāya..."

55.1 DEVANĀTHA THAKKURA TARKAPAÑCĀNANA, *Adhikaranakaumudī*

It has been edited by Narayana Sastri Khiste and Vaidyanatha Sastri Varekale in Kashi Sanskrit Series 50, 1926.

56 RAGHUNĀTHA BHATTĀCĀRYA (1555)

Biswarup Saha (in Saha 1991, pp. v-vi) reports that "Maṇḍana Miśra opines that internal evidence shows that the author of the *Mīmāṃsāratna* belonged to c. 16th century A.D. The surname Bhattācārya testifies that the author was a Bengalee Brāhmaṇa...He must be predecessor of, rather than the contemporary with the author of *Mānameyodaya*, the first Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (1560-1656 A. D.), because in the *Pramāṇaratna* we find no influence of the *Mānameyodaya*. One may notice influence of the *Pramāṇaratna* on Gāgabhaṭṭa's (1630-1700 A. D.) discussion of fallacies. Its beginning and concluding verses suggest the author was a devotee of Lakṣmīdhara or Kṛṣṇa."

56.1. RAGHUNĀTHA BHATTĀCĀRYA, *Mīmāṃsāratna*

Manuscripts exist, according to Ramulu, p. xi. Saha 1991 says: "This work deals with the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*), objects of knowledge (*prameya*) and injunctions (*vidhis*)..."

56.2 RAGHUNĀTHA BHATTĀCĀRYA, *Pramāṇaratnā*

Edited and translated by Biswarup Saha (Saha 1991) from Calcutta. A lengthy work; we refrain from providing the translation but instead provide excerpts from Mr. Saha's Preface.

"The *Pramāṇaratna*, which literally means gem of the source or means of knowledge, is a primer and is intended for the beginners. This treatise is a stepping-stone of the higher authoritative texts of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. It deals with the six means of knowledge, viz perception, inference, verbal authority, comparison, presumption and negation..."

"The manuscript of the first portion of this work is named in the catalogue of the Kavīndrācārya Sarasvatī Library in Benares...this library is not existent at present. So the first portion dealing with the *pramāṇas* remains difficult to trace...The manuscript belonging to the Asiatic Society appears to be of 300-350 years old, as its style of writing, script etc. It is probably copied from the archetype or autograph by a Bengalee copyist. The adscripts in this copy, though in Sanskrit language, are presented in Bengali script, not in Devanagari..."

57 AHOBALA SŪRI (1565)

NCat XI, 164 mentions a work, presumably by this author, titled "*Parakīyādhikaraṇaśarīrakhaṇḍana*". It is not clear whether this is a Mīmāṃsā work or not, as Ahobala also wrote on the Viśiṣṭādvaitin Rāmānuja (a commentary on the *Vedāntasāra*).

57.1 AHOBALA SŪRI, *Vākyaṛtharatna* and *Suvarṇamudrā* thereon

Edited by Ramasastri in Mysore Oriental Library Publications 83, 1943. Chapter Four is translated by Marulasiddhaiah in Mysore Orientalist 2.1, 1969 - 2.2, 1969.

58. VARADARĀJA (1500-1570)

The date is Ramulu's, p. x. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri (Nayaviveka, p. xiv) remarks: "A Varadarāja is well-known as the author of the [Nyāya works] *Tārkikarakṣā* and the commentary called *Bodhīnī* on Udayānācārya's *Kusumājali*. Whether Varadarāja, the commentator on *Nayaviveka*, is identical with the author of the *Tārkikarakṣā* and *Kusumājālībodhīnī* is a problem which has to be further considered." VARS p. 93 says "This Varadarāja should not be identified with Varadarāja the author of the *Tārkikarakṣā*...who must be assigned to about A. D. 1100, much earlier than the date of the author of the *Nayavivekadīpikā*".

VARS p. 93: "In the introductory verses and colophons [to 58.1] he pays his respects to his *guru*, Sudarśana, and to his parents; then refers to Sūtrakāra Jaimini, the Bhāṣyakāra, Prabhākara (the famous Tikākāra), Bhavanātha and the Nibandhanakāras like Candra. Then he gives his genealogy and the place of his birth. On the bank of the Sukapagā in the family

of Kidāmbi was born one Pranātārihara belonging to the Ātreya Gotra; his son was Devarāja whose son was the erudite Raṅganāthadhvarin; and the latter's son was Varadarāja."

58.1 VARADARĀJA, *Dīpikā* on Bhavanātha Miśra's *Nayaviveka*
Edited in SSSastri 1977, who provides the following summary and other remarks in his Introduction, pp. i-iii.

Summary by S. Subrahmanya Sastri

"*Nayaviveka*... is a brief résumé of the two commentaries of *Brhatī* and *Laghvī* written by Prabhākara, otherwise called 'guru', on the *Bhāṣya* of Sabarasvāmin on the *sūtras* of Jaimini.

"*Nayaviveka* while putting forth the purports of *Brhatī* and *Laghvī* of each section condemns the views of Kumārila in each section. The first Section of Chapter I is called *Tarkapāda* wherein (1) the necessity for the study of Mīmāṃsā, (2) the definition of *dharma*, (3) *pramāṇas* acceptable to Mīmāṃsakaḥ, (4) the nature of selves, (5) the everlasting-ness of phonemes, (6) the nature of verbal cognitions and (7) the eternal nature of the Vedas are explained.

"From Section II the examination of the purport of Vedic texts begins. *Brhatī* and *Laghvī* also differ in commenting upon the *Bhāṣya*, though they are by the same author. *Brhatī* attaches importance to the word-senses and so is called '*arthabalamata*' while *Laghvī* attaches importance to words and hence came to be called '*śabdabalamata*'. *Nayaviveka* discusses both the *Tīkās* and faithfully records their purport. He says that he could have interpreted the *Tīkās* in a quite different way but being recognized by the public he was following Śālikanātha...

"It is because of *Nayaviveka* that we are able to find out the views of Prabhākara regarding the subject matter of this school beyond Section 2 of Chapter VI. He is brief but his commentator Varadarāja explains the text very clearly. Appaya Dīksita often quotes from Varadarāja to substantiate the Prabhākara viewpoints he is dealing with. Vivaranācārya and others take pains to show that the views of the Vedāntins in regard to generation of verbal cognition do not militate against the Prabhākara system."

58.2 VARADARĀJA, *Ranakabhāvanā* on a
Mīmāṃsākārikāvivarāṇa

This work, in Tamil, is listed in Ramulu, p. xi, as being

available in manuscript, but it is unclear what the work is which is being commented on.

59 LAUGĀKSI BHĀSKARA (1590)

He was the author of several works on Nyāya, as well as the following well-known handbook on Mīmāṃsā. In Gradinarov we find a discussion of his date: it is found that at least two manuscripts of works by Laugākṣi are dated 1590-1591, which determinates that Laugākṣi must be no later than that date. See #6 in Volume Thirteen of this Encyclopedia for more information on Laugākṣi.

59.1 LAUGĀKSI BHĀSKARA, *Arthasamgraha*

Edited and translated many times. GK with page references refer to the pages of this volume, "E" and "T" refer to the edition and translation by George Thibaut, Chaukhamba Amarabharati Studies Vol. 1 (Varanasi: Chaukhamba Amarabharati Prakashan, Second edition 1974 (it was first published in 1882). The summary provided here is based on Thibaut's with stylistic and other changes suitable to the style of the present Volume. Large portions of this text deal with examples of the technicalities of the methods of sacrifice, which we omit from this summary.

Based on the translation by George Thibaut

(E1; T1) In the first (*Mīmāṃsā*)*sūtra* the word 'next' (*atha*) expressed the immediate consequence of the desire of knowing *dharma* on the reading of the Veda. The word 'therefore' (*atas*) expresses the circumstance of the reading of the Veda having a visible purpose (and not merely tending to produce an unseen result such as the performance of sacrifices alone), as the passage enjoining the reading of the Veda (viz., 'one is to read the Veda') settles that this reading has for its visible purpose the knowledge of the sense of the Veda. the Veda having a visible purpose (and not merely tending to produce an unseen result such as the performance of sacrifices alone), as the passage enjoining the reading of the Veda (viz., 'one is to read the Veda') settles that this reading has for its visible purpose the knowledge of the sense of the Veda. (For a proper understanding of the *sūtra*) we have to complete it as follows: 'Because the reading of the Veda has a visible purpose which consists in the knowledge of its sense, for this reason,

after the reading of the Veda, the desire of knowing *dharma* which latter is the purport of the Veda has to be entertained.' The phrase 'desire of knowing' implies the idea of inquiry, so that the *sūtra* actually refers to the beginning of the (*Mīmāṃsā*)*śāstra* and means 'this *śāstra* whose matter is the inquiry into *dharma* is to be begun'.

(E1; T1-2) Here the question arises: What is *dharma*? What is its distinctive character (its definition)? To this we reply: Sacrifices etc. only (the word 'only' serves to exclude quasi-religious acts like the worship of *caityas* which are not taught in the Vedas) are *dharma*; and we define '*dharma*' as that matter which has a purpose and is to be accomplished according to the Veda. The phrase 'which has a purpose' serves to exclude from the things comprised in the definition matters which are themselves of the nature of a purpose (as e.g., the different results of the sacrifices, viz., heaven etc.). The phrase 'which is to be accomplished according to the Veda' serves to exclude from the definition matters like the act of eating (which is performed not on the authority of the Veda but on the prompting of a natural instinct). The word 'matter' (*artha*, which includes the idea of goodness or usefulness) serves to exclude actions like the sacrifice called '*śyena*' which are to be considered as bad things (*anartha*) on account of their having a bad result (viz. the death of some enemy, for the bringing about of which the sacrificer himself will have to go to hell).

(E1; T2) Here it might be objected that this definition of *dharma* is in conflict with the definition given in the *Mīmāṃsā*sūtras where it is said (I,2) "*Dharma* is that matter the distinctive character of which is instigation [*codanā*]" in which latter definition the word 'instigation' denotes only that one part of the Veda which has the form of injunctions (*vidhi*). To this we reply that in reality the two definitions are not conflicting because in the *sūtra* also the word 'instigation' denotes the Veda in general as the whole Veda on account of its aiming at *dharma* serves to express the accomplishment of *dharma*, [thus the] appropriateness of our definition of *dharma*. (We proceed:) Acts of *dharma* as sacrifices [*yāga*] etc. are enjoined with reference to man by Vedic sentences (as e.g. 'he who is desirous of heaven is to sacrifice') in which heaven etc. is pointed out as the result. The particulars are as follows. The word '*yajeta*', 'he may sacrificed' contains two constituent elements viz. the root *yaj* and the suffix. The suffix again contains two elements as it expresses as well the property of a

verb as the property of an optative. The property of expressing a verb is common to the suffixes of the ten moods and tenses (all of which when added to a root turn the latter into a verb); the property of expressing an optative exclusively belongs to the optative suffixes. Both elements express a creative energy (*bhāvanā*) only. (The word 'only' is meant to exclude the agent (*kartr*) etc.) By *bhāvanā* ('creative energy' or 'productive energy' or 'tendency to realize something') we understand the particular activity of some productive agent (*bhāvayitr*) which tends to bring about the existence of something which is going to be (*bhāvitr*, which is capable of future existence). Such productive energy is twofold being either verbal (*śabda*) or actual (*arthī*). By 'verbal *bhāvanā*' we understand the peculiar activity of some productive agent which tends to make a person act; it is expressed by the optative element (of words like '*yajeta*'); for if some person hears a verb with an optative termination there arises in his mind the exclusive notion 'he (the speaker) instigates me to act; he is engaged in an energy tending to make me act'. (In this explanation of the element which expresses the *bhāvanā* we proceed) according to the general rule that whatever is exclusively understood in consequence of some word being uttered is expressed by it (viz., is the sense of the word); as e.g. in the sentence 'bring the cow' the general character of cow (*gotva*) is the sense of the word 'cow'. The peculiar activity (which has been mentioned above in the definition of *bhāvanā*) is in the case of a sentence belonging to ordinary worldly language some particular intention dwelling in the mind of a speaking person; in Vedic sentences on the other hand where there is no speaking person it resides only in the words characterized by optative terminations etc. For this reason this *bhāvanā* is called verbal *bhāvanā*.

This *bhāvanā* requires three constituent elements; the matter which is to be accomplished (the result, *sādhyā*); the means by which the result is effected (the instrument, *sādhana*); and the mode in which the result is effected (*itikartavyatā*), according to the three questions (suggested by each *bhāvanā*): what is to be effected? by what means is it to be effected? how is it to be effected? Here now the want of a result is to be accomplished being felt there steps in the actual *bhāvanā* (*arthī bhāvanā*) with its three constituent elements.

(E4-5; T8-9) Injunctions of this kind are assisted by six means of proof, viz. direct statement (*śruti*); power (*liṅga*), sentence or syntactical connection (*vākya*); interdependence

(*prakaraṇa*); place of order (*sthāna*); name (*samākhyā*). Applicatory injunctions assisted by these six means of proof intimate subsidiary relation; the subsidiary position of something consists in its being accomplished by the action of some agent engaged in the pursuit of some other result (so e.g. the *prayājas* are performed by a sacrifice offering the new-moon sacrifice with a view to obtaining heaven); the same subsidiary position is expressed by the term "*pārārthya*", "existing for the purpose of something else".

(E5; T9 (We now proceed to a detailed discussion of the above-mentioned six means of proof.) Direct statement (*śruti*, literally "text") we define as irrespective or independent words (words which intimate their sense directly without any intermediate steps of the nature of those required by the other means of proof). Direct statement is of three different kinds, being either injunctive (*vidhātṛ*) or denotative (*abhidhātṛ*) or applicative abode (*vinīyokṛ*). To the first class belong the direct statements contained in optative forms etc. (the optative form directly indicating the *bhāvanā*). To the second class belong statements as those about the rice-grains (viz. sentences like "*vrihin avahanti*", "*vrihin proksati*" etc., where the word "rice-grains" directly produces the idea of the corresponding thing and its connection with the *bhāvanā*). If finally from the mere hearing (the mere statement) of a word a connection (between some primary and some subsidiary matter) is understood, we have an applicatory *śruti*.

(E5; T9-10) *Śruti* of this latter kind is again threefold, being either direct statement by means of case-affixes or direct statement by means of one denotative word (or element of a word) or direct statement by means of some *pada* (in the restricted grammatical sense). Direct statement by means of case-affixes expresses the relation of a subsidiary, as e.g. in the passage "he is to sacrifice by means of rice grains" where by the direct statement of the third case-affix the subsidiary relation of the rice-grains to the sacrifice is expressed. This subsidiary relation is here brought about by the rice-grains forming the original substance out of which the cake is made (which latter stands in direct subsidiary relation to the sacrifice) in the same way as the animal (offered in the animal sacrifice) stands in subsidiary relation to the sacrifice in consequence of its being the original substance from which the parts actually offered viz. the heart etc. are taken. [Several other examples of proof by direct statement are provided.]

(E6; T11) Direct enunciation is stronger than suggestive power (*liṅga*) and the other proofs (by which one thing is shown to be subsidiary to another); for in cases where their subsidiary relation is established by suggestive power there is no verbal statement to be found which would directly teach the application (of a secondary matter to a primary one), but such a statement has to be formed (viz. from the sentence containing the *liṅga*); and in as far as in the latter case an applicatory injunction has to be assumed while in the case of direct enunciation such a one is already actually existing, the power of *liṅga* etc. which is founded on an assumption is set aside by the power of the direct enunciation. ..

(E6-7; T12) Power residing in words (the power words possess to denote or point out something) is called *liṅga*. By power the same thing is understood as by the technical term *rūḍhi* (conventional meaning; i.e. a word has the power of denoting that thing whose name has been settled by convention and tradition) and it can therefore not be said that *liṅga* does not differ from *samākhyā* (name); for *liṅga* which bases altogether on conventional meaning is different from name (*samākhyā*) which consists in words the meaning of which is to be made out from the meaning of their constituent parts. Therefore the *mantra* "I cut grass for the seat of the gods" can only be taken as being subsidiary to the cutting of *kuśa*-grass and not to the cutting of *ulapa*-grass and other kinds of grass, since from the power residing in the word "I cut" etc. it appears that the *mantra* is able to declare the cutting of *kuśa*-grass only...

(E7; T12-13) Power (*liṅga*) has greater force than syntactical connection (*vākya*) and the means of proof that follow (in the list above). Let us take for an example the following *mantra*: "I make a pleasant seat for thee, I make it very lovely with a stream of ghee: on this, the immortal one, sit down, repose on it propitiously minded O marrow of the rice-grains" ... (In the above *mantra* the two halves form one total whole, the connection being effected by the word(s) "on this" (*tasmin*), beginning the second half. It might therefore be maintained that the whole undivided *mantra* is subsidiary to one act, either the making of a seat for the cake or the placing of the cake on the seat; or else that both acts are to be accompanied by the whole *mantra*. But here *liṅga* steps in and shows that one half belongs to the preparation of a seat and the other half to the placing of the cake.)

(E7; T13) By sentence or syntactical connection (*vākya*) we understand common employment and by this term we understand the connected enunciation of two words denoting two things which in reality stand to each other in the relation of principal and subsidiary although this is not indicated by second case affixes etc. directly indicating the one of the two things to be the thing to be accomplished by the other etc., (which relations are directly indicated by *vibhakti*, *śruti* etc.). Take e.g. the passage "he whose sacrificial ladle is made of *parṇa*-wood hears no evil sound". Here we see from the connected enunciation of the quality of consisting of *parṇa*-wood and the ladle that the former stands in subsidiary relation to the latter...For the word "ladle" intimates at the same time the peculiar transcendental result to be accomplished by it (by a ladle made of *parṇa*-wood). So that the sense of the passage is: "By its being made of *parṇa*-wood he is to realize the peculiar transcendental result connected with the ladle, by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel (by *avadāna*)." As it thus appears that if the ladle is made of *parṇa*-wood then the transcendental result to be brought about by it ensues and not in any other case the circumstance of its consisting of *parṇa*-wood is not purposeless..."

(E8; T15) *Prakarana* means interdependence (*ubhayākāṅkṣā*; mutual desire; mutual want of a compliment). An example is afforded by the following passage connected with the *prayājas* "he is to offer the *samidh*". As in this passage no special fruit (of the offering) is mentioned, the sense merely being "he is to realize by means of offering the *samidh*", there arises the question "what (is he to realize)?" originating in the want of something to which the offering of the *samidh* might contribute. And again after the passage about the *darśapūrṇimāsa* sacrifice has given rise to the idea "he is to realize heaven by means of the *darśapūrṇimāsa*" there arises the question "how (is he to realize heaven)?" originating in the want of something which may contribute towards bringing about the desired result. And thus by mutual interdependence the subsidiary relation in which the *prayājas* stands to the *darśapūrṇimāsa* is established.

This *prakarana* is of two kinds, great (*mahāprakarana*) and included (*avāntaraprakarana*). By the former is to be understood that kind of *prakarana* which refers to the principal *bhāvanā* (i.e. the energy productive of the fruit of the entire

sacrificial action)....By included *prakarana* is to be understood *prakarana* connected with the creative energy belonging to the subsidiary parts of the sacrifice...(e.g.) the subsidiary relation in which the act of stepping forward stands to the oblation called *prayājas*....

(E9; T18) *Prakarana* has greater weight than position (*sthāna*) and the following means of proof. For this reason the acts like dicing etc. which are enjoined in the passage "he is to play at dice with a *rājanya*" are, although they are read in the holy text in proximity to the *atiśecaniya* ceremony and therefore would on the ground of position be subsidiary to the latter, in reality subsidiary to the *rājasūya* sacrifice on the ground of *prakarana*.

By "position" is to be understood equality of place. It is of two kinds, being either equality of place according to the text (*pāthasādeśya*) or equality of place according to the performance (*anuśthānasādeśya*). The term "*krama*" (sequence) has the same meaning as "*sthāna*" (position).

(E10; T19-20) By "name" (*samākhyā*) are to be understood words the meaning of which is found by decomposing them into their elements (*yaugikah śabdah*). It is of two kind belonging either to the language of the Veda or to common language...

(E10-11; T20-21) Thus we have shortly explained the six means of proof, direct enunciation etc., assisted by which injunctions of application—as e.g. he is to offer the *darśapūrṇimāsa* sacrifice contributing towards it with the *samidhs*, etc—teach the proper application of subsidiary matters. These subsidiaries are of two kinds being either accomplished things or actions. By accomplished things we understand species (*jāti*), substances, numbers, etc. All these have a visible purpose only. Subsidiary actions are again of two different kinds, being either secondary (*gunakarman*) or primary (*pradhānakarman*). These two classes of actions are also called actions contributing (towards the general result of the sacrifice) through an intermediate step (*samnipatyopakāraka*) and actions contributing (toward the general result) immediately or directly (*ārādūpakāraka*). By actions of the former kind we understand actions enjoined with reference to some substance etc. which latter is itself subsidiary to some other action...These actions are either such as have a seen effect or such as have an unseen effect or such as have a seen as well as an unseen effect. [Examples given.] By an action contributing directly we

understand an action which is merely enjoined, without reference to any substance etc...Such actions are of use only in originating the highest transcendental result (*paramāpūrva*; the transcendental result produced by the sacrificial action in its totality); while the actions contributing through an intermediate step are of use also for the outward form of the sacrifice by means of their producing a modification (*samskāra*) of the material of the sacrifice and of the divinity (whereby they produce the so-called *utpattyapūrva*).

(E11-15; T21-30) *Prayogavidhi*, injunction of performance, is that injunction which intimates speediness of performance. This kind of injunction (is not a separated one, there being no passages which are merely *prayogavidhi* and nothing else, but) consists simply in the injunction of the main sacrificial action...An injunction of performance enjoins, for the purpose of bringing about speediness of the performance of what it enjoins, at the same time a fixed sequence which sequence is to be taken as a special attribute of the things enjoined (if it were not taken as a mere attribute of the things enjoined but as an independent thing the *prayogavidhi* would be open to the reproach of *vākyabheda*)...

By "sequence" (*krama*) we understand...the relation of (different things) being earlier and later with regard to each other. For settling this order of succession (of different actions) we have six means of proof, viz. direct enunciation (*śruti*), sense (*artha*), text (*pāṭha*), position (*sthāna*), principal matter (*mukhya*), procedure (*pravṛtti*). [Examples of each are provided.]

(E15-16; T30-31) By injunction of eligibility (*adhikāraavidhi*) we understand that kind of injunction which intimates the ownership with regard to some result which is brought about by some action. By "ownership" we understand the position of one who enjoys the result. To this class of injunctions belongs e.g. the passage "he who is desirous of heaven is to sacrifice", which passage while it enjoins the sacrifice with regard to heaven intimates the state of enjoyment of the result consequent on the sacrificial action by him who is desirous of heaven.

This kind of ownership with regard to some result belongs to him only who is distinguished by the necessary qualifications (*adhikāra*). By "qualification" we understand that which, in the passages containing injunctions, is mentioned as

a distinguishing attribute of the person (whom the injunction concerns).

Herewith we close the discussion of that part of the Veda which is denoted by the name "injunction".

(E17-18; T31-34) *Mantras* serve to recall to memory the matters connected with the sacrificial performance. By this their property of recalling to memory the matters mentioned they have a purpose and it is not to be supposed that their enunciation merely tends to produce some unseen result, as it would be improper to assume merely an unseen result while a visible result (in this case the circumstance of the performer of the sacrifice being reminded of certain things) exists. Nor can it be maintained that the recitation of the *mantras* is purposeless because the visible end of reminding one of certain things can be obtained by other means also,...for (the exclusive use of the *mantras* for the purpose) is founded on an injunction of a necessary arrangement (*niyamavidhi*) according to which the mentioned matters are to be recalled to memory by means of the *mantras* only (not by any other means).

By an injunction of necessary arrangement is to be understood an injunction which, in the case of one particular instrument being established (by some other means of proof) with regard to an action which can be performed by various instruments, establishes the use of some other instrument which is not yet established (by other means of proof). As it is said: "An injunction takes place when something is absolutely non-established; an injunction of necessary arrangement when one alternative is already established; when both alternatives are already established, (the injunction required) is called limitation (*parisamkhyā*)." The sense of this passage is as follows: That kind of injunction which establishes something not established by any other means of proof is called an injunction of something new (*apūrvavidhi*) (or simply "injunction")...

(Finally it must be remarked that) Those *mantras* which do not possess the power of reminding one of the things connected with the sacrificial performance must, since no other alternative is left, be assumed to contribute toward the unseen result by the mere circumstance of their being uttered and they are therefore not purposeless.

(E18; T34-35) "Names" (as forming one of the constituent parts of the Veda) have a purpose by their defining (or limiting) the matter enjoined. So...the passage "he who is

desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the *udbhid*"...is to be understood as follows. The passage by pointing out a certain result enjoins a sacrifice not established elsewhere. As it does not enjoin sacrifices in general (that it does not do this is shown by the fact of a special result being mentioned) it must be assumed to enjoin a special sacrifice...we learn from the word "*udbhid*" that the sacrifice called "*udbhid*" is intended...

(E18-21; T35-39) [Four cases are studied involving] determining reasons which oblige us to explain certain words as names of sacrifices [along with a fifth putative case which is determined not to involve such an obligation].

(E21; T39-46) By "prohibition" (*nisedha*) we understand sentences turning off man (from some action); for the purpose of sentences of prohibition lies exclusively in their effecting (man's) turning away from action which would be the cause of some disadvantage. The details are as follows. In the same manner as an injunction conveying an instigation in order to give effect to its instigatory power intimates that the thing enjoined, e.g., the sacrifice, is the instrument for obtaining some desired result and thereby instigates the person towards it, in the same manner a prohibitory passage, e.g. "he is not to eat *kalañja*" conveying the idea of turning off (from some action) in order to give effect to its power of turning off intimates that the thing prohibited, e.g., the eating of *kalañja*, is the instrument of bringing about some highly undesirable result and thereby turns man off from it.

If it is now asked how a prohibitory sentence conveys the idea of turning off from something, we answer as follows. The sense of the word "not" is not connected with the sense of the root (of the verb in the prohibitory passage); for although the two words stand in immediate proximity the sense of the root presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to the actual creative energy (*ārthī bhāvanā*) which is expressed by the suffix (of words like "*bhakṣayet*"). For something which presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to one thing cannot be connected with something else. Otherwise in the sentence "bring the king's man" (lit. the king-man, *rājapurusa*) the king himself would enter into relation with the action (while in reality the king only stands in relation to the servant, the latter in his turn being the object of the action expressed by "bring"). Therefore the sense of the word "not" stands in relation to the sense of the suffix only and here again not to the *ārthī bhāvanā* which is expressed by that element (of the suffix) which

denotes the verb—for the *ārthī bhāvanā* presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to the instigation expressed by that element which denotes the optative—but to the verbal *bhāvanā* denoted by the optative element of the suffix, the verbal *bhāvanā* occupying the chief position of all. Thus the nature of the word "not" is to intimate the thing opposite to the thing with which it (the word "not") is logically concerned...

Where there is however an obstacle in the way of the word "not" being connected with what is expressed by the verbal suffix, it is connected exclusively with what is expressed by the root itself. Such obstacles are of two kinds: (1) that beginning with the phrase "his vowed observances are as follows" and (2) the contingent probability of a *vikalpa* (option). [An example of (1) we find in "he is not to look at the rising sun", which, since it expresses a vow, must refer to some action and not merely to a lack or absence of something; thus not-looking must be construed as constituting an action. An example of (2) is "he is to say *ye yajāmahe* at (the beginning of) all *yājyās* (primary sacrifices), not at the *anuyājas* (secondary acts involved in those same sacrifices)", where what is prohibited is not what is to be said at a particular sacrifice in general but only to what can be said at certain parts of it.]

[There follows a lengthy discussion which turns primarily on grammatical points which pose extreme difficulties for one trying to explain them in English!]

(E25-26; T46-48) Sentences whose purport is either praise (glorification) or blame are called *arthavāda*. [They] are of two different kinds being either complements of *vidhi*-passages or complements of *nisedha*-passages...Again, *arthavāda* is of three different kinds...An *arthavāda* is *guṇavāda* i.e. statement of some quality, if it contradicts some other means of proof, as e.g. the passage "Āditya (the sun) is *yūpa* (the sacrificial post)". There, as the sameness of the *yūpa* and the sun is contradicted by perception, the passage establishes by indication [implication?] (*lakṣanā*) the quality (of the *yūpa*'s) being shining like the sun. *Arthavāda* if conveying a sense already established by another means of proof is called *anuvāda*, reiterative statement. As e.g. the passage "*Agni* (the fire) is a remedy against cold"; for here the quality of fire being opposite to cold is already known from sensual perception. A statement conveying something which is neither established by another means of proof nor in conflict with such a one is called a *bhūtārthavāda*, a statement regarding something which has

happened. As e.g. the passage "Indra raise the thunderbolt against Vṛtra".

Thus we have established that the entire Veda...immediately or mediately effects *dharma* consisting in sacrifices etc. Such (acts of) *dharma* if done with a view to that (result) with a view to which they are enjoined are the cause of that particular result; if done with the intention of asking of them an offering to God (*īśvara*) they are the cause of the highest beatitude. Nor can it be said that there is no authority for performing such acts with the intention of making of them an offering to God; for the following passage of the *Bhagavadgītā* furnishes the required authority: "whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you sacrifice, whatever you give, whatever you do in way of penance, Kaunteyas, do it all as an offering to me". And the authoritativeness of *smṛti* is established in the *pāda* treating *smṛti* (I.3) by the argument of its being based on *śruti*.

60 APPAYYA DĪKṢITA I (1520-1593)

VARs pp. 94-103 provides a wealth of information and assessments of this famous figure. "Appayya Dikṣita hailed from the village Adaiyapālam near the historic city of Conjeeveram, once a great center of learning under the Pallavas. His paternal grandfather is known as Ācārya Dikṣita of Bharadvāja *gotra* who performed many Vedic sacrifices. He was much patronised by the famous king of Vijayanagar, Kṛṣṇadevarāya...Ācārya Dikṣita had two wives—the first belonging to an orthodox Śaiva family and the second to an orthodox Vaiṣṇava family of repute known as Śrī Vaikuṇṭhācāryavaṃśa...He had by his second wife Totarāmbā four sons of whom the eldest was Appayya Dikṣita's father Raṅgarājadhvarin who, like his father, performed many Vedic sacrifices. He is known to have written many works on Advaita Vedānta—the *Advaitavidyāmukura*, the *Vivaraṇa-darpaṇa*, etc. He had two sons, the elder being Appayya Dikṣita, the younger Āccān Dikṣita, the paternal grandfather of Nīlakaṇṭha Dikṣita. 'Appadikṣita' was the original name of our author and the honorific 'ayya' was afterwards added to it in recognition of his greatness as a literary prodigy..."

VARs gives several pages to reviewing Appayya Dikṣita's various patrons, concluding "Thus...it is clear that Appayya Dikṣita lived in the 16th century between A.D.1520-1592, thus living for 72 years. It is also known that he spent many years of

his youth in northern India, probably at Benares and reached Chidambaram for worshipping God Nātarāja in his last days...

See Volume Five of this Encyclopedia, pp. 239-240, for more information.

60.1 APPAYYA DĪKṢITA I, *Mayūkhāvalī* on Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Sāstradīpikā*

VARs p. 105: "One descendant of Appayya Dikṣita of the same name might have written this work; but this is also found included in the list of 108 works of Appayya Dikṣita." Manuscripts cited at NCat I, p. 266.

60.2 APPAYYA DĪKṢITA I, *Vādanaksatramālā*

Edited only once, from Srirangam in 1912 by V, Vaidyanatha Sastrigal, constituting Sri Vani Vilas Series #10. It has now been translated by Sheldon Pollock in Pollock 2004, the pages 773-795 constituting the translation. We provide portions of the translation, making our usual revisions to suit the translation and stylistic practices followed in our Volumes. (In what follows, MS = the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras*, and BS the *Brahmasūtras*.)

Translated by Sheldon Pollock

1. Accordingly, insofar as Brahman has been held to be the ultimate referent of all language [by the opponent] it must of necessity also be the referent of the word '*dharma*' which is used to refer to ritual action's (*karman*) being a means to otherworldly good (*alaukikaśreya*). Moreover, Brahman must be directly expressed by the word '*dharma*' by reason of the semantic relation just noted. This is so because Mīmāṃsakas argue that the meaning of the word '*dharma*', insofar as it is held to be used in reference to a thing's being a means of securing the good as understood from the Veda, must refer to class categories, properties, and substances no less than to ritual actions. (Kumārila SV *Codanāsūtra* 14 quoted). Thus, the word '*dharma*' used in the [first] *sūtra* [of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*] system, 'Now, then, the inquiry into *dharma*' (MS 1.1.1) must comprise *brahman*, and *brahman* must therefore also be an object of the examination of *dharma* that Jaimini in that *sūtra* states as his main thesis (*pratijñā*) to undertake. To examine whether or not this is in fact the case is the purpose for initiating the following discourse.

(Objection:) InfA. Brahman - its true nature, the sources of knowledge about it, the means of attaining it, and the end-results of doing so—are an object of Jaimini's proposed examination,

Because Brahman is a means of attaining otherworldly good'

Like ritual action itself.

2.(Answer:) Were *brahman* the object of Jaimini's proposed examination of *dharma*, one would have expected the examination of *brahman* to occur at the beginning of his work, but we do not find that to be the case. Nor is it possible to suppose that the great sage wanted to undertake an examination of Brahman but was somehow impeded from doing so, or simply forgot. This is a sage who analyzed the whole field of ritual action—its true nature, the sources of knowledge about it, the means of attaining it, and the end-results of doing so—in MS, and who, noticing that certain interpretive principles used in that text were not explicitly given in *sūtra* form, produced the *Samkarsakāṇḍa* as a supplement to the *sūtra* in order to gather these principles together. How then are we to suppose that he either was impeded from examining, or just plain forgot to examine, Brahman?

Nor can it be claimed that the analysis of the true nature of Brahman, the sources of knowledge about it, the means of attaining it, and the end-results of doing so was accomplished by the same principles used to examine ritual action, and for this reason no separate examination of Brahman had to be provided. That the interpretive principles used for the analysis of sentences concerned with Brahman are distinct from those used for sentences concerned with *dharma* is proved by the fact that the latter were systematized in BS.

Nor is it possible to believe that the stated assumption that MS and BS form a single knowledge system. There is no valid reason to believe that they do form one system: they have different authors (*vaktr*), their introductions containing the statement of their major theses (*pratijñopakrama*) concern the examination of *dharma* on the one hand and Brahman on the other, and they were undertaken to frame analytic principles regarding positive and negative objectives that are mutually distinct.

Hence, the inference given above [InfA] is blocked. [This can be shown by a counter-argument:]

InfB. Brahman [an already existent thing] is not

expressed [by the word '*dharma*' as something to be accomplished as an action is so expressed;

Because it is something different from ritual action;

Just as a pot (is not expressed, being different from ritual action).

(Objection:) My inference is not blocked, because it is possible for the theses (of MS and BS) to be brought to fruition only by the supposition that (Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta) form a single knowledge system. And there are factors lending support to such a supposition, such as the fact that both works are commentaries on a single text, namely the Veda.

Nor does the fact of their having different authors militate against the supposition: the exegeses of Vāmana and Jayāditya, for example, even though the authors are different, form a single knowledge system insofar as they are a commentary on a single work, namely (Pāṇini's) grammar.

Nor do their introductions containing the statement of their major theses regarding *dharma* on the one hand and Brahman on the other block my InfA: the word '*dharma*' refers equally to *karman* and Brahman, and when the thesis of MS, which is [thus] common (*sāmānya*) to BS, has been dealt with, it stands to reason that thereafter after the examination of *karman* we should have a reference to the synthesis (*avāntarapratijñā*), that is, 'Now, then, the inquiry into what is subsidiary' (BS 3.1.1).

Nor is my inference blocked by the argument that (the two systems) frame analytical principles that are mutually distinct. That there should be a distinction in analytical principles (*nyāya*) in accordance with (differences in the) objects to be analyzed makes perfectly good sense. We find in the MS itself that distinct analytical principles are framed in accordance with the objects to be analyzed, such as the division of ritual action (MS 2), the relationship of dominant and subsidiary elements in a rite (MS 3), and so forth. Thus, my inference is not blocked, whereas yours is ineffectual.

"I do not mean by saying that the principles are 'distinct' merely that they are different. I mean that they are contradictory. And this contradiction is a matter of common knowledge, given that, in the BS we find that Jaimini's doctrines are generally presented as the *prima facie* view to be refuted. These are two knowledge systems, authored by two different authors relying on two contradictory doctrines, and it

is impossible therefore to suppose that they were produced as a single system by these same two men in unanimity. As regards the word 'dharma', it is used in counterpoint to 'brahman' as referring to sacrifice and other ritual action in the *sūtra* 'Jaimini [thinks] for the same reasons that dharma [is what brings about the fruits of action] (BS 3.2.40), which is contained in the topic 'From him [i.e., the Lord there comes] the fruit [of works; for [that only] is possible (BS 3.2.38). Moreover, the great sage Āpastamba uses the word 'dharma' only in the sense of action to be performed such as sacrifice, when he says 'Dharma and adharma do not wander about saying 'Here we are!'. Nor do the gods and *gandharvas* or the ancestors proclaim *adharma* (*Āpastambhadharmasūtra* 1.7.6). In accordance with his view, therefore, the word ('dharma') contained in the *sūtra* on the inquiry into *dharma* must be admitted to refer to sacrifice and other such action to be performed. And so it is unreasonable to suppose that the two *sūtras*, one on inquiry into *dharma* and the other on the inquiry into Brahman, can be distinguished as referring to a thesis that is common to both systems (MS 1.1.1) and to one meant to be a sub-thesis (BS 1.1.1) (*sādhāranāvāntarapratijñāparatvavibhāga*). Therefore, your inference is blocked, and mine is not ineffectual, because anything that, under a given description, cannot be performed can have no connection, under that description, with being taken in the sense of the word 'dharma', since this denotes actions that are to be performed.

(Objection:) It is not proved that the doctrines of Jaimini and Vyāsa stand in contradiction with each other. In some places in the BS Jaimini's doctrine is in fact presented as the *prima facie* view to be refuted. With respect to the topic dealing with human goals (*puruṣārtha*), the *prima facie sūtra* containing a repudiation of Brahman, 'On account of [the Self] standing in a supplementary relation (to ritual action), (the statements as to the fruits of the knowledge of the Self] must be narrative portions (*arthavāda*) (in praise of actions), thus Jaimini believes' (BS 3.4.2) is a restatement, not of Jaimini's own position, but rather of a position that he includes as a supplement [and that does not therefore necessarily reflect his own view). And that is why, in such *sūtras* as 'To the highest (Brahman) (the souls are led), so Jaimini believes, owing to this being the principal sense (of the word 'Brahman')' (BS 4.3.1-2), we find a restatement of a position as belonging to Jaimini that proceeds precisely by way of recognizing Brahman. Similarly,

the *sūtra* 'Jaimini (considers that scriptural passages mentioning those states of life in which celibacy is obligatory contain) a reference only to those states, they are not injunctions, for (other scriptural passages) forbid (those states)' (BS 3.4.18) restates a repudiation of ascetic renunciation merely provided as a supplement to Jaimini: it is not a restatement of its own settled view. Accordingly, in the *sūtra* 'But of him who has become that (i.e., descending to a lower state) according to Jaimini also...' (BS 3.4.40), it is shown that Jaimini also disapproves of any deviation from renunciation once a person has renounced. Thus elsewhere as well, in each individual case (apparent) contradiction may be resolved through interpretation.

"Moreover, the use of the word 'dharma' to refer uniquely to something to be performed (*anuṣṭheyāsādhāraṇya*) is also unproved. We find it used to refer generally to the Blessed One (*bhagavatsādhānyanyokteḥ*) in the *Mahābhārata*: 'The sages who know the Veda and the people who know the transcendent Self say that Kṛṣṇa, the great one, is the eternal dharma' (*Mahābhārata* 3.86.22 crit. ed.).

"Thus, because (1) real contradiction between the two knowledge systems does not exist, or (2) even if contradiction were though somehow to be present, an actual refusal to recognize Brahman is not expressed in any *sūtra* in the MS, and (3) because the word 'dharma' is common to the topics of both systems (*karman* and *brahman*) - for all these reasons there are no grounds for refusing to accept that they form a single system even though the authors are different. Thus, your inference (InfB) is indeed ineffectual, insofar as something not performed can very well be an object of Jaimini's proposed examination, since the word 'dharma' is found used in reference to such things.

(Answer:) The statement that there is no contradiction is unproved. There is an undeniable contradiction between accepting Brahman or renunciation and rejecting them. Moreover, one cannot maintain that the *sūtra* that presents Jaimini's acceptance of both Brahman and renunciation is an indicator that the acceptance of the two constitutes his real settled view. For this situation can be accounted for differently: Jaimini's thought is being represented as self-contradictory and introduced in the BS with the intention of showing its unacceptability for that reason, according to the interpretive principal enunciated in the topic 'On Sāṃkhya'. And moreover

(the Sāṃkhya doctrine) is objectionable (on account of its contradictions' (BS 2.2.10).

"It is also illogical to state that, while granting that Jaimini and Badaṛāyana may stand in contradiction with each other over certain either/or issues (*aikāntyādiṣu*) such as the acceptance or rejection of Brahman, still, insofar as the rejection of Brahman and so on is never actually enunciated in any single *sūtra* in MS, that treatise does not therefore stand in contradiction with BS and so can reasonably be said to form a single knowledge system with it. The reason this argument is illogical is because it does not prove that the principal aims (of the two *śāstras*) do not stand in contradiction with each other.

"(1) For example, when Jaimini proposes a description of the means of knowing *dharma* in the *sūtra* 'An investigation of the conditions (of knowing) it' (MS 1.1.3), the description of these means offered in his first chapter is already in contradiction (with the BS) 'To explain: one opposing *sūtra* reads 'Since the purpose of the Veda lies in the enjoining of actions, those parts of the Veda that do not serve that purpose are purposeless, and with regard to those parts the Veda must be said to be non-eternal (unreliable)' (MS 1.2.1). This means that scripture in its entirety, if it is to culminate in something purposeful, must of necessity have some action as its purpose. Those portions whose purpose is not action insofar as they are not concerned with action-sentences (an action-sentence is something like 'He who desires prosperity should sacrifice a white animal dedicated to the Wind Deity') are said to be purposeless', that is, without any function.

"Therefore, it is claimed (in the *prima facie* view) that the whole range of sentences that do not have action as their purpose have no validity. On the basis of this *sūtra* thus understood the MS goes on to raise a doubt about the validity of the narrative portions of the Vedas. The *siddhānta sūtra* on this topic reads: "Since (these narrative portions) form single discursive units with commandments, (they can acquire validity) through the purpose of commending (the actions that actually are the object of commandments)' (MS 1.2.7). This *sūtra* means that narrative portions concerned with already-accomplished entities can have a purpose by way of the function of commending commandments (that is, substantiating their credibility, value, etc.), since these portions form discursive units with commandment sentences. On the basis of this *sūtra* thus understood the validity of such portions of the

Vedas is established in the topic 'On the *arthavāda*' (MS 1.2.1-18) insofar as these do form single discursive units with commandments. And this position is corroborated in the topic 'On the *audumbara* post' (MS 1.2.19-25), by referring back to the matter raised in 'On the *arthavāda*' when it is said 'But the fact of such sentences being taken along with other sentences has already been explained (i.e., the narrative passages are to be taken along with other injunctive passages)' (MS 1.2.22). Now, if the proposed inquiry into *dharma* were meant to be inclusive of an inquiry into Brahman, then the proposed description of the means of knowing *dharma* given in the *sūtra* 'An investigation of the conditions (of knowing) it' would be inclusive of a description of the means of knowing Brahman. And if that were in fact the case, then, given the doubt about the purposelessness of non-action matters, this (purposelessness) would have to have been refuted (in the MS) by the following sort of division: that the validity of some would be established by their being considered supplementary to commandments regarding acts like sacrifice that are means to ends, and the validity of others, by their promulgating entities such as Brahman that are ends in themselves. There are additional substantive contradictions raised elsewhere in the epistemology chapter that would have to have been resolved.

(2) Likewise, a topic in the eighth chapter (beginning 'When there is (apparent) conflict (between commandments), the procedure should be determined by the sacrificial substance, since the act as such bears upon the substance' (MS 8.1.32-34) is introduced in order to ascertain that the procedure to be followed in the case of the cake offering to the god Indra should be that of the rite of cake offerings to the Fire god, given the identity of sacrificial substances, rather than the procedure of other rites relating to Indra using other substances, given the identity of the deity in question. Here the reasoning approved by Jaimini is that 'deity' is a secondary element, since it is merely a verbal referent. Yet this view stands in contradiction with the view of Vyāsa. In Vyāsa's system, in the topic 'On the deity' (BS 1.3.26ff.), it is maintained that the deities are actually present in the sacrificial space and are to be considered predominant elements since they are consumers of the oblation.

"(3) Another example: In a topic in the second chapter 'Commandment, however, is an undertaking' (MS 2.1.5), Jaimini has maintained that ritual action produces its end-

results by means of a 'transcendental potency', *apūrva*. That position is contradicted by Vyāsa's as expressed in the topic 'From him (i.e. the Lord, there comes) the fruit [of works, for [that only] is possible' (BS 3.2.18). There he argues that it is (not *apūrva* but) the supreme Lord who bestows the end-results when his grace is gained by ritual action and worship. What we have therefore is a contradiction between the two knowledge systems themselves (and not just between their authors).

(4) There is also a contradiction between them occasioned by the repudiation of Brahman and renunciation. To explain: There are discourses (in the BS) concerning Brahman, such as 'that art thou', which make known the identity of Brahman and the individual self. Now by the Mīmāṃsā rule 'Because it forms a single discursive unit with a commandment' (MS 1.2.7), whereby a discourse unrelated to action is held to be supplementary to a commandment (of action), these discourses are said to be supplementary to a commandment to perform worship. Acts of worship, for their part, by another Mīmāṃsā interpretive principle (on 'sprinkling') (MS 2.1.9-12), become supplementary to sacrificial rites insofar as they purify a ritual substance, namely, the agent himself who is engaged in the rite. (This is so for the following reason:) An agent pure and simple (*kārtrmātra*) is something common (to both ritual action and) worldly action, since worldly action is possible even if the Self is held to be identical to the body. (Nevertheless) the Self referred to as an element to be purified by worship in those Vedānta (i.e., Upanishadic) passages that are not found in the context of any specific ritual activity, such as 'One should worship the Self', must have an existence separate from the body: this is presupposed by the commandment to sacrifice as well as by the Self's being said to be an enjoyer of heavenly rewards. This Self is thus necessarily connected with ritual acts; and thus, by way of both (the syntactical association of the Self-as-agent with the act to be performed) and the scriptural passage: 'One that is performed with knowledge..' (Chāndogyopanisad 1.1.10), it makes sense to connect these (acts of worship) with ritual acts.

It will not do to object that acts of worship of the Self cannot be supplementary to a sacrificial rite because Brahman (=the Self) is proved to transcend the individual self in view of the scripture that ascribes to Brahman qualities such as absolute purity that are unimaginable in the individual self. For Jaimini established a hard and fast rule that all non-action discourses

must be taken as supplementary to commandments, and only by violating this rule is the topic 'On coherence' (BS 1.1.4ff.) could the (passages of the) Vedānta pretend to acquire validity independent of action. And it is, after all, only when this putative validity is established with respect to Brahman and its qualities—by means of indications of general purport such as (congruence with) an introductory passage (*upakrama*) that Brahman can even be proved to transcend the individual self through qualities such as absolute purity. But according to the view of Jaimini, the mention of such qualities is only supplementary to ritual commandments: the description of them has in fact the purpose of commending the individual self, and it is this that provides for the coherence of the discourse as a whole. Who would dispute this? We find in various *mantras* and narrative passages of the Veda commendatory descriptions of unimaginable qualities of one entity or another that is connected with the ritual, as in the following: 'Do not scratch the heaven with your index finger, nor harm the atmosphere with your middle, O origin of the earth': 'Let our smoke ascend to the heaven, your flame to the atmosphere: fill the earth with your ash, *svāha*'; 'The seasons are devoid of sin', 'This universe was water'.

Moreover, when Brahman has been repudiated, the means of attaining Brahman, namely renunciation, has likewise been repudiated. And this is why Mīmāṃsakas commonly hold that renunciation is nothing but a ruse for self-advancement: on the part of those disqualified from participating in ritual action, blind people, for example, or cripples. It is therefore incorrect to hold that there is no contradiction between these two knowledge systems.

(5) It is also incorrect to hold that the word '*dharma*' ultimately expresses the same thing as the word 'Brahman'. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that the purpose of the *Mahābhārata* sentence you cited earlier: 'They say Krishna, the great one, is the eternal *dharma*' is commendation, just like the sentence 'Rāma is *dharma* incarnate'. Therefore my inference (InfA) is not blocked, and yours (InfB) is indeed ineffectual.

(Objection:) My inference is not blocked for the following reasons: (1) It is possible to avoid the contradiction revealed in the description of the means of knowing (*dharma*) found in the first chapter of the MS in the following way. In the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, it is true that the premises of validity and the doubt about the lack of validity of non-action passages (on the

grounds that they would be purposeless) would seem to apply equally to discourses concerning Brahman. But whereas Jaimini enunciated an argument for validity with respect to narrative portions that are supplementary to commandments of ritual action - namely, that they have their purposefulness precisely through such supplementation - he hid his intention with regard to the discourses on Brahman, and did not openly broach the argument for validity (that he really did believe, namely) that these have intrinsic (*svata eva*) validity, irrespective of their supplementing commandments of ritual action, because their object is Brahman, which in itself is the supreme human goal.

(2) It is possible to avoid the contradiction cited for the topic in the eighth chapter. In the settled view of this topic, 'When there is conflict...' (MS 8.1.2, the argument is not that the deity is not a subsidiary element, because then there would be no difference between a substance's being a subsidiary element and a deity's being such. Rather, the fundamental argument (*mūlayukti*) of the passage is indicated by the rest of the *sūtra*, 'since the act as such bears upon the substance'. The identity in the sacrificial substance is decisive, because what we see pertaining to these substances is the ritual act itself, which has the form of the offering of such substances. It is the substance and not the deity that we actually see being offered up.

(3) It is possible to avoid the contradiction in the topic: 'Commandment, however, is an undertaking' (MS 2.1.5). Here it is only said that there exists an instrumentality of ritual action. It is not maintained that *apūrva* and *apūrva* alone is the instrument while dismissing the role of the Lord's grace.

(4) It is possible to avoid the doubts about, among other things, the repudiation of Brahman. The rule 'Because it forms a single discursive unit with a commandment' (MS 1.2.70 is concerned with establishing the authoritativeness only of narrative discourses like 'The Wind is the swiftest...' and so on, by their supplementation of commandments; it is not concerned with discourses dealing with Brahman.

(5) Last, it is unreasonable to assume that the statement in the *Mahābhārata* has merely the purpose of commendation. According to the MBh, the word '*dharma*' expresses merely a means to other-worldly good, and so it can be used equally to refer to Brahman. The assumption that the accurate use of '*dharma*' requires additional modifiers such as the fact of being

something commanded or performable, so that its primary expressive power should exclude Brahman, lacks explanatory parsimony, and is thereby violated. Therefore my inference is not blocked, and yours is ineffectual.

(Answer:) First of all, your resolution of the contradiction (between the MS and the matter in the first chapter (of the BS) is incorrect. It is ridiculous to assume that Jaimini after having resolved doubts about the authoritativeness of some discourses not concerned with action should have hidden his intention with respect to other similar discourses (i.e. those of the Upanisads), given that the general thesis (*sāmānyapratijñāna*) (regarding authoritative knowledge about *dharma* and doubt about lack of authoritativeness with regard to *dharma* of the Veda in all its four parts - commandments, narrative portions, *mantras* and proper names - and in their specific modalities (*svaprakāra*) (by directly commanding, by commending, and so on,) and went on to establish the authoritativeness of Vedic texts remembered (*smṛti*) and of the practices of those learned in the Veda to the degree necessary there (In MS 1). Now, how are we to believe that the same man proposed an analysis of the means of knowing *dharma*, in common with [in your view] an analysis of the means of knowing Brahman, and raised certain doubts about the authoritativeness (of some discourses on *dharma*) because of their apparent purposelessness - something common also to these narrative portions of the Vedānta section that are concerned with Brahman - but only resolved the doubts about the narrative portions that are supplementary to ion, and not those related to the narrative portions of the Vedānta that are concerned with Brahman? Why should any one who understands the principles of interpretation (*nyāyavid*) place trust in such empty speculation?

Furthermore, the locus of examining *dharma* and the thesis of examining the means of knowledge about it apply (according to your view) to both ritual action as well as to Brahman and the worship of Brahman equally. Now, in the topic 'On narrative portions' (MS 1.2.1-18), one of the *sūtras* that state the *prima facie* view reads 'Because of the purposelessness (that would be entailed) of other (enjoined actions)' (MS 1.2.4). The target of this *sūtra* is not only those passages as 'By means of the final oblation one attains all desires', but also those passages that narrate the end-results of commandments for worship, since the objection, the

'purposelessness of other (enjoined) actions' applies equally to both...

So (Jaimini) believes that the acts of worship of the Self must be supplementary to ritual acts, and the narratives about their end-results are not to be taken literally, any more than the narrative 'No hearing any evil report of oneself' (regarding the end-result of making one's ladle of *pulāśa* wood, MS 4.3.1) is to be taken literally. It is in view of this that the doubt about the purposelessness of other (enjoined) actions and the arguments obviating this doubt are not raised in connection with them. And that is why there is the prevailing attitude of the followers of Jaimini that 'the Vedānta (i.e., the Upaniṣads) is the wasteland of the Veda', that is, they hold it is without substance insofar as there is nothing therein (relating to action) to deliberate over. And that is why your resolution of the contradiction (of Uttaramīmāṃsā) with the matter of the first chapter (of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā) is completely without merit.

The same holds true for your resolution of the contradiction in the topic in the eighth chapter. You argue as follows: Although all that is seen is the oblation, the sacrificer is something meant to conciliate the deity, and it is the deity, once its grace is won, that bestows the end-result, so the deity must be the predominant element: hence, the similarity of deities trumps any similarity of oblations. It is precisely to dispel this doubt that the following *sūtra* is offered: 'The scriptural reference to the deity is a subsidiary statement'. (MS 8.1.3/4). Nor can one respond that this can be construed as referring to a supplementary position that is, one that Jaimini himself does not actually hold but only reports). For in the ninth chapter Jaimini makes the following argument. He offers the *prima facie* view first with this *sūtra* 'Or, it is the duty that motivates, since the feeding of a guest is for the sake of a guest' (MS 9.1.6), which is to say hospitality consists of paying worship to a guest, and since it is intended to please the guest, the guest must be the predominant element in the act; in the same way, a sacrifice consists of paying worship to a god, and since it is intended to please the deity, the deity must be the predominant element in the act - it is the deity, being thereby pleased, that bestows the end-result. This *prima facie* view Jaimini answers with the following *sūtra*: 'No, rather, it is the act of sacrifice itself that is predominant, since it is the act that follows from scripture; the scriptural reference to the deity is as a subsidiary element' (MS 9.1.9), which is to say, the

predominant elements in a sacrifice is not the deity, since it is sacrifice itself that, by way of a 'transcendental potency', *apūrva*, generates the end-result, not the deity pleased by the oblation. Rather, the deity is referred to as something subordinate to the sacrifice, since it is the reference point for the (offered) substance.

After enunciating this settled view, Jaimini shows the disanalogy of hospitality to sacrifice in the following *sūtra*, 'With respect to a guest, it is he who is predominant in (the act of hospitality), but this is not so in a ritual act, because (in hospitality) it is the pleasing of a guest that is predominant (and this is not the case with a deity in a ritual act) (MS 9.10), which is to say: in hospitality the pleasing of a guest is required, that is, one is required to act in such a way that the deity is pleased, and so the deity is not the predominant element in a sacrifice. Hereby Jaimini has refuted the predominance of the deity in the sacrifice unequivocally.

Hereby fails your resolution of the contradiction with the topic 'Commandment, however, is an undertaking' (MS 2.1.5). For it can be ascertained that, having clearly refuted the predominance of the deity, Jaimini too must hold that position adopted by all commentators on the topic 'Commandment, however...', namely that *apūrva* alone is the instrument (by which ritual produces its end-results, not the grace of the Lord).

Also incorrect is the resolution of the contradiction of the repudiation of Brahman and the means of attaining it, namely renunciation. Jaimini holds that the discourses concerning Brahman communicate the nature of the individual self, which is the object of acts of worship supplementary to ritual in the form of purifications of the agent (of the sacrifice). Given this belief, there is no longer any proof at all for the existence of Brahman (since the discourses on it are now shown to refer to something else), and accordingly it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that both the two (Brahman and renunciation) are indeed repudiated.

It is for this reason that (Kumārila) the author of the *Vārttika* in this topic 'On narrative portions' (MS 1.2.1 ff.), after corroborating the view that narrative portions such as 'Wind is the swiftest...' are supplementary to commandments, states: 'Hereby is explained the non-deontic character (*nairākāṃkṣā*) of the Upaniṣads too.' But the fact that, in the topic 'On grammar' (MS 1.3.24 ff.) the author of the *Vārttika*, after citing certain discourses on the commandments and end-results of

acts of worship of the supreme Self, asserts that these (Upanisads) function as the means of achieving a state of flourishing and final bliss independently (and not supplementary to commandments of sacrificial rites), is something he has done entirely as a result of his own anxiety about repudiating Brahman and renunciation: it is not in accordance with the doctrine of the author of the (*Mīmāṃsā*)sūtras, since we have shown that the sūtras of Jaimini and those of Vyāsa stand in clear contradiction with each other.

You also make the argument that, in order to avoid the charge of lack of explanatory parsimony with regard to accurate usage, we must necessarily accept that the word 'dharma' is used equally to refer to Brahman (as well as ritual actions), and that therefore there is no reason to suppose that the statement of the [*Mahā*]Bhārata (where 'dharma' is used in reference to Krishna) must have the purpose of commendation (instead of being meant literally). This can be answered as follows: True enough, there is no reason to suppose it is meant as a mere commendation - for this is something actually proved from the context itself, which after all is a commendation of Krishna. That (context) does not sustain the argument that the word 'dharma' expressed simply as means of other-worldly good (and not specifically sacrificial action). Were that the case, then the word 'dharma' would refer equally to individual souls, which are means of other-worldly good insofar as they are agents, and to a host of other things insofar as they are causes - and then in what way would it be praising the Blessed one to say that the word 'dharma' refers to him? Therefore we must accept that the word 'dharma' signifies simply ritual acts such as sacrifice if we are to preserve the prevailing and natural meaning (*svārasya prasiddhyartham*) of the passage cited from the Bhārata. And it would then indeed be praise of him to say that the Blessed One, having descended to earth in order to preserve dharma, is himself dharma incarnate.

Or let us accept, for the sake of argument, that the word 'dharma' (in the Bhārata passage) somehow can refer to Brahman as well. Even so, the word 'dharma' mentioned in the (very first) sūtra, on the 'inquiry into dharma'—just like the word 'dharma' in the sūtra 'Jaimini (thinks) for the same reasons that dharma (is what brings about the fruits of action)' (BS 3.2.40) has to be taken to exclude Brahman. This is so because the dharma proposed as the object of examination is said to be

something defined by Vedic commandment (in the sūtra 'Dharma is a good defined by Vedic commandment' (MS 1.1.2)). The word 'commandment' (*codanā*) is derived from a verbal root (*cod*) that means 'impel' (*Dhātupāṭha* 10.53) and so it must enunciate a statement that prompts action. Therefore a commandment is a direct source of knowledge about dharma, whereas a statement providing information about already-existent entities that is transmitted in connection with this or that commandment can be a source of knowledge about it only insofar as it forms a unified discourse with such a commandment, by way of offering commendation or other (supplementary information about the act in question). The end-result enunciated in narrative portions (on the Evening Session and the like) is to be taken; literally only insofar as these form a unified discourse with a principal commandment, because this end-result is required by the commandment in question. By contrast, the end-result enunciated with respect to acts of worship of the Self, which are only subordinate elements of ritual acts since they are purifications of the agent, cannot be taken literally because that end-result is not required by a commandment. It is precisely with this in mind that Jaimini did not bother to answer criticisms (about such acts of worship) such as that deriving from (the *prima facie* view expressed in the sūtra) 'Because of the purposelessness of other (enjoined actions) (MS 1.2.4).

The blessed Bādārāyaṇa, however, observed that Jaimini believed that dharma takes the form of sacrifice, produces an end result that is only a state of flourishing, something both perishable and non-ultimate, and thereby constitutes the meaning of the entire Veda. And he observed further that Jaimini had no understanding of the fact that Brahman is proved to exist by the entire Vedānta (the Upanisads), whose central idea is communicated by its introductory passages and similar aspects of discourse (*upakramādi*), that the end-result of acts of worship of Brahman was final liberation, the eternal and ultimate human goal, and that ritual action was only contributory to this means. And he thought that, lest the world go completely astray by focusing on Jaimini's system, he would confer a benefit on the world by composing the knowledge system that starts 'No, the, the inquiry into Brahman'. Accordingly, there is indeed a very great contradiction between the two knowledge systems of Jaimini and Bādārāyaṇa. Since they cannot form a single knowledge system your inference is

blocked, whereas mine is not ineffectual, and this for the following reason: Jaimini proposed as his object of analysis only action such as sacrifice, whose end-results are both perishable and non-ultimate; therefore, whatever is other than sacrifice cannot be for him an object of analysis in this system.

You cannot object, on the grounds that we do find (in the MS) analysis as to essential nature, physical dimensions, and the like, of things such as the sacrificial post, the oblation fire, milk-pail, and so on that are strictly speaking 'other than sacrifice', that Brahma too, accordingly, could be an object of analysis. For what is meant by the word 'ritual action' is the object of an act aimed at an end-result that is probable and non-ultimate.

Nor can you charge that the inferential reason (namely, that Brahman is included in 'whatever is other than sacrifice') is unproved given that Brahman is in fact connected with the sacrifice, insofar as it is a deity. The deity may be the addressee of the spent oblation, but it is only the word that refers to the deity that is the object of an act, i.e. of the effort made to pronounce the word - and therefore the deity itself is not the actual object of the act.

Thereby is also laid to rest the following doubt (raised by the opponents). Although the *dharma* that Jaimini aims to analyze is concerned with action and so cannot by any direct way be connected with Brahman, it cannot be denied that (Jaimini's notion of *dharma*) must also be concerned with acts of worship (of the Self), and accordingly it must have a connection with Brahman since Brahman is both the end-result and the object of those acts; and therefore by somehow dismissing the contradiction on the ground (of its being subsumed under) the common thesis (MS 1.1.1) (the BS) can be said to form a unified system (with the MS). For we have already stated that the word '*dharma*' is concerned only with action whose end-result - as an examination of the totality of the later *sūtras* (*uttarasūtrajāta*) themselves shows - consists of a state of flourishing, something both perishable and non-ultimate. For there is a Vedic usage of the word '*dharma*' in the sense of mere action: 'Other than *dharma* and *adharmā*, other than this, what is done and what is not done, other than what is both past and future: speak to me of what there is of this sort that we have insight into.' (*Kāthopaniṣad* 2.14)

(The rest of the work is devoted to the correct interpretation of this passage.)

60.3 APPAYYA DĪKṢITA I, *Vidhirasāyana* with *Sukopayoginī* thereon

To the editions cited in the Bibliography (Third edition) we can now add that of K. T. Pandurangi (Bangalore, 2008), pp. 1-211.

A. Mahadeva Sastri, writing a Preface (pp. i-ii) to *Duruha Shiksha*, offers this account:

"Appayya Dikshita was a genius of rare ability and extraordinary versatility. He was not only great but also conscious of his greatness; he had the confidence to declare himself as the greatest Mīmāṃsaka of the country. His work on Mīmāṃsā called *Vidhirasāyana* created a sensation, and Pundits of Mīmāṃsā were quite excited over it. The reason was that Shri Dikshita pointed out that the Mīmāṃsā view of *apūrvavidhi* was full of difficulties. The objections raised by him were challenged by Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa in his *Vidhirasāyanadūṣaṇam*, by Rāmeśvara Sūri in his *Vidhibhūṣaṇam*, by Venkatanārāyaṇa in his *Vidhicamaikaracandrikā*, and by Kollur Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī in his *Vidhidarpaṇa*. Other scholars also such as Khaṇḍadeva, Somanātha, Anantadeva and Śambhubhaṭṭa wrote stray replies but not independent works to meet the challenge of Shri Dikshita and to uphold the old traditional Mīmāṃsā view as propounded in works like *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, *Kaustubha* and *Māyukhamālikā*.

"Notwithstanding the above attempts, many of Dīkṣita's points remained unanswered, especially his objection concerning *apūrvavidhi* that its definition is over-pervasive (*ativyāpta*) as it applies even to cases that are well known examples of *niyamavidhi*. The remarkable feature of this controversy was that even the opponents of Dīkṣita accepted him unhesitatingly as an outstanding Mīmāṃsaka."

McCray 2008, p. 579, reports on how this work was received: "[The work] is a critical examination of the three basic categories of Vedic injunction as defined by Kumārila. The work generated a firestorm of controversy almost as soon as it appeared, becoming one of the most widely reviled works in the entire history of the Sanskrit intellectual world."

K. T. Pandurangi, in his Introduction (pp. iv-viii) to the edition of 2008 cited above, translates the introductory passage of this work as follows: "The earlier great scholars like Jaimini, Śābara and Kumārila have discussed the three topics of injunctions [*vidhi*], viz., *apūrva*, *niyama* and *parisamkhyā* in

detail. Therefore there is nothing more to discuss. However their application in the instances spread over the entire Jaimini *sūtra* and *Sabarabhāṣya* will be discussed and clarified."

Pandurāngi adds: "The text of *Vidhirasāyana* is well planned. It consists of 44 verses. In [the] first 16 verses the [under-extension] *avyāpti* of [the definition of *apūrvavidhi* and its over-extension] are pointed out in select instances. Then up to [the] 19th verse *niyamavidhi* and up to [the] 23rd verse *parisaṃkhyāvidhi* are discussed. In this way it [i.e., the work] gives the application of these injunctions in a number of instances related from *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* works.

"Instances of these three types of injunctions are:

(i) *Apūrvavidhi* - "water should be sprinkled on the rice-grains" (*vrihīn prokṣati*). The [trace of the sprinkling] *vrihanasamkāra* is [not yet realized] *aprāpta*. Hence enjoining it by this injunctions is *apūrvavidhi*.

(ii) *Niyamavidhi* - *vrihīn avahanti* ["they are pounding the rice"] is an instance of *niyamavidhi*. Here pounding of paddy is enjoined to remove the husk. However, the husk can be removed by other means such as by [one's finger]nail. *Avahanana*, i.e. pounding is prescribed by this injunction to exclude the other means. Therefore it is an instance of *niyamavidhi*. The purpose of [a] *niyamavidhi* is to exclude other means and restrict it to *avahanana* only. This injunction is mandatory.

(iii) *Parisaṃkhyāvidhi* - *pañccapañcanakhyā bhakṣyāḥ* - "five animals with five [finger]nails [are to be] eaten". This excludes [the] eating of other animals. The purpose of this injunction is to exclude other animals.

"Though both in *niyamavidhi* and *parisaṃkhyāvidhi* exclusion is the result there is an important difference between the two, viz. in *niyamavidhi*, *avahanana* [pounding] is mandatory, while in *parisaṃkhyāvidhi* the agent may not eat the meat of animals with five nails. *Niyamavidhi* has a positive implication while *parisaṃkhyāvidhi* has no such positive implication.

"A popular example of *parisaṃkhyāvidhi* may be cited as "a signboard on a railway compartment says 'Ladies'." By this remark men are excluded from entering into that compartment. But it is not necessary that the ladies should travel in that compartment only."

Pandurāngi goes on to give examples of the claims of Appayya Dīkṣita, as well as the criticisms of them by Śaṅkara

Bhaṭṭa (in work #62.5 below). He also cites the defense of Appayya by an author named Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa in a work entitled *Vidhibhūṣana*. Both Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa's and this Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's works are edited by Pandurāngi in the 2008 edition of the work (61.3) presently under discussion.

60.4 APPAYYA DĪKṢITA I, *Upakramaparākrama*

Ramacandrulu in SĀDG 8, pp. xi-xii: "When a subject is presented in a systematic manner in a *sāstric* work, there should be coherence in the arguments advanced at different levels. The conclusion, *upasamhāra*, should be in accordance with the beginning, *upakrama*. But there may be some places where it would appear that the concluding part is at variance with the *upakrama*. There are scholars who maintain that the *upasamhāra* is stronger than *upakrama* and that the purport of the whole passage containing discussions on various points should be decided according to the *upasamhāra*. In this work, Śrī Dīkṣita maintains that *upakrama* should be given importance over the *upasamhāra* and therefore it (*upasamhāra*) should be explained in accordance with the *upakrama*. By applying this principle he decides some of the issues discussed in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta*."

60.5 APPAYYA DĪKṢITA I, *Citrapāṭa*

Ramacandrulu in SĀDG 8, p. xii: "Otherwise known as *Laghuvārtika*, this is a short treatise, giving in a convenient form, convenient to an easy remembrance, the *siddhāntas* of the sections of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā darśana* of Jaimini."

60.6 APPAYYA DĪKṢITA I, *Pūrvamīmāṃsāviśayasamgraha-dīpikā*

Ramacandrulu in SĀDG 8, p. xii: "This again is a very short work, in prose, giving the contents of the twelve Chapters of Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras*. In some manuscripts its name is given as "*Dvādaśalakṣāṇyaḥ arthasamkṣepaḥ*".

61. ŚAṅKARA BHATTA I (1593)

VARs p. 114: "Śaṅkarabhāṭṭa is known as the son of one Nārāyaṇabhāṭṭa, the author of the *Prayogaratna*. This Nārāyaṇabhāṭṭa was the son of Rāmeśvarabhāṭṭa whose father was one Govindabhāṭṭa of Benares. Śaṅkarabhāṭṭa had a brother Rāmākṣṇabhāṭṭa who also is known as a commentator on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*."

Presumably this information is drawn from V. Krishnamacharya's article in Adyar Library Bulletin 11.4, 1937, 257-262, who comments on pp. 260-261 "It is said that Rameśvarabhāṭṭa, the grandfather of Śamkarabhāṭṭa, lived for some time at Vijayanagara, then under the rule of the famous Kṛṣṇadevarāya (1509-1529). Nārāyanabhāṭṭa was born to him in the Śaka year 1435 = 1513 A.D., Śrīdhārabhāṭṭa in 1521 A.D. and Mādhababhāṭṭa in 1530 A.D. Mādhasarasvatī, the author of the *Sarvadarśanakaumudī*, the *Prakriyāsudhā* and the *Vedāntasarvasva* was one of his pupils. This Mādhasarasvatī is said to have been the teacher of Madhusūdanasaravātī. Rameśvarabhāṭṭa's son Nārāyanabhāṭṭa is said to have defeated in arguments on Vedānta Nṛsimhāśrama, the writer of so many works on Vedānta. Nārāyanabhāṭṭa had three sons, namely Rāmākṛṣṇabhāṭṭa, Śamkarabhāṭṭa I and Govindabhāṭṭa. Rāmākṛṣṇabhāṭṭa is said to have written a commentary on the *Tantravārttika* of Kumārila. Śamkarabhāṭṭa I was the author of the *Sāstradīpikāvyaḥyā Prakāśa*...His son was the famous Dharmasāstra writer Nīlakanthabhāṭṭa. His digest *Smṛtibhāskara* also called *Bhagavatbhāskara* is a well known work written in about 1630 A. D. Nīlakanthabhāṭṭa's son was Śamkarabhāṭṭa II who wrote the *Kundabhāskara* in 1671 A.D. Rāmākṛṣṇabhāṭṭa's son Kamalākārabhāṭṭa is also known to have written, besides the *Nirṇayasindhu* and *Sāstradīpikāvyaḥyā Aloka*, a Mīmāṃsā work by name *Sāstramālāvṛtti* of which a manuscript copy is available in the Adyar Library. Kamalākārabhāṭṭa's elder brother Divākārabhāṭṭa *alias* Dinkārabhāṭṭa wrote a work on Mīmāṃsā, namely *Bhāttadinākara*. Viśveśvarabhāṭṭa widely known as Gāgabhāṭṭa was the son of Divākārabhāṭṭa and wrote the following works:—1. *Dinakaroddyota*, 2. *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi*, 3. *Mīmāṃsākusumāñjali* and 4. *Rākṣāgama*, a commentary on the *Candrāloka*."

61.1 ŚAMKARA BHATTA, *Mīmāṃsābālaprakāśa* on Śalikanātha Miśra's *Prakaranapañcikā*

McCrea 2008, p. 578, bills Śamkara Bhaṭṭa as "Appayya[deva]'s first major critic'...(I)n his *Mīmāṃsābālaprakāśa* he presents in juxtaposition the (often conflicting) positions of Pārthasārathimiśra and Someśvara on most major questions, often including appropriate quotations from their works. In some cases he simply presents the two authors' views side by side: at other times, he sides with one

against the other. (More often than not he takes Pārthasārathi's part, but not invariably.) To a degree not seen in earlier Mīmāṃsā works, Śamkarabhāṭṭa's *Bālaprakāśa* concerns itself with close textual examinations of earlier works in the field, citing and comparing passages, seeking out contradiction and attempting to resolve them. In this respect his work became a trend setter at least in Varanasi, which at just this time becomes the major center for Mīmāṃsā studies."

61.2 ŚAMKARA BHATTA, *Mīmāṃsāsārasamgraha*

It has been edited by L. S. Dravida in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 17, 1904.

61.3 ŚAMKARA BHATTA, *Nirṇayacandrikā* (cf. B. 98 for ms. cit.)

61.4 ŚAMKARA BHATTA, *Prakāśa* on Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Sāstradīpikā*

V. Krishnamacharya, writing in Adyar Library Bulletin 11.4, 1947, 257-262), notes a manuscript he claims is only preserved at the Adyar Library.

61.5 ŚAMKARA BHATTA, *Dūšana* on Appayya Dīksita's *Vidhirasāyana* (cf. Ad IX, p. 108 for ms. cit.)

McCrea 2008, p. 580: "His *Vidhirasāyadūšana* is a systematically hostile comment on Appayya's work which seeks to undermine Appayya's criticisms and uphold the adequacy of Kumārila's definition [of *vidhi*] as originally stated."

See also above under work #61.6, where it is noted that K. T. Pandurangi has edited this work (Bangalore 2008).

62. VIJAYĪNDRA BHIKSU (1514-1595)

Vijayīndra Bhikṣu is from Tanjore. VARS p. 103: "...a contemporary of Appayya Dīksita I. He frequented the Court of Sevappa, then the King of Tanjore, and held śāstraic discussions along with Appayya Dīksita and Tātācārya. Under the instruction of Sevappa in 1574 Raṅgarāja II of Vijayanagar granted in (śaka 1499) A. D. 1567 the village of Ariviḷimaṅgalam *alias* Acyutappasamuda (in Tanjore district) to our author. He is known as the author of 104 works, most of which contain learned disquisitions on various difficult topics in philosophy."

In BNKS pp. 394-412 is devoted entirely to Vijayāndra Tīrtha. B. N. K. Sharma here discusses Vaijyāndra's life, dates career and works in great detail. An extended review of the Dvaita-related portions of this material will appear in the (eventually forthcoming?) Volume of this Encyclopedia to be devoted to Dvaita Vedānta. Sharma discusses at some length the question Vaijyāndra's dates, concluding that he must have been born "at 1514 or so as the most probable date of his birth" (p. 397). The date of his death, 1595, seems determined by inscriptional evidence. He was a student of the great Dvaitin Vyāsātīrtha. "Vijayāndra succeeded Surendra Tīrtha in or about 1539 A. D. and remained on the Pīṭha till 1595." (ibid.).

62.1 VIJAYĀNDRA BHIKṢU, (*Tātparyā*)*Candrikodāhrtanyāyavivarāṇa* (NCat VI, 382)

Summary by B. N. Krishnamurti Sharma

This work "is an exposition of the principles and sections of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā made use of in the [*Tattvaprakāśikātātparyā*]*Candrikā* of Vyāsātīrtha, in support of Madhva's interpretation of the [*Mīmāṃsā*]*sūtras*. The necessity for writing such a work lay in the loud complaints made by Appayya Dīkṣita and other hostile critics of Dvaita, that Madhva and his followers had flouted the Mīmāṃsā *nyāyas* and often ignored them in their interpretation of the *sūtras*. Such complaints had been met by Vyāsātīrtha in several of his works, "where he had drawn upon several *nyāyas* and sections of the Mīmāṃsā in elucidating or substantiating the interpretation of Madhva and shown that the charge of misrepresentation of and identity to the Mīmāṃsā was unfounded. But the complaints and taunts and sarcastic denunciations of the Advaitins continued with unabated vigor. The leader of the crusade against the Mādhva system in the sixteenth century, Appayya Dīkṣita, claimed to speak with special authority on the Mīmāṃsā...The prestige of Madhva and his commentators was thus at stake in these circumstances and Vijayāndra had therefore to uphold it by repudiating the strictures of Appayya then and there. The *Candrikodāhrtanyāyavivarāṇa* is one such work in which Vijayāndra expounds, for the benefit of both the critics and the followers of Madhva, the sections of the Mīmāṃsā, pressed into service in the *Candrikā*, showing in detail the subject-matter,

the *pūrvapakṣa*, *siddhānta* etc., in each case. The exposition is, in another sense, a very good commentary on the sections in question. The work comes to a stop with *Brahmasūtra* I.1.4..." (BNKS p.p. 402-403)

62.2 VIJAYĀNDRA BHIKṢU, *Nyāyādhvadīpikā* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* (cf. Ad IX, p. 110; MD 4795 for manuscript citations.

B. N. K. Sharma (BNKS p. 407)(writing in 1961): "*Nyāyādhvadīpikā* is a manual of the general principles of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā written from the standpoint of Madhva's system and presumably for the benefit of students approaching the subject through Madhva's system. Besides giving a fair and clear exposition of the orthodox Mīmāṃsā doctrines as presented by the leading commentators of that school, the work aims at harmonizing them with those of Madhva and his followers. The author says that though there are works like the *Sāstrādīpikā* briefly explaining the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, his work would be welcomed by all, especially those who are not equal to the stiff treatment there. The publication of this work had been announced years ago by the Mysore Oriental Library. But so far nothing has been done about it."

62.3 VIJAYĀNDRA BHIKṢU, *Upasamhāravijaya*

This is a work on Pūrvamīmāṃsā from a Dvaita Vedānta point of view. The following summary is found in BNKS pp. 408-410. The passage is long, and since the position defended is that of Dvaita Vedānta, even though the context is Mīmāṃsā it is probably fairer to treat it as a Dvaita text. But we include a portion of Prof. Sharma's summary considering that the question that is being discussed is clearly one that pertains to Mīmāṃsā.

Summary by B. N. Krishnamurti Sharma

"*Upasamhāra-Vijaya* (published by the Raghavendra Svami Mutt, Nanjangud, 1956 with my English translation) is another leading work of Vijayāndra on Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā thought. It is in the nature of a rejoinder to the *Upakarāṇa-Parākrama* of Appayya Dīkṣita (Benares 1904), who in his work pleads for the superiority of the *upakrama* (the initial statement of a conclusion in a textual argument) over its summation in the concluding part thereof, when settling the import of the whole argument in case of any difficulty. Vijayāndra's work is a plea

for the soundness of the reverse procedure advocated by Madhva, which had been ridiculed by Appayya Dīkṣita. The attempt to defend the thesis of the predominance of the concluding statement (*upasamhāra-prābalya*) of Madhva was first made by Vyāsātīrtha in his *Tarkatāṇḍava* and in the *Candrikā*, in the light of some admissions and implications in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and in the commentaries thereon...

"Vijayīndra emphasizes in this work certain broad principles in support of Madhva's stand.

(i) The concluding statement stands in the relation of an explanation (*vyākhyāna*) to the initial statement, which is to be viewed as the *vyākhyeya*, what is to be explained

(ii) A text whose precise import is to be fixed has naturally to be interpreted in consistency with that whose sense and validity are established, viz., the explanation.

(iii) The part of the text that interprets an earlier one, in a given whole, is syntactically to be viewed as logically subsequent to the other.

(iv) The syntactic relation of explanation to explanandum (*vyākhyānavyākhyeyabhāva*) cannot be reversed at will. It needs must be based on certain criteria. This criterion, in Vedic texts, must be the initial statement, which is *prima facie* given in traditional recitation.

(v) Though the Vedic texts are not of human origin (*pauruṣeya*) and cannot be deemed to have an intentional sequence of explanation and explanandum as in human utterances, the same principle of inner harmony that justifies the presence of the imperative in Vedic injunctions may be deemed to account for the natural order of explanation to explanandum in their statements.

(vi) Even in respect of non-scriptural texts, where the order of explanation to explanandum is whimsical, there is such a thing as the sense-order (*artha*) which is more binding and has precedence over the word-order (*padakrama*), which could easily decide the nature of the relation of explanation to explanandum in cases of doubt.

(vii) The only difference between Vedic and secular texts is that while in the former the text-order, as given, is purely governed by unseen merit (*adrstārtha*), in the latter it is optional (*aicchika*). But this makes no difference to the principle of regulating the relation of explanation to explanandum and its implication.

(viii) What is of doubtful import (*sandigdārtha*) and 'given' at first (*niyamena prathamopasthita*) must thus be accepted as the explanandum in the light of what follows. The initial statement satisfies this criterion and is to be invariably treated as the explanandum. There is clear possibility of reason for doubt about the precise import in the case of terms like 'Veda', 'svām devatām' and 'śyena' in the texts that constitute the subject-matter of the *vedopakramādhikaraṇa*, *aśva-pratigraheṣṭyadhikaraṇa*, and the *śyenādhikaraṇa* in which the rule about the initial statement has been pressed into service by others."

"Vijayīndra shows that the counter-thesis of the predominance of the initial statement (*upakrama-prābalya*) is really a shallow one, resting on the mere accident of priority of enunciation, which is not necessarily a logical consideration. The contention that *at the time of the initial statement* (when the eye does not see the final statement) there is or can be no conflict with the initial statement and that, *therefore*, the initial statement could be vested with precedence and primacy to the extent of imposing a secondary sense (*lakṣaṇikārtha*) on the concluding statement is, to say the least, trivial. To vest the initial statement, simply because it is the initial one (and on no other criterion) with a primary sense (*mukhyārtha*) and to apply a secondary sense to the concluding statement, in order to square it up with the initial statement does not rest on any valid material or logical grounds at all and cannot therefore be taken seriously. The relation of explanation to what is to be explained which the Dvaita philosophers have made out, on the other hand, between the conclusion and the initial statement (upon which they base their thesis of the predominance of the final statement and the logical ascension of the explanation over what is to be explained, are both substantial principles of thought and interpretation which have a greater binding force and claim to our acceptance in the solution of this question. Vijayīndra incidentally clarifies another point, that what is meant by saying that the conclusion 'overrides' the initial statement is that the latter would be subjected to a slight depreciation of meaning and not certainly to utter negation as in sublation. He points out that sublation has been explained by the Mīmāṃsakas in various ways consistent with the self-validity of the Vedas.

63 VENKATEŚVARA DĪKṢITA (1600)

VARS pp. 104-105: "He was the son of Govinda Dīksita, the last of the series of the great Pandit-ministers beginning with Kauṭalya. Govinda Dīksita was a Karnāṭaka brahmin of Bodhāyana *gotra* and flourished in the 16th century as a contemporary of Appayya Dīksita. He was the minister of the three Nāyaka kings of Tanjore—Sevappa, Acyutappa and Raghunātha, and Venkateśvara Dīksita, his son, might have been a *protegé* in the courts of Acyutappa and Raghunātha...

"Venkateśvara Dīksita was the teacher of Rājacūdāmaṇi Dīksita and Nīlkaṇṭha Dīksita—two great writers of the 17th century—who have referred to him in eulogistic terms in their works. Rājacūdāmaṇi Dīksita's references in his *Tantraśikhāmaṇi* (a commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras*) gives some details about our author. Venkateśvara Dīksita was the son of Govinda Dīksita by Nāgamāmbā. He was well-versed in all branches of learning. He performed the Agnicayana, Vājapeya and other sacrifices. He has composed (1) an excellent Kāvya called *Sāhityasāmrāhya*; (2) the *Sulbamīmāṃsā*; (3) the *Karmāntavārttika* and (4) the *Vārttikābharana*, a commentary on the *Tuṭtikā*."

"(T)he *Sulbamīmāṃsā* deals with the measurement and other mathematical details regarding the sacrificial *vedī*. It is based on those portions of Bodhāyana *Kalpasūtras*. His *Karmāntavārttika* is a commentary on *Karmāntasūtras* (a portion of the Bodhāyana *Kalpasūtras*. In this work he refers to his father Govinda Dīksita with great reverence. In the colophon of this work it is stated that his father—Govinda Dīksita—was an *advaitavidyācārya*—a teacher of the Advaita system of philosophy and also one who has performed many Vedic sacrifices..."

"To him is ascribed the *Caturdaṇḍapralāśikā*—a standard work on time (*tālā*) in music. His contracted and little modified name Venkatamākhin is popularly known to students and lovers of music as an authority in the technique of South Indian music.

63.1 VENKATEŚVARA DĪKṢITA, *Vārttikābharana* on Kumārila's *Tuṭtikā* (NCat VIII, pp. 2-3)

63.2 VENKATEŚVARA DĪKṢITA, *Mīmāṃsāstāvaka* (cf. Ben. 100; Hall, p. 157 for manuscript citations.)

64 YAJÑANĀRĀYAṆA or (CERUKURI) YAJÑEŚVARA DĪKṢITA (1600)

VARS pp. 129-130: "In the colophon and the introductory verses of the work [viz., 62.1] he has described himself as the great-grandson of Tirumalayajvan, the grandson and disciple of Yajñeśvara Bhattopādhyāya, and the son of Kūverikondabhattachopādhyāya. His mother's name was Gaṅgāmbikā. He had a paternal uncle Lakṣmaṇa whom he calls his *guru* and had an elder brother, Tirumala (Yajvan). He belonged to the Kāśyapa *gotra* and studied the Rg-Veda. ...He calls himself a great writer of Nāṭakas and treatises on *Ālankāraśāstra*, *Vedānta*, *Tarka* and *Śabda* (Vyākaraṇa).

V. Krishnamacharya (Krishnamacharya 1946, pp. 63-) points out that "there are two different commentaries with the title *Prabhāmaṇḍala* on the *Sāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathimīśra written by two different authors, namely Yajñanārāyaṇa and Anubhavananda. The former was the disciple of Yajñeśvara while the latter [a student] of Kṛṣṇānandāśrama. Yajñanārāyaṇa was also called Yajñeśvara in some of his works." Krishnamacharya gives a list of his works: "*Sāstradīpikāvākyā: Prabhāmaṇḍala, Ālankārarāghava, Pañcapādīkāvivaraṇojjīvanī, Ālankārasūryodaya, Śāstracūdāmaṇi, Arṭabhāṣārāmāyana, Campūratna* and *Samgītarāghava*."

"Tirumalayajvan I was his great-grandfather; [another] Yajñeśvara was the grandfather; Kondubhatta was the father; Lakṣmaṇa was the paternal uncle; Tirumalayajvan II was the elder brother. He also states that he was the disciple of Yajñeśvara (his grandfather) and his paternal uncle Lakṣmaṇa was the disciple of Kondubhatta." This Lakṣmaṇa became a *sannyāsin* and was called Rāmānanda, and Krishnamacharya is able to locate a firm reference that places Rāmānanda's later life as including the date of 1670. This confirms the dating of Yajñanārāyaṇa to the latter part of the seventeenth century.

64.1 YAJÑANĀRĀYAṆA, *Prabhāmaṇḍala* on Pārthasārathi's *Sāstradīpikā*

VARS p. 130: "His commentary...beings with the second Section of the first Chapter...His commentary is elaborate and is much useful in tracing out the tenets of the Prābhākara school..." V. Kṛṣṇamacharya at Adyar Library Bulletin 10, 1946, pp. 63-67 give us the following information based on the author's account of his lineage offered in the *Prabhāmaṇḍala*:

"Tirumalayajvan of the Carakūri family was the foremost member; his son was Yajñeśvara; his sons were Kuṇḍubhatta and Lakṣmaṇa; Kuṇḍubhatta's sons were Tirumalayajvan and Yajñanārāyaṇa (the author [under discussion here]). From this it is clear that Tirumalayajvan I was his great-grandfather; Yajñeśvara as the grandfather; Kuṇḍubhatta was the father; Lakṣmaṇa was the paternal uncle; Tirumalayajvan II was the elder brother [of our Yajñanārāyaṇa]. He also states that he was the disciple of Yajñeśvara (his grandfather) and his paternal uncle Lakṣmaṇa was the disciple of Kuṇḍubhatta.

This writer also seems to have written works on Advaita Vedānta, e.g. an *Ujjvanī* on the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* of Prakāśātman.

65 (BHATTA) NARASIMHA (1600)
Consult NCat IX, 358)

65.1. (BHATTA) NARASIMHA, (*Pra*)*Dīpa* or *Padayojanī* on Śābara's *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya* (NCat IX, 358, 363)

66. GOVINDA BHATTA (1610)
Again, nothing is known.

66.1 GOVINDA BHATTA, *Mīmāṃsānyāyasamgraha* (NCat VI, 202)

67 KAMALĀKARA BHATTA (1612)
Ramulu, p. xii, thinks this author is from Maharashtra. VARS p. 131: "Kamalākaraḥ is the son of Rāmākṣṇabhāṭṭa, brother of Śamkarabhāṭṭa (already referred to)... Besides these two works [below] he is credited with twenty more works on different topics, mainly bearing on *dharmaśāstra*. His famous work is the *Nirṇayasindhu-nibandhana* work or digest in the *dharmaśāstra*, which is said to have been completed by the author in 1668 *vikrama* era on the 14th day of the dark half of the month Māgha in the Raudra year, which is equivalent to 20th February A.D. 1612. So his literary career might have been between A.D. 1610 and 1640.

K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, at Poona Orientalist 9.1-2; 1944, pp. 1-3, reports that Aufrecht in Cat. Cat. list the titles of some eighty-five works by a Kamalakarā, all of which may not be by the present author. Sarma's article concerns an Advaita work titled *Vedāntakautūhala*.

67.1 KAMALĀKARA BHATTA, *Āloka* on Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Śāstradīpikā* (NCat III, 163)

67.2 KAMALĀKARA BHATTA, *Śāstramālā* (NCat III, 163)
Ramulu, p. xii, makes this a commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*,

67.3 KAMALĀKARA BHATTA, *Śāstratattva* (NCat III, 162; VIII, 17)

67.4 KAMALĀKARA BHATTA, *Bhāvārtha* on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* (NCat III, 162; VIII, 94)

68 ANNAMBHATTA (1620)

The author of "the most popular primer [viz., the *Tarkasamgraha*] in Nyāya *śāstra*" (VARS p. 137), who comments further "He is said to have belonged to some Andhra district. He is known (from the colophons of his works) as the son of Tirumalārya of Rāghava Somayāj family. A versatile scholar and a reputed polymath, he has written works in almost all important branches of śāstraic literature." (See Volumes 5 and 13 of this Encyclopedia for more.)

The following three works are preserved in the Madras Mss. Libraries, according to VARS p. 137.

68.1 ANNAMBHATTA, *Rānakojjivinī* on Someśvarabhāṭṭa's *Nyāyasudhā*
Someśvarabhāṭṭa's work is also known as "*Rāṇaka*".

68.2 ANNAMBHATTA, *Rānakabhāvanākarikāvivarāṇa*
VARS p. 137: "...containing 54 stanzas with commentary which investigates the import of the *vidhipratyaya* from the Mīmāṃsaka standpoint—probably an extract culled from Bhattasomeśvarta's *Rāṇaka*."

69 DINAKARA or DIVĀKARA BHATTA (1625)

VARs p. 131: "Kamalākaraḥḥaṭṭa's brother is Dinakarabhaṭṭa who is also known as a great scholar on Mīmāṃsā.

69.1 DINAKARA BHATTA, *Bhāttadinakarī* on Pārthasārathi Mīśra's *Sāstradīpikā*

VARs p. 131: "A brief commentary on the 12 chapters of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* on the model of the *Sāstradīpikā*."

70 RUDRA BHATTĀCĀRYA (1630)

Is he identical with #50 of Volume 13?

70.1 RUDRA BHATTĀCĀRYA, *Adhikaranacandrikā* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* (NCat I, 141)

71 RĀJACŪDĀMAṆI DĪKṢITA (1630)

From Andhradesā, says Ramulu, p. xii. VARs pp. 124-125 gives us the following: "Rājacūdāmaṇi Dīkṣita's genealogy and literary works are fully described by a descendant of his family, Bālayajñavedeśvara, in the introductory verses of the latter's commentary on the former's *Rukminīkalyāna*. One of the remote ancestors of Rājacūdāmaṇi Dīkṣita is one Bhavasvāmin who had a son Śrīkrṣṇa and a grandson Kumārabhavasvāmin. This Bhavasvāmin had a son Śrīkrṣṇārya who had a son Bhavasvāmin. This Bhavasvāmin was the father of...Ratnakheṭa Śrinivāsa Dīkṣita whose mother was Laksmī. This Śrinivāsa Dīkṣita had two wives and by the first wife he had two sons, Keśava Dīkṣita and Ardhanaṛiśvara Dīkṣita, and by the second wife, Yajñanārāyaṇa *alias* Rājacūdāmaṇi. It seems that Rājacūdāmaṇi lost his parents in his earlier days and his brother Ardhanaṛiśvara took care of the boy Rājacūdāmaṇi. He educated him according to his family tradition and soon he began to display his genius. In the prologue to his *Nātikā-Kamalīnikalahamsa*—it is said that he wrote it in his sixth year. In his *Kāvya-darpana* he has mentioned 27 works of

Raj Kumari Kubba (RRK pp. 61-63 likewise gives the above genealogy. "He is said to have written more than one hundred books. He had two brothers, Keśava Dīkṣita and Ardhanaṛiśvara. The latter was his teacher also...The original name of Rājacūdāmaṇi Dīkṣita was Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita and

Rājacūdāmaṇi was his title. He lost his parents in his early age, so his elder brother Ardhanaṛiśvara gave him proper education according to the tradition of his family. He was an exceptionally intelligent person who had mastered all *sāstras* and many languages even before completing his seventh year. He wrote about 30 books amongst which the *Rūkminīkalyāna* is one Mahākavya, which he wrote under the patronage of Raghunātha, the Nāyaka of Tanjore, who came to the throne in 1614 A.D."

71.1 RĀJACŪDĀMAṆI DĪKṢITA, *Tantrasīkhāmaṇi* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

VARs pp. 123-124: "The *Tantrasīkhāmaṇi* is a commentary on the *Dvādaśalakṣaṇī* [i.e., the first twelve chapters of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*] which was written by him at the bidding of his teacher Venkateśvara Dīkṣita. The date of composition of this work is given by the author as 1559 *śaka* which is equivalent to A. D. 1636.

71.2 RĀJACŪDĀMAṆI DĪKṢITA, *Karpurāvarttika* on Pārthasārathi Mīśra's *Sāstradīpikā* (cf. Ad IX, p. 35 for ms.)71.3 RĀJACŪDĀMAṆI DĪKṢITA, *Tantraratanākara* or *-sāra* (NCat VIII, 92)71.4. RĀJACŪDĀMAṆI DĪKṢITA, *Nyāyamuktāvali* or *Śāṅkaramuktāvali* on Kumārila's *Sankarsakāṇḍa* Mentioned on VARs p. 124.

72 VENKATĀDHVĀRIN (1637)

Ramulu, p. xii, says he's from Kāñcī. VARs pp. 124-125 writes: "he is the author of a "famous literary work—the *Viśvagunādarśa Campū*,...he belonged to the family of the famous Tātācārya who was well-known as the teacher of the great king, Venkatapati of Vijayanagar, and a rival of Appayya Dīkṣita; that his grandfather was one Appayya who is glorified as the nephew of the famous Tātārya, otherwise known as Tātācārya, and as a great literary scholar who performed many sacrifices; and that this Appayya had a son called Raghunātha Dīkṣita who was a poet of a very high order. His son was our author—Venkatadhvarin—who regarded himself to be well-versed in logic, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa—the four great

sāstras. He belonged to the village Araśānipāle near Conjeeveram in the North Arcot District (Madras)."

EVVR, p. 226, provides more information "The *kuṭastha* or founder of the Kidāmbi family to which our poet [viz., Venkaṭādhvarin] belonged was Kidāmbari Āccān (*alias* Pranatāriharācārya) of the Ātreya-*gotra*, a favourite disciple of the famous Rāmānuja (1017-1137 A.D. The next famous scholar in the line was Kidāmbi Appillār (=Ātreya Rāmānuja) or Vādihaṃsajaladācārya), the famous South Indian Sanskritist. Appayādhvarin (*alias* Śrīnivāsādhvarin), a scholar of repute, was the poet's grandfather (*pītāmaha*). This Appayādhvarin was the sister's son of Tirumala Tātācārya (1590-91 A.D.), the author of *Pañcamatabhañjana*, who was the *guru* of the king of the Karnāta (i.e. Rāmarāya (1541-65 A.D.). Appayādhvarin's son, Raghunāthādhvarin, married Sītāmbā to whom our poet was born."

"Our poet was the Chief Pandit at the court of the king of Pralaya-Kāverī (the modern Pulicat near Sūdūrpet-M. & S.M.Railway), and a contemporary and school-mate of Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣīta, author of the *Nīlakaṇṭha-Vijaya* which was composed between 1637-38.

"In his *Viśamagunadarśa*. the poet describes the Hūnas ('white men of the British settlement in Madras'). Since the English got Madras in 1639 A.D., the poet must have written that work some time after that date."

72.1 VENKATĀDHVARIN, *Mīmāṃsāmakaranda*

VARs p. 125 says it deals "with *dharma* as understood by the *Mīmāṃsakas*." EVVR, p. 228 says it "discusses the authoritative character of *arthavādas*."

72.2 VENKATĀDHVARIN, *Nyāyapadma* (cf. Ad IX, p. 111)

72.3 VENKATĀDHVARIN, *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (NCat VIII, 87)

72.4 VENKATĀDHVARIN, *Vidhitrayaparitrāna*

VARs, p. 125 says it explains 'the necessity of the division *vidhi* into three—*apūrva*, *niyama* and *parisaṃkhyā*."

73 NĀRĀYANA BHATTA I (1640)

There are two *Mīmāṃsā* philosophers named Nārāyana Bhaṭṭa, both of the 17th century and both contributing sections

of the work titled *Mānameyodaya*. K. Kunjunni Raja has written a long article (KKRaja 1954-55) in which the difference between the two is brought out, an article which discusses at length the life and works of the present author. He is known as Nārāyanabhaṭṭa of Melputtur, "was a Nambutiri Brahmin and belonged the family of Melputtūr near the Devī temple at Caṇḍanakkāvu, about two miles to the north of the famous temple of Viṣṇu at Tirunāvāya on the northern banks of the Bhāratappula. his father was Mātrdatta, a famous scholar proficient in Bhaṭṭa *Mīmāṃsā*, a well-known teacher with several students under him, and a pious and virtuous Brahmin." His teacher was Acyuta Piśāroṭi, who wrote on grammar and astronomy. Nārāyana Bhaṭṭa is known for his *Prakrīyāsarvasva* on grammar, written in 1616, but he is perhaps better known as the author of a famous poem, *Nārāyanīya*. But he wrote many other works, carefully described by Kunjunni Raja.

73.1 NĀRĀYANA BHATTA I, *Viśamagranthabhedikā* on

Mandana Miśra's *Bhāvanāviveka*

Edited by V. A. Ramaswami Sastri and K. A. Subramania Sastri in Annamalai Sanskrit Series 16, 1952

73.2 NĀRĀYANA BHATTA I, *Mānameyodaya*

Nārāyana Bhaṭṭa wrote only the first part of this work; presumably he died before finishing it, and the work was taken up and finished by Nārāyana (Bhaṭṭa II or) Paṇḍita (see 85.1).

As noted above, the present work is apparently an abridgement and re-arrangement of the work by Cidānanda Muni titled *Nītitattvāvīrbhāva*, our work #36.1 above. "ET" for the following summary is the edition and translation by C. K. Raja and S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri contained in *Manameyodaya*. ET, pp. 11-17, provides Detailed Contents of the Text, which amounts to a summary: we provide it below, with emendations to satisfy the style used in our Volumes.

Summarized by C.K.Raja and S.S.Suryanarayana Sastri

I. Instrument of Knowledge

(i) Introduction

(The figures refer to the paragraphs, unless otherwise stated)

(ET1-5) I. Maṅgala. Brief statement of the subject matter. Definition of the instruments of knowledge and of knowledge. 2. Recollection and restatement excluded from

knowledge. 3.4. Continuous stream of cognition is knowledge. 5-7. Manifested-ness as the extraneous adjunct which defines the element of time. 8. No false awareness according to Prabhākara. 9. Reply to this. 10. Senses and sense-contact, instruments of knowledge. 11. Cognition too is so spoken of. 12. Definition of knowledge and means thereto according to the Logicians [viz., the Naiyāyikas] and according to Prabhākara; refutation thereof. 13. Further refutation of Prabhākara. 14. Buddhists' view of knowledge and its refutation. 15. Final statement of the definition of the instruments of knowledge. Enumeration of the instruments of knowledge. Number of instruments of knowledge according to the various systems.

(ii) Perception

(ET8-25) 1. Definition of perception and enumeration of kinds of sense-contact. 2. Description of the sense-organs. 3. Establishment of the nature of the five external sense-organs. 4. The Logicians' view regarding the sense of hearing and its refutation. 5. The sense called the internal organ. 6. Some details about visual perception. 7. The Logicians' view regarding sight at a distance and its refutation. 8. Sense-organs not perceptible. 9. Two kinds of sense-contact. Cases of contact. 10. Identity with what is in contact; identity with what is identical with what is in contact, if needed. 11. Six kinds of sense-contact according to the Logicians. 12. Its refutation. 13. Prabhākara's enumeration of sense-contacts and its refutation. 14. Construction-free and construction-filled cognition. 15. No construction-free cognition according to the Grammarians; refutation of this. 16. Construction-filled cognition neither valid nor perceptual according to the Buddhists; this refuted. 17. The Buddhist's position further explained and refuted. 18. The applicability of the term 'perception' to construction-filled cognition. 19. Prabhākara's view on this. 20. Its refutation. 21. Five kinds of construction-filled cognition. 22. A sixth variety stated and shown to be included in one of the five. 23. Instrumentality for perception in the sense-organs, their contact and cognition. 24. Prabhākara's definition of perception. 25. What is freedom from construction? 26. Freedom from construction explained and refuted. 27. The Buddhists' view of perception and its refutation. 28. Logicians' definition of perception to include yogic vision; its refutation.

(iii) Inference

(ET25-91) 1. Definition of inference. Reciprocal and non-reciprocal pervasion. 2. Definition of pervasion. 3. Definition of extraneous adjunct. 4-7. Purpose of the various elements in this definition; this purpose explained in two ways. 8. Doubtful extraneous adjunct. 9. Sometimes only particular forms of the reason are effective. 10. How pervasion is apprehended; repeated observation. 11. Prabhākara's view that it is from a single observation. 12. This refuted. 13. Objection: No repeated observation possible in certain cases. 14. Reply to this. 15. Counter-argument: its five elements. 16. Fallacious counter-argument. 17. Defects like self-dependence included in counter-argument. 18. Counter-argument helps inference. 19-22. Objection: Further doubts are possible. Reply to this. 23. Doubts about invisible extraneous adjuncts. 24-25. Counter-arguments help other instruments of knowledge. 26. Further points regarding counter-arguments. 27. Relative importance of repeated observation and counter-arguments in inference. 28. Buddhists' view of apprehending pervasion. 29. Its refutation; synonyms of pervasion and pervaded. 30. Three-fold cognition of the pervaded. 31. Purpose of the word 'non-proximate' (*asamnikṛṣṭa*) in the definition of inference. 32. Cārvākas' view that in inference either there is no pervasion or there is proving what is already known. 33. Reply to this. 34. Prabhākara's view that in inference what is to be understood as new is only the existence of the *hetu* in the *pakṣa*. 35. This refuted. 36. Cognition too is spoken of as a means of inference. 37. Three kinds of *hetu* terms. 38. The corresponding three kinds of pervasion. 39. The negatively concomitant not accepted by the Kaumārīlas. Logicians' defense of it; this refuted. 40. The view that there is no 'non-established qualification'. (*apratīśiddhaviśeṣaṇatva*). 41. A modified acceptance. 42. The five elements of the positively and negatively concomitant *hetu* term. 43. The purely positively concomitant and the purely negatively concomitant terms have only four elements. 44. The seen and the generically seen *hetu* terms. 45. Logicians' view of the generically seen. 46. This refuted. 47. Two kinds of inference. 48. Five members of an inference for another. 49. Three members alone wanted. 50. Buddhists' view that only two members wanted; refutation of this. 51. Examples of a three-membered syllogism. 52. Fallacies of the *pakṣa*. 53. The various sublating means. 56-58. The fallacies of the reason. The non-established' (*asiddha*). 60. Logicians' view of 'the non-

establishment of the relation'; this refuted. 61. Non-establishment only for one or for both parties. 62. "The contradictory' (*viruddha*). 63. "The non-conclusive" (*savyabhicāra, anaikāntika*). 64. The view of some on this. 65. Partial acceptance of this view. 66. The five kinds of fallacy of the reason according to the Logicians; a sixth according to some; the sixth according to Bhāsarvajña. 67. Example of 'the similar to the context' (*prakaraṇasama*) may be included in the 'non-conclusive'. 68. This is included in what are already enumerated. 69. The view that this must be distinct. 70. This refute. 71. 'The similar to the context' may be included in 'the non-conclusive'. 72. 'The contradictory non-inconstant' (*viruddhāvabhicāra*). 73. Bhāsarvajña's explanation of this. 74. This refuted. 75. 'The discarded through lapse of time' (*kālātyayāpadīṣṭa*) only a fallacy of the *pakṣa* (*pakṣābhāsa*) [called *bādhita*]. 76. Objection: There are no fallacies except for [those of] the reason. 77. Reply to this. 78. "The non-efficient' (*aprayojaka*) is only non-establishment of pervasion (*vyaptysiddha*). 79. "The non-ascertained" of Bhāsarvajña is not a distinct fallacy. 80 Examples; two kinds. 81, 82. Four kinds of fallacies for each of the two kinds. 83, 84. Two further fallacies for both.

(iv) Authority

(ET91-108) 1. Why this topic is next taken up. Definition of authority. 2. Method of learning the meaning. 3. The views of Parthasarathi and Cidānanda about the meaning of a word. 4. The Logicians' view of it. 4. Siddhānta view that the meaning of a sentence is through secondary implication. The relation of what are expressed and the expression of what were related. 6. Capacity of the words in respect of their senses as related. 7. Prabhākara's view that words express isolated objects and then express them as related. 8. This refuted. 9. Defense of Siddhānta view. 10. Causes of the apprehension of the meaning of a sentence. 11. Proximity; Prabhākara's view refuted. 12. Further statement of Prabhākara's view and refutation of it. 13. Verbal cognition; human and superhuman. Prabhākara's view that verbal cognition is only scriptural. 14. 115. This refuted. 16. The view of Kaṇāda and its refutation. 17. Scripture can have no defect. 18. Further details not enlarged upon.

(v) Comparison

(ET108-117) 1. Definition. It is a distinct instrument. Its means and fruit. 2. This element is inference to the Logicians. 3. This refuted. 4. A separate means to cognizer dissimilarity? 5. No. 6. Logicians: comparison is knowing the relation of the name and the named. 7. Its justification. 8. An objection to this. 9. Reply. 10. This knowledge of the relation of the name and the named from dissimilar attributes and form attributes in general. 11. The view of the Logicians refuted. 12. The word 'comparison' not applicable to what the Logicians have in view. 13. The view of there being only three instruments of knowledge rejected. Prabhākara's view that similarity is a distinct category will be refuted later.

(vi) Presumption

(ET118-131) 1. Definition; further improvement on it. 2,3. This is inference according to the Logicians. There can be no conflict between two valid cognitions. An apparent conflict exists in inference too. 4-9. This refuted; there can be such a conflict; not included in inference. 10. Prabhākara's view that presumption is generated by doubt. 11. This refuted. 12. Two kinds of presumption: from the seen and from the heard. 13. Presumption from the heard explained. 14. Prabhākara's view that there is no presumption from the heard; this refuted. 15. Further refutation of it. 16. A doubt about this refutation. 17. Refutation justified.

(vii) Negation

(ET132-143) 1. Definition. 2. Its instrument. Justification of the term 'negation'. 3. Its auxiliary: capacity. 4. Capacity explained; its need. 5,6. Two kinds of non-cognition: one, due to the non-existence of knowledge and two, due to the non-existence of recollection. 7. Absence is perceptible according to the Logicians: this refuted. 8. Knowledge is non-perceptible; so its absence too must be so. 9. Inferences for the perceptibility of absence(s); brief statement of the defects in them. 10-14. Defects in them enlarged upon. 15,16. There is no relation called that of the qualification and the qualified. 17. Absence can be seen only as construction-filled if it be perceptible. 18. Inference from this of its non-imperceptibility. 19. Non-existence known only from non-cognition. 20. Prabhākara's view that there is no such thing called absence; this will be refuted later.

(vii) Conclusion

(ET143-146) Inclusion and tradition not separate instruments. Inclusion is a form of inference. Tradition is generally invalid; if valid, it is only authority. The *Rāmāyana* interprets the six-fold division of the instruments of knowledge.

73.3 NĀRĀYANA BHATTA I, Commentary on Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Sāstradīpikā* (cf. K. 112; Hall, p. 167)

73.4 NĀRĀYANA BHATTA I, *Nibandhana* on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* (NCat VIII, 94)

Attributed to him by V. A. Ramasvami Sastri, says Kunjunni Raja, p. 33.

73.5 NĀRĀYANA BHATTA I, *Sarvamatasamgraha*

Edited by M. Madhavan Unni as Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. 245, 1977, who tells us in his Introduction, p. ii: "The treatise deals with the systems of Cārvāka, Arhatā, Bauddha, Vaiśeṣika, Naiyāyika, Śeṣvaramīmāṃsā, Nirīśvarasāṃkhya, Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa. It also contains brief reference to the systems of Pāśupata and Rāmānujas. Among these the Bauddha system is dealt with rather succinctly while the others are treated in greater detail. The enumeration of objects, the nature of liberation etc. according to the systems of Cārvāka and others are described in detail."

74 ANANTABHATTA (1645?)

VARs p. 133 gives a range of dates—1630-1730. He is a son of Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa.

74.1 ANANTABHATTA, *Śāstramālāvṛtti*

VARs p. 133: "It is a commentary on the [Mīmāṃsā] Sūtras on the model of the *Sāstradīpikā*. It is very brief and summarizes the contents of the *adhikāraṇas*."

75 UTTAMAŚLOKATĪRTHA (1650)

Presumably the same as the Advaita author of a *Laghuvyākhyā* on Sureśvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣyavārttika*, edited in Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series 46, 1915, 1919.

75.1 UTTAMAŚLOKATĪRTHA, *Nyāyasudhā* on Kumārila's *Tūptikā* (NCat II, 299)

76 RĀGHAVENDRA TĪRTHA or YATI (1640)

VARs p. 126 gives the dates as 1600-1670. "About fifty works are ascribed to him, including commentaries on the Vedas. One of the greatest works of his is the *Parimala* (on the model of Appayya Dīkṣita's *Kalpataruparimala*), a commentary on Jayatīrtha's *Nyāyasudhā*. His father was Timmannabhaṭṭa, his mother Gopammā, his grandfather, Kanakācalabhaṭṭa and great-grandfather, Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa. His teacher was Sudhindragurupāda. His original name was Venkannabhaṭṭa. His great-grandfather left Kumbakonam for Vijayanagar and was a famous Vaiyākaraṇa in the Court of Vijayanagar. After the ruin of Vijayanagar, he left for Kāñcī. Rāghavendrayati, alias Venī-(Vinā?) Venkannabhaṭṭa is said to have married at Bhuvanagiri, five miles from Chidambaram. His mortal remains lie entombed at the Mantrālaya on the banks of the Tuṅgabhadra in the Bellary District."

76.1 RĀGHAVENDRA TĪRTHA, *Bhāttasamgraha* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* (cf. MD 4444; Ad IX, p. 84 for mss.)

VARs p. 126: "His only work in Mīmāṃsā is the *Bhāttasamgraha*, a commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* which was much appreciated by Nilakantha Dīkṣita."

77 KAUNDA BHATTA (1640)

Kaunda or Koṇḍu Bhaṭṭa is the same as the author of the famous work on grammar, the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana* with its commentary titled *-Sāra*, summarized by S. D. Joshi in Volume 5, pp. 255-306. He also wrote works on Nyāya; see #57 of Volume Thirteen of this Encyclopedia, and #37 of Volume Five.

77.1 KAUNDA BHATTA, *Bhāttamatapradīpikā* (NCat V, 92)

78 PEDDA DĪKṢITA (1645)

From Andhra, according to Ramulu, p. xiii. He is the same as #58 of Volume 13. He was "the pupil of his paternal uncle Dharmarājadhavarindra" (NCat VIII, 38), of the Kaundinya Gotra.

78.1 PEDDA DĪKṢITA, *Bhāttaparibhāṣā* (cf. MD 4439 for ms.)

79 RĀMAKRṢNA ADHVARIN or DĪKṢITA (1650)

VARs p. 127: "He is the son of Dharmarājadhvarīndra, the celebrated author of the Advaita *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* and the *Tarkacūdamani* (a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmani* and an adverse criticism of the *Daśatīkā*). He belonged to the Vedānguḍi village near Kumbakonam where flourished the great revered scholar Veṅkatanātha, the teacher and father of Dharmarājadhvarīndra...Rāmakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita is known to posterity as the famous commentator on his father's *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, where he plays the part more of a Naiyāyika than of a true Advaitin."

79.1 RĀMAKRṢNA ADHVARIN, *Mīmāṃsānyāyadarpana* (ms. at GOML, Madras)

80. BĀBADEVA (1650)

80.1 BĀBADEVA, *Adhikaranadarśa*

V. Krishnamacharya in *Adyar Library Bulletin* 14.1, 1950, 49-55., notes that this work is a rare one, "a brief and polemic discussion on the subject of *ādhāna* relating to the sacrificial ceremonies, [which] deals with various *adhikaraṇas* of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*."

80.2 BĀBADEVA, *Ārpanamīmāṃsā* (NCat I, 135)

81. GOPĀLA BHATTA (1650)

From Maharashtra (Ramulu, p. xii).

81.1 GOPĀLA BHATTA, *Mīmāṃsāvidhibhūṣaṇa* (NCat VI, 146)

81.2 GOPĀLABHATTA, *Mīmāṃsātattvacandrikā* (NCat VI, 146)

82 KAVĪNDRĀCĀRYA (1650)

VARs p. 132: "He is said to be a contemporary of Viśvanātha Pañcānana, the author of the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali* and other works in Nyāyasastra. Besides being a great scholar and an author of many works including commentaries on the Vedas, he is known to have possessed a good collection of rare works carefully preserved; and this list of books has been published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda No. 17."

82.1 KAVĪNDRĀCĀRYA, *Mīmāṃsāsarvasva* (see Sucipattra 52)

82.2 KAVĪNDRĀCĀRYA, *Prakāśikā* on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* (NCat VII, 94)

82.3 KAVĪNDRĀCĀRYA, *Jñānasāra*

Edited by Kamalanayan Sarma, Allahabad 1996.

83 CINNĀPPAYYA (DĪKṢITA) (1650)

A Chinnaswami Sastri in *Duruha Shiksha*, p. ii, says "Chinna Appayya Dīkṣita was a contemporary of Cokkanath, the king of Vellor, who flourished in the 16th century and so Chinna Appayya Dīkṣita also must belong to the 16th century."

VARs p. 136 gives his date as 1650, and says "Appayya Dīkṣita is known as the author of the *Tantrasiddhāntadīpikā*, a commentary on the [*Pūrva*] *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*. As is stated in the colophon he was the son of Appayya Dīkṣita (the author of *Rukmiṇīparinaya* and many other works) and grandson of Ayyā Dīkṣita; so he may be assigned to the middle of the 17th century."

83.1 CINNĀPPAYYA, *Atidesalakṣaṇavicāra* (NCat I, 7, 267)

83.2 CINNĀPPAYYA, *Durūhasīksā* (NCat I, 267; IX, 74)

A. Chinnaswami Sastri, writing in *Duruha Shiksha* pp. ii, says "His work answers not only Somanātha and his pupil Nārāyana Sāstri but also others who criticized Appayya Dīkṣita's *Vidhiraśāyana*. So to Chinnappayya Dīkṣita goes the credit drawing attention to the problems raised in *Vidhiraśāyana*; it

was he who forced the Pandits to reconsider their position in the light of difficulties pointed out by Appayya Dikshita. The book has seven *tarāṅgas* which are intended to refute the seven main objections of Nārāyaṇa Śāstri. The author specifically mentions two names, Kaustūbhakāra Khaṇḍadeva and *asmad gurvaḥ*, i.e. Somanātha Dīkṣita, whom he has criticized.

The work is edited and published in Duruha Shiksha. Also consult V. Raghavan at Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference 10, 1940, pp. 176-180]

83.3 CINNAPPAYYA, *Tantrasiddhāntadīpikā*
(NCat I, 267; VIII, 102)

Consult N. Aiyaswami Sastri at Journal of Oriental Research 2, 1928, 237-250]

83.4 CINNAPPAYYA, *Viśayasamgraha*

VARs p. 136: "There is another work—*Viśayasamgraha-dīpikā*—from the pen of one Appayya Dīkṣita who might be the same as the author of the *Tantrasiddhāntadīpikā*. [It] is only a succinct summary of the contents of the 12 Chapters of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* excluding the *Tarkapāda*."

84. NĀRĀYANA (BHATTA) PANDITA II (1660?)

KKRaja 1955-56, p. 16, commenting on this writer, "Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita, a pupil of Mānaveda of Calicut, and the famous commentator on the *Raghuvamśa* and the *Kumārasambhava*." This second Nārāyaṇa was also a student of Mānaveda, and may have completed the work below at the suggestion of Mānaveda. "From...historical records we know that this Mānadeva...was the Zamorin of Calicut from 1655 to 1658 A.D..." On pp. 35-36 Kunjunni Raja indicates that this second Nārāyaṇa was also the author of "the commentaries on *Raghuvamśa* and *Kumārasambhava*, and the short poem *Āśleśāsataka*."

VARs p. 130 says "from the introductory and concluding verses of his work his teachers are known—Subrahmanya (the son of the daughter of one famous Puruṣottama) and Rāma for Mīmāṃsā, and Kṛṣṇa for Sāhitya."

84.1 NĀRĀYANA PANDITA II, *Mānameyodaya* (second part)

As indicated above the work has been edited and translated in *Manameyodaya*, which is our "ET".

II. Objects of Knowledge

(i) Introduction

(ET147-148) *Maṅgala*. The King Mānaveda. Completing the work under his orders. Objects of knowledge stated differently. Five according to the Siddhānta.

(ii) Substance

(ET148-229) 1. Definition of substance. Logicians' definition; this refuted. 2,3. Defense of the Siddhānta definition. 4. Classification of substances. 5. Definition and classification of earth. 6. Four kinds of earth-bodies. 7. Prabhākara's view that what are produced from sprouts are not bodies. 8. Refutation of this; it is against codes and epics. 9. Objection to this refutation. 10. Reply to this objection. 11. Further objection to the refutation and replies to them. 12. Creepers have intelligence; this further defended. Or, it may be conceded that they have no intelligence. 13. Definition and classification of water. 14. Definition and classification of fire. 15. Definition and classification of air. 16. Logicians' view that air is to be inferred. 17. This refuted. 18. Inference to prove that air is perceptible. 19. Air is not established by elimination. 20. Definition and classification of darkness. 21. Logicians' view that darkness is absence of light; this refuted. 22. Further refutation of it. 23. Prabhākara's view of darkness. 24. Its refutation. 25. Difficulty in darkness being perceptible. 26.27 Reply to this difficulty. 28. Scriptural evidence for darkness being blue. The view of some that darkness is a quality of earth; this too accepted. 29. Refutation of the Buddhists' view that there is no whole as distinct from parts. 30. Logicians' view of primal atoms and the creation of the universe. 31. *Siddhānta* view of primary atoms; no evidence for the primal atoms of the Logicians. 32. Objection to the *Siddhānta*: there is evidence. 33.34. Reply to this objection. 35. Yogic perception as evidence; rejected. 36. Universe not created by God. 37. Inference to show that God is creator; this refuted. 38-40. This further refuted. 41. Inference to prove the Siddhānta view. 42. Objection to this inference. 43. Reply to this objection. 44. Need for an agent. 45. There is no such need. 46. God's desire and volition cannot be causes for creation. 47. Objection to this" reply to the objection. 48. God of the true followers of the Vedas; an objection to this: God must be the author of the Vedas. 49. Reply to this. Defects in the inference. 50. Logicians'

objection: even words of Manu etc. would turn out to be superhuman. This refuted. 51. Further defense of the Siddhānta. 52. Inference to show that Vedas were never created. 53. Why not say that *Mahābhārata* etc. too are superhuman? Reply: No. 54. Vedic authority for the human origin of the Vedas. 55. Reply to this. 45. Objection: an author needed for the Vedas to be authoritative. 57. Validity not due to merit. 58. Intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity for cognitions. Various views on validity. 59. Sāmkhya view that both are intrinsic. 60, 61. Reply to this. 62-64. Logicians' view that both are extrinsic. 65-67. Reply to this. [68-76 are not summarized in ET, the summary provided is by the Editor] 68. Udayana's inference for extrinsic validity refuted. 69. So validity is intrinsic. 70-76. Further arguments. 77. Buddhist view that validity is extrinsic and invalidity intrinsic; this rejected. 78. Final statement about divisible substances. 79. Brief statement about space etc. 80. Space etc. non-eternal according to Saṃkara; this rejected. 81. Space, time and direction are perceptible; no other evidence for their existence. 82. Objection: there is evidence in space being the abode of the quality sound. 83. Reply: sound is not a quality; even if it be a quality, it needs no new like space. 84. Space, seen by the entire world, cannot be imperceptible. 85. Time not to be inferred; it is perceptible. 86. Space too is perceptible. 87.88. Space, time and direction—divisions through extraneous adjuncts. 89. Self; object of mental perception. Prabhākara's view that self and cognition are understood as agent and knowing in the cognition of every object. 90-92. Refutation of this. 94. Sāmkara's view that the Self is self-manifesting; this refuted. 95. Objection: if self is not self-manifesting it would be both subject and object. Reply: there is no harm. 96. Brief statement of the self being distinct from the body, sense-organs, cognition and happiness. 96. Refutation of the view that the body is the self. 97.98. Refutation of the sense-organs being the self. 99. Refutation of cognition being the self. 100. The Upaniṣadic view that cognition is the self. The scripture 'Brahman, knowledge, bliss' ([*satcitānanda*]). 101. The different words are according to the distinctness of what are to be excluded. 102. In 'intense brightness is the moon' identity of meaning for the words 'intense', 'brightness' and 'moon'. 103. Inference to show that the import of a proposition is the impartite. 104. Brief statement of the different views regarding the import of a proposition. 105-107. Refutation of the view that

it is impartite. 108. Knowledge is not eternal. 109, 110. Unity of self refuted. 111. Differences in the universe not due to assumption. 112. Self is all-pervasive. 113. Heaven and liberation; the materialists' view on this rejected. 114. Buddhists' view of liberation; this refuted. 115. Logicians' view of liberation; this refuted. 116. Prabhākara's view; this refuted. 117. Sāmkhya view; this refuted. 118. Saṃkara's view; this refuted. 119. The world is an illusion and hence can be destroyed—refutation of this view. 120. What liberation is. 121.122. Difficulties in this view replied to. 123. Description of liberation and the path thereto. 124. Definition of mind; its being atomic refuted. 125. Objection: all-pervasiveness sublated by the very evidence for its existence. 126. Its refutation. 127. Difficulty that if mind be all-pervasive, it can have no contact with the all-pervasive self; this avoided. 128. Two all-pervasive substances can have contact. 129. Why a distinct substance called mind? 130. Definition of sound. 131. The view that sound is a quality of space rejected. 132. Sound is all-pervasive. 133. Logicians' explanation for the simultaneous cognition of sound. 134. This refuted. 135. Refutation of sound being produced or destroyed. 136. The activity of the lips etc., though antecedent to the sound, is not its cause. 137. Sound, though all-pervasive, need not be heard by all; what manifests sound is only the contact of the audible sound (a variety of air) with the sense of hearing. 138. Different qualities in the same sound intelligible. 139. Identity of the phoneme is not a delusion. 140. Various difficulties if sound be accepted as producible. 141. Sound divided into significant and non-significant. 142. Definition of word. Brief statement of the *sphoṭa* theory. 143. Refutation of *sphoṭa*. 144. Acceptance of *sphoṭa* does not remove any difficulties. 145. Relation of the word to the sense is eternal. Logicians' view that this relation is a convention, with God as the author; this refuted. 146. Only the genus is signified by the word; the particular is secondarily implied. 147. The need for this elaborate discussion on the eternity of sound.

(iii) Universal Property

(ET229-239) 1. Definition of a universal. 2. The Buddhists' view that there is no universal. 3. Reply to this. 4. A universal is not merely the exclusion of what is not that. 5. A universal cannot be either different or non-different from the particular(s); reply to this objection: it can be different and non-different at the same time. 6. Experience is the authority

for assuming these contradictory attributes in the same thing. 7. This experience explained. 8. Prabhākara's view of inherence being the relation between the universal and the particular this rejected. 9. Prabhākara's view that existence etc. are not universals. 10.11. Refutation of this. 12. Logician's view that there is no 'existence' in a universal property. 13. This refuted. 14. Soundness established as a universal property. 15. Further justification for accepting existence as a universal. 16. Justification for accepting soundness as a universal. 17. Justification for accepting Brahmin-ness as a universal. 18. Substance-ness etc. too are universal properties.

(iv) Quality

(ET240-276) 1. Definition and classification of quality. 2. Definition and classification of color. 3. Definition and classification of taste. 4. Definition and classification of smell. 5. Definition and classification of touch. 6. Definition and classification of number. 7. Definition and classification of size. 8. Definition of distinctness. Prabhākara does not accept distinctness in produced substance; refutation of this position. 9. Justification of Prabhākara's position and its refutation. 10. The followers of the Upaniṣads do not accept distinctness at all. 11.12. Refutation of this. 13. Definition and classification of contact. 14. Definition and classification of disjunction. 15. Definition and classification of remoteness and proximity. 16. Definition and classification of weight. 17. Definition of viscosity. 18. The qualities from cognition up to volition defined. How they are cognized. 19. Different views regarding cognition—how cognition is understood. 20. Self-manifestedness of cognition. 21. Its refutation. 22. Difficulty if cognition be a content of cognition; reply to this. 23. Inference to show that cognition is a content of cognition. 24. Logicians' view that cognition is perceptible; its refutation. 25. Difficulty if cognition is understood from manifested-ness. Reply to this. 26. Further justification of Siddhānta position. 27. Buddhists' view of cognition; will be refuted later. 28. Classification of happiness. 29. Classification of misery. 30. Definition of desire, aversion and volition. 31-33. Definition and classification of traces. 34. Definition of audible sound. 35. Definition of manifested-ness. 36. Manifested-ness exists in all categories. 37. Prabhākara's definition of manifested-ness; this rejected. 38-41. Explanation and justification of manifested-ness. 42. Definition and classification of potency. 43. Potency in substance, quality and

action illustrated. 44. Logicians' view that there is no potency. 45. Refutation of this. 46.47. Non-existence is never a cause. 48. Prabhākara[s] view that potency is a distinct category and is to be understood through inference. Refutation of both these views. The first accepted by some among the Kaumārīlas. 49. How potency is understood through presumption. 50. It is a quality though it exists in categories other than substances. 51. Differences in the Logicians'; enumeration of qualities. This rejected. 52. Virtue and vice are specific qualities of the self according to the Logicians. This rejected. 53. The term 'virtue' not seen applied to any quality of the self. Prabhākara's view that the optative mood expresses unseen result. This rejected. 55, 56. Objection: one learns the meaning as something to be done. The primary significance of the optative mood is the unseen result. 57, 58. Refutation of this. 59. What is done by a sentence is to state the knowledge that something is the means to what is desired. 60. Unseen results not expressed by the optative mood. 61. Virtue means sacrifice etc. 62. View of Salikanātha; one is called virtuous when one performs what is enjoined. This rejected. 63-66. Scripture too identifies virtue with sacrifice. Scripture cites sacrifice alone as means to prosperity. Two kinds of productive operation. 67. Mode of expressing verbal productive operation. 68. Two views regarding the meaning of an injunction. 69. No real difference in these two views. 70. Only sacrifices etc. are virtues; only cruelty etc. are vices. 71. Unseen result not a distinct quality nor category.

(v) Motion

(ET277-283) 1. Definition and classification of motion. 2. Prabhākara's view that motion is not perceptible. 3. Objection: motion is to be inferred. 4. Reply to this. 5. Difficulty if motion is to be inferred from contact and disjunction. 6-10. Attempts to justify such inferences and their refutation. 11. Why in certain cases motion is not seen. 12. The *Bhāṣya* which states the inferability of motion to be discarded. 13. If action be not perceptible there is no evidence for motion. 14. Objection: There is evidence in that the non-inherence cause of contact must be motion. 15. Reply to this.

(vi) Absence

(ET284-305) 1. All positive categories have been dealt

with. 2. Prabhākara's view that there are still more categories. 3. Logicians' view that there are still others. 4. Reply to Prabhākara: potency and number are only qualities; similarity not a distinct category. 5. Defense of Prabhākara: the cognition 'like that' instead of 'that' is not intelligible if similarity were not a distinct category. 6. Reply: explanation of the distinction between the two cognitions 'like that' and 'that'. 7. Difficulty in Prabhākara's view: comparisons like 'very similar' and 'less similar' become unintelligible. 8. Evidence for particularity adopted by Logicians. 9. Refutation of this. 10. The view that inherence is perceptible' this refuted. 11. No sense-contact possible for inherence. 12. Inferences used by Prabhākara cannot establish inherence. 13. Bhavanātha's inference; this refuted. 14. Infinite regress if inherence is accepted. 15. Between part and whole etc the relation is identity. 16. Justification for dealing with instruments of knowledge etc. as distinct from object of knowledge. 17. Definition of absence. 18. Classification and illustration of absence. No absence according to Prabhākara. 19-24. Refutation of this: either absence is a distinct reality or cognition of absence is possible even where the thing is present. 25. Mādhyamika view of the universe. 26.27 Yogācāra view of the universe. 28.29. Sautrāntika view of the universe. 30. Vaibhāsika view of the universe. 31. Brief statement of the views of the four Buddhist schools. 32. Momentariness cannot be established through perception. 33. Nor can it be by inference. 34. Upaniṣadic view of the universe. 35. Refutation of this: illusoriness cannot be absolute non-existence nor is it being other than reality and non-reality. 36. Defense of the Upaniṣadic view: being other than reality and non-reality is possible. 37. Reply to this. 38. Illusoriness cannot be the possibility of sublation, since there is no sublation possible. 39. Defense of the Upaniṣadic view: inference may be the sublater. Reply to this. 40. The five categories are real.

(vii) Conclusion

85 KHANDADEVA (1665)

P. K. Gode discusses, in Gode 1940. Working from evidence that Khandadeva died in 1665 he is able to date the three works listed below. He determines their chronological order and fixes their dates (given below) on the basis of the dates of various manuscripts that are still extant.

Gode 1940 cites Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum* Part I, p. 136: "Khandadeva or Śrīdhareṇdra, son of Rudradeva, guru of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, and Sambhubhaṭṭa (who wrote in 1707), died at Benāres in 1665."

Gode 1940, p. 14, also says the following: "Prof. Chinnaswami [in his Introduction to the edition of 71.2 cited below] states that Khandadeva was born of a Deccani family having the name 'Deva'. In A.D. 1657 a dispute arose at Benāres between the Deccani Citpāvan Brahmins and other Brahmins. This dispute was settled by an assembly of Brahmins at Muktimandapa. Their decision was recorded in a document signed by the pandits present. Among the signatures of these pandits we find the signature of Khandadeva himself. As this document bears the date *sāmvat* 1714 or *śaka* 1579 we get a decisive proof about the date of Khandadeva, viz. A.D. 1657.

VARs p. 118: "He is known (from a reference made by Jagannātha Paṇḍita in his *Rasagaṅgādhara*) as the Mīmāṃsā teacher of Perubhaṭṭa, the father of Jagannātha Paṇḍita who flourished in the middle of the 17th century (in the courts of Shah Jehan and Dara Shikho at Delhi and of Prāṇanārāyana of Kāmarūpa, a vassal under the then Mogul ruler and the Lord of Kamata, the modern Assam.

In addition to materials mentioned below, attention is also drawn to the treatment of these materials in McCrea.

85.1 KHANDADEVA, *Bhaṭṭa-* or *Mīmāṃsā-kaustubha* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* (up to III.8)

Composed around 1630, says Gode 1940. It is edited by A. Chinnasvami Sastri in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 1924-33, and by Rama Misra Sastri in *The Pandit* (1892-90). PSNS 1985, p. xi, describes this work: "*Bhāṭṭakaustubha* is an elaborate commentary on Jaimini *sūtras* from second *pāda* of first Chapter up to *Bālābālādhikāraṇa* of third Section of the third Chapter (I.2 to III.3.7). The work though appears incomplete covers all major issues of Pūrvamīmāṃsā occurring even in later chapters."

Summary by S. Subrahmanya Sastri

S. Subrahmanya Sastri, in his Introduction to BhD: "This is an exhaustive commentary on Jaimini's *sūtras* according to Sabara's *Bhāṣya* and Kumārila's *Vārttikas*. It begins with the first *sūtra* of Section II, Chapter I, and extends up to Balābalādhikarāna. Sambhubhaṭṭa, the commentator on *Bhāttadīpikā*, tells us that the *Kaustubha* ends with this section... Khandadeva discusses each topic in full, examines the views of Sabara, Kumārila, Bhavadeva and Pārthasārathi and lays down his own views. He freely uses the Navyanyāya terminology. In these sections he incidentally discusses the topics connected with the other sections also (e.g. *svaracārcā* (2.3), *bādha* etc.). We find him referring to *Kaustubha* intermittently in all the chapters of *Bhāttadīpikā*.

"Some notable points in the *Kaustubha*, not to be met with in the earlier works: In the first section Khandadeva discusses the significance of verbal endings in general and *lin-pratyaya* in particular, the relationship between the two and how a knowledge of both of them induces a man to perform Vedic rites. Incidentally he discusses the meanings of prohibitive injunctions and explains how they prevent him from committing evil deeds. He says that in the injunctions like 'he should not eat *kalañja* or drink intoxicating liquor' the *lin-pratyaya* connected with *nañ* denotes *nivartanā* or prohibition. The knowledge of *nivartanā* gives rise to an inferential cognition of the action being conducive to evil and the hearer desists from proceeding with the deed; prohibitive injunctions like 'he should not perform *ṣoḍaśīyāga* in *atirātra*' do not mean that such a *yāga* leads to evil results since the performance of the *yāga* is only a Vedic rite, but it is to be understood that the *atirātrayāga* would be fulfilled even without performing the *ṣoḍaśīyāga*.

"In I.2.4 he explains how the *mantras* which do not enjoin anything new become valid. There he adopts *abhihitānvayavāda* by which the word-senses and not their knowledge contribute to the knowledge of the sentence-sense. He says that in the injunction 'He should invoke *gārhapatya* fire with the *aindrī mantra*', the *mantra* which causes the knowledge of the sentence-sense is new and thus valid...

"*Niyama-vidhi* is an injunction whose purpose is to dissolve the partial inapplication (*ayoga*) of the subject of injunction directly or by implication, (e.g.) 'He should pound the corn'. Here the performer may adopt other methods to get

rice from corn. The Vedic injunction here removes the partial inapplication of pounding caused by those methods. *Apūrva-vidhi* is any injunction other than the two. These definitions are capable of refuting the objections raised by Appayya Dīksita.

"Khandadeva has also shown a different classification [of *vidhis*] quite new in the history of Mīmāṃsā. He says (I.4.1) that they are six altogether.

(1) The injunction of the verbal sense (*dhātvartha*) alone (e.g.) 'He should perform *agnihotra*'.

(2) The injunction of the verbal sense for the attainment of another object (e.g.) 'He should perform *agnihotra* for the attainment of heaven.

(3) The injunction of another element for the sake of the verbal sense. This is called the injunction of *guṇa*. (e.g.) 'He should offer oblation with curd'.

(4) The injunction of another element for the attainment of another object. Here the verbal sense is left untouched (e.g. 'He should offer curd for the attainment of health or vitality.'

(5) The injunction of the verbal sense combined with an attributed (*guṇa*) (e.g.) 'He should sacrifice with Soma.' Here sacrifice with Soma is the subject of injunction.

(6) The injunction of the verbal sense with an attribute for the attainment of a fruit. (e.g. 'He should sacrifice with boiled rice for Sūrya for the attainment of Brahmic glory.'

Among these the succeeding kinds of injunctions are said to be more cumbersome than the preceding ones. This classification helps us a great deal in arriving at the final view in a good section.

"Again, Khandadeva has taken pains to establish *arthī bhāvanā* as distinct from the verbal sense (2.1.1). He says that it is human effort denoted by the verbal suffix. This being [prominent, all other elements are syntactically conned with it. The Naiyāyikas who hold that the sense of the nominative alone is prominent in a sentence and the grammarians who hold that verbal sense alone is prominent are herein refuted.

"In the following section Khandadeva establishes the existence of *apūrvas* (unseen effects) which are derived from Vedic rites. He stresses the necessity of accepting nine *apūrvas* for the Darśapūrṇimāsa sacrifice. It may be noted that *apūrva* is only a link between the Vedic rite which is performed in this life and the fruit which is to be enjoyed hereafter. For linking the principal sacrifice with its subsidiaries other *apūrvas* are required. This discussion is large and conclusive.

"In the second Chapter the proofs for differentiating the Vedic rites are elaborately dealt with. They are (1) different words, (2) repetition, (3) number, (4) name, (5) attributes and (6) context. Khandadeva defines each of them.

85.2 KHANDADEVA, *Bhāttadīpikā* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*
Around 1635, says Gode 1940, who mentions editions by Candrakānta Tarkālamkāra and others, Calcutta (1899-1912) and again by Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstrī and V. L. Pansikar, Bombay 1921, with Sambhubhatta's *Prabhāvalī*.

PSNS 1985, p. xi comments " *Bhāttadīpikā* is a running commentary on all twelve chapters covering all sections and interpreting all *sūtras*. Though it is modeled on *Śāstradīpikā*, Khandadeva differs from Pārthasārathi in a number of sections. A doubt is expressed regarding the genuineness of [the] *Tarkapāda* portion of *Bhāttadīpikā* (I.1)...In his two works on [the] *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* Khandadeva set a new trend. He introduced *pariskara* style of Navyanyāya. He criticizes Bhāṣyakāra, Vārtikakāra and Parthasārathimīśra in interpreting certain *sūtras* and differently interprets them. He also applies certain Pūrvamīmāṃsā maxims differently. Thus he initiated a Navīna school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā within [the] Bhāṭṭa school, though it is not as fully developed as Navyanyāya or Navya Vyākaraṇa."

85.3 KHANDADEVA, *Bhāṭṭa(tantra)rahasya*

Before or after 1641, says Gode 1940. It has been edited with a commentary by Peri Surya Narayana Sastri (Rajahmundry 1985). K. T. Pandurangi provides a lengthy English Introduction (PSNS 1985), and it is from pp. xi-xix that we draw the following:

Summary by K. T. Pandurangi

(pp. xi-xii) "Khandadeva's third work, i.e. *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, is a unique work in a number of ways. It is exclusively devoted to the discussion of the problems of syntax and semantics. These problems are discussed in Sanskrit under the heads *śābdabodha*, *vākyārthabodha*, *vyutpatti* etc. These problems are arranged under *vidhyartha*, *lakārārtha*, *dhātvartha*, *vibhakyartha* etc. and the specific import of each and their inter-relation with each other are fully discussed. The problem as to what is the universe of verbal communication, whether it

is a word or a sentence, is elaborately discussed in Sanskrit linguistics. Within a sentence the question whether it is a noun or verb that is the center of semantic organization is raised and heatedly discussed. The question whether verbal communication is optative or merely factual is discussed. Thus the entire range of the theory and practice of verbal communication is handled by Sanskrit linguists in the works especially written for this purpose...

(pp. xv-xix) "Khandadevas begins his *Bhāṭṭarahasya* with the definitions of *dharma* and *adharmā*. He explains that though these terms have wider application he is concerned with the Do's and Don'ts enjoined in the Veda. Whatever is enjoined in [the] Veda as the means of good or *īstasādhana*, that is *dharma*, and whatever is mentioned as bad or *aniṣṭasādhana* in the Veda that is *adharmā*. He is not concerned with the good and bad in the general sense, or in [the] purely ethical sense. His definitions of *dharma* and *adharmā* are in the context of Vedic rituals and sacrifices, and the Do's and Don'ts mentioned in the Vedas. He considers *jñāna*, *brahman* etc. outside the scope of his definition of *dharma* since these are not activities that could be undertaken. He considers the ticklish example of *śyenayāga* as both *dharma* and *adharmā* from different angles. So far as the sacrifice of *śyena* is concerned it is considered as *dharma* since it is recommended by a Vedic injunction. But its result, viz. the destroying of the enemy, comes under the Vedic prohibition viz. none should be killed. Hence it is *adharmā*.

Then he proceeds to discuss *vidhyartha*. *Vidhi* is the optative mood. Its meaning is discussed in great detail in Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. Vedic injunctions are communicated through optative sentences. These have to lead to activity. Therefore, such a meaning has to be conveyed by *vidhi* or the optative suffix which can stipulate activity. The optative suffix is called *liṅ* in Sanskrit. Therefore, this discussion is known as *vidhyārthavicāra* or *liṅ arthavicāra*

"The Nyāya theory of *vidhyartha* takes the stand that the motivation for activity on the part of an individual can arise when three conditions are fulfilled, viz. (1) the proposed activity should be *īstasādhana* or capable of fulfilling some or other desire of his; (2) it should be *kṛtisādhyā* or within his capacity to undertake, (3) it should be *bālavādāniṣṭānūbandhi* or not leading to any strong adverse consequences. Only when these three requirements are fulfilled does one proceed to undertake an activity. Therefore, *vidhi* or the optative suffix

whenever it leads to the intended activity on the part of the listener will have conveyed these three requirements to him. Therefore, these three constitute the meaning of *vidhi* or the optative suffix.

"The above theory is not acceptable to Khaṇḍadeva. Firstly, this raises the question whether these three meanings are conveyed by one power or *śakti* or by three powers belonging to the same optative suffix. The Naiyāyikas are divided on this issue. The old school holds the one-*śakti* view while the new school holds the three-*śaktis* view. Further *bālavadāniṣṭānubandhitvajñāna* or the awareness of some strong adverse consequence may prevent the undertaking and therefor its absence may be a necessary factor to undertake the activity. But it cannot be considered as one of the factors for motivating the activity. it is merely a negative element. Further, the very concept of leading to adverse consequences differs from person to person and varies in different circumstances. Its intensity, presence or absence could be ascertained only after taking or not taking the action. Hence this cannot be included under the pre-requisites to be conveyed by the optative suffix. *Kalañjabhakṣaṇa* [eating poison] may be taken as leading to adverse consequences by one person and not so by another who has a temptation for it. Similarly *kṛtisādhyatva* also could be ascertained by other means. Whatever information could not be obtained in other ways in a given context, that is only conveyed by the words.

"As regards *iṣṭasādhanatva* or the fact or proposed undertaking being a means of fulfilling desire, the Vaiyākaraṇas and a section of Mīmāṃsakas also hold it to be the meaning of the optative suffix or "injunction" (*vidhi*). As this leads to the undertaking of the activity, they call it ["instigation"]. *pravartanā*. Being a means of fulfilling desire is equated with instigation or *bhāvanā* by this section of Mīmāṃsakas. However, Khaṇḍadeva does not agree with them. In sentences like "*ācāryaprēṛitaḥ ahaṃ gam anyamiś*" ["being iurged by my teacher I am leaving him for another"] there is instigation but no desire being fulfilled. Therefore these two cannot be equated, they say. The view that *iṣṭasādhanatā* is *pravartanā* was held by Maṇḍana Miśra, Parthasārathi etc. Mīmāṃsakas. The difference between the Navina ["new"] Vyākaraṇa view and Parthasārathi's view is very slight. While the Navina Vaiyākaraṇas consider *iṣṭasādhanatā* alone as the meaning of an injunction, the Mīmāṃsakas consider *iṣṭasādhanatā-rūpa*

pravartanā as the meaning of injunction. As Mīmāṃsakas they naturally prefer to give emphasis to the instigation aspect rather than the mere *iṣṭasādhanatā* aspect. Khaṇḍadeva goes a step ahead and makes instigation alone the meaning of an injunction. This is nothing but *bhāvanā*. He also points out that among the six meanings given in Pāṇini's *sūtra* for *liñ-nimantraṇa* etc.—four have an element of instigation. The Prābhākaras are more radical and they make *niyoga* or command to be the meaning of *vidhi*. Thus it is clear that the Nyāya approach is an approach of practical considerations, the Vyākaraṇa and early Mīmāṃsaka approach is a psychological approach, and the approach of Khaṇḍadeva and Prābhākaras is that of an imperative or duty concept. However, the duty concept here is not so much ethical but it is theological and scriptural. In fact the very expression "*vidhi*" stands for enjoined assignment. *Nisedha* naturally means prohibited.

"After discussing the meaning of an njunction or *liñ*. Khaṇḍadeva takes up the discussion of the meaning of all other *lakāras* or verbal suffixes and points out how all of them could be connected with *bhāvanā*

"Then Khaṇḍadeva proceeds to discuss *vibhaktiyartha* or the meaning of case suffixes from nominative to locative. He examines the meanings assigned to these by Naiyāyikas and Vaiyākaraṇas, and differs from them considerably. He quotes all the Pāṇini *sūtras* connected with the explanation of the meaning of case suffixes and interprets them in support of the meanings assigned by him to different case-suffixes. Case-suffixes play a vital role in syntactical and semantical organization of a sentence. They convey the *kāraṇa* relations. Though broadly a certain case suffix can be considered as indicating a certain *kāraṇa* relation-- for instance, accusative case indicates *karmatva* or objectivity--there are many exceptions, variations, and secondary usages in case of each case suffix. Man is capable of manipulating the language in innumerable ways for communication. As the language and culture develop, the manipulation of language also develops. However, grammarians try to codify these usages from time to time and try to formulate certain uniform rules to achieve precision in language and thought. Sanskrit has been fortunate to have great codifiers of language and great linguists from time to time. Khaṇḍadeva is one such linguist who is bold and original. His handling of the meaning of case suffixes or

vibhaktiyartha has two main objectives: (1) to define the nuclear meaning of a case suffix in such a way that all possible shades of this meaning are included in it. The chief characteristic of this nuclear meaning is called *akhaṇḍopādhi* by him. *Akhaṇḍopādhi* is a characteristic that indicates any given shade of that nucleus meaning in the given context but cannot be reduced to that alone. The particular shade, of course, is determined by the particular context. But such of the meanings of a case suffix which cannot be brought under this nucleus meaning have to be considered as secondary usages or *lakṣanika prayogas*. (2) The meanings of all case-suffixes in a sentence are to be related with *bhāvanā*. With these two objectives, Khaṇḍadeva discusses the meaning of all case-endings. He criticizes the Nyāya views and the views of Navīna Vyākaraṇa also in some cases. He interprets the relevant Pāṇini *sūtras* afresh and points out that his approach is supported by Pāṇini *sūtras*. He mentions Kātyāyana's views and explains the same suitably. He quotes *Mahābhāṣya* usages. Thus, the work is more a linguistic document than a mere Mīmāṃsā document. With a view to understand his originality and fresh approach we will notice only one or two special points in the case of each case suffix.

"Firstly, he opposes the contention that the nominative case suffix has no particular meaning and it is employed only to fulfil the maxim 'no stem be used without a suffix and no suffix without a stem'. By itself the nominative has no particular meaning. Against this Khaṇḍadeva argues that in case of the vocative case (*sambodhanā*) at least one has to accept addressing (*abhimukhikaraṇa*) as the meaning and there is no harm if the meaning of presenting (*pratipādika*) is taken as the meaning of the nominative case also. The nominative case conveys it in a general way while the particular *pratipādika* conveys it particularly. This meaning of the nominative, of course, is to be connected with the *bhāvanā*.

"As regards the accusative, he discusses various definitions of objectivity (*karmatva*) given in Nyāya and Navīna Vyākaraṇa works and shows how one or the other usage baffles them. He proposes the concept of *akhaṇḍopādhi* here. *Karmatva* is *akhaṇḍopādhi* with a nuclear meaning of objective-ness and all shades of objective-ness come under this. He disagrees with the distinction of desired (*ipsitā*) and undesired (*anipsitā*) as

two varieties of objectivity. He considers the use of the accusative case suffix as secondary in a number of instances wherein objectivity is not found and gives the other meanings such as *uddeśatva*, *nirūpitatva* etc. admissible in those instances. The *karmapravaciniya* usages also come under such secondary usage.

"*Kartrtva* and *karanatva* constitute the meaning of the third case suffix. This meaning is to be related with *bhāvanā* in a sentence. These are *akhaṇḍopādhis*. The definition of *kartrtva* and *karanatva* given by Nyāya and Navīnavyākaraṇa are inadequate and therefore *akhaṇḍopādhitva* is the only solution. Similarly *sampradānatva* is the meaning of the dative case. This is to be related with *bhāvanā* and it is an *akhaṇḍopādhi*.

"The meaning of the fifth case is *apadānatva*. But in the instances like '*vrkṣāt vibhajate*' it is *avadhitva* by way of *lakṣanā*. Similarly *pratyagivatva* [?], *janyatya* etc. are also the meanings of the fifth case suffix by way of *lakṣanā*. There need not be any *anugama* or bringing under a common group in case of *lakṣanā*. The meaning of the fifth case is also to be related with *bhāvanā* and *apadānatva* is also *akhaṇḍopādhi*. While discussing the fifth case suffix Khaṇḍadeva points out that many of the *sūtras* are superfluous as their purpose is served otherwise.

"The meaning of the sixth case is *śeṣa* or relation in general. When particular *kāraka* relations such as *karmatva*, *karanatva* etc. are to be conveyed, the accusative, instrumental etc. case suffixes are employed to convey the same. But when relations not covered by these, such as *svasvāmibhāva* etc. are to be conveyed, *ṣaṣṭhī* is to be employed. But the special point of Mīmāṃsā is that even the meaning of *ṣaṣṭhī* is to be related with *bhāvanā*. They do not agree with the view of others that in the case of *ṣaṣṭhī* its meaning is to be connected with the adjoining noun only.

"The meaning of the seventh case is *adhikaraṇatva*. This is also *akhaṇḍopādhi* and is to be related with *bhāvanā*. Khaṇḍadeva concludes that the meaning of all case suffixes is to be related with *bhāvanā* only. His vehement assertion of the *akhaṇḍopādhi* concept in respect of the meaning of case suffixes tempts one to call him Khaṇḍadeva." [!]

85.4 KHANDADEVA, *Matvarthalakṣaṇākhaṇḍana*

McCrea 2002, p. 491, fn. 10: "The work is unpublished, and survives only in a single manuscript - see *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Tanjore Maharaja Serfoji's Sarasvati Mahal library, Tanjore, Vol. XII. Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and Uttara-mīmāṃsā* (Srirangam: Vani Vilas Press, 1931k pp. 5159-5160. The manuscript is from the library of Gāmbhīrarāya Dīkṣita, father of Bhāskararāya, who seems to have played a major role in promulgating Khaṇḍadeva's Mīmāṃsā in South India in the early eighteenth century."

85.5 KHANDADEVA, *Sthānino Bhāvanāvācītvakhaṇḍana*

"Again, a single manuscript belongs to Gāmbhīrarāya Dīkṣita (ibid., pp. 5157-5159)." McCrea translates the title of this work as 'Rejection of the View that *Bhāvanā* is Expressed by the Substituend' (McCrea 2002, p. 493)

86 PURUṢOTTAMA PĪTAMBARA (1670)

The famous author of a great many works in the school of Suddhadvaita.

86.1 PURUṢOTTAMA PĪTAMBARA, *Vivaraṇa* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

Edited at least twice, once in *Brhatstotrasahitsāgara* (Bombay 1927), again in *Puṣṭivaktisiddhi* 5.2.

87 ĀPADEVA II (1670)

P. V. Kane, in PVK 1938, explores the date, relations and works of this author. "The genealogy of Āpadeva, the author of the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* as recorded by his son Anantadeva in his work *Smṛtikaustubha* is as follows"

Ekanātha

Āpadeva

son

Anantadeva (I)

son

Āpadeva (II) (author of *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*)

son

Anantadeva (II) (author of *Smṛtikaustubha*. (p. 40)

On the basis of this genealogy Gode argues that the author of a work titled *Adhikaraṇacandrikā*, ascribed to an Āpadeva, is

not the same as the author of 68.1 although both works are on Mīmāṃsā, but is rather the work of Anantadeva (II) in the above genealogy. He also agrees with P. V. Kane's dating of the author of 68.1 as in "the period 1600 to 1650" (p. 46).

MNP, p. 17, provides a bit more: "What is known of Āpadeva is derived chiefly from the statements of his son, Anantadeva, in his *Smṛtikaustubha*. He came of a family of Maratha *brāhmaṇas*, distinguished for learning and religious devotion..."

87.1 ĀPADEVA II, *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*

The following summary is found in MNP, pp. 4-17.

Summarized by Franklin Edgerton

"The *Āpadevī*-to use the brief designation of Āpadeva's work which has become familiarly known in India-professes to summarize the essential doctrines of the whole Mīmāṃsā system. As indicated by the first *sūtra* of Jaimini, this system has as its purpose the exposition of duty (*dharma*), which means any matter set forth in the Veda as having a useful purpose (3). The entire Veda is useful as bearing on duty (9, 363). For we are commanded to study the entire Veda...and as what is not useful could not be an object of required study, this proves that all the Veda must be useful; *anāarthakya*, meaninglessness or uselessness, is ruled out in any part of the Veda. This principle of *anāarthakya* is applied in Hindu law; a statute or legal principle must be interpreted in such a way that no part of the code shall be rendered void or meaningless (Kane, *A Brief Sketch of the Purva-Mīmāṃsā System*, p. 27).

"The central element in the Veda is the collection of injunctions to perform specific ritual acts, such as sacrifice. And in these the central or principal element is the verb which enjoins the act. This leads to an analysis of the verbal expression of an injunction, which is found primarily in an optative verb-form such as *yajeta*, 'he shall sacrifice'. (That other, non-optative forms may be used in the same sense is a minor detail which our text ignores, evidently regarding it as unimportant; many such forms are found in actual Vedic injunctions which it quotes later on.) This analysis is finished only at the end of the work 367ff.

"The optative form *yajeta* is divided into the root *yaj(i)* and the ending (*e*)*ta*. This ending in turn contains two elements, psychologically speaking (both expressed by the same identical formulativeness). All verbal endings express the former, but only optative forms the latter. Both these two elements in the ending express efficient-force, *bhāvanā*. This term *bhāvanā* is of the most fundamental importance in the Mīmāṃsā system. The *bhāvanā* of an injunctive verb is the heart of the heart of the whole Veda. Each and every part of the Veda must be related in some way, directly or indirectly, to it. That is, the Veda consists primarily of a collection of injunctions; all its other parts must be shown to be related to them, and have a right to exist only thereby; and the heart of each injunction is the efficient-force, the *bhāvanā*. This word is a noun of action from the causative of the root *bhū*, 'to come into being', and means accordingly 'a causing to come into being', a bringing-about, tendency to produce something; or, as I have rendered it, 'efficient-force'.

"This efficient-force is expressed by the optative ending—which accordingly is the principal part of the word; the root depends psychologically upon it. This, by the way, is universally true of all words, both nouns and verbs; the root or stem is regarded as invariably subordinate to the ending...

"Since there are psychologically two parts to the optative ending, and both express efficient-force, it follows that there are in injunctive forms two efficient-forces. One is that which expresses optative or injunctive force; it is called 'word-efficient-force', *sābdī* or *śabda-bhāvanā*. The other expresses general verballity, and is called 'end- or fruit-efficient-force,' *ārthī*, *artha-* or *phala-bhāvanā*. This is subordinate to the former, being that which it effects. For the optative force prompts to the performance of the action indicated; it is 'a causing to come into being' of the 'end-efficient-force,' which in turn is 'a causing to come into being' of the action denominated by the root. For instance, 'he shall sacrifice' means 'he shall (injunctive) bring-into-being (verballity) something by a sacrifice.

"As stated, the entire Veda must in some way or other be brought into relation to one of these efficient-forces. Now every efficient-force has three dependent elements; it requires an end or object produced, a means or instrument, and a manner of performance. These answer the questions 'what' ('does the force cause to come into being?'), 'by what?' and 'how?'. The

injunctive or 'word-efficient-force- has as its end the 'end-efficient-force', for it stimulates the person, e.g. the sacrificer, to start to perform the action. Its means is knowledge of the meaning of the optative and similar forms, for it is through that knowledge that one understands, and is prompted by, the injunctive efficient-force. Its manner of performance consists in the explanatory-passages, *arthavāda*, which glorify sacrificial actions and so help to stimulate men to wish to perform them.

"The injunctive efficient-force is called 'of-the-word' in Vedic injunctions because it resides in and is based upon nothing but the independent word of the Veda. In worldly injunctions it is based on the will of the person who delivers the injunction, and expresses his command or wish. But according to the Mīmāṃsā the Veda has no personal basis; it expresses the will or desire of no one, not even of God, of whom it is quite independent. The Veda is eternal, uncreated, and absolute. God is concerned in it only to this extent, that at the beginning of each world-eon he 'remembers' the Veda from past world-eons and reveals it to men. So, since Vedic injunctions have no other basis than the Veda itself, their injunctive efficient-force is called 'of the word', being rooted in the word alone.

The end-efficient-force has as its end the fruit or object of the rite to be performed, such as 'heaven', for it leads to that. That is why it is called the efficient-force of the end or fruit..It has as its means the root-meaning of the verb, such as 'sacrifice'. That is, *yajeta svargakāmah*, 'who desires heaven shall sacrifice', means 'by sacrifice he shall effect (attain) heaven', *yajena svargam bhāvayet*. It has as its manner of performance the numerous subsidiaries, *aṅgāni*, subordinate elements which go to make up each ritual performance, as indicated by applicatory injunctions, *vinīyoga-vidhi*.

"Different teachers of the Mīmāṃsā undertook to formulate more precisely the exact psychological values of each of the two efficient-forces. Our author, at the end of the work, viz. in 368ff., summarizes the views of two opposing schools; those of Someśvara and Pārthasārathimīśra; both are subdivisions of Kumārīla's school. Āpadeva clearly agrees with Pārthasārathimīśra, whose views in general he adopts. Both these masters agree that the word-efficient-force means primarily just a general and unspecified impellent force (*pravartanā*), and Someśvara thinks (368-374, especially 372) that it cannot be more precisely defined than as an activity

(*vyāpāra*) based on the Vedic word alone, for which a synonym is instigation (*preraṇā*). But Pārthasārathimīśra (375-382), while agreeing that general impellent force is all that it means primarily, holds that since such a general notion could not be responsible for human action, to be effective it must suggest something more specific, by secondary implication (*lakṣanā*). And this more specific implication he finds in the fact that the action instigated is a means of attaining a desired end. That is, the Vedic injunction suggests—though indeed it does not say definitely—that 'by performing such an action (expressed by the end-efficient-force) a man may obtain a desired end', and so instigates him to perform it; this is the *implied* meaning of the injunctive or word-efficient-force, though all that it means primarily is an impulsion—'do so and so'.

"As to the meaning of the end-efficient-force, also, these same teachers differ. Somevara holds (384-387) that it means an effort or energy (*prayatna*), and that a synonym for it is *karoti*, 'does', which according to him has the meaning of 'makes an effort, exerts energy', and which is used as a synonym for any active verb; thus 'he cooks' means 'he does cooking', 'he sacrifices' means 'he does sacrifice'; while if the subject does nothing, but let us say is blown by the wind, we do not say 'he does (anything)', but 'he is swayed by the wind'. But Pārthasārathaimīśra (388-391) holds that this is over-specific, pointing out cases in which it cannot hold; he argues that the end-efficient-force expresses simply the notion of general activity conducive to the bringing into being of something else (this same activity being specified by the meaning of the verbal root, as e.g. *yuj-*; so that 'he shall sacrifice means 'he shall operate in such a way that by a sacrifice a desired result will ensue'.

Returning now to the beginning of our text: after the preliminary analysis of the word-efficient-force, ending in 9, it proceeds to 10 to list the five divisions of the Veda: injunctions (*vidhi*), formulas (*mantra*), names (of rites, *nāmadheya*), prohibitions (*nisedha*), and the explanatory-passages (*arthavāda*). Of these, names and explanatory passages are a kind of negative injunctions; while formulas, names, and explanatory-passages will be shown to have importance only indirectly, as related to injunctions or prohibitions. The major part of our text is devoted to injunctions, as the principal part of the Veda according to Mīmāṃsā theory.

"First, in 10-12, injunctions are classified as primary, injunctions, injunctions of secondary or accessory matters (*guṇa*), and 'particularized' or 'qualified' injunctions, which enjoin both things—the primary rite and an accessory. This leads to a long digression in which it is proved that in these last the accessory must be understood as a modifier of the rite, or (as it is phrased) with implication of a possessive suffix; e.g. *somena yajeta* is understood as *somavatā yāgena (phalam) bhāvayet*, "with a sacrifice containing *soma* he shall effect (the desired end)."

"When this has been finally disposed of, in 62 we come to the principal classification of injunctions as 'originative' (*utpatti*) injunctions, injunctions of application (*viniyogin*), of performance (*prayoga*), and of qualification.

"An injunction of application (66) is one which indicates the relation of some subsidiary matter to its principal, as 'he shall perform the oblation with sour-milk'.

"This leads, in 67ff., to a detailed treatment of the six *pramāṇas*, modes of evidence, by which one may determine that a certain thing is subsidiary to another thing that is related to it in dependence. These *pramāṇas* are direct-statement (*śruti*), word-meaning (*liṅga*), syntactic connection (*vākya*), context (*prakaraṇa*), position (*sthāna*), and name (*samākhyā*). In the order named, each prevails over the following ones, so that in case of doubt as to what subsidiary element belongs to what principal thing, a careful analysis of the logical basis of the various alternatives will always decide the matter...

"Thus we find a sentence 'With Indra's verse he worships the householder's fire'. The word 'Indra's verse', *aindrī*, refers to Indra by *liṅga*, 'word-meaning' (literally, 'mark, tag, label'), and so it might be inferred that this verse goes with worship of Indra; but the direct-statement that it goes with worship of the householder's fire annuls this, since *śruti* is stronger than *liṅga* (89). The reason for this is that *liṅga* can make application only by implying *śruti*; that is, when we hear the word *aindrī* we might imagine that it means 'with this verse one is to worship Indra' because of the 'tag' *aindrī*, 'Indra's verse'. But before this imaginary *śruti* or direct-statement can be aroused by implication through the 'tag' *aindrī*, the direct-statement actually found in the text, 'with Indra's verse he worships the householder's fire' shows that the verse belongs to the worship of the householder's fire; and so there is no chance for the 'tag' to work by implying a different direct-statement.—In the same

way each of the succeeding modes of evidence works only by implying all the preceding ones, up to direct-statement; for the details see the text. So syntactical-connection or connected-utterance (*vākya*) in a single sentence is weaker than word-meaning (103f.) but stronger than *prakaraṇa*, context, but not in the same sentence (114f.); this *performance* therefore makes application by suggesting an implied *vākya*, an implied connection of the two things in the same sentence, which then implies *liṅga*, which then implies *śruti*, and so the application is made. Context, *prakaraṇa*, is in turn stronger than *sthāna*, position because in context there is a mutual interdependence of the two things, the principal and the subordinate; each has a need which is satisfied by the other; while in things related by *sthāna* only the subordinate thing, mentioned in a 'position' near the principal thing, is felt to have a need of the thing to which it is related, while the principal thing has no such need (159f.). But position is in turn stronger than 'name' (*samākhyā*), the weakest of the six *pramāṇas*, which determines relationship only through the etymological or derivational meaning of an expressions (176-181), as when it is inferred that the *hotr* priest is to drink a certain draught because it is served in what is called the '*hotr*-cup'. The weakness of this inference is in full accord with a well-known and very sound Mīmāṃsā principle that etymology, *yoga*, is an unsafe guide to interpretation; it is only to be resorted to when all other helps fail, and is always overruled by established conventional usage (*rūḍhi*). This is what is called the *rathakāraṇyāya*, from the stock illustration that is given of it (see 98, 229). Many a modern Western scholar has sinned against this excellent philological principle by interpreting words according to their derivation instead of searching the texts themselves to find how the word is actually used.

"After the discussion of the six *pramāṇas* which help to establish application (*vinīyoga*), we come in 182ff. to a classification of subsidiaries, *aṅga*. The most important classification of them is into *samnipātyopakāraṅgāni* and *ārādupakāraṅgāni*, those which affect or assist in the rite indirectly by helping to fit some *guna*, material substance or the like for use in it, and those which effect it immediately, not through the means of any subordinate matter. The former prevails over the latter; that is, when there is doubt as to whether something is connected with the main rite or with a subordinate matter, the latter has the preference (186ff.) But

both kinds of subsidiaries relate in reality not to the external form of the rite, but to the mystic *apūrva* which it is to produce (192ff.)..

"This *apūrva* is one of the most important concepts in the Mīmāṃsā system. It designates the mysterious, transcendental power generated by a correctly performed ritual act (the correct performance including the presumption that the performer is qualified to perform it), and it in turn produces, in the fullness of time (often after the death of the sacrificer), the 'fruit' which is the promised reward of the act. Not only has every rite as a whole an *apūrva*, but each subordinate action that belongs to it has a subordinate (*utpatti*-, 'productive') *apūrva* of its own...

"With 196 we come to the treatment of *prayogavidhi*, the injunction of performance. This means an injunction governing the order of parts of the rite, and it is usually implied rather than directly-stated. Subtle reasons are given in 196ff. for making the assumption. In connection with this matter of order, too, we find six *pramāṇas* or modes of evidence, each stronger than the ones which follow it; they are listed in 199, and explained and differentiated in the following sections.

"The fourth kind of injunction, that of qualification, is treated in 225ff. It designates the person who is qualified to perform a rite and expect its fruit; or, as we should sometimes prefer to put it, the circumstances under which a rite is to be performed. Ordinarily the circumstances of the qualified person is specifically stated in the injunction of qualification. But certain necessary qualifications are always understood, viz. the necessary knowledge (gained only from Vedic study), possession of the sacred fire in the case of fire rites, and capacity (physical power). The former two bar out non-Aryans, and women as independent agents (but a wife has joint qualification with her husband, who supplies the necessary knowledge); and the Veda specifically authorizes certain non-Aryans to perform certain specific rites. Capacity applies to all optional rites (*kāmyāni*), but not to permanent (*nityāni*) ones; these must be performed as well as one can all one's life long, even if bodily strength is lacking to perform them completely.

"This closes the first part of the text, as it is divided in Chinnaswami's edition, and the treatment of *vidhi*, injunction. With 239 we take up *mantras*, formulae. According to the Mīmāṃsā their only purpose is to remind us of something connected with the sacrifice. Or if it is impossible to interpret them thus, as the text admits it is in a few cases (248), then

they have a purely transcendental effect, for they can not possibly be meaningless, being part of the Veda.

"This transcendental (*adr̥ṣṭa*) effect is a matter of which we hear much in other connections. It is a convenient peg on which to hang anything for which no reason can be discerned. For every part of the Veda must have some purpose in relation to the efficient-force (*bhāvanā*) of some injunction (or prohibition). Any subsidiary, if it has no visible effect upon the rite, must be assumed to have an invisible effect; for instance, when rice is husked, there is a visible effect, but when rice is sprinkled with water, no effect is visible, yet there must be one, otherwise the sprinkling would not be enjoined. This is the *adr̥ṣṭa* of which we hear so much. However the Mīmāṃsā teaches, very sensibly, that the use of this principle must be restricted as much as possible—that when a visible purpose is discernible no *adr̥ṣṭa* must be assumed. For otherwise, the whole ritual would tend to be resolved 'into a string of performances of which nobody would understand how they came to be combined' (Thibaut, *Arthasaṃgraha*, Introduction, p. xiii).

"Now, the *mantras* used at the various rites must all have some effect, and to our minds that effect would seem clearly to have been *adr̥ṣṭa* in character—mystical and super-sensuous—rather than of any practical import. But in accordance with the principle just laid down, the Mīmāṃsā insists that we must try to find a visible purpose for them as far as possible. And in the vast majority of cases, it claims, such a visible purpose is discernible, namely, the *mantras* mention some element of the sacrifice, most commonly its deity, and so serve to remind the participants thereof. Thus they are of practical and 'visible' use in the sacrifice. Only in the relatively few cases where no such use of the *mantras* can be discerned may they be interpreted as invariable in effect. The principle is an excellent one, although it seems (as pointed out by Thibaut, i.e.) that it is carried too far in this instance.

"Most curious to our minds is the next grand division of the Veda, 'name' *nāmadheya* (249ff.). This applies to words which are names of rites, such as *agnihotra*, *udbhid*. They seem to us hardly to deserve being classified in this way on a par with injunctions, formulas, and explanatory-passages. For unlike the other grand divisions; they do not comprise complete sentences, but are only isolated words occurring in sentences which belong to some of the other categories, most commonly injunctions.

"The reasons why the Mīmāṃsā considers this classification necessary may be illustrated as follows. In such an injunction as *agnihotram juhōt* or *juhuyāt*, 'he shall offer oblation with the *agnihotra*', the word *agnihotra*, if considered an integral part of the injunction, must stand in some relation to the efficient-force, the *bhāvanā*. The only possible value it could have would be to state some accessory (*guṇa*), as for instance the place in which or the deity to which the oblation is offered. But both of these *gunas* are laid down elsewhere. And an injunction can only lay down something which is not elsewhere enjoined; otherwise it would be meaningless, which is contrary to the principle of *ānarthakya*. Hence the word *agnihotra* is merely a name, qualifying the sacrifice; the sentence means *agnihotreṇa homena (phalaṃ) bhāvayet*. So the word *agnihotra* stands outside the injunction as an extra modifier describing the oblation, because of 'another authoritative passage setting forth that (*guṇa* which might otherwise be designated by the word)' (273F).

"There are three other reasons, besides this, which are taught by the Mīmāṃsā as justifying the assumption of a 'name'. I shall mention here only one of them—the avoidance of what is called 'split of the sentence', *vākya-bheda*. This compels us to assume that in the injunction *citrayā yajeta paśūkāmaḥ* ['one who desires cattle should sacrifice with the *citṛā*'] the word *citṛā* is the name of a rite, because any other interpretation involves 'split of the sentence' (265ff.) This, like *ānarthakya*, is a logical fault of which we hear much in the Mīmāṃsā. It means this: except in an originative injunction not more than one thing may be enjoined at one time. That is, each section or sentence of the ritual code should deal with only one thing. Otherwise confusion would ensue. A single sentence should be devoted to laying down a single thing. Only in an originative injunction, laying down the general nature of a rite, is it felt that more than one subsidiary matter may be enjoined also, along with the main injunction, because the subsidiaries are really included in the main injunction, and so the unity of the subject-matter does not suffer thereby (12); in such a case we have a 'particularized injunction', as we saw. But otherwise, to enjoin two things at once involves *vākya-bheda*; the sentence is split. And this must be avoided. This is an excellent legal principle, and is taken over from the Mīmāṃsā into Hindu law. It is regrettably true that it is very hard at times to avoid admitting 'split of the sentence' in both Vedic injunctions and legal maxims; but the

principle is none the less sound, and we must approve the attempts of the Mīmāṃsā to apply it as far as possible—sometimes with great subtlety.

"We come now, with 320ff., to the fourth grand division of the Veda, prohibitions, *nīśedha* or *pratiśedha*. These are a kind of negative injunctions. It is first shown very subtly that in them the negative goes regularly with the optative part of the ending, which expresses the injunctive or word-efficient-force, because that is the principal element in the verb, which is itself the principal part of the injunction. Therefore the negative cannot go with the root-meaning of the verb, nor with another word, because these are dependent on the ending, and what is dependent on one thing cannot be combined with something else; else the sentence 'bring the king's servant (*rāja-puruṣa*, in which 'king' depends on 'servant') might be taken to mean 'bring the king'. Therefore the negative goes with the injunctive efficient-force, upon which all the rest of the sentence depends. And so the prohibition means the opposite of what the injunctive efficient-force means. Since the meaning of the latter is impellent-force, the meaning of the negation, the prohibition, is deterrent-force.

"Then follows (329ff.) an explanation of certain cases in which, for special reasons, it is impossible to assume a prohibition, but instead we must assume a positive command to perform some action, the negative then going not with the injunctive efficient-force but with either the root-meaning of the verb ('one shall perform an action opposite to the action denoted by the verb') or with a noun ('one shall perform the action of the verb in relation to something else than this noun'). In both these cases we have not prohibitions but exclusions, *paryudāsa*.

"One of the two conditions which require us to assume an exclusion rather than a prohibition in negative sentences is 'the contingency of an option, *vikalpa*'; that is, the fact that if we assume a prohibition we should find ourselves in this dilemma, that the Veda both commands and prohibits the same thing (341ff.). This is known as 'option', and naturally is by all means to be avoided; any interpretation which makes it unnecessary is to be preferred. It is said to involve no less than eight faults (318). Yet the Mīmāṃsā honestly admits that there are cases where the assumption is unavoidable. So in the case of negative sentences, sometimes we cannot avoid this dilemma, and must then admit that the same ritual act is

enjoined and elsewhere prohibited in the Veda (359). It is apparently understood that in such cases either course may allowably be followed.

"The fifth and last of the grand divisions of the Veda, *arthavāda* or explanatory-statement, is very briefly treated in 364-367. Explanatory-statements glorify sacrificial acts that are enjoined, or stigmatize prohibited acts. Thus they constitute, as we saw, the manner-of-performance to the injunctive (or prohibitive) efficient-force; they are the 'way' in which the instigatory power tends to instigate man to perform (or avoid performing) the acts in question.

"The work closes with the statement (393) that duty as laid down in the Veda leads to the fruits assigned to each act if performed with a view to attaining them; while if they are performed as pure acts of devotion to God it leads to supreme beatitude. This is proved by the quotation from the *Bhagavadgītā*: 'Whatever thou doest, eatest, offerest in oblation, givest in alms, or performest as penance, that do as an offering to me'. And for this the *smṛti* and not Vedic *śruti* is authoritative, because according to Mīmāṃsā doctrine true *smṛti*, when properly understood, is based upon the Veda and not inconsistent with it, and therefore is equally authoritative (although, when it appears to be inconsistent with it the Veda prevails, because it alone is independently authoritative; *smṛti* must be interpreted in such a way as not to clash with Vedic *śruti*."

"In this brief summary I have omitted many topics which are treated incidentally in the course of the work. One of these deserves special mention, namely the matter of *atideśa*, 'transfer'. According to the Mīmāṃsā the rules for the various Vedic rites are not entirely unrelated one to another. This is evident from the fact that with many of them only very incomplete statements are found of their details. This circumstance is explained by the theory that they are modifications or ectypes, *vikṛti*, of other rites, which are called archetypes, *prakṛti*. A *prakṛti*, archetype or primary form of a rite, is one in which all the elements which make it up (*aṅga*) or *dharma*) are directly prescribed (*upadiṣṭa*) or at least (cf. 156) not understood as transferred (*atidiṣṭa*) from any other rite. A *vikṛti* or modification, on the other hand, is a rite in which the details are in part, that is so far as not specifically prescribed, 'transferred' from some more primary rite. The general rule by which this transfer takes place is called *codaka*,

rule of transfer (not to be confused with *codanā*, a synonym for *vidhi*, injunction). It derives its force from comparison, *upamāna* or *upamiti*. That is, we see that one rite, whose details are incompletely prescribed, resembles another rite in some respect (usually in respect to the deity addressed, or the material used in it); and this comparison suggests that the details of that other rite are understood as applying to this rite, by *codaka*. For instance, the *jyotiṣṭoma* is the archetype, *prakṛti*, of *soma* rites in general, the *agnīṣṭomīya* (first animal-sacrifice at the *soma*-rite) is the archetype of animal-sacrifices; and the *darśapūrnamāsa* of *īṣṭis* in general. A rite may be a modification of one rite and still serve as archetype to other rites (cf. 222).

87.2 ĀPADEVA II, *Vādakautūhala* (NCat II, 125)

88 (BĀLA)KRṢṂĀNANDA SARASVATĪ (1670)
#1247 of Bib 3, which cites NCat XIII, 270-271.

88.1 (BĀLA)KRṢṂĀNANDA SARASVATĪ, *Nyāyāmōḍa*
147.1.1 Edited in the Journal of the Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Library 18.1, 1965, 1-8

89 GĀGĀ BHATTA or VIŚVEŚVARA (1674).

We seem to have a great deal of information about this person. In Bendray, pp. 22 ff., a wealth of information about the ancestors and successors of Gāgā Bhatta is provided, from which we draw portions in what follows:

"Viśveśvarabhatta, better known to Maharashtra by his pet name Gāgābhatta, belonged to Viśvamitra *gotra*, *gadhivamśa* and Bhatta family, having Goddess Bavani of Kolhapur as his family deity. The earliest mention of his line of the family is known from that of Nāgapaśa, who had Caṅgadeva as son and Govindabhatta as his grandson. Govindabhatta had a son by name Rāmeśvarabhatta, who was a well-reputed teacher of Vedānta and Dharmasāstra. Rāmeśvara Bhatta lived in Paithan, his native place. In 1514 A.D. Rāmeśvara Bhatta went to Sangamner on his way to Kolhapur to visit the shrine of his family deity, where he had his first son, Nārāyaṇa Bhatta, born. Later, Rāmeśvara Bhatta proceeded to Dwarka on pilgrimage by about 1516 A.D. and stayed there for four years.

He returned to Paithan and was there for four years. But he soon left his native place Paithan for a permanent residence at Kashi or Benares in 1525 A.D. Rāmeśvara Bhatta died very old at Kashi leaving, besides Nārāyaṇabhatta, two sons named Sridharabhatta and Mādhavabhatta behind. Nārāyaṇa Bhatta was widely renowned for his learning, and even today his authority is being equally well acknowledged. Nārāyaṇa Bhatta was responsible for getting the temple of Kāśivīśveśvara rebuilt after its destruction by Muslims, and also for devising a special procedure (*prayoga*) for renovating a *śivaliṅga* in the new temple. This *prayoga* is still current and used on such Liṅgapratiṣṭhā occasions. Nārāyaṇabhatta was recognized as 'Jagatguru' throughout India and also by Mogul monarchs. His old family tradition for great learning, which was further brightened by Nārāyaṇa Bhatta, was continued with the same zeal and authority by all his descendants with this special title of 'Jagadguru'. Nārāyaṇabhatta died sometime after 1575 A. D. He left three sons by his wife Parvatī, named Rāmakṛṣṇabhatta, Saṃkarabhatta and Govindabhatta. Rāmakṛṣṇabhatta died at the age of 52 when his wife Umā ascended his funeral pyre with him. Rāmakṛṣṇabhatta had three sons called Divākara alias Dīnkarabhatta, Kamalākarabhatta and Lakṣmanabhatta. Dīnkarabhatta appears to have left only one son named Viśveśvar alias Gāgābhatta. It is really to the great credit of this renowned Bhatta family that every male member of all the branches, right from Nāgapaśa to Gāgābhatta and further down to three or four generations, should each have left behind very valuable treasure to Maharashtra or Bhārata of learned authoritative treatises in Sanskrit on all *sāstras* and subjects of learning. Such a family tradition for learning is very rarely to be found even in the history of the whole world."

"No certain data is available about Gāgābhatta's birthdate or of his early life. Roughly he must have been born some time before 1600 A.D. The earliest mention of his name is found among those in the assembly of learned Brahmins in Kashi deciding upon the rights of a Shende Golak family according to Brahmin Varnashramadharmā held in about 1640 A.D. Next we come across his signature on a Sammatīpatra in regard to a similar dispute...among the Brahmins about their religious rights. Sammatas of Anantadevabhatta and some Brahmins from the Saṃgameśvar-Konkan side appear also on the Pātra. This also indicates that Gāgābhatta's residence was

then in Kashi. In 1663 A.D. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa came to the Deccan and, along with Anantadevabhāṭṭa, he visited Rajapura-Sangameshwara side. Shivaji then invited him to decide upon the rights of the Shenavi or Saraswat Brahmin community to end the local dispute among the Brahmin communities of the Konkan. Gāgābhāṭṭa presided over the assembly of learned Brahmins renowned in the Konkan District and his brother disciple Anandabhāṭṭa and some others from Kashi took part in the discussion. . .

"There was then a long stay of Gāgābhāṭṭa in the Deccan. It seems from the contents of the *Nirnaya* that they had to await some authoritative works on Dharmasāstra from Indore. Since, in 1665 A.D., a local pandit named Raghunathabhāṭṭa had to be sent to Mriza Rāja Jaising, it appears that Gāgābhāṭṭa had left for Kashi before then. It is, however, probable that Shivaji must have met Gāgābhāṭṭa in Kashi when he went there on his way back to Rajgad after his escape from Agra in 1666 A.D. Shivaji used to refer disputes of Dharmasāstra to Gāgābhāṭṭa in Kashi, and the decision given by Gāgābhāṭṭa in regard to the C.K.Prabhu community sometime between 1669-1672 is quoted by Raghunāthabhāṭṭa Panditaraja in his orders for the execution of the decision. In this decision he appears to have been assisted by Anantadevabhāṭṭa also. Later, at the end of 1673 A.D. Gāgābhāṭṭa had presumably arrived in the Deccan to visit his native place Paithan as also to pay his homage to the shrine of the family Goddess Bhavani of Kolhapur. When he arrived at Nasik, which country was then conquered by Shivaji, his arrival was duly intimated by his officers to Shivaji and Shivaji immediately, as was customary in those days, sent Pandits to receive and invite him to the capital. Gāgābhāṭṭa, along with Anantadevabhāṭṭa, called on Shivaji at Rajgad and all homage due to the great learned man of 'Jagatguru' family was paid. Here Gāgābhāṭṭa discussed the need for coronation and subsequently performed the ceremony under his direction in June 1674. As soon as the monsoon in the Deccan subsided, Gāgābhāṭṭa appears to have left for Kashi. Shivaji requested him to compile *Ślokavarttika* or *Śivarkodaya*, which he completed and sent to Shivaji, but by the time of his writing it appears from his remarks in the work itself that he had then entered *caturthāśrama* or *sannyāśrama*. When Sambhaji Raja thought of having Maharajabhisheka to himself with the same ceremony he sent some learned men to bring him down to Raigad. But he was then quite old to undertake the

journey. Besides, he was then a *sannyāsī*. The ceremony was carried out, on the basis of the same Prayoga Poṭhi by the Kuladhpati of the Bhonsla family as before. Gāgābhāṭṭa, however, compiled a work on *vratas* called *Samayanaya* at the request of Sambhaji and sent it with those who had gone to bring him to Rajgad. This was compiled by him in 1681 A.D. [On this episode see V. S. Bendrey, *Coronation of Shivaji the Great* (Bombay: P.P.H. Bookstall 1960.) Gāgābhāṭṭa appears to have died sometime before 1686 A.D."

89.1 GĀGĀ BHATTA, *Bhattachintāmani*

Noted as available in manuscript according to Ramulu, p. xiii.

89.2 GĀGĀ BHATTA, *Tantrakaustubha* (NCat VIII, 95)89.3 GĀGĀ BHATTA, *Tantrakaumudī* on Sucarita Miśra's *Kāśikā* (NCat VII, 95)89.4 GĀGĀ BHATTA, *Kusumañjali* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*
Available in manuscript according to Ramulu, p. xiii.89.5 GĀGĀ BHATTA, *Śivarkodaya*

Available in manuscript, according to Ramulu, p. xiii.

90 CAMPAKANĀTHA MIŚRA (1675)

90.1 CAMPAKANĀTHA MIŚRA, *Prakāśa* or *Praveśa* on
Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Śāstradīpikā* (NCat VI, 388)

91 KEŚAVA AGNICIT OR ĀHITĀGNI (1675)

91.1 KEŚAVA AGNICIT, Commentary on Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa's
Mīmāṃsāsārasaṃgraha (NCat V, 61)

92 KOLLURI NĀRĀYANA ŚĀSTRIN (1680)

From Andhra, says Ramulu, p. xiii. VARS p. 134: "Kollur Nārāyana Śāstri is known as the disciple of Somanātha Dīkṣita, the famous commentator on the *Śāstradīpikā*. His father was Kolūr Somayāśin and mother, Accanāmbā...He may be fairly placed soon after him [viz., Somanātha Dīkṣita] i.e. A. D: 1630-1700."

92.1 KOLLURI NĀRĀYANA ŚĀSTRIN, *Mīmāṃsāsarvasva* (cf. Ad IX, p. 137 for ms. cit.)

VARs p. 134: "A commentary on the [*Mīmāṃsā*] Sūtras explaining the sections in full."

92.2 KOLLURI NĀRĀYANA ŚĀSTRIN, *Nyāyamañjarī* on Pārthasārathi Mīśra's *Śāstradīpikā*

Cf. Ad IX, p. 41 for ms. citation.

92.3 KOLLURI NĀRĀYANA ŚĀSTRIN, *Vidhidarpaṇa* (cf. Ad IX, p. 141 for ms. citation)

VARs p. 134: "Another similar work dealing with the *vidhis* and its varieties."

92.4 KOLLURI NĀRĀYANA ŚĀSTRIN, *Vidhiviveka* (cf. Ad IX, p. 142 for ms. citation)

VARs p. 134: "An independent treatise possessing nine main sections chiefly dealing with the various aspects of *vidhi*—(i) *utpatti*, *vinīyoga*, *prayukti* and qualification; (ii) compulsory, occasional and *kāmya*, etc.."

93 SOMANĀTHA DĪKṢITA (1680)

From Andhra, says Ramulu, p. xiii. VARS p. 128: "The earliest reference to him is made by Śambhubhatta in his *Prabhāvalī*, a commentary on Khaṇḍadeva's *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*. From the colophon, the introductory verse and an *ūhā* passage it is clear that he was the great-grandson of Sureśvarayajvaśarman, otherwise known as Sūrabhāṭṭamahopādhyāya. His mother's name is Mairammadā. His teacher was his own older brother Veṅkaṭadriyajvan. His family is very famous for the performance of Vedic sacrifices. He himself is known in the colophon as a *sarvatomukhayajvara*. The three *pravaraṣīs* of his family are Yajvanāśva, Ambarīṣa and Aṅgiras."

93.1. SOMANĀTHA DĪKṢITA, *Mayūkhamālikā* on Pārthasārathi Mīśra's *Śāstradīpikā*

VARs p. 129: "...a standard commentary on the *Śāstradīpikā*. He refers to most of the important authors and works in the *Mīmāṃsā śāstra*—the Bhāṣyakāra (Śabarāsvāmin), the Vārttikakāra, the author of the *Nibandhana*, Bhavadeva, Bhavanātha, the Nyāyasudhākara, Varadarāja, Appayya Dīkṣita's *Vidhirasāyana*, the *Kāśikāṭikā*, the *Tantraratna*, and the *Nyāyaratnamālā*."

94 JĪVADEVA (1690)

The younger brother of Anantadeva, son of Āpadeva II. VARS p. 132: "His other works are the *Gotrapravarānirṇaya* and the *Āśaucānirṇaya* bearing on the *dharmaśāstra*." In the Foreword to Bhāṭṭabhāskara by Kamalanarayana Sarma, p. vi, we find: Jīva Deva and his forefathers lived and worked in the historical city of Paithan (Pratiṣṭhāna) situated on the bank of [the] Godavari in the state of Maharashtra (some 40 km. south of the city of Aurangabad)."

94.1 JĪVADEVA, *Bhāṭṭabhāskara* (NCat VII, 288)

VARs, p. 132: "referred to by Śambhubhatta. It deals with the *pramānas* on *dharma*—the contents of the first Chapter [of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*]. Bhāṭṭabhāskara, p. vi: "The present work, though unfortunately incomplete, is a lucid exposition in very simple language of the basic tenets of the *Mīmāṃsā* Philosophy. It can serve as a very good introduction into the *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy for the fresh entrants in this *śāstra*. Though the exact period of the composition of this work cannot be fixed with certainty, it can safely be assumed that the work was composed sometime between 1670 to 1685."

95 ANUBHAVĀNANDA YATI (1695)

Kṛṣṇamacharya 1946 identifies his teacher as Kṛṣṇānandapūjyapāda, author of the Advaita work *Siddhāntasiddhānta*, whose date is given in our Bibliography as 1665. Kṛṣṇānanda also taught Rāmānanda (or Lakṣmīdhara), the nephew of Yajñanārāyaṇa (see #64 above), and thus his date must be very close to that of Yajñanārāyaṇa. V. Krishnamacharya (Adyar Library Bulletin 10, 1946,

pp. 67ff.) ascribes an Advaita work, *Advaitaratnakośavyākhyā*, to Anubhavānanda, and identifies Anubhavānanda as "a pupil of Rāmānanda under Kṛṣṇānandapūjyapāda. Therefore Anubhavānanda may be placed more or less in the same period in which Rāmānanda is known to have lived, i.e. 1600 to 1680 A.D."

95.1 ANUBHAVĀNANDA YATI, *Prabhāmandala* on Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Śāstradīpikā* (NCat I, 207)

Krishnamacharya 1946 says: This work "is practically unknown to most of the scholars." He mentions two manuscripts, one at Tanjore, the other at Trivandrum. The Adyar Library has a copy of the former.

96 ANANTADEVA II (1700)

See above under Āpadeva II (1610) for P. V. Kane's dating of the members of this family. Kane believes Anantadeva II to be the son of Āpadeva II. He apparently dates Āpadeva II closer to 1650 than (as we have) to 1610, so that subsequently in SILH 2, p. 402, he gives the period 1675-1700 for Anantadeva.

96.1 ANANTADEVA II, *Adhikaranacandrikā*

P. V. Kane in PVK 1939 speaks of a manuscript of this work, now apparently lost. A manuscript of the work appears in Rajendralal Mitra's Notices, p. 229, as located in Darbhanga, and is described there as "*Adhikaranacandrikā*. On syllogisms with explanations and bearing of the various illustrations usually cited by authors", and the name of the author is given as Āpadeva Mahāmahopādhyāya. (PVK 1939, p. 39). The author is identified as also the author of *Smrticandrikā*, likewise described by Rajendralal Mitra in *Notices of Sanskrit MSS* Volume 6 (Calcutta 1882, pp. 300 ff., "a digest of *smṛtis* regarding duty by Āpadeva Mahāmahopādhyāya." Kane compares the two works thus attributed to the present author, Anantadeva II, and concludes they are likely by the same hand. However, since the only manuscript of this work is now lost he speculates (SILH 2, p. 48) that it may be a work of Āpadeva I, the great-grandfather of Anantadeva II (I).

96.2 ANANTADEVA II, *Bālābālakṣepaparihāra* (NCat I, 166)

96.3 ANANTADEVA II, *Ākhyātavāsavivarāṇa* (NCat IX, 165)

96.4 ANANTADEVA II, *Bhāttālamkāra* on Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*

VARs pp. 131-132: "Anantadeva is the author of a commentary on his father's *Nyāyaprakāśa*, called *Bhāttālamkāra*, which Śambhubhatta has every now and then referred to and criticized." (See F. Edgerton's introduction to his edition of the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, p. 18 for more information)

The work has been edited by L. S. Dravida in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 23, 1921.

96.5 ANANTADEVA II, *Devatā(svarūpa)vicāra* (NCat IX, 166)

96.6 ANANTADEVA II, *Phalasāṅkaryakhaṇḍana* (NCat I, 166)

96.7 ANANTADEVA II, *Vākyabhedavāda* (NCat I, 167)

97 NĀRĀYANA TĪRTHA or GOVINDA ŚĀSTRIN (1700)

He is #1305 in Bib 3, author many works on a variety of schools of philosophy. See K. Endo's exhaustive article in *Sambhasa* 14, 1993, pp. 41-60 for information on this author.

97.1 NĀRĀYANA TĪRTHA or GOVINDA ŚĀSTRIN, *Bhāttabhāskara* or *Bhāttabhāṣāprakāśa*

Edited by Bhagavat Acarya in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 4, 1900.

98 ŚAMBHU BHATṬA (1710)

Died in 1708, according to F. Edgerton 1929, Intro. p. 18. He was a pupil of Khandadeva's. Ramulu, p. xiii, says he's from Banaras. SSSastri 1952, p. xiii, says: "Śambhubhatta, as known from the colophon [of mss. of 93.2] was the son of Bālakṛṣṇabhāṭṭa, student of Khandadeva, master of both Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā and a poet. In the concluding stanzas of his commentary he requests the readers who could discriminate between good and bad to review his work wherein he has set down the purport of the text after meditating a great deal upon his *guru's* teachings.

VARs p. 135: "He is known as the direct disciple of Khandadevamīśra himself. His father was Bālakṛṣṇa, who is described by him as well-versed in the Vedas and śāstras, as a great sacrificer and an ardent devotee of Śiva."

98.1 ŚAMBHU BHATTA, *Adhikaraṇasamkṣepa* (NCat I, 142)

98.2 ŚAMBHU BHATTA, *Prabhāvalī* on Khandadeva's
Bhāttadīpikā

Composed in 1708 according to Franklin Edgerton (ibid.) as reported by P. K. Gode in SILH 2, p. 46. S. Subrahmanya Sastri (SSSastri 1952, pp. xiii-xiv): "From a perusal of the *Prabhāvalī* one may easily see that Sambhubhatta was a writer of great erudition in all Vedic lores and śāstrāic subjects. More than that...he is marked by an independent spirit and whenever he disagrees with the *guru* he plainly says that that is his own opinion. He never leaves any difficult text without his comments. In introducing a section he traces the development of the topic from Jaimini himself down to Pārthasārathimīśra and his commentator Samkara Bhatta, and Khandadeva's own remarks upon these works. He always takes up the original Vedic texts, Kalpasūtras and Smṛtis to decide the meaning of any passage. His criticism of the works of Pārthasārathimīśra, Appayya Dīksita and Khandadeva are noteworthy...According to Sambhu Bhatta the *Ṭīkā* was finished on the 11th day of the third month of 1764 (Śaka) forty-two years after the *samādhi* of Khandadeva."

VARs p. 135: "As he himself has said, he was asked by his teacher not to comment on the *Bhāttadīpikā* to the end of the Balābalādhikaraṇa on the ground that students of Mīmāṃsā could understand the terse and brief language of the *Bhāttadīpikā* by a close study of the more elaborate *Bhāttakaustubha*. But against the wishes of his revered teacher he has commented on those portions also with a fitting introduction dealing with the important topics in the Tarkapāda. It is a very elaborate commentary on the *Bhāttadīpikā* and it further establishes the *navyamata* by refuting the views of the *prācīnas* belonging to the Bhatta school—Pārthasārathimīśra, Bhattasomeśvara, Khandanakāra (?), Appayya Dīksita, Āpadeva and his son Anantadeva, Samkarabhatta and Somanātha Dīksita. At times he refutes also the views of the Prābhākaras."

McCrea 2008, p. 582: "The work was apparently begun before Khandadeva's death in 1665, and was not completed until 1708. Far more than a mere gloss of his teacher's words, Sambhubhatta's work is a virtual encyclopedia of sixteenth and seventeenth century Mīmāṃsā. He carefully reconstructs the polemical context around Khandadeva's arguments: at each juncture he points out who Khandadeva is arguing against and why, notes and extensively quotes from more recent authors who have attacked Khandadeva, and offers his own rejoinders to these attacks."

The work has been edited several times. See Bib 3, #1292.2.

99 LAKSMANA PANDITA (1710)

McCrea 2008, p. 583: "From the location of the extant manuscripts, it appears that he was a Southerner....(H)e refers on several occasions to one Ayyana Ācārya, a writer on Dvaita Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā who was active in the early eighteenth century, so he was presumably active in the mid- to late-1700s. It is possible that he was himself a Dvaitin." McCrea refers to an unpublished manuscript (Adyar Manuscript 8.E.26).

99.1 LAKSMANA PANDITA, *Tantravilāsa* (NCat VIII, 95)

McCrea 2008, pp. 584: "The *Tantravilāsa* consists of six chapters (perhaps originally separate works compiled in an anthology), each of which sets out to overturn both the *pūrva-* and *uttara-pakṣas* of a particular topic in the Mīmāṃsā system—to show that as they have been explained in existing Mīmāṃsā works, they are fundamentally misconceived, and, frequently, that the problem that they purport to address is really a pseudo-problem, one which would not arise at all but for a fundamental misconception—a misconception shared by all previous writers in the entire history of Mīmāṃsā."

100 (TATSAT) VAIDYANĀTHA (BHATTA) (DĪKṢITA)
(BHĪŚĀGRAJA) (1722)

This author also wrote works on Nyāya and Advaita: more information provided in the volumes covering his period in the literature on those systems.

100.1 (TATSAT) VAIDYANĀTHA, *Dhanyāyamālā* (NCat I, 141)

100.2 (TATSAT) VAIDYANĀTHA, *Prabhā* on Śabara's *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya*

100.3 (TATSAT) VAIDYANĀTHA, *Nyāyabindu*

It was edited, with Madan Mohan Pathak's *Tippaṇa*, by M. B. Bakre from Bombay, 1915.

100.4 (TATSAT) VAIDYANĀTHA, *Prabhā* on Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Sāstradīpikā* (cf. Ad IX, p. 39; HDV 811 for mss. cites. edited in B132. M5 P39 1978, two volumes.)

100 KṚṢṆA YAJVĀN (1750)

From Andhra, says Ramulu, p. xiv. But VARS p. 141 thinks he "seems to be a Tamilian and as such it [his work below] is popular in the Tamil countries."

101.1 KṚṢṆA YAJVAN, *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*

Edited several times and translated into English at least twice, by Madhavananda (Howrah: Ramakrishna Mission, 1948, and by Bhabani Prasad Bhattacharya in MPBh. Bhattacharya's Introduction to the latter is the source of the following summary (pp. 16-22). "E" and "T" references are to pages in the same volume.

Summarized by Bhabani Prasad Bhattacharya

(E1-3; T23-25) ("At the very beginning the author discusses the nature of *dharma* and *adharmā* following in the footsteps of Jaimini. According to him, Veda, *smṛti* and custom are the proofs regarding virtue and vice. The Veda is divided into two broad divisions - *mantras* and *brāhmaṇas*. 'Mantra' denotes those Vedic texts that are expressive of mere assertion. Barring the *mantra* portion, all the rest of the Veda are *brāhmaṇas* which have been regarded as synonymous with injunctive texts. These injunctive texts have been classified into five divisions - the *karmotpattivākya*, the *gunavākya*, the *phalavākya*, the *phalāyagunavākya* and the *sagunākarmotpattivākya*. The author has dealt with the nature of [these] five-fold texts and has brought out their essence with the help of suitable illustrations.

(E3-5; T24-29) In the course of the above discussion, the concept of *apūrva* arises which has been elaborately delineated by the author. There must be such a thing as *apūrva*, because action is enjoined in such injunctions as 'desiring heaven one should perform sacrifice'. If there were no such thing as *apūrva*, such an injunction would be meaningless, because the sacrifice itself is something perishable and if it were to perish without bringing into existence something else, then the result in the shape of 'heaven' could never come about. From this it follows that the act of sacrifice does bring about something—some capability or potency—which continues to exist and operate until the final result in the form of heaven is accomplished. The act of sacrifice itself cannot and does not continue to exist after it has been accomplished and because of the fact that the act is perishable, it must be taken as producing some such faculty as *apūrva* leading to the result.

"The author then proceeds to deal with the different kinds of *apūrva* in the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices. It has already been shown that in all simple sacrifices there is a single *apūrva* bringing about a single result. But there are certain elaborate sacrifices which are highly complex being made up of a number of subsidiary sacrifices; such, for instance, as the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices. In this particular case, four kinds of *apūrva* take place which are the *phalāpūrva*, the *samudāyāpūrva*, the *utpattyapūrva* and the *aṅgāpūrva*.

(E5-6; T29-30) "The three-fold classification of injunctions is the next important topic for discussion. They are *apūrvavidhi* or original injunction, *niyamavidhi* or restrictive injunction and *parisamkhyāvidhi* or exclusive injunction. Kṛṣṇa Yajvan has dealt with the nature of each type of injunction along with suitable illustrations. He has also shown the difference between the two last-named injunctions by citing illustrative references.

(E6-10; T30-34) "The author then deals with the concept of auxiliary [*aṅga*] which plays a prominent role in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system. "The term 'auxiliary' has been defined as 'that which helps another'. In the case of the *prayājas* prescribed in connection with the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices. We find that these latter stand in need of help; and also that certain acts in the shape of the *prayājas* need something to which they could afford some help. Thus, this mutual help leads us to presume that the *prayājas* help and subserve the purposes of the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices.

"According to the Mīmāṃsakas there are six means of ascertaining what is auxiliary to what. They are *śruti* (direct assertion), *liṅga* (indirect indication), *vākya* syntactical connection), *prakaraṇa* (context), *sthāna* (place) and *samākhyā* (name). All these are varieties that have been clearly brought out with the help of suitable examples...

"The question now arises—which of these is to be regarded as most authoritative in a case where two or more of these are applicable but in conflict with one another? The answer is provided by the author following Jaimini. Among the six means mentioned above that which follows is weaker than that which precedes. This means that in the case of scripture coming into conflict that which precedes is stronger, that which follows is weaker. The instances of conflict and supersession have been brought out in an easy and intelligible manner.

"Thereafter, the auxiliaries have been classified under two heads - (1) direct and (2) indirect. Those auxiliaries which help in the fulfilment of the sacrifice and only through that sacrifice, the final *apūrva* - are called 'direct' (*sannipātopakāra*), and those are called 'indirect' (*ārādūpakāra*) which produce distinct *apūrvas* of their own, these *apūrvas* being produced in the performer's self - and through these subsidiary *apūrvas* help the final *apūrva* of the sacrifice itself.

(E10-11; T34-40)"Kṛṣṇa Yajvan then proceeds to show the nature of religious acts. In this connection, he lays down a two-fold division of Vedic acts into primary act (*arthakarman*) and subsidiary act (*gunakarman*). *Gunakarman* is further subdivided into two categories - *upayuktasamskāra* and *upayokṣyamānasamskāra*. The former subdivision is also known as *pratipattikarman* or act of disposal. *Pratipatti* or disposal is of three kinds--*pradhānottarakālā*, *pradhānasamakālā* and *pradhānapūrvakālā*, each of which is illustrated by the author. The latter subdivision may also branch off into several categories as pointed out by the eminent author. At the end of this topic we find the distinguishing attribute which differentiates *arthakarman* from *gunakarman*.

"In another way the *gunakarman* may be divided into four classes—*utpatti*, *āpti*, *vikṛti* and *samskṛti*, so argues the author. He illustrates each one of them by citing suitable Vedic texts. The most important classification of primary acts into everlasting, occasional and optional varieties has again been made here. In the course of discussion the author also shows with illustrations the three subdivisions of optional acts.

(E12-14; T40-44)"The meaning of the injunctive Vedic text is the next important topic of discussion. The injunctive text is always a sentence which consists of several words. The question now arises as to which particular word in the sentence it is that denotes the act to be done and in what way this denoting is done. This question has been pertinently raised for the purpose of determining the difference between acts enjoined by different Vedic texts. The author here elaborately deals with the entire process of injunction and at the same time throws light on the role of *bhāvanā* in this connection. In the typical injunctive text, '*svargokāmo yajeta*' ('desiring heaven one should perform sacrifice') there are two terms, '*svargakāmaḥ*' (desiring heaven) and '*yajeta*' ('should perform sacrifice'). The former states the result that is desired by the agent and the latter prescribes the act producing that result. According to the Mīmāṃsakas this second term '*yajeta*' consists of two parts—(1) the verbal root '*yaj*' and (2) the injunctive affix '*liṅ*'. In the connotation of this word '*yajeta*' also there are two factors—(1) the act of sacrificing and (2) the accomplishment of that very act. Of these two—the act and the accomplishment—the former is signified by the verbal root i.e. *yaj*, and the latter is signified by the injunctive affix, i.e. *liṅ*. This accomplishment or bringing about is technically called '*bhāvanā*'. In other words it is this *bhāvanā* or bringing about that is signified by the injunctive affix '*liṅ*'.

"Kṛṣṇa Yajvan, following in the footsteps of Jaimini, divides *bhāvanā* into two types—(1) *ārtha* (actual) and (2) *śābdī* (verbal). Both of these two consists of three parts—(1) what is to be accomplished (*kim*), (2) by what instrumentality it is to be accomplished (*kena*), and (3) the process or manner in which it is to be accomplished (*katham*). In the case of the *ārthī bhāvanā* the three constituents are as follows—(1) what is to be accomplished is the final result, heaven in the case of sacrifices; (2) the instrumentality by which the result is to be accomplished comprises the act, and (3) the process of accomplishment lies in the whole procedure of the actual performance of the act. On the other hand, the *śābdī bhāvanā* contains (1) what is accomplished is the prompting of the agent to activity, (2) the prompting is accomplished by the instrumentality of the injunctive and (3) the process of the prompting lies in the impressions about the excellence of the activity derived from the declamatory and other texts.

(E14-17; T44-50) "Let us now deal with the Vedic text

'svargakamo yajeta' in the light of the discussion on *bhāvanā*. Here the injunctive affix indicates 'one should bring into existence the final result in the form of heaven', and this is what is meant by '*bhāvanā*'. This *bhāvanā* in its *ārthī* form consists of the three parts already mentioned above, while *ārthī bhāvanā* itself consisting in the activity of the agent is something that is accomplished by the *śābdī bhāvanā*.

"The author then proceeds to deal with the concept of *nāmadheya* which occupies an important place in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. *Nāmadheya* or name is based on the signification of the individual words in the Vedic text and most of them, after proper inquiry, are found to be proper names of sacrifices and other things. Following in the footsteps of Jaimini, Kṛṣṇa Yajvan lays down four means such as *tatprakhyā*, *tadvyapadeśas*, *yaugika* (etymology) and *vākyabheda* (syntactical split) in determining the proper names. Each and every category has been brought out with suitable illustration for the clear understanding of this technical subject.

(E17-22 T50-54)"The exact nature of *arthavāda* texts and their useful character have been pointed out by the author. Here the four-fold classification is described and exemplified. Kṛṣṇa Yajvan, in the course of discussion, make it clear that the *arthavādas* not only serve the purpose of commending the act already enjoined by injunctive texts but they also help in the solution of doubtful cases.

"The author now proceeds to determine the concept of *mantra*. According to him, the utility of the *mantra* lies in the understanding of the meaning coupled with the result but not unseen merit, as the entire Veda is regarded as useful by the injunction of Vedic study. The arguments advanced by the *pūrvapakṣin* as well as the final conclusion have been dealt with by the author. It has been laid down that the *mantras* have their application in relation to their respective meanings. The author points out that the *vinīyoga* or application is equivalent to something related subserviently. In this connection the *parisāṃkhyāvidhi* or preclusive injunction as well as its three faults has been shown with instances. The author discards the use for such *parisāṃkhyā* if there is another way of not resorting to the same.

"In a similar manner *vikalpa* or option forms the subject of discussion. As a rule option is not permissible except under strict necessity, because its acceptance gives rise to eight undesirable contingencies. Here the typical instance of option

between *yava* and *vṛhi*, both of which are optional alternatives, has been discussed. The subject of *bādha* or exclusion naturally follows which is generally expressed by the negative term. The author holds the view that the negative term in the text '*Sodaśin* should not be held at the *atirātra*' does not signify exception, on the other hand it has been made a matter of option. There are two classes of option - *vyavasthita* (restricted), where among the alternatives there is a limit of restriction, and *avyavasthita* (unrestricted), where there is no such restriction of result. Thus the author concludes that the injunctive texts, the *nāmadheyas* and the *arthavādas*, being held as authoritative the authenticity of the Veda with regard to the transcendental *dharma* and *adharmā* is fully established.

(E -22 T54-58) "Kṛṣṇa Yajvan then deals with the authoritativeness of *smṛti* texts. In his opinion the *smṛti* is to be regarded as authoritative only insofar as is based upon and derives its authority from the Veda. Likewise, the usage of good people is held to be authoritative through the *smṛti* text which in its turn is based on the Veda itself. In this way the author lays down the authority of Veda, *smṛti* and custom with relation to *dharma* and *adharmā*.

"The celebrated author next enumerates the six means of differentiation among acts. They are (1) different words (*śābdāntara*), (2) repetition (*abhyāsa*), (3) number (*saṃkhyā*), (4) name (*saṃjñā*), (5) accessory details (*guṇa*) and (6) different context (*prakaraṇāntara*). All the above six types have been shown with specific instances with a view to bringing out their distinguishing traits.

"The three-fold classification of cognizable acts forms the next topic of discussion. According to Kṛṣṇa Yajvan they are: *kratvartha* (sub-serving the purposes of an act), *puruṣārtha* (sub-serving the purposes of man) and *ubhayārtha* (sub-serving both the purposes). The three kinds of act have been exemplified which clearly brings out the difference existing among them. Under the category of *kratvartha* are included all those auxiliary acts that have their sole purpose in fulfilling the principal act itself, e.g., the *prayājas* which are auxiliary to the *darśapūrnamāsa* sacrifices, while to the category of *puruṣārtha* belong all the principal sacrifices like the *darśapūrnamāsa*, as these lead to results desired by the agent. There are certain things which have been regarded as both *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha*; for instance, the curd is, in one case, mentioned only as a substance to be offered at a sacrifice, but in another,

it is mentioned as a substance to be offered for obtaining efficient sense-organs.

(E 22-23; T58-60) "In view of the multiplicity of principal and subsidiary acts some kind of sequence should be resorted to in their performance. The concluding topic of the *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā* relates to this sequential order which goes by the name of *krama*. There are six means by which the sequential order among sacrificial acts is determined. They are (1) *śruti* (direct assertion), (2) *artha* (purpose), (3) *pāṭha* (verbal text), (4) *sthāna* (place), (5) *mukhya* (principal) and (6) *pravṛtti* (commencement). All the six means have been illustrated by the author with the help of suitable instances. In his opinion, the performance of a sacrificial act should be done in the above sequence; if one perform them otherwise it will lead to futile result.

102 RĀGHAVĀNANDA SARASVATĪ (1750)

See Volume Twelve of this Encyclopedia, pp. 232-294, for information on him. He is the author of *Maṇiprabhāvṛtti* on Patañjali's *Yogasūtras*, summarized there.

102.1 RĀGHAVĀNANDA SARASVATĪ, *Pramānastavaka* (cf. Ben. 100; Hall, p. 188 for mss. cites.)

102.2 RĀGHAVĀNANDA SARASVATĪ, *Dīdhiti* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* (cf. IO 1458; L. 1991; K. 110 for mss. cites.)

103 CAṆDEŚVARA VĀCASPATĪ (1750)

103.1 CAṆDEŚVARA VĀCASPATĪ, *Tattvabodhinī* (NCat VIII, 56)

104. UDAYA PŪJYAPĀDA (1750?)

From Malabar, says Ramulu, p. x, who provides the date.

104.1 UDAYA PŪJYAPĀDA, *Adhikaranaślokaṛthadīpikā*
A Prābhākara work, according to Ramulu, p. x.

105 MUDGALA BHATTA (1760)

105.1 MUDGALA BHATTA, *Bhāvakaḥpalatā* on Maṇḍana Miśra's *Bhāvanāviveka* (cf. SB 418; NW 522; Hall, p. 140)

106 BHĀSKARARĀYA (1700)

VARs p. 140: "To the beginning of the 18th century belonged Bhāskaraṛāya, the son of Gambīraṛāya...Bhāskaraṛāya seems to have been a prolific writer. Among his other works mention may be made of this commentary on the *Lalitāśahasranāma* and his *Vaidikakośa* with his *Vṛtti*."

106.1 BHĀSKARARĀYA, *Bhāttacandrodaya* on Khaṇḍadeva's *Bhāttadīpikā*

SSSastri 1952, p. xiv: "This commentary is by the well known writer and foremost expositor of Śākta cult Bhāskaraṛāya of the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries. The *Bhāttacandrodaya* has not been published. A manuscript of it comprising Chapters I and II is available in the Adyar Library.

106.2 BHĀSKARARĀYA, *Candrikā* on Jaimini's *Sankarśakāṇḍasūtras*

VARs p. 140 says that it gives "only the *pūrvapakṣa* and *śiddhānta* views briefly", and that it is published in The Pandit.

106.3 BHĀSKARARĀYA, *Natvārthakajñānavicāra*

VARs p. 140 says "it is also believed that he [Bhāskaraṛāya] is the author of a paper" with this title.

107 VĪRARĀGHAVĀCĀRYA BĀLASARASVATĪ (1750)

107.1 VĪRARĀGHAVĀCĀRYA BĀLASARASVATĪ,
Dīpikā on Vedānta Deśika's *Mīmāṃsāpaduka* (?)

108 VASUDEVA DĪKṢITA (1750)

VARs p. 141: "He was the son of Adhvaryu Mahādevavājapeyin by Annapurnā. Mahādevavājapeyin was the *adhvaryu* (one of the four chief priests) in the sacrifices performed by Tryambakarāyamakhi, the famous minister of King Sāhaji d. A.D.1684-1710) and by Anandarāyamakhin, the well-known minister and Dalavoy of the Mahratha kings of

Tanjore-Serofji I and Tukkoji (Tulaja I) between c. A.D.1711-1735."

VARs p. 143: "Among his other works, mention may be made of (i) the *Bālamānoramā*, a good and exhaustive commentary on the *Siddhāntakaumudī*, and (2) the *Bodhāyanaśrautasūtravyākhyā*."

108.1 VĀSUDEVA DĪKṢITA, *Kutūhalavṛtti* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

VARs pp.141-142: "A voluminous and polemic commentary on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* on the model of the *Bhāṭṭakastubha* of Khandadevamīśra; and this marks the last of the series of this kind of commentary in the history of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system. Very frequently he quotes the *Śaṅkarsakāṇḍa sūtras* together with Devasvāmin's *Bhāṣya* thereon, which helps one considerably for the reconstruction of the lost *sūtras* of the *Śaṅkarsakāṇḍa*.

"In many places his interpretations of *sūtras* and Vedic passages differ considerably from those of the Vārttikakāra and his followers. His interpretation of the *svādhyāyavidhi* in the *Arthavadādhikarāna* (I.2.1) is a departure from those of his predecessors in the field. He says that the *svādhyāyavidhi* enjoins *vedādhyayana* not for *arthajñāna* but for *akṣaragrāhaṇa*; and he argues that if the former be the case, then all *traivarnikas* would not have the necessity of studying all portions of the Vedas, in view of the fact that a Brahmin has not the utility of the knowledge of the text dealing with the Rājasūya sacrifice which a *ksatriya* alone is allowed to perform. And he raises a technical objection to the fact that the *arthajñāna* is the *phala* (fruit) of the *svādhyāyavidhi*, i.e. that the *phala* would be that which is already known to us and that nobody would desire to get a thing which is not known to him. So, on the authority of the *puruṣārthānuśāsana sūtras* (quoted by Sāyanācārya in the Introduction to his *Rgvedasamhitābhāṣya*) and of the *śruti* cited by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*, he concludes that the injunction to study enjoins study for *akṣaraprajñā*, and that the *arthajñāna* is also made an everlasting requirement by the *smṛtis* like '*sthānurayam bhāvahārāḥ kilābhū*' which condemns the person who after committing the Vedic texts to memory does not understand the meaning of the Vedas, as a statue or pillar which bears a great burden on its head without knowing its nature and weight.

The work has been edited by P. N. Pattabhīrama Sastri in three volumes as *Samskritavidyapithagranthamala*, puspam 6 (Delhi 1969-1972).

Ujjwala Jha writes (UJha 2003, pp. 290-292: "The work consists of four volumes. This is a very useful, lucid and not very lengthy commentary on J(aimini's)S(ūtra).. Pattabhīrama Shastri, the editor of the work, states that the first volume of this work was once published in 1939. But the remaining three volumes have seen the light of the day only after Independence...

"...If one studies this work it becomes obvious that Vāsudeva Dikshita has done a great favor to the serious students and scholars of Mīmāṃsā alike by giving precise and root-oriented interpretation, explanation of the issue in question. Sometimes he follows the footsteps of the predecessors like Śabārasvāmin, sometimes he improves upon the *Bhāṣya*-comments by giving original references from different *vedāṅgas* like *śikṣā* etc.; and sometimes he reconciles among different contrary streams of thought in the system in such a way that all the contradiction is removed on the one hand and the system, without any harm to it, is developed and enriched further by the comments of Vasudeva on the other...

"An example of reconciling various contrary streams of thought with the system and arriving at an amicable solution may be cited as follows: Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Slokavārttika* has refuted yogic perception as a means of knowledge in no ambiguous words...

"The reason why Kumārila does not want to accept yogic perception is, if he so accepts it there would be nothing that would stop a *yogin* from perceiving *dharma* and thus the stand of Mīmāṃsā that *dharma* can be known only through the Vedas would be shaken. Kumārila cannot go for that, hence the refutation of yogic perception.

"Vāsudeva, here, clearly differing from Kumārila, has accepted yogic perception as a means of valid cognition on the one hand and by stating "*yoginām hi tatsāmarthyam nākāsmikam kintu dharmānuṣṭhānādeśa bhavati. Tatra na dharmjñānam vinā bhavati*" has kept the fundamentals of the system intact on the other. Because his statement clearly says that even *yogins* do not have any other way to know *dharma* than the Veda.

The work is edited in four volumes by Pattabhīrama Sastri, *Samskrita Vidyapitha Granthamala* 6-9, Delhi 1968-74.

And earlier edition is to be found in Sri Vani Vilas Series 1, Srirangam 1907.

109 GOPĀLA (BHATTA) ŚĀSTRIN (1750)

109.1 GOPĀLA (BHATTA) ŚĀSTRIN, *Dīpikā* on Kṛṣṇa Yajvan's *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*

110 MURARI MIŚRA II (1750)

McCrea 2008, p. 582: "We have no specific information on the date or location of this Murāri, but he is thoroughly familiar with Khandadeva...so he is probably no earlier than the mid-seventeenth century."

110.1 MURĀRI MIŚRA II, *Aṅgatvanirukti*

Edited in The Anandasrama Sanskrit Series Volume no 137, 1894; reprinted 1973. McCrea 2008, pp. 592-593 says (in part): "Murāri's work is unusual in that it is written in the full-fledged Navyanyāya style which...is almost never the case even with Mīmāṃsā works that are styled as 'navya'...The *Aṅgatvanirukti* deals primarily with the formulation, criticism and progressive refinement of definitions—specifically, definitions of 'subordinateness' itself, of *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha* ('for the sake of the sacrifice' and 'for the sake of the person'—the two basic categories of subordinate elements dealt with in Mīmāṃsā, and of the six means for determining subordination recognized by the Mīmāṃsakas. For each of the terms in question, Murāri typically cites the definitions given by the 'Old' and the 'New' Mīmāṃsikas—the 'old' definitions generally drawn from Pārthasārathi, the latter invariably from Khandadeva—and proceeds to reveal the inadequacies of each. He then offers a reformed definition of his own, which avoids the difficulties he finds in those given previously.

111 RĀMAKṚSNA DĪKSITA or BHATTA (1700-1770)

Ramulu, p. xiv, says this author is from Malwa and gives the dates. Cf. #991 of Bib 3. VARS pp. 138-139: "His introductory verses give his genealogy. In the Malwa country on the northern bank of the Narmada (Revā) there flourished a Brahmin family of Parāśara gotra where was born one Śivadāsa

who was well-versed in the Vedas and *śāstras*. He had a son Mitraśarman who was much revered by the scholars of his day for his learning in all *śāstras* and for his magnanimous personality. He had in his turn a son called Janārdana, a great scholar and devotee of Visnu. This Janārdana begot a son Bhairava by his wife Gaṅgā. This Bhairava was much patronized by the contemporary king of Śeṣavaṃśa. From him and Pūmadevī was born Nārāyaṇa who also was a reputed scholar in *śāstras* and was patronized by the contemporary kings. He had by his wife Ramā a son called Mādhava who is said to have left his native place for Benares for his education. There he had by his wife Prabāvatī a son called Rāmakṛṣṇa (our author) who was much devoted to his parents and was known as an adept in all the *śāstras*. He got the title 'Bhatta' in an assembly of learned pandits and citizens and he made a name for himself by writing many works. By the composition of his *Pratāpamārtanda* he got the title Panditśramani from Balabhadra, the preceptor of the then King (of Benares) in the *Gajapatisadas*. He says also that he wrote his commentary on the *Śāstradīpikā* (*Tarkapāda* only) in view of the fact that no commentary had been so far written on it."

111.1 RĀMAKṚSNA BHATTA, *Yuktisnehaprapurāṇī* or *Siddhāntadīpikā* on Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Śāstradīpikā*

Edited by Dharmadatta (Baccha) Jha, Bombay 1915 (reprinted Varanasi 1988), and again by L. S. Dravida in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 43, 1916.

VARs p. 139: "His commentary—*Yuktisnehaprapurāṇī*—with his own *Tīkā* (gloss) elucidates the text of the *Tarkapāda* of the *Śāstradīpikā*; in addition, it quotes Uṃveka, Bhartrmitra—two obscure and generally unknown authors in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā *śāstra*. It refers to the *Brhattīkā* as belonging to the Vārttikakāra. It helps considerably in the establishment of the view that the *Vrtti grantha* in the Śabarabhāṣya on I.1.5 extends from the end of the *Bhāṣya* thereon. It quotes profusely from Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* and from Sucaritamīśra's *Kāśikā*."

112 BĀLAMBHATTA (1725-1775)

#1325 in Bib. Ramulu says he's from Andhra. The dates are Ramulu's.

112.1 BĀLAMBHATTA, *Piṣṭapaśu*
Ramulu, p. xiv, cites this work as available in manuscript

113 VEDĀNTĀCĀRYA (1800)

113.1 VEDĀNTĀCĀRYA, *Anumānasya*
prthakpramānyakhaṇḍana (NCat I, 210)

114 RĀMĀNUJA DĀSA (1810)

CONSULT *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 9, 1972, 75-76;
Daedalus 130.4, 2001, 179-206, *Journal of the American*
Academy of Religion 66.4, 1999, 955-938

114.1 RĀMĀNUJA DĀSA, *Tantranītilaharī* (N
Cat VIII, 89)

115 PAṬṬĀBHIRĀMA (1830)

His date is given as 1830. He also wrote on Nyāya. He
was a pupil of (Raya) Narasimha, whose date is around 1800.

115.1 PAṬṬĀBHIRĀMA, *Arthāloka* on Laugākṣi Bhāskara's
Arthasaṃgraha

116 VAÑCHEŚVARA YAJVAN or KUTTI KAVI (1830)

For a thorough review of this author's life, times and
works see P. V. Kane's "Vañcheśvara alias Kutti Kavi and his
contact with Patwardhan Sardars of the southern Maratha
country", first published in the *ABORI* 20, pp. 9-20, and
reprinted in *SILH* 2, pp. 499-511. SSSastri 1952, p. xiv says he
"flourished in Sahajirajapuram (Tiruvīsalur) in the Tanjore
District between 1780 and 1866 A.D.

116.1 VAÑCHEŚVARA YAJVAN, *Bhāttacintāmaṇi* on
Khaṇḍadeva's *Bhāttadīpikā*

This seems to be the only work by this author dealing
with Mīmāṃsā. It is edited by Venkatasubrahmanya Sastri,
Madras: Law Journal Press, 1934. Kane (ibid., p. 499, fn. 4)
adds "Vide my critical review of this edition in the *ABORI* Vol.
XVII, 1936, pp. 400-405... This edition is based on a single Ms.
of the commentary in the possession of Mahāmahopādhyāya

Veṅkata Subrahmanya Shastri of Madras (died 1928) who was
the son of the daughter of Vañcheśvara, the author of the
Bhāttacintāmaṇi." According to SSSastri 1952 it is available
only up to the beginning of the *Nīvitapāda* (IIIa).

117 ŚĪTIKANTHA (1841) or RAMEŚVARA (ŚIVAYOGIN

Umesh Mishra, in his "Critical Bibliography" in
Ganganatha Jha's *Purvamīmāṃsā in its Sources*, pp. 68-69, tell
us "Rāmeśvara was the son of Subrahmanya. He lived at
Benares and wrote a *Vṛtti*, called *Vihāravāpi*, on the
Mīmāṃsakasūtras in 1763 śaka, that is, 1841 A. D. He should
be identified with the author of the *Arthasaṃgraha-Kaumudī*,
a commentary on the *Arthasaṃgraha* of Bhāskara. So, he was
the pupil of Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī and grand-pupil of
Guṇacandra Sarasvatī..."

"It appears that there lived at Benares a Pandita, named
Śītikantha, who wrote a commentary (*vṛtti*), called *Subodhinī*.
on the Jaiminīyasūtras which was published in The Pandit. This
author, later on, became a *dandī-sannyāsi* and became popular
as Rāmeśvara. The late Babu Govind Das of Benares says in a
note that 'he was the author of the *Arthasaṃgrahaṭīkā* also.
(He) was a *sannyāsi* (*dandī*) and lived in the *matha* just behind
my garden in which my tutor Paṇḍit Hari Sasrti Manekar spent
the later portion of his life. Śītikantha was probably his
pūrvāśrama name, while Rāmeśvara was his later name. Now,
this *Subodhinī* was written at Benares in 1761 śaka, that is,
1869 A.D. [Mishra provides the concluding verses as evidence.]
Again, the author says at the end of the tenth chapter that the
book was complete in 1758 śaka, that is, 1836 A.D. So, he says
at the end of the eleventh chapter also. From the dates and
their place of residence, it appears that the author of the
Vihāravāpi is the same as the author of the *Subodhinī*..."

117.1 ŚĪTIKANTHA, *Kaumudī* on Laugākṣi Bhāskara's
Arthasaṃgraha

It has been edited many times. See Bibliography
e1236.1: 4, 7-8, 10, 12, 12.1. [E.g. B132. M5 L2813 1931]

117.2 ŚĪTIKANTHA, *Subodhinī* on Jaiminī's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*
See the passage by Umesh Mishra quoted above.

118 GOVINDĀMRTA or DEVENDRA SARASVATĪ (1850)

118.1 GOVINDĀMRTA, *Vivarana* on Śabara's *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya* (NCat VI, 212; IX, 159)

119 MUKUNDĀNANDA YATI (1850?)

From Kerala, says Ramulu, p. xiv, who provides the estimated date.

119.1 MUKUNDĀNANDA YATI, *Vyākhyā* on Cidānanda's *Nītitattvāvīrbhava*

See Ad IX, p. 100 for a manuscript citation

120 (MYSORE) ANANTĀCĀRYA or ANANTĀLVAN (1860)

A well-known writer on Nyaya, he is also called Anantādhvāra. Thangaswami, p. 270, gives his date as 1822, says he was a Viśiṣṭādvaita paṇḍit from Melkot, Mysore. He was the "author of many Viśiṣṭādvaita works, of the Śeṣārya family, resident of Yādavagiri or Melkote in Mysore, flourished in the court of Kṛṣṇarāja Wodaya III" (NCat I, p. 186).

120.1 (MYSORE) ANANTĀCĀRYA, *Vidhisudhākara*

A collection of the author's works has been published, edited by P. T. Narasimha Iyengar, at least twice, the first time in Vedantavadavali Series 1-2, Bangalore 1898-99. This work is included. Cf. also NCat I, 187.

121 GARUDĀDHVAJA (1860)

Ramulu, p. xiv, says he's from the "South".

121.1 GARUDĀDHVAJA, *Tantrasiddhāntasamgraha* (NCat VIII, 102)

Ramulu, p. xiv, ascribes a work with this title to "Annu Śāstrī", says he's from Paralam. Is this another name for Garudādhvāja.

121.2 GARUDĀDHVAJA, *Vijayasamgrahadīpikā*
Cf. Ramulu, p. xiv.

122 MADANA MOHĀNA PĀTHAKA (1875)

122.1 MADANA MOHĀNA PĀTHAKA, *Tippanī* on Āpadeva II's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*

122.2 MADANA MOHĀNA PĀTHAKA, *Tippanī* on Vaidyanātha's *Nyāyabindu*

123 KṚṢṆANĀTHA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA BHATTĀCĀRYA (1892)

123.1 KṚṢṆANĀTHA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA BHATTĀCĀRYA, *Pratīpādakā* on Laugākṣi Bhāskara's *Arthasamgraha*

123.2 KṚṢṆANĀTHA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA BHATTĀCĀRYA, Commentary on Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*

124 JĪVĀNANDA VIDYĀSĀGARA (1897)

This versatile commentator is found at Bib 3, #1597. He edited several works on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika CF. FOR REFS.

124.1 JĪVĀNANDA VIDYĀSĀGARA, Commentary on Laugākṣi Bhāskara's *Arthasamgraha*
Published from Calcutta 1874 and again 1901.

125 ĀRYA MUNI (1906)

125.1 ĀRYA MUNI, *Mīmāṃsāryabhāṣya* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

Partly edited in two volumes through Adhyayā 3, Pāda 8 from Harayana Sahitya Samsthana, Delhi 1977

126 A. CINNASVĀMI ŚĀSTRĪ (1910)

From Madras, says Ramulu, p. xiv. He is #1696 of Bib 3.

126.1 A. CINNASVĀMI ŚĀSTRĪ, *Sāravivecanī* on Āpadeva II's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*
S. G. Moghe has compared this commentary with

another written at about the same time by V. S. Abhyankar in Baratiya Vidya 40.2-3, 1980, 95-100.

127 NITYĀNANDA (1915)

127.1 NITYĀNANDA (1915), *Laghutipañī* on Kṛṣṇa Yajvan's *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*

128 SUDARŚANĀCĀRYA PAÑJABI (1924)

This author wrote a work on Ramānuja, published in 1924.

128.1 SUDARŚANĀCĀRYA PAÑJABI, *Prakāśa* on Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Śāstrādīpikā*

129 RĀMA SUBRAHMANYA or ŚUBHA ŚĀSTRIN (1927)

SSSastri 1952, p. xv says he is "of the same Tiruviśālūr [ās Vañcheśvara Kavi, see #121 above]

129.1 RĀMA SUBRAHMANYA, *Kalpataru* on Khandadeva's *Bhāttadīpikā*

"A part of this gloss was published by the author himself" (SSSastri 1952, p. xv).

130 VĀSUDEVA ŚĀSTRIN ABHYAÑKAR (1929)

Panse 2003, pp. 126-127, offers the following: "Mm. Vasudevashastri Abhyankar was born at Satara in Maharashtra on 4th August 1863. He came to Pune in 1890 and since then he taught and served the cause of Sanskrit continuously for more than five decades. He died in 1942.

"He has contributed to Vedānta and also to grammar. He has contributed to Sāhityaśāstra and also to the systems of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Dharmasūtra.

130.1 VĀSUDEVA ŚĀSTRIN ABHYAÑKAR, *Prabhā* on Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*

Ms. Panse (Panse 2003) provides a few passages in Sanskrit mixed with an English exposition. Here are selections:

"This commentary elaborates the ritual context of a certain sentence - it gives appropriate examples of certain principles and thus gives the light, *prabhā*, to the student who is groping in the dark and dense jungle of Pūrvamīmāṃsā... While doing this he has used the language of Navyanyāya in a very palatable way which makes the discussion precise and unambiguous.

"In his illuminating introduction to the commentary, he has touched upon almost all the points that he has dealt with in the commentary. The main thing here is that the whole Veda is authoritative as it conveys some meaning or the other. No syllable of the Veda can be found meaningless because the *svādhyāyavidhi* prescribes the study of the whole of the Veda and not of the part of it. Now the task of the Mīmāṃsakas is to show how the whole Veda, i.e. *vidhi*, *mantra*, *nāmadheya* etc., all are purposeful and meaningful.

"To decide this i.e. the way in which any given Vedic sentence is purposeful is called following the *nyāyas* i.e. maxims. What is this following of *nyāyas*? It is nothing but an attempt to avoid the faults in understanding a sentence. But then what are the faults? One must know them in order to avoid them. Mm. Vasudevashastri has recorded twenty such faults in understanding a sentence's meaning. Avoiding these faults necessarily as far as possible is called *nyāyanusarana*.

"All these faults he has explained in detail in the text of the commentary whenever the occasion of such a discussion is there: e.g. in connection with the interpretation of the sentence 'somena yajeta', Āpadeva has mentioned that it is not possible to connect the *yāga* with *bhāvanā* as something to be achieved (*sādhyā*) when it is actually connected with the *bhāvanā* as its instrument (*sādhana*), because if we do so the fault of *viruddhātrikadvaya* will be the result...

"He also at many a place has brought out the difference between two *doṣas* and also has explained which of the two faults is major and which is minor. Needless to say, it is the contention of the Mīmāṃsakas that if a fault is unavoidable then the minor fault should be allowed. Also there is another theory (maxim) corresponding to this one that if a fault is to be accepted as there is no other way out then it should be accepted in a subordinate element (of a sentence); e.g. If there is a likelihood of the occurrence of two faults simultaneously such as *matvarthalakṣaṇā* and *vākyabheda* then *lakṣaṇā* is to be resorted to if there is no other way but never *vākyabheda* as

vākyabheda is a major fault. It concerns the whole sentence and *matvartalakṣanā* is a minor one as it concerns a word which is just a part of the whole sentence.

See also the article comparing the commentary of this writer with that of A. Cinnasvami Sastri noted above (140A.1).

131 GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ (1871-1941)

Better known, perhaps, for his work in Nyāya; see the Volume of this Encyclopedia (to come) under his name for a lengthy account.

131.1 GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, *Maṇḍana* on Maṇḍana Miśra's *Mīmāṃsānukrāmanikā*

131.2 GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, *Prabhākarapradīpa* (NCat V, 208)

131.3 GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, Commentary on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

132 PRAMATHANĀTHA TARKABHŪṢANA (1865-1944)

According to Umesh Mishra, Pramathanatha was the youngest son of Tarkācarana Tarkaratna, who was the younger brother of Rakhaldāsa Bhaṭṭācārya Nyāyaratna. "He lived at Kāśī and was a *sabhāpandita* of Kāśīrāja Mahārāja of Benares...After some time he left for Calcutta where he was a Professor in the Government Sanskrit College. He...has translated some Vedānta works, like *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* of Vidyāraṇya into Bengali". (UM p. 451).

Details of the career of this well-known Professor at various universities in India are described in Volume Four of this Encyclopedia, p. 473, where the dates of his birth and death are also given. Also find there (pp. 473-486) a summary by Kalidas Bhattacharya of Pramathanātha's *Amalā* on Aniruddha's *Sāmkhyasūtravṛtti*.

Simha 1993, pp. 51-52: "Pramatha Nātha was appointed Professor of Smṛti in the Sanskrit College in 1898. He was attached to the post-graduate class of the Calcutta University when it was first opened. He retired from the Sanskrit College in 1922. In 1923, he was appointed Head of the Oriental Studies of the Hindu University, Benares.

"The Government of India conferred on him the title Mahāmadhopādhyāya in recognition of his outstanding scholarship. In 1942 he got the D. Litt. degree of the Benares Hindu University. He was connected with many learned societies. He was elected president of the 9th session of the Baṅgīya Sammilāna. From 1331 to 1333 B. S. [1924-1926 A.D.] he was the President of [the] Sanskrit Sahitya Parishad. He was elected President of the All India Association of Oriental Learning held in Tirupati in 1940. In 1335 B. S. [1928 A.D.] he became the President of the Hindu Association held on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha of Mymensingh where he pointed out the necessity of reforming Hindu social customs and religious rites. He co-operated with Madana Mohāna Mahaviya in his attempt to improve the condition of the depressed class. But the conservative section of the Hindus made a serious agitation against it. Pandit Pramathanath died on 22 May, 1944 at Benares."

132.1 PRAMATHANĀTHA TARKABHŪṢANA, *Amalā* on Laugākṣi Bhāskara's *Arthasaṅgraha*

133 N. S. ANANTAKRṢNA ŚĀSTRIN (1946)

133.1 N. S. ANANTAKRṢNA ŚĀSTRIN, *Mīmāṃsāśāstrasāra* or *Mīmāṃsāsiddhāntatattvārthaprakāśikā*

134 HARIHARA KR PALU DVIVEDIN (1946)

Works are published that are edited by this writer as late as 1946.

134.1 HARIHARA KR PALU DVIVEDIN, *Kalpalatikā* on the *Tarkapāda* of Śabara's *Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya*

135 (PERI) SŪRYANĀRĀYANA ŚĀSTRĪ (1950)

K. T. Pandurangi, in KSTS 1985, p. xx, identifies him as "of Rajamahendri...He was born on August 20, 1910 at Pedanandipalli Agraharam-Vizianagaram District in Andhrapradesh. He studied Vyākaraṇaśāstra under Peri Venkatesvara Sastri Vijayanagaram and Tata Subbaraya Sastri deeply. He joined the Oriental College Rajamahendri as

Vyākaraṇa paṇḍita, teaching a number of batches for over thirty years...He has written a commentary on *Vyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* of Kaundabhaṭṭa and *Laghumañjūsā* of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa."

135.1 SŪRYANĀRĀYANA ŚĀSTRĪ, *Bhāvaprakāśikā* on Khaṇḍadeva's *Bhaṭṭarahasya*

This commentary is printed in his edition of the text, Rajahmundry 1985, the volume which is introduced in KSTS 1985.

136.1 RĀJA NĀRĀYANA ŚŪKLA (1954), *Vidhi* on Laugākṣi Bhāskara's *Arthasaṃgraha*

137.1 A. CHATTERJEE (1956), *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*

138 VĀCASPATI UPĀDHYĀYA (1970)
He was publishing works up to 1981, at least.

138.1 VĀCASPATI UPĀDHYĀYA, *Mīmāṃsādarśanavimarsā*
Ujjwala Jha (UJha 2003, p. 282, says of this work: "Published in 1976 from New Delhi. This book is divided into seven chapters...It is obvious from the topics discussed in the book that the author has tried to sum up the philosophical as well as epistemological doctrines and contributions of the Mīmāṃsā system."

139 (UTTAMUR) T. VĪRARĀGHAVĀCĀRYA (1975)
This author will be discussed at length in the forthcoming Volume on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to the present.

139.1 T. VĪRARĀGHAVĀCĀRYA, *Mīmāṃsāsudhāsvāda* on Āpadeva II's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*

140.1 KEVALĀNANDA SARASVATĪ (1976), *Mīmāṃsākośa*
This mammoth work, in seven volumes, was published from Wai between 1962 and 1966.

141.1 NAVALPAKKAM DEVANĀTHĀCĀRYA (1978), *Phalavatī* on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*

142 MAHĀPRABHULĀLA GOSVĀMI (1984)
Works were being edited by this writer until at least 1993.

142.1 MAHĀPRABHULĀLA GOSVĀMIN, *Bhāvaprakāśikā* on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*

143 DEVANĀTHA TĀTĀCĀRYA (1896-1988)
cf. #208 of Nyaya.

143.1 DEVANĀTHA TĀTĀCĀRYA, *Pariskara* on Kṛṣṇa Yajvan's *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*
Published Kumbhakonam 1919.

143.2 DEVANĀTHA TĀTĀCĀRYA, *Mīmāṃsābhyudaya*
Ramulul, p. xiv, says it is available in manuscript.3

144. K. VARADĀCĀRYA (1991), *Śāstrāloka*

144.1 K. VARADĀCĀRYA, *Bhūṣaṇa* on Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*

145. PATTĀBHIRĀMA ŚĀSTRIN (2000)
Of Varanasi.

145.1 PATTĀBHIRĀMA ŚĀSTRIN, *Mīmāṃsānyāyamañjarī*
Published in three volumes, 1984, 1992 and ?. In UJha 2003 some remarks are provided in appreciation of this work. "One main difficulty in studying P[ūrva]M[īmāṃsā] that a novice faces is even if there are introductory manuals of *prakaraṇa granthas* on PM, they, being full of the technical terminology, are not very easy to grasp. Moreover, while explaining the system, these manuals do not follow the same order of the Jaiminisūtras (JS) and hence one does not feel himself or herself well equipped to enter the *ākara*-texts of PM even after studying the manuals. If one decides to read the

Śabarabhāṣya (ŚBh), he cannot understand the same without the help of Kumārila's *Vārtika*, which is too elaborate at times for a student with less patience.

"To rule out this difficulty and to fill up the deficiency, M. M. Pattabhīrama Śaṣtri of Varanasi has brought out *Mīmāṃsānyāyamañjarī* which is a lucid and timely exposition of [the] *Mīmāṃsā* of Jaimini. (The first volume of this work was published in 1984 and the second in 1992. I could not trace the third one.) In this work the Śaṣtri has given the exposition of the twelve chapters of JS and ŚBh in the simplest possible way to make the modern students understand PM in its very sources.

146. A. YAJÑARĀMULU (2000)

From Hyderabad. This author has also published a volume studying Mādhavācārya's *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvīstara*.

146.1 A. YAJÑARĀMULU, *Pūrvamīmāṃsābhāṣyavārtikayoḥ matabhedāpyayanam*

Ujjwala Jha (UJha 2003): "First published in 1993, as the title says, the author has tried to bring out the places where Kumārila differs from the *bhāṣyakāra* while writing his *Vārtika*...Kumārila has differed from the *Bhāṣyakāra* in quite a number of places."

"The style that the author has adopted is like this: first he gives the opinion of the *Bhāṣyakāra* regarding a certain issue. Then he shows how Kumārila differs from him and lastly he also gives information regarding the followers of Kumārila like Pārthasārathi Mīśra, Mādhavācārya and Khaṇḍadeva. Here he specifies who have accepted whose view..."

147.1 R. THANGASVĀMI ŚARMA (2000), *Mīmāṃsāmañjarī*

Noted by Ujjwala Jha (UJha 2003, p. 294), who says it is published by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi 1996.

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GLOSSARY-INDEX

The following Index attempts to provide a guide to references to names, titles and topics. It also indicates which Sanskrit words are likely to be translated by which English expressions, and vice versa. Page references in bold face indicate the primary citation of the author or work.

- abhāva*, see absence; negation; non-existence; non-reality
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